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EDITOR'S NOTE
As technology changes our world and opens new avenues for educa-
tion, entertainment and virtually every facet of our lives, we are forced to
adapt our lifestyles in response to take advantage of these new opportuni-
ties. In particular, the area of computer technology continues to develop
more quickly than most. In the last decade, computers have become com-
monplace in our schools, homes and offices. As a result, we have come to
learn new skills that are specific to these devices themselves. Perhaps the
most obvious of these skills concern the use of the software programs
which we use.
While it is important for us to learn new skills to apply these technolo-
gies in our everyday lives, it is equally important for attorneys to recognize
the legal implications raised by these new technologies. One rapidly de-
veloping area of the law that addresses some of these developments is the
field of computer law.
This symposium issue offers a variety of articles that focus specifically
on software issues in computer law. Hopefully, it will be of interest to not
only one well-versed in the field of computer law, but also to those who
wish to become familiar with this rapidly developing area of the law. I
would like to thank the contributing authors and members of the Denver
University Law Review for their efforts in writing and preparing the issue.
In particular, I would like to thank Maria Woods, Marty Paluch, Zeke Wil-
liams, Brian Lewandowski, Eden Steele, Leslie Kramer, Don Quigley and
Cindy McNeill for making this such an enjoyable experience.
William F Vobach
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Since the advent of microelectronic technology, businesses-whether
organized as large corporations or sole proprietorships-have increasingly
utilized computers to perform countless functions. Businesses invest con-
siderable resources in the development of complex data bases1 and com-
puter software 2 designed to manage the underlying data. As a result, data
bases and software often represent substantial business assets.5 The utiliza-
tion of complex data bases inspires the creation and exploitation of pro-
prietary software, which are computer programs designed or modified for
a specific business entity and purpose.
4
Whether the business utilizes commercial or proprietary packages,
each of the three principle software components-the process, the pro-
gram, and the documentation-represents significant investments of engi-
neering, scientific, and writing skills. 5 Business decision-makers and
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1. Data bases are "[bodies] of information organized in a logical manner such that
[they] can be accessed either randomly and selectively or sequentially by a computer." Robert
C. Dorr & William P. Eigles, Resolving Claims to Ownership of Software and Computer-Stored
Data-The Importance of Temporary Restraining Orders and Preliminary Injunctions, 5 COMPUTER/
L.J. 1, 6 (1984).
2. Although commentators recognize that the term "computer software" is not precise,
a well-accepted definition suggests that the following three elements comprise computer
software: (1) the underlying process or "algorithm" upon which the program is based; (2)
the program itself coded in a programming language; and (3) the supporting documenta-
tion, including items such as flow-charts, instruction manuals, and other materials that ex-
plain the operation of the program. Michael S. Keplinger, Computer Software-Its Nature and
Its Protection, 30 EMORY LJ. 483, 484-85 (1981) (citing WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGAN-
IZATION, Pua. No. 814-E, MODEL PROVISIONS ON THE PROTECTION OF COMPUTER SOFrWARE
(1978) [hereinafter MODEL PROVISIONS]). The Supreme Court has defined an algorithm as a
"procedure for solving a given type of mathematical problem." Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S.
175, 186 (1981).
3. Jerry R. Selinger, Protecting Computer Software in the Business Environment: Patents, Copy-
rights and Trade Secrets, 3J.L & CoM. 65, 65 (1983).
4. Id.
5. Keplinger, supra note 2, at 486.
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corporate counsel must therefore prepare business and legal plans that
consider the investments made in each of these categories and select legal
mechanisms designed to protect the investments. 6 In the event that the
selected means of protection fails, questions arise concerning "title" to the
software asset.
Software title issues, however, are not limited to claims of misappro-
priation. Specifically, in consideration of the expense associated with de-
veloping and operating proprietary systems, businesses must also establish
software ownership as a preventive measure. Software developers, licen-
sees, and other purported owners therefore regularly seek advice concern-
ing the question of software title. Moreover, although independent
designers fashion proprietary software packages, corporations also develop
proprietary software for internal use, with the potential for sale to third
parties.7 Questions of ownership thus arise from such activities as the
purchase and sale of a corporation or its assets and from legal audits that
reveal a potential conflict with respect to software title.
Computer software is comprised of both symbolic ideas and mechani-
cal objects.8 Unlike ownership disputes concerning real property or other
readily identifiable articles, conflicts involving computer software focus, to
some extent, on intangible property.9 Legal counsel must consider the
technical nature of computer software when selecting the appropriate
method of protecting the client's interest in the software. 10 The technical
complexities associated with computer software also cause problems when
purported software "owners" ask courts, which are consistently pressed for
time and generally unfamiliar with the intricacies of software issues, to re-
solve disputes concerning software title.
This Article considers whether quiet title and declaratory judgment
proceedings constitute effective means of determining ownership to com-
puter software. Section I describes the functions and limitations of three
conventional methods of safeguarding ownership rights to computer
software-patent, copyright, and trade secret protection. Section II sets
forth the factual context of disputes concerning the ownership of com-
puter software. The Article then presents, in Section III, the jurisdictional
6. Id.
7. Selinger, supra note 3, at 65.
8. For a detailed discussion of the "dual nature" of computer software, see Duncan M.
Davidson, Protecting Computer Software: A Comprehensive Analysis, 1983 Aiuz. ST. LJ. 611, 616
(1983); see also Raymond G. Areaux, Comment, Computer Software Protection: From Infancy to
Adolescence, 31 Loy. L. Rav. 301, 322 (1985) (noting the courts' confusion concerning the
dual nature of software). Moreover, as one commentator noted:
Technology has blurred the once-clear line between hardware and software with
"firmware," a hardware element, generally a semi-conductor chip, combined with
software, such as a program coded into the chip's memory matrix, to produce a
hybrid .... In their various forms, these devices perform a variety of functions,
from storing programs and memory for electronic games to speeding up the opera-
tion of a large mainframe.
Joseph E. Root III, Protecting Computer Software in the '80s: Practical Guidelines for Evolving Needs,
8 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. LJ. 205, 208 (1981) (citations omitted).
9. An in-depth presentation of the technical issues associated with computer software is
beyond the scope of this article.
10. See Areaux, supra note 8, at 322.
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and procedural issues associated with quiet tide actions. Section IV con-
siders the potential use and effectiveness of the declaratory judgment ac-
tion in computer software disputes. The Article concludes that the
declaratory judgment action and the quiet title action, as framed in the
jurisdictions allowing the procedure to encompass personal property
claims, present viable alternatives to resolving ownership disputes concern-
ing computer software.
I. TRADITIONAL METHODS OF PROTECTING COMPUTER SoFrWARE
Advocates for protecting computer software from misappropriation
or for otherwise clarifying title to software-whether the individual advo-
cate recommends patent, copyright, or trade secret protection-must ad-
dress an underlying policy question. 1 Simply stated, software developers
and other owners must determine which legal mechanism, or combina-
tion of mechanisms, 12 best protects their expensive technological invest-
ment without sacrificing incentives for future development or sanctioning
the anti-competitive protection of socially valuable ideas.13 Any appropri-
ate protective scheme must adequately balance the social interest in the
complete dissemination of technological information against the often
competing economic interest in protecting property against
misappropriation. 14
A. Patent Protection for Computer Software
1. Statutory Requirements and Jurisdiction
Patent law theoretically provides the broadest scope' 5 of protection
for computer software because patents encompass both the develop-
ment and use of the software product.1 6 Federal law essentially gives
the patentee a statutorily prescribed, seventeen-year monopoly on
11. Generally, intellectual property rights are, by nature, "negative rights" that allow
owners to prevent others from: (1) making, using, or selling the protected product (patent);
(2) copying the protected item (copyright); and (3) improperly obtaining secret business
information (trade secret).
As discussed below, patents and copyrights effectively license the software "owner" to
monopolize the use of the software product. In contrast, trade secret law protects confiden-
tial business information that provides a competitive advantage.
12. See David A. Einhorn, Copyright and Patent Protection for Computer Software: Are They
Mutually Exclusive, 30 IDEAJ.L. & TECH. 265 (1990) (stating that an analysis of relevant law
reveals no sound justification for denying joint patent and copyright protection for computer
software that is otherwise independently eligible for both forms of protection).
13. Davidson, supra note 8, at 634.
14. Areaux, supra note 8, at 311.
15. The broad scope of patent protection originates in the United States Constitution,
which empowered Congress "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by secur-
ing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writ-
ings and Discoveries." U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Congress invoked this power by enacting
patent statutes protecting inventors from the unauthorized use of their discoveries. 35
U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1988). The copyright statutes, as codified in 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1988),
protect the writings of authors.
16. Vibert L. Kesler & David E. Hardy, Legal Protection of Software in the United States: A
Status Report, 10 Irrr'L Bus. LAw. 266, 267 (1982); see Selinger, supra note 3, at 66.
19941
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the rights to make, use, or sell the patented invention.' 7 In order to
qualify for this protection, an invention must be "new and useful,"' 8
"novel," 19 and "non-obvious."20 In addition, the applicant must satisfy
several procedural requirements before the Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) will issue the requested patent.2 1 The federal
17. The statute provides in relevant part:
Every patent shall contain a short title of the invention and a grant to the patentee
•.. for the term of seventeen years... of the right to exclude others from making,
using, or selling the invention throughout the United States, and, if the invention is
a process, of the right to exclude others from using or selling throughout the
United States, or importing into the United States, products made by that process
35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988) (footnotes omitted). This statutory prohibition applies to "copyists"
and persons who independently conceive of the patented invention. Selinger, supra note 3,
at 66 (citing Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 490 (1974)).
18. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) provides that "[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful im-
provement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements
of this tide."
19. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1988) provides in part:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless-
(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or
described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention
thereof by the applicant for patent, or
(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or
a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year
prior to the date of application for patent in the United States, or
(c) he has abandoned the invention, or
(d) the invention was first patented or caused to be patented, or was the sub-
ject of an inventor's certificate, by the applicant... in a foreign country prior to the
date of the application for patent in this country on an application for patent or
inventor's certificate filed more than twelve months before the filing of the applica-
tion in the United States, or
(e) the invention was described in a patent granted on an application for pat-
ent by another filed in the United States before the invention thereof by the appli-
cant for patent... or
(f) he did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented, or
(g) before the applicant's invention thereof the invention was made in this
country by another ....
20. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988) provides in part:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed
or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the
subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject
matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a
person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.
21. 35 U.S.C. § 111 (1988) provides in part:
Application for patent shall be made, or authorized to be made, by the inven-
tor.., in writing to the Commissioner. Such application shall include (1) a specifi-
cation as prescribed by section 112 of this title; (2) a drawing as prescribed by
section 113 of this tide; and (3) an oath by the applicant as prescribed by section
115 of this tide. The application must be accompanied by the fee required by
law.... Upon failure to submit the fee and oath within [the] prescribed period, the
application shall be regarded as abandoned, unless it is shown.., that the delay in
submitting the fee and oath was unavoidable. The filing date of an application shall
be the date on which the specification and any required drawing are received in the
Patent and Trademark Office.
35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988) provides in relevant part:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of
the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and
exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with
which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the
best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(b), 113-15 (1988).
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Initially, software developers seeking patent protection for computer
software faced a seemingly insurmountable obstacle in the form of an
early determination by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
(CCPA) 24 and PTO that computer programs were unpatentable "mental
steps."25 The United States Supreme Court basically strengthened that
finding when it first visited the matter of the patentability of computer
software in 1972. In Gottschalk v. Benson,2 6 the Court held that a patent
claim relating to a method of converting one form of numerical represen-
tation to another was not a patentable "process" within the meaning of
Section 101 of the Patent Act.27 The patent claim was not limited to any
particular art, technology, machinery, or end use, and purportedly cov-
ered any use of the method in a general-purpose digital computer. 28 The
Court reasoned that a patent on the method of applying the algorithm
would "wholly preempt the mathematical formula and in practical effect
would be a patent on the algorithm itself."2 9 After Benson, the Supreme
Court issued two other opinions concerning software issues, Dann v. John-
ston3 ° and Parker v. F/ook,3 1 both of which made a significant impact on the
area of software patents.
22. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1988) provides that "[t]he district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents. ....
copyrights, and trademarks."
23. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1988) (patent infringement).
24. Prior to the creation of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in
1982, the CCPA was the federal appellate court maintaining jurisdiction over the Patent Of-
fice. Since the district courts and their respective circuit courts of appeals heard suits for
patent infringement, the non-uniformity of decisions in the circuits produced considerable
"forum shopping" and concomitant uncertainty. The creation of the Federal Circuit elimi-
nated conflicts between the circuits and reduced the need for Supreme Court certiorari re-
view. PETER B. MACGS ET AL., COMPUTER LAw: CASES-COMMENTs-QUESTIONS 186 (1992).
25. The "mental steps doctrine" provides that "claims to mental concepts which consti-
tute the very substance of an alleged invention are not patentable .... It is self-evident that
thought is not patentable." In re Abrams, 188 F.2d 165, 168 (C.C.P.A. 1951). In order to
circumvent the mental steps limitation, developers often acquired patent protection by unit-
ing the computer hardware and software components and claiming that the combination was
a patentable invention. Areaux, supra note 8, at 311.
26. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
27. Id. at 71-72. The claim in question related to a method for converting binary-coded
decimal numbers into equivalent pure binary numbers. Id. at 64-66.
28. Id. at 64. The Court stated that the applicants' process claim was "so abstract and
sweeping as to cover both known and unknown uses of the [conversion method]." Id. at 68.
29. Id. at 72. The Court expressly restricted its holding to the particular facts of the case
to avoid stating a general rule. Davidson, supra note 8, at 636; see Benson, 409 U.S. at 71 ("We
do not hold that no process patent could ever qualify if it did not meet the requirements of
our prior precedents .... We have, however, made clear from the start that we deal with a
program only for digital computers."). The Benson Court also relied on the Report of the
President's Commission on the Patent System, which cited the inability of the Patent Office
to examine program patent applications and recommended against the patentability of com-
puter programs. Benson, 409 U.S. at 72-73.
30. 425 U.S. 219 (1976). In Johnston, the Court reversed the CCPA, which found that
the bank record keeping system was patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Id. at
1994]
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The most recent Supreme Court case concerning an attempt to ob-
tain a process patent for an invention that could be implemented in whole
or in part by computer software involved a process for curing synthetic
rubber that utilized a mathematical formula and a programmed digital
computer. In the landmark case of Diamond v. Diehr,3 2 the Court reviewed
Benson and Hook and held that mathematical formulas alone do not war-
rant the protection of federal patent law,33 a principle which one could
not circumvent by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particu-
lar application.a
4
The Court concluded, however, that the Diehr applicants sought pat-
ent protection for an industrial process, not a mathematical formula.
3 5
The applicants argued that they only desired to foreclose others from the
use of the equation insofar as it was a part of the other steps in their
claimed process.3 6 The Supreme Court allowed the patent to issue and
established that claims which implement or apply mathematical formulas
in a process that, considered as a whole, performs a function that the pat-
ent laws were designed to protect, satisfy the requirements of Section 101
of the patent laws.
3 7
3. Patent Licensing
Not every patent owner retains the monopolistic rights in an inven-
tion for the statutorily protected seventeen-year-period. A patent owner
may enter into a license agreement, which formally evidences the com-
plete or partial surrender of the rights in the invention to the licensee.
3 8
Although a patent license agreement necessarily involves the application
230. The CCPA narrowly interpreted Benson by distinguishing apparatus claims from process
claims. See In reJohnston, 502 F.2d 765 (C.C.P.A. 1974). Over strong dissents, the CCPA
continued to narrowly construe Benson in subsequent program patent claims. See In re Chat-
field, 545 F.2d 152 (C.C.P.A. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977) (Benson only precluded
process inventions where the claim would preempt all uses of an algorithm or mathematical
formula); In re Noll, 545 F.2d 141 (C.C.PA 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977) (distin-
guishing apparatus claims from process claims). Without addressing the issue of whether the
program was patentable subject matter under Section 101, the Johnston Court disposed of the
case by holding that the invention was "obvious" and therefore unpatentable pursuant to
Section 103. Id. at 149.
31. 437 U.S. 584 (1978). In Rook, the patent applicant sought patent protection, pur-
portedly within the guidelines established in Benson, for a mathematical formula covering a
narrowly defined range of potential uses. The Court was presented with the specific question
of whether the identification of a limited category of useful, though conventional, "post-
solution" applications of a formula allowed patent protection. Id. at 585. The Court rejected
the applicant's argument that the identification of post-solution activity distinguished the
claim from Benson and determined that the only novelty was the algorithm. I1. at 586. Ac-
cording to the Court, "[t]he notion that post-solution activity, no matter how conventional or
obvious in itself, can transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable process exalts
form over substance." Id. at 590.
32. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
33. 1d. at 191.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 187.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 192.
38. See ROBERT C. DoRt & CHRISTOPHER H. MUNCH, PROTECTING TRADE SECRETS, PAT-
ENTS, CoPYRIGHTs, AND TRADEMAR S § 5.9, at 202 (1990) (defined in the context of copyright
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of the statutory rights to the underlying patent, such an agreement is not
grounded in statute.3 9 The patent license is a creature of common law
and remains governed by general principles of state contract law.
40
A patent owner may grant an exclusive or non-exclusive license. 4 1 An
agreement conveying exclusive rights to a transferee, short of an assign-
ment of full ownership, constitutes an "exclusive license."4 2 In contrast, a
"non-exclusive" patent license is generally issued to a number of different
entities43 and constitutes only an assurance of immunity from suit with
respect to acts completed within the scope of the license.
44
Whether a patent owner should grant an exclusive or non-exclusive
license depends on several factors, including the nature of the invention
and the extent to which the owner desires to market the product incorpo-
rating the patented invention. An exclusive license generally commands
higher payments or royalties,4 5 but over-all marketing conditions often
make the granting of several non-exclusive licenses desirable to the patent-
holder.
The patent licensor and licensee should both follow several practical
guidelines when entering a license agreement. First, prior to negotiations,
the licensor must investigate the financial and litigation history of the po-
tential licensee.4 6 Second, the licensor must offer a presentation of the
licensed subject matter, including the results of the patent search and a
copy of the patent application. 47 Third, the licensor must articulate its
goals for licensing in the context of the relevant product and geographical
markets. 48 Finally, the licensor should also clearly document performance
licenses). The license simply constitutes either an oral or written grant of permission to use
the otherwise exclusive work. Id.
39. RAYMOND C. NoaRnIrAus, PATENT LICENSE AGREEMENTS: LAW AND FoRMs 2 (1967).
40. Id. (citing L.L. Brown Paper Co. v. Hydroiloid, Inc., 32 F. Supp. 857, 868 (S.D.N.Y.
1939)).
41. Id. at 3; see DoRa & MUNCH, supra note 38, § 2.34, at 92. Although the most common
practice involves the grant of a license under an issued patent, a patent applicant may also
properly assign or license rights to an invention prior to issuance by the Patent and Trade-
mark Office. No.DnHAus, supra note 39, at 3.
42. HARRY R. MAYERs & BRIAN G. BRUNSVOLD, DRAFTING PATENT LICENSE AGREEMENTS 39
(2d ed. 1984). Cf DoRa & MUNCH, supra note 38, at 92 ("Exclusive licenses are akin to actual
assignments and, in some cases, an exclusive license may constitute an actual assignment of
the invention.").
43. DoiR & MUNCH, supra note 38, § 2.34, at 92.
44. MAYERs & BRUNSVOLD, supra note 42, at 31-32. The term "cross-license" describes a
reciprocal agreement in which (1) Party A grants a license to Party B and (2) at least part of
the consideration provided by Party B is a license to Party A under Party B's patents. Id. at 35.
The related term "package license" refers to the grant of rights associated with two or more
patents in a single license agreement. See genera//y NoRDHAus, supra note 39, at 29-38.
45. DoRR & MUNCH, supra note 38, at 92. In a patent license agreement, the licensor
may seek payment in the form of a lump sum, royalty, installments, or a combination of the
three. Id. at 93. Payments may also be tied to a number of factors including manufacturing
quality, sales to wholesalers, and retail sales. Id.
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standards and consider imposing penalties upon the failure of the licensee
to effectively exploit the market.
49
The licensee should also investigate several potential problem areas
before entering a license agreement. The licensee should conduct an in-
dependent patentability and infringement search and retain counsel to
analyze the results of the search and the entire PTO file of the patent.
50
The licensee should secure the relevant warranties of ownership and ob-
tain a clear definition of terms from the licensor, including the market,
territory and product specifications. 5 1 Finally, the licensee must review all
payment obligations and allow enough time to comply procedurally with
the payment terms.52 If the parties investigate these areas of concern and
document their respective expectations of performance prior to entering
the license agreement, they may successfully avoid, or at least reduce the
expenses of, subsequent litigation concerning the terms of the license.
53
4. Patent Summary
Although the Supreme Court has not specifically ruled on the patent-
ability of computer software, Diehr extended patent protection to the
processes underlying computer programs, provided that the algorithm
constitutes only part of the patentable invention. 54 It follows that software
owners may bring claims for patent infringement if the invention satisfies
the statutory criteria. Since the Court rarely addresses the patentability of
computer program inventions, however, the rulings of the Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit will continue to influence decisions by busi-
nesses concerning the appropriate means of protecting proprietary
software.5 5 Accordingly, attorneys should follow the practical guidelines
prepared by the PTO, which are derived from the holdings of the Federal
Circuit, concerning the patentability of mathematical algorithms and com-
puter programs.
56
49. See id. at 95-96 (setting forth several additional considerations relevant to the licens-
ing context).
50. Id. at 96.
51. d. at 97.
52. Id.
53. For detailed drafting considerations, see MAFvxs & BRUNSVOLD, supra note 42;
NORDHAus, supra note 39.
54. Id.; see aLso In re Bradley, 600 F.2d 807 (C.C.PA. 1979), afftd, 450 U.S. 381 (1981)
(recognizing a patent claim for software that enhanced the operation of a computer).
55. See Keplinger, supra note 2, at 492. Before a patent issues, and if no patent issues on
an application, the PTO holds the patent application in confidence. 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1988).
The disclosure requirements associated with issued patents, however, may reveal previously
protected trade secrets. The patent process, therefore, remains unattractive to software de-
velopers skeptical of a method whereby the protected information becomes available for pub-
lic inspection upon issuance. Kesler & Hardy, supra note 16, at 267.
56. See MAGcs ET AL., supra note 24, at 265.
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B. Copyright Protection for Computer Software
1. Statutory Requirements and Jurisdiction
Modern copyright protection developed from the common law right
of an author to receive the benefits derived from the first publication of
the work. By statute, the author of a copyrightable "writing" must register
the original work57 with the federal Copyright Office in accordance with
Sections 701 and 702 of the Copyright Act.5 8 The copyright grants the
author a limited monopoly59 on copying rights and other specified acts,
but does not preclude independent origination by another individual. 60
The copyright only protects the author's tangible expression; it does not
extend to underlying ideas, processes, systems, or methods of operation.
61
Using a common analogy for illustrative purposes, Leonardo da Vinci
would hold the exclusive rights to publish copies of the Mona Lisa. The
copyright protection, however, would extend only to the picture itself, not
the idea behind the painting. Another artist could publish a different in-
terpretation of the concept, and that publication would receive federal
copyright protection upon creation.
62
The author must also comply with several notice, deposit and registra-
tion requirements. 63 The author provides notice of the reservation of
rights by inscribing each copy of the work with the word "copyright" or the
symbol "©", accompanied by the author's name and date of reservation.64
The basic methodology of actually enforcing the licensed protection
under copyright law parallels that of patent law. A claim of copyright in-
fringement will not automatically invoke federal jurisdiction when the in-
57. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988 & Supp. III 1992). Although copyright in a work tech-
nically subsists upon creation, the copyright legislation provides significant incentives for re-
gistration. See 17 U.S.C. § 412 (infringer pays reasonable attorney's fees), § 504 (providing
statutory damages in lieu of actual damages), § 411 (copyright registration required before
author may initiate suit for infringement); see also Selinger, supra note 3, at 77-78.
58. 17 U.S.C. §§ 701-02 (1988 & Supp. III 1992).
59. For works created after 1977, copyright protection is extended for the author's life-
time plus fifty years. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1988).
60. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988 & Supp. III 1992) provides:
Subject to sections 107 through 120, the owner of copyright under this title has the
exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: (1) to reproduce the
copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public
by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the
copyrighted work publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including individual
images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copy-
righted work publicly.
61. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988).
62. For a historical illustration of this concept, see Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879)
(copyright on book did not convey the exclusive right to use the bookkeeping concept ex-
plained in the copyrighted work).
63. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 401-12 (1988 & Supp. III 1992); 37 C.F.R. §§ 201.20, 202.2 (1992).
64. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 401-06 (1988 & Supp. III 1992).
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fringement is merely incidental to the primary dispute over the ownership
right.
6 5
Since Congress did not license the judiciary to grant extra-statutory
relief in these matters, courts have generally concluded that Congress in-
tended to limit the remedies of aggrieved copyright holders to those pro-
vided in Sections 501-510 of the Copyright Act, including actions for
copyright infringement. 66 The courts reason that remedies not expressly
provided by the copyright statutes are remedies not intended.
6 7
2. Legislative Developments
Congress secured for authors the exclusive rights to their respective
writings by enacting the Copyright Act of 1909.68 The Copyright Office
subsequently announced guidelines governing the registration of com-
puter programs in 1964, even though it was still unclear whether com-
puter software was a copyrightable "writing" under the original
legislation. 69 Congress considerably broadened the registration guide-
lines by enacting the Copyright Act of 1976,70 which suggested that com-
puter software was eligible for copyright protection. 7 1 The 1976 Act,
however, did not specifically prescribe that computer software was copy-
65. 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1988).
66. See, e.g., Xerox Corp. v. Apple Computer, Inc., 734 F. Supp. 1542, 1549 (N.D. Cal.
1990). Moreover, Section 701 of the Copyright Act provides that "[alU administrative func-
tions and duties under this title, except as otherwise specified, are the responsibility of the
Register of Copyrights as director of the Copyright Office of the Library of Congress." 17
U.S.C. § 701 (1988). Section 702 authorizes the Copyright Office to establish regulations for
the administration of its functions and duties. 17 U.S.C. § 702 (1988).
67. Xerox, 734 F. Supp. at 1549.
68. See U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075.
69. The Copyright Office announced the guidelines in accordance with its policy of
resolving questionable issues in favor of registration. See OFFICE OF THE REGISTER OF CoPY-
RIGHTS, ANNOuNCEMENT SML-47 (May 1964). The Copyright Office accepted approximately
2,000 programs for registration under the 1909 Act between 1964 and 1977, most of which
were registered by two mainframe manufacturers-IBM and Burroughs. Davidson, supra
note 8, at 652 n.72 (citing CONTU FINAL REPORT at 38, 85 (July 31, 1978)) [hereinafter
CONTU REPORT].
70. Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541, 2565 (codified as amended at
17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1988)).
71. Dorr & Eigles, supra note 1, at 8. The original legislation incorporated the Supreme
Court's decision in White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908) by
providing that imperceptible forms of work were not copyrightable. See Davidson, supra note
8, at 652-53. Section 102(a) of the 1976 Act, however, broadened the subject matter of copy-
right protection. That section provides:
(a) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from
which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the
aid of a machine or device. Works of authorship include the following categories:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works;
(7) sound recordings; and
(8) architectural works.
(b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend
to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or
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rightable subject matter. As a result, the courts failed to reach a consensus
with respect to the nature and scope of copyright protection for computer
programs.
72
Copyright protection for computer software remained problematic
until Congress, acting on the recommendation of the National Commis-
sion on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU),
7 3
passed the Software Protection Act of 1980, 74 which included provisions
specifically extending copyright protection to computer programs.7 5 The
1980 amendments plainly applied to software represented in "source
code," but failed to address potential copyright questions concerning
other forms of software translations. The courts were therefore required
to resolve the question of whether copyright protection extended to com-
puter programs expressed in binary form or "object code."
76
3. Significant Decisions
Notwithstanding the seemingly broad reach of the copyright statutes,
questions continually arise concerning the scope of copyright protection
discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or
embodied in such work.
17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988 & Supp. III 1992).
72. Dorr & Eigles, supra note 1, at 7 (citing Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc.,
562 F. Supp. 775 (C.D. Cal. 1983), afTd, 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984)).
73. For an overview of the development of copyright protection for computer software,
see John T. Soma et al., A Proposed Legal Advisor's Roadmap for Software Developers: On the Shoul-
ders of Giants May No Breachers of Economic Relationships nor Slavish Copiers Stand, 68 DENy. U. L.
REV. 191 (1991).
74. Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028 (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117 (1988)).
75. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) provides that "[a] 'computer program' is a set of statements
or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a
certain result." 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1988) provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an infringement for the
owner of a copy of a computer program to make or authorize the making of an-
other copy or adaptation of that computer program provided:
(1) that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential step in the
utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a machine and that it
is used in no other manner, or
(2) that such new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes only and that all
archival copies are destroyed in the event that continued possession of the
computer program should cease to be rightful.
Any exact copies prepared in accordance with the provisions of this sec-
tion may be leased, sold, or otherwise transferred, along with the copy from
which such copies were prepared, only as part of the lease, sale, or other trans-
fer of all rights in the program. Adaptations so prepared may be transferred
only with the authorization of the copyright owner.
76. See infra text accompanying notes 79-90. "Object code" refers to the numerical lan-
guage designed as the mechanical apparatus for operating a machine. See Davidson, supra
note 8, at 620-21.
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for computer software. 77 The cases concerning the copyright protection
of computer software fall into three generations or waves.
78
The first generation of cases addressed the copying of substantial por-
tions of literal software elements, including object and source codes. In
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 79 the Third Circuit held that
computer software, whether an operating system program or application
program expressed in object code or source code, constituted a literary
work within the scope of copyright protection.8 0 The court noted that the
1980 amendment to the Copyright Act firmly established the copyright-
ability of computer programs8 l and, citing the plain language of the Copy-
right Act and its legislative history, the court soundly rejected the alleged
source code-object code distinction.
8 2
77. In a copyright infringement action, the plaintiff must establish: (1) ownership of a
valid copyright; and (2) that the defendant copied the protected work. 3 MELVILLE B. NIM-
MER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPRIGHT § 13.01, at 13-5 (1992). The plaintiff may prove
the copying element either through direct evidence of the copying or by showing that: (1)
the defendant had access to the plaintiff's copyrighted work; and (2) the defendant's work
was substantially similar to the plaintiffs copyrighted work. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v.
Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 701 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d
44, 48 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159 (1986)). See also Warner Bros. v. American Broad-
casting Cos., 654 F.2d 204, 207 (2d Cir. 1981); Manufacturers Technologies, Inc. v. Cams,
Inc., 706 F. Supp. 984, 990 (D. Conn. 1989).
78. Soma et al, supra note 73, at 198 (describing several cases in each "generation" and
the potential impact of the respective holdings on software development and protection); see
David Bender, Computer Associates v. Altai: Rationality Prevails, COMPUTER LAW., Aug. 1992 at
2,3.
79. 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984)..
80. Id. at 1249. The appellate court also reversed the district court's ruling concerning
irreparable harm. Although Apple occupied a more favorable financial position than Frank-
lin, the Third Circuit observed that Apple's ability to withstand lost sales did not outweigh the
strong presumption in copyright cases that any copying causes irreparable harm. ld. at 1254.
Apple sought a preliminary injunction to restrain Franklin from using, copying, selling,
or otherwise infringing Apple's copyrights to fourteen computer programs. Id. at 1245. The
disputed software consisted of various operating system programs, which generally manage
the internal functions of the computer or facilitate the use of application programs. MAGs
ET AL., supra note 24, at 6. The district court denied Apple's motion for a preliminary injunc-
tion based, in significant part, on the view that operating system programs, in binary form,
were not the proper subject of copyright protection. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Com-
puter Corp., 545 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
The district court also determined that Apple failed to establish the "irreparable harm"
requisite to the issuance of a preliminary injunction. Ia at 825. Although Franklin admit-
tedly copied the operating system programs in an effort to manufacture and market "Apple-
compatible" hardware, it defended the suit on the ground that the Apple programs, which
were expressed in object code, were not subject to copyright protection. Franklin, 714 F.2d at
1245.
81. Franklin, 714 F.2d at 1248 (citing Williams Elec., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870
(3d Cir. 1982)).
82. Id. Franklin also argued that an operating system program, in contrast to an applica-
tion program, constitutes a process, system or method of operation that was per se excluded
from copyright protection by the express terms of Section 102(b). Id. at 1250. 17 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) (1988) excludes from copyright protection any "idea, procedure, process, system,
method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is
described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work."
The court also noted that Section 102(b) codified a substantial part of the holding and
dictum of Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879), which held that copyright of a book did not
grant the copyright owner the exclusive right to use the system explained in the book. Frank-
lin, 714 F.2d at 1250. The court, however, determined that Franklin misconstrued the dis-
tinction between patentable and copyrightable subject matter. Id at 1250-51. The court
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In the second generation, the courts considered the extent to which
the non-literal aspects of computer software, including the structure, se-
quence and organization (SSO) of programs, received copyright protec-
tion. In Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc.,83 a software
copyright case, the Third Circuit established a test for distinguishing non-
copyrightable idea from copyrightable expression.8 4 The court concluded
that the purpose or function of a computer program or other utilitarian
work constitutes the idea, and the elements of the work unnecessary to the
central purpose comprise copyrightable expression.8 5 Where various
means of achieving the desired purpose exist, the particular method uti-
lized by the developer becomes the copyrightable expression.8 6 The court
held that after isolating the idea-the primary purpose of the software-
copyright protection clearly extended beyond the literal code to the struc-
ture, sequence and organization of the program.
8 7
In a recent second generation case, Computer Associates International,
Inc. v. Altai, Inc.,8 8 the Second Circuit presented an alternative analytical
framework for distinguishing idea from expression and determining the
substantial similarity of non-literal program structures.8 9 When the court
faced the threshold obstacle of separating non-copyrightable idea from
observed that Apple did not seek to copyright the method that instructs the computer to
perform operating functions, but rather the instructions themselves. Id. at 1251. The court
stated that Franklin's challenge with respect to operating system programs as 'methods' or
'processes' seemed inconsistent with its concession that application programs were properly
copyrightable because both types of programs instruct the computer to perform tasks. I.
Furthermore, the court found no statutory distinction between operating and application
programs and rejected Franklin's argument for limiting copyright protection by program
function. Id.
83. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
84. See i. at 1235-38.
85. Id. at 1236. The court noted that "[t] his test is necessarily difficult to state, and it may
be difficult to understand in the abstract." Id. at 1236 n.28.
DefendantJaslow, with access to plaintiff Whelan's source code for a computer program
designed for dental laboratory operations, developed and distributed a similar program in
another programming language. Id. at 1225-27. Utilizing the court's test, the efficient man-
agement of a dental laboratory comprised the idea of the program. Id. at 1236 n.28.
86. I. at 1236.
87. Id. at 1237-39. Although Whelan's framework for dissecting the software develop-
ment process into its component parts remains useful to the idea/expression determination,
the "idea equals purpose" rule proves unworkable in cases involving complex programs. See
Bender, supra note 78, at 3 ("The Whelan distinction rule was so weighted toward the idea
end of the spectrum as to render the framework generally useless.").
88. 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
89. Id. at 706. The case developed after Altai recruited a Computer Associates (CA)
employee to assist in designing a new version of an Altai program. Id. at 699. The former CA
employee was "intimately familiar with various aspects of Adapter." Id. Moreover, the em-
ployee knowingly violated his contractual agreement with CA by removing copies of the
source code for both the VSE and MVS versions of Adapter. Id. at 699-70. The employee
developed a counterpart to Computer Associates' "Adapter" program for use in Altai's pack-
age by copying, without Altai's knowledge, portions of the Adapter source code. I. at 700.
Altai marketed the resulting program, which was entitled "Oscar 3.4," as a component of
its software package. Id. After learning of the misappropriation, however, Altai initiated a
rewrite using clean-room conditions whereby the copied portions of Adapter were excised
from the remainder of the Oscar 3.4 program. Id.
Computer Associates maintained that, despite Altai's rewrite of the Oscar code, the re-
sulting program-entitled "Oscar 3.5"-remained substantially similar to the structure of its
Adapter program. I. at 702. Specifically, Computer Associates alleged copying based upon
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copyrightable expression, it rejected the Whelan model of equating pur-
pose and idea because the test relied heavily on metaphysical distinctions
without placing enough emphasis on practical considerations.9 0
The court instead adopted a three-step analysis for determining
whether the non-literal elements of two or more computer programs were
substantially similar.9 1 First, the court reduced the allegedly infringing
program to its constituent parts by isolating each level of abstraction.92 In
this abstraction process, the court retraced each step in the design process
to identify the ultimate function of the program.93 In the second step-
the filtration process-the court removed the non-copyrightable material
including incorporated ideas, expressions incidental to the ideas and ele-
ments derived from the public domain. 94 The third and final element of
the test constituted the search for impermissible copying and required a
comparison of the remaining core of potentially protectable expression
with the structure of the allegedly infringing program. 95 Applying this test
to the structural components of Oscar 3.5, the court held that the evi-
dence failed to establish the degree of substantial similarity requisite to a
finding of copyright infringement.
96
The third generation of software copyright cases further extended
protection to non-literal elements, often focusing on the user interface.
97
In Lotus Development Corp. v. Paperback Software International,98 the court ad-
dressed whether the non-literal elements of a computer program, particu-
larly the program's user interface, were copyrightable.99 The Lotus court
refused to adopt a bright-line rule, choosing instead to develop another
three-part balancing test to determine the copyrightability of non-literal
components of computer software. The court first identified the underly-
ing idea of the program for the purpose of distinguishing between the
the substantial similarity of several non-literal program components (including flow charts,
macros, lists of parameters and services) and the specific organization of modules. Id.
90. Id. at 706.
91. Id. The Second Circuit's "abstraction-filtration-comparison test" was based in part
on the abstractions test set forth in Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir.
1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931). Id.
92. Computer Associates, 982 F.2d at 707.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 707-10.
95. Id. at 710-11.
96. Id. at 715. Specifically, the court found that the evidence failed to establish that the
macros and parameter lists of the allegedly infringing Oscar 3.5 program were substantially
similar to CA-Adapter. Moreover, the list of services was dictated by the nature of other
programs with which it was designed to interact, and the respective programs' organizational
charts were so simple and obvious that copyright protection could not attach. Id. For a
detailed discussion of the Second Circuit's analysis, see Bender, supra note 78.
97. For an extensive analysis of the important software copyright cases, see Soma et al.,
supra note 73, at 198.
98. 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990).
99. Id. at 42. Specifically, the issues presented to the Lotus court concerned: (1)
whether and to what extent Lotus's spreadsheet program, "Lotus 1-2-3," was copyrightable;
and (2) whether Paperback's competing program, "VP-Planner," infringed the copyrighted
expression in Lotus 1-2-3 by impermissibly incorporating substantially similar elements. I.
The court focused on whether the non-literal elements of the program, including its overall
organization, the structure of the command system and the presentation of information on
the computer screen, were copyrightable subject matter. Id. at 46.
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idea and the expression allegedly infringed.1° ° Second, the court sepa-
rated the expression from the idea and evaluated the individual elements
of expression comprising the work to determine whether the expression
was part of the public domain or otherwise limited to the functional re-
quirements of the work. 10 1 Finally, the court determined whether the
copyrightable expression identified in the second step constituted a sub-
stantial part of the product allegedly infringed.
10 2
4. Cancellation of Copyrights
Congress empowered the Copyright Office with the authority to can-
cel, as well as to grant, copyright protection. The Code of Federal Regula-
tions describes the circumstances under which the Copyright Office will
cancel a registration.10 3 When the Copyright Office discovers after regis-
tration that a work is not copyrightable, either because the authorship is de
minimis or the work does not contain authorship subject to copyright, it
may cancel the registration.
10 4
Although the threat of copyright invalidation would seem to present
an effective deterrent to copyright misappropriation, the Copyright Office
presently has no procedures for adjudicating factual controversies be-
tween parties. In the comments accompanying the proposed cancellation
regulation, the Copyright Office explained that, as a general rule, it will
initiate cancellation procedures only upon the discovery of a material er-
ror in the registration. 10 5 Since the Office is not prepared to resolve dis-
putes concerning software ownership, aggrieved parties must resort to
traditional infringement actions to adjudicate their respective claims.
5. Copyright Licensing
A developer or other owner of a marketable computer program gen-
erally distributes software packages for use under a licensing agree-
ment.10 6 The license operates pursuant to state law and formally
evidences the complete or partial relinquishment of the copyright owner's
exclusive rights.' 0 7 The copyright owner may grant a licensee the exclu-
100. Id. at 60. In reaching this threshold determination through an abstraction analysis,
the decision-maker focused "upon alternatives that counsel may suggest, or the court may
conceive, along the scale from the most generalized conception to the most particularized,
and choose some formulation [of idea]." Id.
101. Id. at 60-61. The court stated that "the decision-maker must focus upon whether an
alleged expression of the idea is limited to elements essential to expression of that idea (or is
one of only a few ways of expressing the idea) or instead includes identifiable -elements of
expression not essential to every expression of that idea." Id.
102. Id. at 60-61.
103. 57 C.F.R. § 201.7 (1988).
104. 37 C.F.R. § 201.7(c)(1) (1988).
105. The Copyright Office added that it "does not invite, and will generally not respond
favorably to, requests to cancel a complete registration by a party other than the owner of the
copyright."
106. Copyright owners receive royalties in exchange for the grant of technological and
economic benefits associated with the license.
107. See DoR & MuNcH, supra note 38, § 5.9, at 202. The license is simply either an oral
or written grant of permission to use the otherwise exclusive work. Id.
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sive right to use the software product for a defined period of time or
within a given area.10 8 One benefit of an exclusive license is the licensee's
standing to bring suit against infringers of the underlying copyright.
10 9
Although the licensee is not required to record the license as a prerequi-
site to initiating an infringement action under the Berne Convention Im-
plementation Act of 1988,110 recordation provides constructive notice of
ownership.11
Many of the issues associated with the types and terms of copyright
licenses mirror those discussed in the context of patent license agree-
ments. 1 12 Perhaps the most common form of license outside of the mass-
market context is the non-exclusive right to use the copyrighted work
either for a single use or for inclusion in a single work. 113 Unlike the
owner of an exclusive license, however, the owner of a non-exclusive li-
cense does not have the right to bring suit against infringers. 1 4 More-
over, the owner of a non-exclusive license must operate within the
limitations of the license to avoid a potential infringement claim by the
copyright owner. 115 Both parties to the license agreement, however, may
greatly reduce the potential for litigation by following general licensing
practice guidelines, including the investigation of financial histories, defi-
nition of product and geographical markets and documentation of per-
formance standards, warranties of ownership and payment terms.
1 16
6. Copyright Summary
Unlike patent law, the statutory scheme of copyright protection only
prohibits copying, not independent creation by another person or en-
tity. 117 Modern copyright law thus affords considerable protection for
computer software as literary works of authorship, whether utilized as a
distinct alternative or a supplement to patent protection."18 The benefits
of copyright protection include both the relatively low cost of obtaining
the copyright and the normally straightforward and expeditious registra-
tion process.
19
The copyright protects the specific expression of an idea, not the idea
itself,' 2 0 and, in the case of a dispute, the copyright owner has the burden
108. Id. at 203.
109. Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (1988)).
110. See 17 U.S.C. § 205 (1988).
111. DoRR & MUNCH, supra note 38, at 203. The Berne Convention Implementation Act
also makes it unnecessary to register a copyright; however, unless and until the copyright
owner registers the copyright, the licensee may not record the exclusive license or other
instrument of transfer. Id.; see 17 U.S.C. § 205(c)(2) (1988).
112. See supra text accompanying notes 38-53.
113. DoRR & MUNCH, supra note 38, at 202.
114. Id. at 203. The recordation of a non-exclusive license would therefore serve no seri-
ous purpose.
115. Id.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 46-53.
117. Selinger, supra note 3, at 74.
118. See generally Einhorn, supra note 12.
119. Selinger, supra note 3, at 77.
120. 1d. at 74.
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of establishing unauthorized copying. 12 1 The benefits of copyright protec-
tion are reduced if the underlying idea represents the greatest value in the
program and the form of expression (i.e., the specific program language)
is easily circumvented.1 22 If the value of the software resides in the partic-
ular form of expression, the copyright statutes generally provide the great-
est protection.'
23
Despite the facial simplicity of the tests utilized in Lotus and the other
copyright infringement cases, the complexities associated with computer
software blur the boundary separating non-copyrightable idea and copy-
rightable expression. 12 4 The resulting imperfections of line-drawing and
uncertainty associated with ad hoc judicial determinations may lead
software developers to secure complementary patent protection for com-
plex programs despite the complicated procedures and increased
expense. 1
2 5
Counsel to software developers should encourage clients to reduce
potential infringement claims by following several routine procedures.
First, counsel should alert developers of the idea-expression dichotomy,
and suggest that software developers appropriately document the reasons:
(1) why they wrote the software in the manner in which it was written; (2)
why certain design decisions were made; and (3) why some decision
choices were limited to a few or even one option. 12 6 In addition, if a de-
velopment involves a software application similar to an existing program,
counsel should determine whether any pre-existing economic relationship
exists in order to identify and act to prevent attempts to obtain colorable
title. 127 Finally, counsel should ensure that software developers do not
merely clone existing programs, but instead seek to improve an existing
product with substantially independent work.
128
C. Trade Secret Protection for Computer Software
1. Definition and Application
Although the Uniform Trade Secrets Act 129 modified the definition, a
trade secret generally comprises any "formula, pattern, device or compila-
121. Id. at 75.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Judge Learned Hand once stated that "nobody has ever been able to fix [the] bound-
ary [between idea and expression], and nobody ever can." Nichols v. Universal Pictures
Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931). Sixty-three years
later, Judge Hand's statement holds true.
125. See Summary of Computer Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, 1992 U.S. App.
LEXIS 14305, 10 CoMPUTER LAw MoNrOR 510, 511 (1992).
126. Soma et al., supra note 73, at 226.
127. Id.
128. Id.; see Margaret L. Pittman, What the Judge Sees is What You Get: The Implications of
Lotus v. Paperback for Software Copyright, 37 WAYNE L. Rxv. 1527, 1573-75 (1991). In light of
the Lotus decision, the author suggests "the cautious use of 'clean room' techniques, compe-
tition on the basis of performance rather than compatibility, and the security of a develop-
ment license." 1d. at 1575.
129. UNIFORM Tt DE SEcETms Acr, § 1(4), 14 U.LA. 541 (1980) [hereinafter UNIFORM
Acr].
19941
DENVER UN/VERS/TY LAW REVIEW
tion of information" used in business that provides the owner with an op-
portunity to obtain a competitive advantage.130 By definition, information
disclosed to the public or otherwise generally known by persons who may
obtain economic value from the disclosure or use of the information can-
not constitute a trade secret.13 1 Computer software is well-suited for trade
secret protection because a trade secret encompasses the underlying con-
cepts of an invention or process in addition to the specific expression of
those concepts.13 2 Prior to the enactment of the 1980 software amend-
ments and the development of patent protection for computer software,
the law of trade secrets afforded the basic foundation for safeguarding
computer software.1 33 The relatively broad trade secret protection gave
the holder the right to grant licenses to use either the concept or the
application without the loss of protected rights.'
3 4
Trade secret protection differs in several respects from the safety af-
forded by patent and copyright laws. Patent and copyright law are gov-
erned by federal law; trade secret protection is governed by state law. In
addition, patent and copyright laws protect, through the grant of limited
monopoly power, the developer's interest in the computer software while
allowing society to benefit from the dissemination of valuable informa-
tion.1 35 Trade secret law, in contrast, serves to maintain secrecy and
thereby retain the exclusive right to the technology for the software
developer.1
3 6
2. Scope of Trade Secret Protection
Trade secret protection is founded on principles of contract law and
generally exists in the form of contractual covenants in employment and
license agreements restricting the unauthorized transfer, use, or disclo-
130. REsTATEMENr OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939) (this Restatement section also suggests
six factors for determining whether information may receive protection as a trade secret).
Section 1 of the Uniform Act refined the Restatement definition and provides in part:
(4) "Trade secret" means information, including a formula, pattern, compila-
tion, program, device, method, technique, or process, that:
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being
generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by,
other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to
maintain its secrecy.
UNIFORM Acr, § 1(4).
Applying such a definition, courts have found that chemical formulas, industrial
processes, pricing information and data base information such as customer lists constitute
trade secrets under the proper factual circumstances. Selinger, supra note 3, at 80-81.
131. UNIFORM ACr, § 1(4)(i).
132. See ILG Indust., Inc. v. Scott, 273 N.E.2d 393, 395 (Ill. 1971); MIGRiM, TRADE SEcRErs,
§ 2 at 26 (1980).
133. See MACs a-r. AL, supra note 24, at 301; Areaux, supra note 8, at 319; see aLso Selinger,
supra note 3, at 81 (Before the enactment of 17 U.S.C. § 301, trade secrets were recognized
either as a complement to copyright protection or the sole form of protection for software).
134. Management Science Am. v. Cyberg Sys., Inc., 6 Computer L. Serv. Rep. 921 (N.D.
Ill. 1978). See David Bender, Protection of Computer Programs: The Copyright/Trade Secret Inter-
face, 47 U. Prrr. L REv. 907, 938 (1986) (trade secret licensing has become widespread on
both a domestic and international basis).
135. See supra text accompanying notes 12-14.
136. See infra text accompanying notes 148-56.
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sure of the software.13 7 The software owner gains several advantages by
utilizing trade secret protection, whether as the sole form of protection or
a complement to another method. 138 The primary strength of trade se-
cret protection is that it gives the owner the ability to protect both unpub-
lished programs and the underlying ideas and concepts embodied in the
algorithm.13 9 Provided the requisite secrecy is maintained, the holder
benefits because the indefinite duration of protection for trade secrets ex-
ceeds the statutory limits associated with patent and copyright
protection. 140
The trade secret approach does, however, have some basic disadvan-
tages.14 1 Perhaps the most problematic drawback is the difficulty in estab-
lishing and maintaining secrecy. 142 Although the standards for
determining issues such as the loss of secrecy vary by jurisdiction,
143 it
appears universally true that proprietors lose trade secret protection once
the information enters the public domain. Software owners therefore
must usually rule out the potential for wide distribution of computer pro-
grams under this approach; generally, only software developers engaging
in limited distribution benefit from trade secret protection.' 44 In addi-
tion, proprietors may lose the secrecy element through employee turno-
ver. 145 Detection of this form of misappropriation remains difficult and
software employers rarely win lawsuits against former employees. 146 Pro-
prietors should therefore secure nondisclosure contracts or noncompeti-
tion agreements from key employees.'
47
3. Licensing and Internal Protection of Trade Secrets
Trade secret information can be licensed, but the potential licensor
must incorporate provisions in the agreement that are not characteristic of
a patent or copyright license. Trade secret licensing requires additional
consideration because the secret nature of the underlying information dif-
fers from the public material embodied in a patent or copyright license. A
trade secret license agreement must include provisions for the mainte-
nance of secrecy and non-disclosure in relation to the subject matter of
137. Kesler & Hardy, supra note 16, at 267; see infra text accompanying notes 179-80.
138. Dorr & Eigles, supra note 1, at 12 (noting the use of trade secret protection in con-
junction with copyright law).
139. See id at 13; Root, supra note 8, at 226.
140. Trade secrets have an indefinite, and possibly perpetual, term. DoRt & MUNcH,
supra note 38, § 1.7, at 9. See Dorr & Eigles, supra note 1, at 12-13; 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1988)
(copyright endures during author's life plus fifty years, or if the copyright owner is a corpora-
tion, for a term of seventy-five years after the year of first publication); 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988)
(patent protection endures for a period of 17 years).
141. Kesler & Hardy, supra note 16, at 267.
142. See Selinger, supra note 3, at 86; Root, supra note 8, at 227.
143. Kesler & Hardy, supra note 16, at 267. This problem increases in importance when
applied on an international scale. Id
144. Root, supra note 8, at 227.
145. See Selinger, supra note 3, at 86; Root, supra note 8, at 227.
146. Root, supra note 8, at 227.
147. For a discussion of several preventive measures, see Selinger, supra note 3, at 86; see
infta text accompanying notes 149-54; see also Bender, supra note 134 (trade secret licensing
widespread).
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the agreement, whether the subject matter concerns general customer in-
formation or software-specific material. 148 Notwithstanding the decision
to license trade secret information, the proprietor business must continu-
ally protect the trade secret from misappropriation.
The implementation of a comprehensive internal trade secret pro-
gram weighs strongly in favor of the business when the court addresses a
misappropriation claim against an outsider or former employee. 149 Not
surprisingly, the failure to exercise effective control over corporate trade
secrets or the inability to demonstrate such control will likely result in the
loss of trade secret protection. 150 The basic elements of a corporate trade
secret program should include: (1) physically securing business opera-
tions from outsiders; 15 1 (2) controlling access by suppliers, vendors and
visitors; 152 (3) creating "technological fingerprints";15 and (4) properly
marking and categorizing documents.
154
A planned business program focuses on securing trade secret infor-
mation from external forces. Perhaps the greatest risk of trade secret
theft, however, involves materials and knowledge possessed by existing em-
ployees.1 55 The protection of the business's trade secrets, therefore, con-
stitutes an essential part of the contractual employment agreement,
whether the employee serves in a managerial or technical position.
156
4. Federal Preemption of State Trade Secret Law
The possibility of federal preemption remains the major obstacle con-
cerning the use of state trade secret protection for computer software.
157
Under the federal preemption doctrine, when Congress manifests an in-
tent to regulate a specific field of commercial activity, the courts construe
the federal statute to prevent the states from enacting legislation or
148. HOWARD C. ANAWALT & ELIZABETH F. ENAYATI, 1991 LICENSING LAW HANDBOOK
§ 4.03[4], at 210 (1991).
149. See DoRR & MuNCH, supra note 38, § 1.9, at 11.
150. Id. at 6-7 (citations omitted).
151. Id. at 12. Security measures include electronic surveillance, document destruction/
retention programs, employee access procedures and the use of restricted areas. Id. at 12-13.
152. I. at 12. Businesses should enforce a single entrance/exit policy and utilize a "log-
in" procedure requiring visitors, vendors and repair and service personnel to provide basic
information concerning the nature of their visit. If an outsider requires access to sensitive
areas, businesses should consider the use of "visitor agreements" concerning trade secret
protection. Id. at 13-15.
153. Id. at 12. The incorporation of intentional mistakes and buried instructions or iden-
tifiers in software programs provide evidence of misappropriation in subsequent litigation.
I. at 17.
154. Id. at 12. Businesses should identify material using a trade secret legend in order to
protect the ideas and concepts contained in the document. The expression embodied in the
particular document should also receive the overlapping protection of federal copyright law.
Id. at 15.
155. Id. at 18.
156. See id. at 18-29 (providing detailed guidance for employee-related protective meas-
ures including pre-employment clearance, employee education, termination procedures, and
the use of covenants not to compete).
157. Bender, supra note 134, at 924. For an extensive analysis of the federal preemption
issue, including discussions of the relevant case law and legislative history, see Bender, supra
note 134; Selinger, supra note 3.
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promulgating regulations in that field. 158 The federal Copyright Act,
through the application of Section 301, thus preempts all state law relating
to copyright or any exclusive right otherwise within the scope of federal
copyright protection.
159
The majority view maintains, however, that Section 301 of the federal
Copyright Act fails to pre-empt most of state trade secret law, at least as it
applies to computer software.16  The majority position contends that the
law of trade secrets, in most of its manifestations, does not satisfy two of
the three preemption conditions set forth in Section 301: "equivalency,
subject matter type, and subject matter aspect. " 16 1 Computer software
clearly constitutes a literary work for the purposes of Sections 101 and 102
and thus meets the requirement of "subject matter type." An analysis of
the remaining two preemption conditions reveals differences in the pro-
tection afforded by copyright and trade secret law that weigh against a
determination of preemption.
162
First, trade secret rights are generally not "equivalent" to the rights
protected by federal copyright law because the two forms of protection
differ in relation to the conduct prohibited and the classes of persons
whose acts are proscribed.16 3 With respect to prohibited conduct, the
Copyright Act forbids the unauthorized copying of the author's work,
while state trade secret law prevents the wrongful disclosure or use of
trade secrets. 64 Although the delineation concerning the classes of pro-
scribed persons remains less clear, authors may generally secure copyright
protection against persons engaging in the prohibited conduct.165 Trade
secret protection, in contrast, is available only against persons placing
158. Dorr & Eigles, supra note 1, at 12.
159. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1988) provides in relevant part:
(a) On or afterJanuary 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to
any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by
section 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expres-
sion and come within the subject matter or copyright as specified by sections 102
and 103, whether created before or after that date and whether published or un-
published, are governed exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled to
any such right or equivalent right in any such work under the common law or stat-
utes of any State.
(b) Nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or remedies under the common
law or statutes of any State with respect to-
(1) subject matter that does not come within the subject matter of copyright as
specified by sections 102 and 103, including works of authorship not fixed in
any tangible medium of expression; or
(2) any cause of action arising from undertakings commenced before January
1, 1978; or
(3) activities violating legal or equitable rights that are not equivalent to any of
the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section
106.
160. Bender, supra note 134, at 936.
161. Id. at 936-37.
162. Id at 937.
163. Id. See Selinger, supra note 3, at 85 (the trade requirement involving the breach of a
confidence or improper acquisition defines rights that are qualitatively different from those
provided by the federal copyright laws).
164. Bender, supra note 134, at 937.
165. Id.
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themselves in a confidential, contractual or fiduciary relationship with the
proprietor of the trade secret.
166
Second, copyright and trade secret laws differ concerning the requi-
site "subject matter aspect." Federal copyright protection extends only to
the author's expression, not the concepts and information embodied in
the expression. State trade secret law, however, constitutes a viable means
of protecting the underlying ideas, algorithms, concepts and principles
embodied in the expression, which in this case is the computer
software. 1
67
The courts should narrowly construe Section 301 of the federal Copy-
right Act and limit preemption to those instances where trade secret pro-
tection for computer software satisfies the three statutory preemption
conditions. 168 Proprietors currently employ the law of trade secrets to
protect technological and commercial information licensed by, or main-
tained within, the organization. 1 69 If courts readily apply the doctrine in
areas not warranting preemption, including the context of computer
software, owners would lose protection for valuable rights secured by state
law.17
0
II. FACTUAL CONTEXT OF SOFTWARE OWNERSHIP DisPuTEs
A developer or other owner may discover that another person, per-
haps a competitor or former employee, has claimed colorable title to the
owner's proprietary software. This problem will be exacerbated if the of-
fending party has taken action that would lead to the perfection of the
software title. An adverse claimant may seek such perfection of title either
by applying for patent protection or by following the relatively simple
copyright registration procedures, which require the placement of a copy-
right legend on the program. An adverse claimant may also establish a
colorable interest by simply incorporating the software into his operation,
treating it as proprietary, and claiming trade secret protection.
Persons or entities may assert colorable title in a number of ways.
Among these might be the following hypothetical situations: (a) a previous
owner of the "protected property" might claim a retention of rights in the
property, predicating such claim on a faulty sale process; (b) a program-
mer who worked on the development of the software might contend that
he or she was engaged under terms of the engagement as an independent
contractor relationship rather than as an employee, that the terms of the
engagement contract called for delivery of a product other than the
software in question, and that, he or she therefore retained the ownership
rights in that software; (c) a former employee may argue that the key de-
166. 1d
167. Dorr & Eigles, supra note 1, at 12; Bender, supra note 134, at 937.
168. Id. at 938.
169. Id (quoting Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1971)). Proprietors
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velopment work leading to the final product was done off-site and on his
or her own time, and that the associated work product was merely shared
with the employer to facilitate the employer's then-current needs. While
there are undoubtedly many other scenarios giving rise to claims of colora-
ble title, each of the foregoing illustrates a circumstance giving rise to the
need to establish marketable title.
Since the disclosure and publication requirements associated with
patent and copyright law may reduce or destroy the value of otherwise
'secret" business assets, patents and copyrights may fail as preventive meas-
ures where the owner of confidential software technology desires to main-
tain secrecy. The title issue thus concerns the ability of a proprietary
software owner to preserve secrets associated with the software or other-
wise resolve the question of ownership after the breach of the secrecy.
Declaratory judgment proceedings or state statutes that extend quiet title
actions to disputes involving personal property constitute means of resolv-
ing such questions of software ownership.
III. TRADITIONAL QUIET TrrLE ACTIONS
A. Nature and Purpose
The best approach to resolving ownership disputes concerning real
property is to bring an action requesting the court to "quiet the title" to
the property. The effect of such a "quiet title" action is two-fold: (1) it
judicially defines the instant ownership of the property; and (2) it "cuts-
off" future adverse claims of ownership. 17 1 When properly brought before
the court, the joined parties may fully litigate the question of title and
define their respective rights in relation to the property as of the time that
the plaintiff brought the action. 17 2 The court enters a decree assigning
the title, or any part thereof, to the property in controversy to the party
holding the superior claim.1
7 3
The court, however, will generally not address ancillary issues174 such
as the rights of persons not joined as parties 175 or the validity of title pro-
ceedings originating in another court. 176 Furthermore, the court will not
examine the validity of alleged "clouds" on a title where it appears that,
even if such "clouds" were removed, title would still lie in the
defendant.177
Although the nature of a quiet title action appears to provide an "eq-
uitable" remedy, matters affecting title to realty constitute actions "in law,"
and historically courts of equity lacked jurisdiction to effect title. As a re-
sult, quiet title actions are generally deemed to lie in equity only when it
171. Rawlinson v. Oregon Textile Mach., 99 P.2d 999 (Or. 1940).
172. Stricker Land & Timber Co. v. Hogue, 61 F. Supp. 825 (D. La. 1945).
173. Dolen v. Black, 67 N.W. 760 (Neb. 1896).
174. Snook & Wells v. Holmes, 193 P.2d 487 (Cal. Dist. CL App. 1948).
175. Bray v. Germain Inv. Co., 98 P.2d 993 (Colo. 1940); Turner v. Bank of Am. Nat'l
Trust & Say. Ass'n, 27 P.2d 383 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1933).
176. Woods v. Monroe, 17 Mich. 238 (1868).
177. Masterson v. Cranitch, 19 N.Y. Wkly. Dig. 55 (1883).
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otherwise would be necessary to bring multiple suits in order to achieve
the desired "quieting."
"Quiet title" suits are therefore legal actions which must be supported
by statute, and all federal and state jurisdictions have enacted appropriate
enabling legislation or court rules. Although the quiet title provisions are
not uniform in every jurisdiction, each provides claimants with a vehicle
for curing technical failures of record title by supplying the missing con-
nection in a derivative chain of title. In addition, holders of property may
seek quiet title decrees in an effort to establish record ownership after
obtaining legal title through foreclosure or adverse possession.'
78
Notwithstanding a claimant's particular reason for initiating an action,
however, statutes and rules allowing suits to quiet title eliminate the need
for multiple petitions and provide a single form of action to adjudicate the
ownership rights concerning a specific parcel of property.
B. Statutory Authority
As a threshold matter, claimants must examine the statute or rule gov-
erning quiet title actions in the controlling jurisdiction in order to deter-
mine the scope of the proceeding and remedy. Quiet title legislation
generally provides only a rule of procedure for determining parties' re-
spective rights under a substantive provision, rather than creating substan-
tive rights. 179 In addition, the majority of jurisdictions limits quiet title
actions to disputes concerning real property, and courts generally allow
quiet title actions to resolve personal property disputes only where author-
ized by statute or court rule or, because of exceptional circumstances or
conditions, the remedy at law would prove inadequate.' 80
Claimants must examine the statute controlling quiet title actions
within the jurisdiction in order to determine which court holds the au-
thority to adjudicate issues of title.1 8 1 Such an examination will also iden-
tify the nature of, and limits upon, quiet title proceedings within that
jurisdiction.18 2 Modern courts do not hear a large number of quiet title
178. In fact, such a use of the action is classic, in those instances wherein the legal title
holder's right to possession of the property is challenged by another. In this regard, the
Colorado enabling statute is typical:
An action may be brought for the purpose of obtaining a complete adjudication of
the rights of all parties thereto, with respect to any real property and for damages, if
any, for the withholding of possession. The court in its decree shall grant full and
adequate relief so as to completely determine the controversy and enforce the
rights of the parties. The court may at any time after the entry of the decree make
such additional orders as may be required in aid of such decree.
CoLo. R. Civ. P. 105(a) (1988).
179. See WILLIS V. CARPENTER, COLORADO REAL ESTATE PRACnCE 1992, ch. 14, at 478
(1992).
180. See Carter Oil Co. v. Owen, 27 F. Supp. 74 (D. I1. 1939); Ellis v. Dixie Highway
Special Road & Bridge Dist., 138 So. 374 (Fla. 1931).
181. See Martin v. Pacific Southwest Royalties, 106 P.2d 443 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1940).
182. While the enabling statutes vary in scope and detail, one or more courts within a
jurisdiction hold the power to: (1) determine all the rights and claims of the parties relating
to the subject matter in controversy; and (2) make such disposition of the case as will afford
complete relief in order to safeguard the interests of all the parties. See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE
§§ 760.010-764.010 (West 1992) (procedural requirements).
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suits and generally confine the actions to the determination of existing
rights18 3 in particular property when the system of recordation of title has
failed.
18 4
The enabling statutes that control quiet title actions within the several
states vary in detail, but some level of court in most jurisdictions is given
the power to "determine all the rights and claims of the parties relating to
the subject matter [concerning the issue of title] and make such disposi-
tion of the case as will afford complete relief in order to safeguard the
interests of all the parties."185 This statutory language ordinarily means
that the court is empowered to act as necessary to define the title, estate




Of primary importance to disputes concerning the ownership of com-
puter software is whether the relevant authority allows actions to quiet title
to personal property. On the federal level, quiet title actions proceed
under the Quiet Title Act, 18 7 which established a procedure similar to
those developed by the majority of the states. The procedure available
under the Quiet Title Act is expressly limited to disputes concerning real
property; the procedure is not available to resolve controversies involving
personal property. l8 8 The Act establishes a basis for the adjudication of
title only when the claimant names the United States as a defendant.' 89
These restrictions preclude the application of the federal statute to dis-
putes concerning the ownership of computer software.
2. State Law
Although virtually every state has enacted some form of quiet title
legislation or court rule, each statute or rule varies in terms of scope and
procedure. The clear majority of state jurisdictions limit the availability of
quiet title actions to controversies involving the title to real property, 190
but some states expressly allow quiet title actions for personal property. 19
183. Victoria Hosp. Assoc. v. All Persons, 147 P. 124 (Cal. 1915).
184. Taylor v. Focks Drilling & Manuf. Corp., 62 P.2d 903 (Kan. 1936).
185. Kellogg v. Schaueble, 273 F. 1012 (D. Miss. 1921).
186. Milton E. Giles & Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 117 P.2d 943 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1941); Goodfellow v. Barritt, 20 P.2d 740 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1933).
187. 28 U.S.C. 2409(a) (1988).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Colorado's rule governing quiet title actions is illustrative of the majority position.
Rule 105 of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
An action may be brought for the purpose of obtaining a complete adjudication of
the rights of all parties thereto, with respect to any real property and for damages, if
any, for the withholding of possession. The court in its decree shall grant full and
adequate relief so as to completely determine the controversy and enforce the
rights of the parties. The court may at any time after the entry of the decree make
such additional orders as may be required in aid of such decree.
CoLo. R. Crv. P. 105 (1988) (emphasis added).
191. Utah's quiet tide statute is representative of the minority position. That statute pro-
vides that:
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In those jurisdictions which have extended the legal remedy to encompass
personal property, purported owners of computer software may use these
broad-based statutory provisions in cases involving adverse claims to
software. Other states have addressed the issue by enacting a statutory
scheme with a separate provision governing controversies involving per-
sonal property.
192
C. Need for an Alternative Method of Resolution
In instances where the owner of confidential software technology
desires to maintain secrecy, the disclosure and publication requirements
associated with patent and copyright law may destroy the value of the
property. In these cases, the use of patents and copyrights fails as an effec-
tive method of ownership control. The concern in this situation involves
the ability of the owner of proprietary software to either preserve secrets
associated with the software or otherwise resolve the question of owner-
ship once the sought-after secrecy has been breached. State statutes that
extend quiet tide actions to disputes involving personal property consti-
tute a means of resolving such questions of software ownership.
D. Procedural Issues
In order to prevail in a quiet title action, most statutes require the
claimant to demonstrate vested title on the strength of his or her own
claim, rather than on the weakness of the defendant's right or tide.
193 If
neither party carries the burden of establishing title, the court will likely
refuse to quiet the title in the name of either party. Although such action
will result in the denial of relief, the court subordinates the societal inter-
est in clarifying ownership rights to prevent an inequitable resolution of
the controversy.
The California quiet title statute, which allows the court to decide
adverse claims to personal property, provides a procedural model for
resolving potential software disputes. 19 4 California's rules of civil proce-
dure govern such requirements unless the applicable statute or rule specif-
An action may be brought by any person against another who claims an estate or
interest in real property or claim to personal property adverse to him, for the purpose
of determining such adverse claim.
UTAH COnE ANN. § 78-40-1 (1992) (emphasis added); see also CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE
§ 760.020(a) (West 1992) and IDAHO CODE § 6-401 (1992).
192. For example, the Montana code provides in relevant part:
Any person claiming title to personal property, whether in actual possession thereof or
not, may bring an action in the district court of any county wherein such personal
property or any part thereof is situated against any person or persons claiming any
interest therein by reason of alleged ownership... and by a decree of such court
may have established and determined finally the rights of all claimants to such per-
sonal property.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-2-201 (1991) (emphasis added).
193. See CARENTER, supra note 179, at 479.
194. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 760.010-.060 (West Supp. 1993).
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ically prescribes an alternative forum. 195 As in any civil suit, the plaintiff
must adhere to the relevant pleading 19 6 and service 19 7 requirements and
bring the quiet title action in the appropriate jurisdiction and venue.' 9 8
The plaintiff must also join the relevant parties, whether known or un-
known,1 9 9 when filing the complaint or risk the imposition of limitations
195. CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE § 760.060 (West Supp. 1993) provides that "[t]he statutes and
rules governing practice in civil actions generally apply to actions under this chapter except
where they are inconsistent with the provisions of this chapter."
196. CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 761.020 (West 1992) provides in part:
The complaint shall be verified and shall include all of the following:
(a) A description of the property that is the subject of the action. In the case
of tangible personal property, the description shall include its usual location ...
(b) The title of the plaintiff as to which a determination under this chapter is
sought and the basis of the tide...
(c) The adverse claims to the title of the plaintiff against which a determina-
tion is sought.
(d) The date as of which the determination is sought. If the determination is
sought as of a date other than the date the complaint is filed, the complaint shall
include a statement of the reasons why a determination as of that date is sought.
(e) A prayer for the determination of the tide of the plaintiff against the ad-
verse claims.
The defendant's answer must include: (1) any claims by the defendant; (2) any facts tending
to controvert the plaintiffs allegations; and (3) a statement of any new matter constituting a
defense. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 761.030 (West Supp. 1993). The defendant may also seek
affirmative relief by filing a cross-complaint in the action. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 761.040
(West Supp. 1993).
197. For an example of a typical service requirement, see CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 763.010
(West Supp. 1993).
198. The California Code also provides an example of the jurisdiction and venue require-
ments. CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 760.040 (West 1992) (entitled "Jurisdiction; equitable relief")
provides:
(a) The superior court has jurisdiction of actions under this chapter.
(b) The court has complete jurisdiction over the parties to the action and the
property described in the complaint and is deemed to have obtained possession and
control of the property for the purposes of the action with complete jurisdiction to
render the judgment provided for in this chapter.
(c) Nothing in this chapter limits any authority the court may have to grant
such equitable relief as may be proper under the circumstances of the case.
CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 760.050 (West Supp. 1993) (entitled "Venue") provides in part:
Subject to the power of the court to transfer actions, the proper county for the trial
of an action under this chapter is:
(b) Where the subject of the action is personal property, the county in which the
personal property is principally located at the commencement of the action or in
which the defendants, or any of them, reside at the commencement of the action.
199. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 762.010 (West Supp. 1993) provides "[tihe plaintiff shall
name as defendants in the action persons having adverse claims to the title of the plaintiff
against which a determination is sought." CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE § 762.020 (West Supp. 1993)
provides in relevant part that "(a) If the name of a person required to be named as a defend-
ant is not known to the plaintiff, the plaintiff shall so state in the complaint and shall name as
parties all persons unknown in the manner provided in Section 762.060." In turn, CAL. Civ.
PROC. CODE § 762.020 (West 1992) provides in part:
(a) In addition to the persons required to be named as defendants in the ac-
tion, the plaintiff may name as defendants "all persons unknown, claiming any legal
or equitable right, tide ... or interest in the property described in the complaint
adverse to plaintiff's title, or any cloud upon plaintiff's title thereto," naming them
in that manner.
(b) In an action under this section, the plaintiff shall name as defendants the
persons having adverse claims that are of record or known to the plaintiff...
(c) If the plaintiff admits the validity of any adverse claim, the complaint shall
so state.
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on the resulting title.200 The aggrieved party bears the burden of estab-
lishing colorable title to the software by presenting testimony of product
developers and key employees and by producing relevant documents, in-
cluding the software codes.
20 1
The court will dispose of the claims in a manner that affords complete
relief to the aggrieved party within the scope of the pleadings. 20 2 If prop-
erly raised by the pleadings, the parties may fully litigate the question of
software title according to the existing conditions and rights to the prod-
uct.203 The court, however, will only make a determination of superior
title as it relates to the named parties, 20 4 with the result that strangers to
the proceeding may hold the "true" title to the subject software.
20 5
E. Potential Resolution and Effect
An increased application of the quiet title action to challenges con-
cerning title to personal property would allow attorneys to resolve disputes
concerning software protected by any of the three traditional methods.
Owners could seek to quiet title to software otherwise protected by a pat-
ent or copyright if the statutory remedies proved inadequate. Perhaps of
greater importance, however, is the potential effectiveness of the quiet ti-
tle action in software disputes based on the misappropriation of trade
secrets. Owners of proprietary software who had relied solely on trade
200. CAL. CIV. PROc. CODE § 762.040 (West 1992).
201. The court renders judgment in accordance with the evidence and law. See CAL. Crv.
PROC. CODE § 764.010 (West Supp. 1993).
202. See id
203. CAL Crv. PROC. CODE § 760.030 (West Supp. 1993) provides:
(a) The remedy provided in this chapter is cumulative and not exclusive of any
other remedy, form or right of action, or proceeding provided by law for establish-
ing or quieting title to property.
(b) In an action or proceeding in which establishing or quieting title to prop-
erty is in issue the court in its discretion may, upon motion of any party, require that
the issue be resolved pursuant to the provisions of this chapter to the extent
practicable.
CAL. CMv. PROC. CODE § 764.010 (West 1992) provides for a hearing in which the court exam-
ines and determines the plaintiffs title against the claims of the defendant. The court ren-
ders its judgment in accordance with the evidence and law. Id.
204. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 764.030 (West Supp. 1993) (emphasis added) provides:
The judgment in the action is binding and conclusive on all of the following persons,
regardless of any legal disability:
(a) All persons known and unknown who were parties to the action and who
have any claim to the property, whether present or future, vested or contingent,
legal or equitable, several or undivided.
(b) Except as provided in Section 764.045, all persons who were not parties to
the action and who have any claim to the property which was not of record at the
time the lis pendens was filed or, if none was filed, at the time the judgment was
recorded.
205. CAL. CIM. PROC. CODE § 764.045 (West Supp. 1993) provides in part:
[T] he judgment does not affect a claim in the property or part thereof of any person
who was not a party to the action if any of the following conditions is satisfied:
(a) The claim was of record at the time the lis pendens was filed or, if none was
filed, at the time the judgment was recorded.
(b) The claim was actually known to the plaintiff.... Nothing in this subdivi-
sion shall be construed to impair the rights of a bonafide purchaser or encum-
brancer for value dealing with the plaintiff or the plaintiffs successors in interest.
Although this provision is more relevant to actions concerning real property, by definition
the statute could apply to actions involving personal property.
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secret protection could avail themselves of a cost-effective procedure to
resolve the question of ownership when a challenge arose. Moreover, the
quiet tide action may serve as a precursor to securing patent or copyright
protection.
IV. DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTIONS
A. Nature and Purpose
Although a "restricted" quiet title jurisdiction may preclude an ag-
grieved software owner from initiating a quiet title proceeding, a declara-
tory judgment action will most likely be available to the owner. Similar to
the quiet title action, a declaratory judgment ruling defines the relative
rights of the disputing parties with respect to the property at issue.
20 6
When the underlying dispute concerns rights of ownership, the declara-
tory judgment proceeding allows the parties to effectively adjudicate their
alleged ownership interests in the same manner as a quiet title action.
20 7
The declaratory judgment action differs in some respects from the
quiet title proceeding. In a quiet title action, the plaintiff seeks to prevent
a prospective interloper from taking financial advantage of his or her pre-
vious access to the "secret." The quiet title plaintiff's desire to take action
will most often arise before the interloper has demonstrated any solid in-
tent to benefit from the prior access. In such a situation, a court has noth-
ing to consider with respect to a "quieting of the title" because there is
nothing to "quiet" unless and until there is a colorable challenge to the
ownership of the property.20 8 An action for a declaratory judgment, on
the other hand, is not limited in this respect, because the purpose of the
action is to allow the court to determine the rights of the parties.
20 9
206. The Colorado enabling statute, similar to § 1 of the Uniform Declaratory Judgment
Act is typical: "Courts of record within their respective jurisdictions have power to declare
rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed."
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-51-105 (1987). For interpretation of this portion of the Act, see Lane
v. Page, 251 P.2d 1078 (Colo. 1952).
207. That is, as it applies here, insofar as the ownership interests in question arose as a
result of a contractual relationship between the parties. The Colorado enabling statute, simi-
lar to § 2 of the Uniform DeclaratoryJudgment Act is typical: "Any person interested under a
deed, will, written contract, or other writings constituting a contract . .. may have deter-
mined any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument... [or] contract
... and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder." COLO.
REv. STAT. § 13-51-106 (1987). This application lies in the present instance because of the
provision following: "A contract may be construed either before or after there has been a
breach thereof." COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-51-107 (1987); similar to § 3 of the Uniform Declara-
tory Judgment Act. For a specific example of an adjudication of contractual rights prior to
breach, see Hartford Ins. Group v. District Ct. for the Fourth Jud. Dist., 625 P.2d 1013 (Colo.
1981).
208. This consequence springs from the fact that a decree to quiet tide is in fact a decree
to define relative ownership rights, and where the court is unable to decide the question of
those relative ownership rights, such a decree is improper. Citizen's State Bank of Waterville,
Kan. v. Paul, 239 P. 880 (1925).
209. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
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B. Declaratory Judgments in Federal Court
Declaratory judgment actions are controlled within the federal courts
by Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Declaratory judgments
may be brought "between citizens of different states," under the authority
enumerated in Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution. Congress,
acting under that grant of authority, has determined that a citizen of one
state can bring action against a citizen in another state under this "diver-
sityjurisdiction" of the federal courts if the controversy arose from a cause
of action grounded in state law and if the damages claimed are in excess of
a statutory amount.2 10 Currently, the "amount-in-controversy" require-
ment is $50,000,211 which the purported owner will likely establish in the
situation where there was substantial "secondary" activity affecting the
trade secret.
The lack of a colorable challenge to tide, however, may serve as a bar
to a declaratoryjudgment action in federal court as a result of the "case or
controversy" requirement of the United States Constitution.2 12 Under this
clause, the federal courts may only hear those matters that have matured
into an actual controversy. Since the usual software tide dispute does not
present a defined controversy, a declaratory judgment action will probably
not lie for such matters in the federal courts. Plaintiffs, however, could
bring the majority, if not all, of those actions in state court, because all
states have statutes in place enabling the courts to determine and define
rights before a controversy actually arises.
C. Declaratory Judgments in State Court
States have enacted their own statutes authorizing declaratory judg-
ment actions, and a potential plaintiff would look to the enabling statute
in the applicable jurisdiction in order to determine the scope and form of
the action. The first step in such an examination would be to determine
whether the jurisdiction imposed a "case or controversy" limitation as
found in the federal constitution. 2 13 The majority of the state constitu-
tions contain no such limitation.
2 14
Second, the potential plaintiff must examine the jurisdiction's rule
concerning declaratory judgment actions. Each state has enacted its own
statute authorizing declaratory judgment actions, but most of the state en-
abling statutes, unlike those enabling quiet title actions, are modeled after
the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act.
2 15
210. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988).
211. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988).
212. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
213. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2.
214. For example, the Colorado Constitution allows courts increased latitude in ac-
cepting cases and an action seeking such a declaration need not be delayed until the owner
has suffered, or is about to suffer, damages as a result of the compromise of the trade secret.
COLO. RL Civ. P. 57(c) (1988) (stating that "[a] contract may be construed either before or
after there has been a breach thereof").
215. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1988). The enabling statute in Colorado, which was revised in
1973 to conform with the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, is typical of the state provi-
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The potential plaintiff's ability to bring a declaratory judgment action
depends on whether the complaint implicates an issue arising out of a
contract.2 1 6 This should not present an overwhelming problem, however,
because almost every fact scenario giving rise to the type of software dis-
pute under consideration involves access to a trade secret that was prohib-
ited by contract. Since the "cloud" on the title most likely arose when a
contractual relationship existed, the owner will probably not be precluded
from bringing a declaratory judgment action.
2 17
D. Jurisdiction Over the Parties
The nature of actions affecting either title to personal property, such
as the monopolistic right to software technology, or rights under a con-
tract are in personam actions rather than in rem proceedings, such as the
adjudication of title to real estate. As a result, a court will only adjudicate
a matter with respect to the parties properly before the court. If a declara-
toryjudgment action is to be effective in determining title, the owner of
the software should first identify all potential "problem" sources or de-
fendants, including entities whose claim to the secret might exist as a re-
sult of a "secondary contact" with the party causing the original
problem.2 18 Only by joining these persons or entities as parties in the
action can the owner ensure that each of the sources of future "problems"
are bound by the outcome of the suit.
Once all the potential sources of "clouds" on the title are identified
and enjoined, the next matter concerns the determination of whether the
court has personal jurisdiction over the defendants. 21 9 In most cases, the
sions. The statute, which was incorporated into the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure states in
part:
Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract, or other writings consti-
tuting a contract, or whose rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a
•.. contract... may have determined any question of construction or validity aris-
ing under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract, or franchise and obtain a
declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder.
COLO. Rav. STAT. § 13-51-101 (1987); COLO. R Civ. P. 57(b) (1988).
216. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
217. The language of the Colorado rule, as adapted from the Uniform Act, suggests its
application in this context. The provision states in part, "[t]his Rule is declared to be reme-
dial; its purpose is to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to
rights, status, and other legal relations; and is to be liberally construed and administered."
COLO. R. Civ. P. 57(k) (1988) (emphasis added).
218. The language of the Colorado statute as adapted from section 11 of the Uniform
Declaratory Judgments Act reads as follows: "When declaratory relief is sought, all persons
shall be made parties who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the declara-
tion, and no declaration shall prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the proceeding."
COLO. RFv. STAT. § 13-51-115 (1987).
219. The Supreme Court applied the Fourteenth Amendment to establish the principal
that a given court must have personal jurisdiction over the parties in order that action or-
dered by that court have validity:
Since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, the
validity of such judgments may be directly questioned, and their enforcement in the
State resisted, on the ground that proceedings in a court ofjustice to determine the
personal rights and obligations of parties over whom that court has no jurisdiction
do not constitute due process of law.
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877).
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court will have personal jurisdiction because the fact scenarios involving
software disputes result from the in-state domicile or other presence of the
defendant. If such a basis for jurisdiction does not exist in a given situa-
tion, it is difficult to imagine a situation that would give rise to a "cloud on
the title" which would not also give rise to the forum state having personal
jurisdiction over the defendant based on "minimum contacts." This would
certainly be true for all claimants to colorable title whose claim springs
from personal contact with the owner of the software. However, an owner
seeking to adjudicate his or her claim of superior title may have difficulty
obtaining personal jurisdiction over "derivative" or secondary claimants.
Absent the sufficient "presence" of the potential defendant in the fo-
rum state to establish jurisdiction of the courts of that state over the per-
son of the "interloper," the owner may use the state's "long-arm" statute to
establish the requisite jurisdiction. Such statutes, which grew out of the
Supreme Court's holding in International Shoe v. Washington,2 20 represent
the state legislatures' attempts to grant to their respective state courts the
power to "reach out" and exercise jurisdiction over parties who do not
otherwise maintain a sufficiently strong "presence" in the state to justify
personal jurisdiction. The problem such statutes present in the situation
currently under consideration is that, in order to establish jurisdiction,
they generally require either "tortious conduct" toward the plaintiff citizen
or a sustained economic presence within the state. In other words, the
statute requires the existence of the very situation that the owner either
does not want-prior damage as a result of a breach of the secret-or may
not have-a provable, sustained financial tie to the State.
CONCLUSION AND PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE
Software developers traditionally employ one or more of three con-
ventional methods of safeguarding ownership rights to computer software-
patent, copyright and trade secret protection. The benefits derived from
each form of protection depend largely on the owner's needs and the spe-
cific nature and application of the software. 221 Attorneys should therefore
consider the following factors when developing a package of protection
for computer software:
(1) The target market. If the owner intends to produce the prod-
uct for general distribution, the attorney should consider patent
and copyright protection. If the only concern, however, is the in-
house use of a proprietary software package, the attorney should
recommend trade secret protection to safeguard the owner's
interests.
(2) The importance of the underlying algorithm. The owner may con-
sider securing a patent as a means of complementing another
form of protection or otherwise restricting the market to facili-
tate effective trade secret protection.
220. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
221. Selinger, supra note 3, at 66.
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(3) The costs and benefits associated with each form of protection. The
attorney must consider the intended use of the software and allo-
cate the client's resources efficiently.
222
If the selected method of protection fails, the attorney should con-
sider initiating a quiet title action or seeking a declaratory judgment as a
means of resolving the question of software ownership. Because of the
statutory limitations in the majority of jurisdictions concerning personal
property claims, however, attorneys may not implement the quiet title ac-
tion as a universal approach to resolving software ownership disputes. Ac-
cordingly, just as attorneys evaluate relevant factors in selecting the means
of protecting computer software, counsel should weigh the following ele-
ments when considering an action to quiet software title:
(1) The scope of the applicable statute or court rule in the relevant juris-
diction. The threshold inquiry concerns whether the existing
source allows, by the language of the statute or judicial interpre-
tation, an action to quiet title to personal property.
(2) The procedural requirements. The attorney must adhere to the
procedural rules concerning pleadings, venue and joinder of
parties.
(3) The effect of an action to quiet title. The court will characterize
the result in terms of superior title by limiting the title determi-
nation to the joined parties, in contrast to awarding absolute ti-
tle, which would foreclose unknown adversary interests.
A distinct minority of jurisdictions currently allow adverse claimants
to initiate quiet title actions involving personal property. The widespread
availability of the quiet title action as a means of resolving software owner-
ship disputes therefore rests primarily with the majority of state legisla-
tures and judiciaries. Unless state legislatures and courts expand the
scope of the quiet title action beyond its historical application to interests
in real property, few software owners will realize the relative simplicity and
effectiveness of the procedure.
Although the quiet title approach remains unavailable in a majority of
jurisdictions, each state allows an action for a declaratory judgment, which
defines title to personal property in a manner analogous to the protection
afforded by a quiet title action. The software owner may then use the
declaratory judgment ruling as the foundation for obtaining an injunction
or other appropriate relief against adverse parties making unauthorized
use of the trade secret. In addition, the owner may bring a legal action for
conversion against any unauthorized recipient of the software or any of
the parties to the declaratory judgment proceeding who violate the terms
of the ruling before the owner obtains an injunction. In the rare situation
in which control of the trade secret has eroded to the point that a federal
222. See Root, supra note 8, at 229-30. Considering the ease and scope of protection and
the available remedies, one commentator suggests that attorneys seek copyright protection
for nearly all computer programs. Id. at 229. The author reasons that, even if the owner
employs primary means of coverage other than copyright, the complementary copyright may
prove invaluable because "the client will have erected a foundation of enforceable rights to
fall back upon should those [primary] means fail." Id at 229-30.
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diversity action is both jurisdictionally appropriate and required to protect
the secret, the size of the claim will likely satisfy the federal amount-in-
controversy requirement.
RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION, EQUITABLE SERVITUDES,
AND THE FEUDAL NATURE OF COMPUTER
SoFrwARE LICENSING
THOMAS M.S. HEMNES*
BACKGROUND: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMPUTER SOFTWARE LICENSE
A discussion of computer software licensing appropriately begins with
the question of why a license is needed at all. The purchase or sale of a
truck, a lathe, a set of instructional manuals or a box of pencils does not
require a complex legal document. At most, terms and conditions of sale
are printed on the back of a purchase order, or on an invoice, and no one
worries about them enough to hire a lawyer. Negotiations are usually lim-
ited to price, credit, delivery and warranty terms. It does not take a lawyer
to figure these out.
Why should software be any different? The license agreement immea-
surably complicates what otherwise seems a simple, straightforward busi-
ness transaction. From the vendor's standpoint, the license impedes sales;
from the user's standpoint, the license frustrates purchases. For everyone
involved, the license agreement dramatically increases transaction costs.
It is tempting to say that a license agreement is required because com-
puter software is a type of intellectual property, while a truck and a lathe
are not. But this answer is wholly inadequate. A book contains every bit as
much "intellectual property" as a computer program, yet the purchase of a
book is not conditioned on a "shrink wrap" license agreement.1 For that
matter, a truck or a lathe may embody patented inventions, the benefit of
which ordinary people blithely buy and sell without aid of license agree-
ments every day of the week. Again, why should computer programs be
any different?
The answer to this question is largely historical. At some point in the
development of computer technology, perhaps during the 1960s, people
came to see computer programs as having value independent of the hard-
ware on which they operated.2 This created a challenge for lawyers. If
one represented a client, A, who wanted to make his computer program
available to B for a price, into what legal framework did this transaction
* Partner, Foley, Hoag and Eliot. The author gratefully acknowledges the contribu-
tions of Mark Clark to the analysis presented in this article and the assistance of Daniel
Schaeffer and Karen Cheyney in its preparation.
1. A "shrink wrap" license agreement requires the consumer to abide by the terms of
the license when he opens the protective packaging containing the software. Opening the
packaging means that the consumer consents to the terms of the license. There are ques-
tions regarding the enforceability of such purported agreements. See infra note 26.
2. See Robert W. Wild, Comment, Computer Program Protection: The Need to Legislate a
Solution, 54 CoP.NELL L. REv. 586, 587 (1969); Note, Computer Programs and Proposed Reviso of
the Patent and Copyright Laws, 81 HAav. L. Rav. 1541, 1543-45 (1968).
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fit? It wasn't exactly a sale or lease of the program, because, in the typical
case, A wanted to continue to use the program, and to make the same
program available to C, D and E for a price as well.
The transaction was more like a sale of a copy 9 f the program, akin to
the sale of a copy of a book or of a device embodying a patented inven-
tion. But this categorization had the difficulty that computer programs,
unlike books, were not clearly protected by copyright in the 1960s and
early 1970s.3 Prevailing wisdom held that protection for computer
software programs was precluded by the principle that mathematical for-
mulas and algorithms were not patentable. 4 In the absence of clear copy-
right or patent protection, providing a copy to B would enable B to make
other copies and sell or give them away to C, D or E, destroying A's
market.
Lawyers for software developers were therefore driven to the conclu-
sion that trade secret law provided the only protection for their clients'
programs. 5 Trade secrets partake of the plasticity of the common law.
Anything can be a trade secret, as long as it is, in fact, maintained in se-
crecy and provides a competitive advantage to its owner.
6
3. For a discussion about the copyrightability of computer programs under the 1909
Copyright Act, see Note, supra note 2. The Copyright Act of 1976 extended protection to
computer programs to an unspecified extent. S H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54
(1976). It was not until 1980 that computer programs were definitively protected under
copyright law: "Any lingering doubts as to the copyrightability of computer programs was
dispelled by the Computer Software Copyright Act of 1980 which 'has the effect of clearly
applying the 1976 law to computer programs .... " 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.04[C], at 2-46.3 to 2-46.4 (1993) (footnotes omitted) (quoting H.R.
REP. No. 1307, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1980)); see Computer Software Copyright Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. (94 Stat.) 3028.
4. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585 (1978) (method for calculating "alarm limits"
during catalytic conversion process held unpatentable); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63
(1972) (method for converting binary-coded decimal numerals into binary numerals in a
digital computer held unpatentable). This impediment was substantially eliminated by Dia-
mond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981), which allowed patent protection for the process of
curing synthetic rubber while not pre-empting the use of the mathematical formula embod-
ied in the process. It is now widely believed that patent protection for software programs can
be obtained by describing an invention that embodies a program to achieve a particular
result. SeeJOHN T. SOMA, COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAw, §§ 2.02-2.03 (1983 & Supp.
1992). Thus far, however, there have been few court cases testing the validity of such patent
claims. Id.
5. See, e.g., Cybertek Computer Prod., Inc. v. Whitfield, 203 U.S.P.Q. 1020, 1022 (Cal.
Super. Ct. 1977); Amoco Prod. Co. v. Lindley, 609 P.2d 733, 743 (Okla. 1980); see also LESTER
HORwrrz & ETHAN HoRwrrz, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY COUNSELING AND LITIGATION
§ 11.03 [3] [a] (1994);Wild, supra note 2, at 590-92; Note, supra note 2, at 1554-56. In the early
days of computing, the majority of programs were protected by trade secret law, if at all.
Unlike copyrights and patents, trade secret protection has been analogized to a blanket,
.protecting everything beneath it," including both ideas, and the expression of those ideas.
HORWITZ, supra § 11.03[3]; see also T. Buckman, Comment, Protection of Proprietay Interest in
Computer Programs, 51 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 135 (1969).
6. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939). Section 757 defines trade secret as
follows:
A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of
information which is used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to
obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it. It may be a
formula for a chemical, compound, a process of manufacturing, treating or preserv-
ing materials, a pattern for a machine or other device, or a list of customers. It
differs from other secret information in a business (see § 759) in that it is not simply
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A trade secret may be disclosed to others without losing its protected
status, as long as the persons to whom it is disclosed agree that they will
not themselves disclose it.7 This principle has the absurd implication that
something can be a secret even if everyone knows it, much like in the story
of the Emperor's New Clothes.8 This fiction nevertheless forms the basis
in commerce for trade secrets, since, without it, the first disclosure would
destroy the protected status of the secret.
So far, one might conclude that a software developer in 1970 could
have simply required purchasers of copies of the program not to re-sell or
otherwise disclose it to anyone else. This would protect the secret, while
giving the purchaser the bargained-for use of the program. Still, no li-
cense would be required-only a simple nondisclosure agreement.
Lawyers for vendors perceived, however, that such an arrangement
would violate an ancient tenet of the common law-that "restraints on
alienation" are generally unenforceable. 9 According to the United States
Supreme Court, "[t]he right of alienation is one of the essential incidents
of a right of general property in movables . . . ."10 The Supreme Court
could have included real estate and some intangibles as well. The right of
alienation finds expression in such diverse places as the antitrust laws,"'
the Bankruptcy Code, 12 the Copyright Act, 13 patent law,14 and article 2 of
information as to single or ephemeral events in the conduct of the business, as, for
example, the amount or other terms of a secret bid for a contract or the salary of
certain employees, or the security investments made or contemplated, or the date
fixed for the announcement of a new policy or for bringing out a new model or the
like. A trade secret is a process or device for continuous use in the operation of the
business. Generally, it relates to the production of goods, as, for example, a
machine or formula for the production of an article. It may, however, relate to the
sale of goods or to other operations in the business, such as a code for determining
discounts, rebates or other concessions in a price list or catalogue, or a list of spe-
cialized customers, or a method of bookkeeping or other office management.
7. Management Science of Am. v. Cyborg, 6 Comp. L. Serv. Rep. 921 (N.D. Ill. 1978)
(distribution to 600 licensees under confidentiality agreements did not destroy secret); Data
Gen. Corp. v. Digital Controls Corp., 297 A.2d 433, 436 (Del. Ch. 1971), affd 297 A.2d 437
(Del. 1972) (distribution to licensees under confidentiality agreements did not destroy
secret).
8. See, e.g., AMY EHRLICH, THE RANDOM HousE BOOK OF FAIRY TALES 3 (1985) (adapted
from original by Hans Christian Anderson).
9. See THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAw 528-29 (5th
ed. 1956). Plucknett traces the principle of freedom of alienation to developments that oc-
curred about the year 1200. Id.
10. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v.John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 404 (1911); see also
Meyer v. Estes, 41 N.E. 683 (Mass. 1895); see generally Beley v. Naphtaly, 169 U.S. 353, 363
(1898); A. JAMES CASNER & W. BARTON LEACH, CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY 1075-82 (1st std.
ed. 1951 & Supp. 1959) (citing cases); 61 AM. JUR. 2D Perpetuities and Restraints on Alienation
§ 100 (1981) (citing cases).
11. See Dr. Miles Medical Co., 220 U.S. at 404.
12. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(0(1) (1988) (authorizing trustee or debtor in possession to as-
sign any executory contract that the Bankruptcy Code allows them to assume, notwithstand-
ing any provision in the contract or applicable law that "prohibits, restricts or conditions the
assignment of such contract.") There are some limitations on this power. See infra note 71.
13. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1988) ("the owner of a particular copy... lawfully made under
this title . .. is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise
dispose of the possession of that copy.. ."). Section 109 contains certain restrictions on the
right of alienation, which are not here relevant.
14. "[O]ne who buys patented articles of manufacture from one authorized to sell them
becomes possessed of an absolute property in such articles, unrestricted in time or place."
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the Uniform Commercial Code.15 It serves a variety of societal interests,
including: promoting free commerce in goods; avoiding resale price main-
tenance and other restraints of trade; preventing springing interests that
could defeat the rights of an owner; providing creditors a means of recov-
ery on debts; and promoting competition. 16 As the United States
Supreme Court stated in Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., 17 "[t]he incon-
venience and annoyance to the public that an opposite conclusion would
occasion are too obvious to require illustration."
18
Software is ordinarily made available in the form of some moveable,
tangible embodiment, such as diskettes or tapes. If A transferred title to
these chattels to B, B could transfer good title in the chattels to a person
who had not agreed to hold them in confidence, even if such a transfer
violated an obligation owed by B to A. 19 Like the little boy in The Em-
peror's New Clothes who dared to say that the emperor had no clothes
on, 20 the purchaser might lawfully tell the secret and thus destroy the basis
for the developer's rights.
2 1
To get around the conflict between the need for non-disclosure on
the one hand, and the right of alienation on the other, lawyers invented
the software license. The notion is to purport to give the user of the
software none of the indicia of ownership. Lack of ownership avoids the
'restraint on alienation" problem because the user never has more than a
bailment of the copy of the software. Unless the bailee is a merchant who
deals in goods of that kind,2 2 a mere bailee does not have the power to
transfer good title to a chattel.2 3 Thus, carefully drafted software licenses
never "sell" anything to the user, not even the copy of the program that is
delivered to the user.
2 4
Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659, 666 (1895) (holding that purchaser of
articles manufactured by patentee may re-sell the articles in a territory which the patentee
had granted exclusive rights to another person).
15. U.C.C. § 2-403(l) (1978) ("A person with voidable title has power to transfer a good
title to a good faith purchaser for value.").
16. See, e.g., CASNER & LEACH, supra note 10, at 1080 (quoting Meade v. Dennistone, 196
A. 33 (Md. 1937) ("restraints take property out of commerce ..
17. 157 U.S. 659 (1895).
18. Id. at 667.
19. See U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (1978) ("A purchaser of goods acquires all title which his trans-
feror had or had power to transfer. . . ."); see also RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86, 89
(2d Cir.) ("Restrictions upon the uses of chattels once absolutely sold are at least prima facie
invalid; they must be justified for some exceptional reason, normally they are 'repugnant' to
the transfer of the title."), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 712 (1940).
20. See EHRUCH, supra note 8, at 3. t
21. See infra Part II.B for a discussion of the question whether a purchaser of a copy
could be held to his seller's agreement not to disclose it.
22. See U.C.C. § 2-403(2) (1978).
23. Id.
24. See Miles R Gilburne & Ronald L. Johnston, The Protection and Enforcement of Trade
Secrets in Software and High Technology Information, in DANIEL T. BRooKs & MicHAE S.
KEPLINGER, SOFrWARE PROTECTION: CuRRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN COPYRIGHT AND PATENT AND
THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO TRADE SECRET 225, 239 (1982) ("[I]n light of policies against re-
straints on alienation, restrictions on use or disclosure of a licensed product are more likely
to be enforceable than with respect to a sold product.").
[Vol. 71:3
1994] FEUDAL NATURE OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE LICENSING 581
With this addition, one has all of the ingredients of the classic
software license. 25 The license recites that the licensed program is a valua-
ble trade secret of the vendor, the use or disclosure of which without the
vendor's permission would cause irreparable injury. Indeed it would: law-
ful disclosure by any licensee would break one link in the chain of nondis-
closure obligations on which trade secret protection hangs. The license
further recites that the vendor retains all right, title and interest in the
copy of the program that is being provided to the user. This finesses the
restraint on alienation problem. The license permits the licensee to use
the program, but only to the extent provided in the agreement. Finally,
the agreement is signed by the licensee, to ensure its enforceability. 2 6
In most cases, the retention of "tile" in the "licensor" is little more
than a legal fiction. Although the license purports to create a reversionary
interest in the licensor at the termination of the license, few if any copies
of licensed software are ever returned to their licensors. Even when a li-
cense terminates, the license will ordinarily provide that the licensee may
certify that it has destroyed all copies of the licensed program in its posses-
sion as an alternative to returning the program. In reality there are very
few instances in which this is actually done. Instead, the licensee assumes
practical ownership of a copy, under the legal fiction that its possession is
a mere bailment.
Once lawyers persuaded software developers that they could not sell
their programs like books and instead had to demand that their customers
sign onerous license agreements as a condition to access to the software,
the floodgates were opened for lawyers to pile into the agreements all pro-
tections they could think of for their clients. Warranty disclaimers, limita-
tions on liability, noncompetition covenants and clauses indemnifying the
vendor against third party claims all seemed to be insignificant if the cus-
tomer were already willing to sign a rather burdensome license agreement
to gain access to the software.
The next section of this Article will demonstrate that the software li-
cense recreated one of the most ancient forms of property ownership.
II. THE FEUDAL NATURE OF SoFTWARE LICENSING
A. Characteristics of the Feudal System
As we have seen, the computer software license was an effort to sepa-
rate a right of possession from the right of alienation. The latter right was
not always a feature of our law. In feudal times, title to real property could
25. See infra Appendix for a representative computer software license agreement.
26. "Shrink wrap" agreements included in the packaging of computer software are not
signed; as a result there are nagging worries about their enforceability. At least one state has
a statute that makes such agreements enforceable. See LA. Ray. STAT. ANN. 51:1963-65 (West
1987). Portions of that statute, however, were found to be preempted by the Copyright Act.
Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 655 F. Supp. 750, 762-63 (E.D. La. 1987) (statute provi-
sions allowing software licensor to prohibit acts of licensee which are permitted under § 117
of Copyright Act were preempted and license provisions forbidding such acts were unen-
forceable), aftd 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).
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not be passed without the consent of the lord of whom it was held. 27 The
chain of title descended vertically from the Crown, rather than temporally
from one's predecessors in interest. 28 The Crown held all land as "lord
paramount."29 The Crown granted "tenures" in exchange for certain du-
ties or services.3 0 The grantee could grant "subtenures," also called "sub-
infeudations."3 1 If he did, the grantee became a "mesne lord" with
respect to persons holding of him. 32 Land so held of another was known
as a "feud," "fief" or "fee." The process continued through the layers of
society (sometimes seven or eight of them in all) until it reached the per-
sons who actually created the avails of the land, the "tenants paravail."
33
An important feature of the feudal system was the personal nature of
the relation between lord and tenant or vassal. The relation was created
through the ceremonies of "homage" and "fealty" by which the lord and
tenant bound themselves to one another3 4 Vassals owed duties of military
or other service (including in some cases payment of money) to their
lords.35 The lords also enjoyed the "incidents" of homage, relief, wardship
and marriage, aids and escheat.3 6 The lords, in turn, owed duties of pro-
tection to vassals. Plate 1 summarizes the feudal system of land tenure.
27. CASNER & LEACH, supra note 10, at 251; PLUCKNETT, supra note 9, at 539. This state-
ment may represent Norman views imposed on a rather different English custom. Id. at 517,
539-40.
28. There is some question whether "feudalism" as a unified doctrine ever existed
throughout Europe. See, e.g., PLucKNE'rr, supra note 9, at 509 ("All these characteristics of
feudalism ... are subject to infinite variation in every quarter of Europe ...
29. GLEASON L. ARcHRg, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 20 (2d ed. 1927).
30. Id.; HERBERT THORNDIKE TIFFANY, A TF.ATIsE ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PRop-
ERTY AND OTHER INTERESTS IN LAND 13 (Carl Zollmann, abr. ed. 1940).
31. ARCHER, supra note 29, at 20; TIFFANY, supra note 30, at 14.
32. TIFANY, supra note 30, at 14.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 18; PLUCENETr, supra note 9, at 507.
35. CAsNER & LEACH, supra note 10, at 253-54; PLucEeTrr, supra note 9, at 531-32.
36. CAsNER & LEACH, supra note 10, at 254-56.
[Vol. 71:3
19941 FEUDAL NATURE OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE LICENSING
Tenant Substitution Tenant









There were two means of alienation in the feudal system.3 7 One was
the creation of a subinfeudation. 38 A second was the substitution of one
tenant for another.39 Either of them was potentially damaging to the abil-
ity of the tenant's lord or lords to realize the value of the services and
incidents that were due them. "In the case of substitution the incoming
tenant might be poor, dishonest, or unfriendly ...."-40 Subinfeudation
undermined the lord's ability to realize the value of the incidents of "ward-
ships, relief, marriage and escheat."
4 1
To prevent these threats to the lords' interests, the practice in Nor-
mandy was to require every subinfeudation and every substitution to be
confirmed by the tenant's lord and by every superior lord.42 This require-
ment was never clearly adopted in England, at least with respect to
37. See PLUCKNEIT, supra note 9, at 538; CASNER & LEAcH, supra note 10, at 259.
38. See PLUCKNETrr, supra note 9, at 538; CASNER & LEAcH, supra note 10, at 259.
39. See PLUCKNETT, supra note 9, at 538.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 538-39; TiwAY, supra note 30, at 20.
42. PLUCKNETr, supra note 9, at 539-40.
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subinfeudation. 43 As a result tenants in England were able to use subin-
feudation to realize the value of their holdings, while defeating almost
entirely the ability of their lords to realize more than nominal value from
their seignories. 44 The nobility acted repeatedly to remedy the prob-
lem. 45 The third Great Charter (1217) stated, "No freeman henceforward
shall give or sell so much of his land that the residue shall be insufficient
to support the service due in respect thereof to the lord of the fee."
46
More importantly, the celebrated Statute Quia Emptores4 7 abolished alto-
gether the practice of subinfeudation of an entire fief.48 In exchange,
however, it ratified the process of substitution of one tenant for another. 49
The Statute Quia Emptores has sometimes been cited as the well-
spring for the common law's hostility to restraints upon alienation.5 0 In
fact, as we have seen, English law and practice had favored alienation to a
greater extent than Norman law since a time that antedated the Magna
Carta. 51 Furthermore, the Statute Quia Emptores actually abolished an
important form of alienation-the practice of subinfeudation of the ten-
ant's entire fief.5 2 The Statute Quia Emptores did, however, expressly per-
mit any tenant in fee simple to sell part or all of his tenancy by substitution
without his lord's permission,5 3 and without payment of any fee to the
lord.54 The substituted tenant or tenants would hold directly of the
lord.55 Although the substituted tenant might be less reliable than the
one he had chosen, the lord always had recourse to his right of forfeiture
if there were a default in the new tenant's rendering of service to the
lord.5 6
43. Id. at 540; TiWA, Y, supra note 30, at 19-20. Plucknett suggests that substitution with-
out the lord's consent may have occurred in England, while Casner and Leach definitively
rule it out. Compare PLUCKNETr, supra note 9, at 540 with CASNER & LEACH, supra note 10, at
259.
44. PLUcKNErr, supra note 9, at 539. A tenant could, for example, deprive his lord of the
value of the incident of wardship by selling the right to occupy his land for a substantial sum
(none of which would go to the lord) and then subinfeud the purchaser for a nominal
sum-"a rose at midsummer." Id. If the tenant died leaving a minor heir, the lord could
collect only the rose until the heir reached majority. Id.
45. See id. at 540.
46. Id. (quoting the third Great Charter (1217)); see also TinFANY, supra note 30, at 19-20.
Although designed to protect lords against loss of rights through alienation, Plucknett and
Tiffany agree that this clause had little effect. See PLUCKNETr, supra note 9, at 540; TnTFFAN,
supra note 30, at 20. In any event, it was superseded in 1290 by the celebrated Statute Quia
Emptores, 18 Edw. 1, ch. 1 (1290) (Eng.). Id.
47. 18 Edw. 1, ch. 1 (1290) (Eng.).
48. Casner and Leach note that the prohibition on subinfeudations was achieved by
interpretation of the statute, as it did not appear in the text. CASNER & LEACH, supra note 10,
at 260.
49. See PLUCKNE1-r, supra note 9, at 540.
50. See ARCHER, supra note 29, at 25.
51. See PLUCKNE=r, supra note 9, at 539-41.
52. See ARCHER, supra note 29, at 25; PLUCKNE-rr, supra note 9, at 540; TiffANY, supra note
30, at 20-21. Subinfeudation of a part of a tenancy, for example by the creation of a life
estate or an estate for years, continued to be permitted. TiEANy, supra note 30, at 21.
53. See CASNER & LEACH, supra note 10, at 260.
54. See id.
55. See PLUCKNE=r, supra note 9, at 540; Tinar A, supra note 30, at 20-21.
56. CASNER & LEACH, supra note 10, at 253. By contrast, if a tenant subinfeuded his
entire fief to another and then defaulted in his services to his lord, the fief would forfeit to
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The Statute Quia Emptores represented a significant step in the con-
version of property from one in which the personal relationship of vassal-
age dominated to one in which the personal relationship took second
place to ownership of the land itself.57 By abolishing the creation of new
enfoeffments, the Statute Quia Emptores led directly to the eventual aboli-
tion of the feudal system as a whole.
58
B. Feudal Characteristics of Software Licensing
The system of software distribution under license is analogous to the
feudal system of land tenure. The computer program constitutes a trade
secret owned entirely by the program's developer. The developer dis-
closes the secret to distributors, who enter into a personal contract with
the developer. The contract recites that the secret still belongs to the de-
veloper (licensor) and binds the distributors to maintain the secrecy of the
program, and to pay certain royalties or other amounts to the developer.
The developer, in return, promises to defend the title to the software.
The distributors-mesne lords, in feudal terminology-enter into subli-
censes with end users. These end users-who derive benefit from the in-
tellectual property as tenants paravail-bind themselves to the distributors
on terms analogous to the distributors' contracts with the developer.
Neither the distributor nor the end user is permitted to alienate its rights,
either by sublicense or substitution, without the consent of the licensor.
As in the case of feudal ownership of real property, the personal rela-
tionship between intellectual property licensor and licensee is considered
a vital part of the relationship. Both copyright and patent licenses5 9 have
traditionally been considered mere covenants not to sue, personal to the
named licensee, and not assignable by the licensee without the consent of
the lord, but the lord would be bound by the terms of the subinfeudation. If the subinfeuda-
tion required only the payment of a "rose at midsummer," that is all the lord would receive.
PLUCKNE-r, supra note 9, at 539. The fact that such an obvious ruse could be used to defeat
the services due to a feudal lord suggests the view that the feudal system was never completely
implemented in England.
57. CASNER & LEACH, supra note 10, at 260.
58. See PLUCKNETr, supra note 9, at 540-41; TlnFmNY, supra note 30, at 21. The statute's
prohibition against subinfeudation-which was probably intended to shore up the feudal
system by protecting the incidents of lordships-actually contributed to its demise. The ten-
ancies of mesne lords regularly terminated as a result of causes such as escheat (reversion to
the lord for lack of a surviving heir). With no new infeudations being created, the feudal
pyramid was inexorably flattened and, in the seventeenth century, it was abolished alto-
gether. See PLUCKNETr, supra note 9, at 540-41; TIFFANY, supra note 30, at 21.
59. United States law seldom distinguishes between the assignability of copyright
licenses and patent licenses. For example, in Harris v. Emus Records Corp., 734 F.2d 1329
(9th Cir. 1984), the court decided the transferability of a copyright license primarily by anal-
ogy with decisions relating to patent licenses. Id. at 1333-34. It cited only two cases regarding
transferability of copyright licenses, both without discussion, and one of the cited cases was
itself decided by reliance on patent decisions. Id. at 1333 (citing Ilyin v. Avon Publications,
144 F. Supp. 368, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (copyright licensee had no right to assign its privi-
lege)); cf Mills Music v. Cromwell Music, 126 F. Supp. 54, 61-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (deciding
assignability of copyright license by analysis of whether contract involved "a relationship of
personal credit and confidence." (quoting Paige v. Faure, 127 N.E. 898, 899 (N.Y. 1920))).
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the licensor. 6° There is a strong sense that persons who create copyright-
able or patentable property select their licensees with care, and should not
suffer to have a different licensee imposed on them by assignment of the
license. To bolster this principle, software licenses typically provide that
they are personal in nature and not assignable or sublicensable without
the consent of the licensor.61 Plate 2 summarizes the typical system of
software usage. The parallels to the feudal system of land use are
striking.
62
60. Harris, 734 F.2d at 1333-34 (citing Hapgood v. Hewitt, 119 U.S. 226, 233 (1886));
Unarco Industries, Inc. v. Kelley Co., 465 F.2d 1303 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 929
(1973)) (holding that trustee in bankruptcy did not have power under prior law to transfer a
nonexclusive copyright license, and relying on established patent authority); see PPG Indus-
tries, Inc. v. Guardian Indus. Corp., 597 F.2d 1090, 1093-94 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
930 (1979); Ilyir, 144 F. Supp. at 372 (applying traditional approach); Mills Music, 126 F.
Supp. at 61-62; see also 3 NIMMER ON CoPYIGrHT, supra note 3, §§ 10.01 [C] [4],10-02[B] [4];3
PETER D. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 16.01 [1] [b] (2ded. 1991).
61. See infra Appendix, § 3. There is a trend toward provisions allowing transfer of the
licenses of "off the shelf" software. The implications of such transfer, and of transfers to
which the licensor has not consented, are discussed later in this Article.
62. A further point of similarity is that the system of software licensing is, to a varying
extent, a fiction that is only occasionally enforced in reality. Thus, for example, non-assign-
ment clauses are frequently disregarded in practice, without any complaint from the
licensors.
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If one accepts that modern software licensing has taken a form that is
analogous to the feudal system of land tenure, it is worth inquiring
whether the pressures that undid the feudal system might not have ana-
logues at work in the context of software licensing. In particular, one
would expect to find a growing tendency to consider licensed rights in
computer software (or, for that matter, other embodiments of intellectual
property) to be alienable property of the licensee, rather than a personal
privilege granted to the licensee by the licensor. That would lead, in turn,
to commercial resistance against restraints on alienation, and even cases
holding that agreed-to restraints on alienation are unenforceable.
All three processes are already underway. To begin with, the tradi-
tional principle that a patent or copyright license is personal to the licen-
see is no longer followed in all jurisdictions. 63 The alternate line of
authority springs from the decision of Justice Traynor in Farmland Irriga-
tion Co. v. Dopplmaier.64 Beginning with the observation that earlier fed-
63. See infra notes 64-73 and accompanying text.
64. 308 P.2d 732 (Cal. 1957).
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eral common law limiting the assignability of patent licenses was not
binding following Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins,65 Justice Traynor found no
reason to exempt patent licenses "from a general rule adapted to facilitate
the freest possible transfer of valuable contract rights .... "66 The court
held that assignability should be determined by asking, as to each license,
whether "the duties imposed upon [the licensee] may be of such a per-
sonal nature that their performance by someone else would in effect de-
prive the [licensor] of that for which he bargained, '67 or whether
"assignment would materially impair the [licensor's] chance of obtaining
the performance he expected."
68
The easiest case for permitting an unconsented assignment would be
a reorganization of a business, in which the use of the licensed product by
the successor in interest is in practical terms indistinguishable from that of
the original licensee. For example, in Synergy Methods, Inc. v. Kelly Energy
Systems,69 Judge Pettine allowed the assignment of a technology license in
connection with a merger.70 A harder case occurs when the licensee is to
perform substantial services on behalf of the licensor, as, for example, in
the case of a distributorship agreement. The assignee might be less capa-
ble of performing these services than the original licensee was, thus de-
priving the licensor of the benefit of the bargain. Even this consideration
might be overcome, however, in reorganization proceedings where the
success of a debtor's reorganization might well depend on its ability to
transfer valuable licensed rights to a successor entity. 71 Thus, the bank-
65. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
66. Dopplmaier, 308 P.2d at 740.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 741.
69. 695 F. Supp. 1362, 1366 (D.R.I. 1988) (quoting Trubowitch v. Riverbank Canning
Co., 182 P.2d 182, 188 (Cal. 1947) (Traynor, J.)) (validity of a transfer resulting from a
change in the form of the licensee's business "depends upon whether it affects the interests
of the parties protected by the nonassignability of the contract.").
70. Contra PPG Industries, Inc. v. Vanguard Indus. Corp., 597 F.2d 1090, 1093-94 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 930 (1979).
71. The Bankruptcy Code authorizes a trustee or debtor in possession to assign any ex-
ecutory contract that the Code allows them to assume, "notwithstanding a provision in an execu-
tory contract or... in applicable law, that prohibits, restricts or conditions the assignment of
such contract," subject only to an obligation to provide "adequate assurance of future per-
formance" to the other party. 11 U.S.C. § 365(f) (1988) (emphasis added). The trustee/
debtor-in-possession is barred from nonconsensual assumption of leases and licenses only to
the extent that "applicable law excuses [the licensor] ... from accepting performance from
or rendering performance to an entity other than the debtor or debtor in possession,
whether or not such contract... prohibits or restricts assignment of rights or delegation of
duties." 11 U.S.C. § 365(c) (1) (A) (1988). Therefore if a software licensee were in bank-
ruptcy and the license were held not to be "personal" in nature, as seems quite possible, the
licenses could be transferred without the licensor's consent, even if they contained antias-
signment clauses. See, e.g., In re Taylor Mfg., Inc., 6 B.R. 370 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980).
There is authority in the First and Fifth Circuits, however, which holds that the Bank-
ruptcy Code permits assumption and assignment in spite of "state laws that enforce contract
provisions prohibiting assignment"; by contrast, laws "that forbid assignment even when the
contract is silent.., are to be heeded." In re Pioneer Ford Sales, Inc., 729 F.2d 27, 28-29 (1 st
Cir. 1984) (invalidating assignment of franchise agreement because state statute required
franchisor's consent to transfer); accord In re Braniff Airways, Inc., 700 F.2d 935, 943 (5th Cir.
1983) (assignment of airline's airport lease disapproved without airport's consent because
District of Columbia Code and FAA regulations required such consent). The Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that a trustee or debtor in possession in bankruptcy has no greater
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ruptcy court in Matter of Sentty Data, Inc.72 held that a software distribution
agreement was transferable without the licensor's consent because it was
not personal in nature.
73
At the same time that the personal nature of the license relationship
has come under question, software licensees have bargained for, and won,
more of the indicia of ownership. Today, it is common for a licensee to
negotiate for a "fully paid up, royalty free, perpetual" license to use a basic
item of software. Although it is probably unnecessary, 74 language of this
kind increases the licensee's comfort level that the vendor's bankruptcy
cannot trigger a forfeiture of the licensed rights, which may be vital to the
operation of the licensee's business. Even if the vendor's pricing strategy
contemplates a stream of payments rather than a single, up front payment,
the vendor can accommodate this request because it can tie a stream of
payments to "updates" and "maintenance" of the software, rather than to
the basic right to use it.
A factor contributing to vendors' tolerances for such perpetual
licenses is the expanded scope of copyright and patent protection for
software. The original justification for going to the trouble of a licensing
agreement was to protect the software as a trade secret because other
forms of protection were at best of doubtful validity through the early
1970s. 75 Since that time, the United States Copyright Act has been
amended to extend copyright protection explicitly to computer pro-
grams; 76 the European Communities have adopted a Directive requiring
all member states to protect computer programs under copyright;77 and
the courts, particularly in the United States, have gone overboard in their
zeal to accord programs protection at least equal to that given books and
other copyrighted works. 78 Furthermore, patents are increasingly per-
power to transfer a copyright license than a licensee that is not in bankruptcy. Harris v. Emus
Records Corp., 734 F.2d 1329, 1334 (6th Cir. 1984). However, the vitality of the Harris deci-
sion is doubtful. It was grounded in limiting language that appeared in the old Bankruptcy
Act but not in the current Bankruptcy Code. "Section 70(a) (5) of the Bankruptcy Act pro-
vides for the transfer of all assets which the bankrupt 'could by any means have transferred
.. ' prior to the petition for bankruptcy." Id. at 1334.
72. 87 B.R. 943 (Bankr. N.D. 11. 1988).
73. Id.
74. Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code that were enacted in 1988 effectively prevent
an intellectual property license from terminating the licensee's right. See Thomas M.S.
Hemnes, Computer Software Licensing After the Enactment of the Intellectual Property Bankruptcy
Protection Act, COMPuTEk LAw., No. 10, Oct. 1988, at 7, 9.
75. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
76. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1988).
77. Council Directive 91/250, art. 1, 1991 OJ. (L 122) 42, 44.
78. See, e.g., Whelan Assoc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1238-40 (3d Cir.
1986) (holding copyright extends to the "structure, sequence, and organization" of a pro-
gram), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp.,
714 F.2d 1240, 1249 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding copyright protection extends to machine-reada-
ble code), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l,
740 F. Supp. 37, 68 (D. Mass. 1990) (holding Lotus 1-2-3's user interface contains copyright-
able elements). These cases have recently been questioned. The Whelan court's "structure,
sequence, and organization" formula was not followed in Computer Assoc. Int'l v. Altai, Inc.,
775 F. Supp. 544, 559 (E.D.N.Y. 1991). Lotus arguably extends copyright protection beyond
that given to books in Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 107 (1879), which held that a method of
double entry book-keeping, manifested in the forms, charts, and columns printed in a trea-
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ceived as available for computer software, 79 according rights that are ar-
guably much deeper than those available under copyright.8 0
In the relaxed atmosphere encouraged by such broad noncontractual
protection for software, it is easy to overlook the fact that a "fully paid up,
royalty free, perpetual" license is virtually indistinguishable from the sale
of a copy. To return to the real estate model, a deed conveying the per-
petual right to use a parcel is considered a conveyance of fee simple, and
clauses in the conveyance purporting to restrict its alienation or attach-
ment are void under the rule of the Statute Quia Emptores. 81 It seems
likely that, given an appropriate case, a court would explode the fiction
that a fully paid up, royalty free, perpetual license is not a sale.
In the context of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, the fic-
tion is regularly disregarded. In Communications Groups, Inc. v. Warner Com-
munications Inc.,82 the court held that installation by the plaintiff of its
specially designed computer software involved a transaction of movable,
tangible and identifiable products or "goods" under the U.C.C.8 3 The
court disregarded language in the agreement purporting to retain title in
the licensor and characterizing the agreement as a "license," in part be-
cause the licensee paid a one-time perpetual license fee. 84 The court con-
cluded that Article 2 of the U.C.C. governed the transaction.
85
If the license is merely a sale in disguise, then the clauses in the "li-
cense" agreement prohibiting subsequent transfer by the "licensee" are
nothing more than unenforceable restraints on alienation.8 6 Ironically, in
adopting a feudal model for software licensing, lawyers for vendors thus
sowed the seeds of its own demise. Just as the Statute Quia Emptores un-
dermined the feudal system, its latter-day progeny, the Copyright Act, pat-
ise, was not copyrightable. See also Ronald Abramson, Why Lotus-Paperback Uses the Wrong Test
And What the New Software Protection Legislation Should Look Like, COMPUTER LAW., No. 8, Aug.
1990, at 6-7; D. Lee Antton & Gary M. Hoffman, Copyright Protection and Innovation: The Impact
of Lotus Development v. Paperback Software, CoMPuTrR LAw., No. 8, Aug. 1990, at 1, 3.
79. See SoMA, supra note 4.
80. Unlike copyright, patent protects against the independent creation of the same in-
vention. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1988) (defining exclusive rights of patentee) with 17
U.S.C. § 106 (1988) (defining exclusive rights of copyright holder).
81. ARCHER, supra note 29, at 113.
82. 527 N.Y.S.2d 341 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1988).
83. Id. at 345-46; see also Advent Sys. Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670, 675 (3d Cir.
1991) (computer software is a "good" within the meaning of the Pennsylvania version of the
Uniform Commercial Code); RRX Indus., Inc. v. LAB-CON, Inc., 772 F.2d 543, 546 (9th Cir.
1985) (computer software system was a "good" rather than a service, for purposes of the
California Commercial Code). But see United States v. Brown, 925 F.2d 1301, 1307 (10th Cir.
1991) (computer program was intangible intellectual property, and as such, did not consti-
tute goods, wares, merchandise, securities or monies within the meaning of the National
Stolen Property Act).
84. Communication Groups, 527 N.Y.S.2d at 345. Oddly, the court reasoned that this
made the transaction a lease, rather than a sale. In this regard, the court's reasoning was
probably result-oriented. Notwithstanding the U.C.C.'s statement that it only applies to sales,
courts have often applied it to leases where the lease has no termination date or the lessee
has continued, uninterrupted use of the leased item at the end of the lease. See L. J. KtrrraN,
COMPUTER SovrwAE: PROECrION/ LALtAirr/LAw/FoRMs, § 1.11 (2], at 1-27 (1993).
85. Communication Groups, 527 N.Y.S.2d at 345.
86. See supra notes 9-17 and accompanying text.
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ent law, the common law and the Bankruptcy Code, 87 lie in wait to
challenge restraints on alienation imposed in a modem transaction, par-
ticularly if the transaction is a sale masquerading as a foeffment.
In at least one case, the restraints failed. In First Nationwide Bank v.
Florida Software Services,88 two software vendors had licensed computer
software programs to two savings and loan institutions ("S&Ls"). 89 The
licenses were each for five years, and required both up-front license fees
and quarterly payments.90 As is customary, the vendors' licenses required
the licensees to hold the software in secrecy and confidence, 9 1 and pre-
vented the licensees from transferring or assigning their interests in the
software without the consent of the vendors.
92
The S&Ls followed their own custom by becoming insolvent. Their
assets were acquired by the plaintiff in the action, First Nationwide Bank,
under procedures established by the Financial Institutions Reform, Recov-
ery and Enforcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA"). 93 The licenses were in ef-
fect at the time of the acquisition, and First Nationwide continued to use
the licensed software and to make the quarterly payments through the end
of the license terms.9 4 The vendors objected to such use on the ground
that it violated the anti-assignment provision of the license agreements.
95
They rather ungenerously offered consent, however, if the bank paid addi-
tional license fees totaling almost $2 million (the original license fees had
totaled about $750,000).96
The court refused to enforce the anti-assignment clause of the license
agreements, on two grounds: 1) permitting the assignment did not "in-
fringe on any substantive right of [the vendors]"; 9 7 and 2) requiring the
bank to pay an additional license fee "is contrary to the general contract
principles of good faith and fair dealing."98
The "general contract principles of good faith and fair dealing" are
not a satisfying explanation for the court's decision. The insolvent banks
knowingly accepted licenses that were not assignable. Presumably, they
might have bargained for assignable licenses, and paid a higher price for
the privilege of assignment. The court permitted them to transfer more
rights than they had, without paying the toll that a right to transfer might
87. See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
88. 770 F. Supp. 1537 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
89. Id. at 1539.
90. Id. The court's opinion does not state whether the quarterly payments were for the
right to use the software, for maintenance, or both.
91. Id. at 1540. The court's opinion notes that the banks had access to the vendors'
trade secrets." Id.
92. Id. at 1539.
93. Act of August 9, 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. (103 Stat.) 183
(amending 12 U.S.C. § 1821).
94. 770 F. Supp. at 1540. When the vendors refused to accept the quarterly payments,
the bank started depositing them into the court. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1539-40.
97. Id. at 1541. To the extent that this conclusion requires an interpretation of FIRREA,
it is beyond the scope of this paper.
98. Id. at 1542.
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have required. Does that order not violate the "principles of good faith
and fair dealing" as least as much as the licensors' insistence on an argua-
bly inflated transfer fee?
One might argue that the licensors sought to obtain, in effect, a wind-
fall from the licensees' misfortune in becoming insolvent. However, this
argument also falls short of the mark. It is the essence of contract law that
one may insist on the benefit of a bargain, even if its enforcement results
in an unexpected profit.
The court's comments only have force if one believes that the licen-
sors did in fact receive the benefit of their bargains. As has been noted,
the court based its conclusion on the finding that the use was permitted to
the original licensees, and that there had been no disclosure beyond that
permitted by the original licensees. In fact, there had been a new disclo-
sure, even if access to the program following the reorganization was lim-
ited to the same employees who had access before. After the
reorganization, those persons were employed by a new entity First Nation-
wide, which therefore gained access to the programs to the extent that a
corporation can ever have access to any form of information. However, it
is clear that the court had in mind what one might call the "objective"
extent of disclosure of the trade secrets-i.e. how many people knew and
used it-not the legal identity of the employer of those people.
In other words, the court's result seems correct, and its comment
about "good faith and fair dealing" appropriate, if one believes that the
identity of the licensee is immaterial to the license transaction. As long as
the licensee paid the homage the license required of it (i.e., did not ex-
ceed the licensee's scope of use and non-disclosure provisions), the licen-
sor cannot complain if the homage is paid by original Licensee A or by
Licensee B.
The elimination of the personal nature of the relation between lord
and tenant was, as we have seen, one of the fundamental changes wrought
by the Statute Quia Emptores. After the Statute Quia Emptores, a lord
could not complain if the identity of his tenant changed. 9 So also, under
the rule of First Nationwide, the identity of a software licensee is not a mate-
rial part of the vendor's bargain.100 It is the performance of the contract
that counts, regardless of the identity of the person performing it.
Under the Statute Quia Emptores, the substituted tenant held directly
of the lord, who could, in turn, proceed directly against the substituted
tenant for satisfaction of the terms of the fief. Whether a software vendor
could proceed directly against the transferee of a licensee's rights was not
resolved in First Nationwide. It is this question to which we now turn.
II. ALIENATION AND EQUITABLE SERVITUDES
The First Nationwide court was assisted in reaching its result because
the assignment of the license did not result in any expansion of the
99. See supra notes 49-57 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 88-98 and accompanying text.
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software's use or disclosure of the vendors' trade secrets to individuals
other than the ones who had access to the trade secrets under the original
agreement. 10 1 By the time the case was decided, the licenses had expired,
and the bank's respective obligation to comply with licenses was not at
issue.10 2 In many cases, these favorable conditions would not exist. As-
suming that First Nationwide represents the vanguard of what might be-
come a typical holding, the next question is whether restrictive covenants
imposed on licensees might be enforceable against transferees of the
software, even if clauses that prevent outright transfer are not. This ques-
tion intertwines with the difficult issue of the enforceability of "equitable
servitudes" on movable property.1 03 If the licensor cannot enforce mate-
rial terms of the license against the transferee, then the argument for en-
forcing the restraint on alienation is improved. At the same time, if the
restraint on alienation fails, the argument for enforcing the servitude be-
comes more compelling.
For our purposes, an equitable servitude may be defined as any limita-
tion or condition on the use of property short of a prohibition against its
transfer or alienation.1 0 4 Servitudes are very common in real estate, com-
paratively rare in the case of chattels, and ubiquitous in software licens-
ing.10 5 Virtually every software license imposes restrictions on the use of
the licensed software. 10 6 At a minimum, the license will ordinarily require
the licensee to hold the software in confidence, to make copies or deriva-
tive works only for specified purposes, and to restrict its use to certain
computers and locations.107
Equitable servitudes have a considerably shorter history than re-
straints on alienation. Their origin is ordinarily traced to the 1848 case of
Tulk v. Moxhay,108 decided by the English Court of Chancery. In Tulk v.
Moxhay, the plaintiff owned property in Leicester Square.10 9 He conveyed
the "Leicester Square Garden or Pleasure Ground" containing an "eques-
trian statue then standing in the centre thereof, and the iron railing and
stone work round the same" 110 to one Elms, who covenanted that he and
his heirs and assigns would maintain the Pleasure Garden and grant the
101. First Nationwide Bank v. Florida Software Serv., 770 F. Supp. 1537, 1540 (M.D. Fla.
1991).
102. Id. at 1541.
103. Zechariah Chafee addressed the issue of the enforceability of "equitable servitudes"
in two articles: Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Equitable Servitudes on Chattels, 41 HARv. L. Rev. 945
(1928) [hereinafter Chafee I]; Zechariah Chafee,Jr., The Music Goes Round and Round: Equita-
ble Servitudes and Chattels, 69 HARv. L. REv. 1250 (1956) [hereinafter Chafee II].
104. See Chafee I, supra note 103, at 946-48.
105. Based on personal knowledge and conversations with convey, assign, and commer-
cial attorneys in author's law firm.
106. In some cases, the licensors have attempted to extend the reach of their restrictive
covenants very far indeed. In Lasercomb Am. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990), for
example, the license agreement between a software developer and its licensee included a 99-
year noncompetition provision that forbade the licensee from attempting independently to
implement the idea which the developer's program expressed. Id. at 978.
107. See, e.g., infra Appendix § 3.
108. 2 Ph. 774 (1848).
109. Id.
110. Id.
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plaintiff's tenants access to it."' The Pleasure Garden was eventually con-
veyed to the defendant, who proposed to build on it. 1 1 2 The Court of
Chancery affirmed an injunction preventing Elms' successor from doing
so.
1 1 3
Tulk v. Moxhay exemplifies the basic requirements for equitable en-
forcement of a servitude against a subsequent purchaser-that is, for the
covenant to "run" with the land.' 14 First, there must be notice of the servi-
tude. 115 In real estate, notice is invariably satisfied by including the servi-
tude in the deed, which is recorded and becomes part of the tide record
that a purchaser is assumed to have examined before purchasing the par-
cel. 116 Second, there must be a "dominant tenement" that benefits from
the servitude, or at least a "scheme" from which the party seeking to en-
force the covenant will benefit.117 In Tulk v. Moxhay, the plaintiff owned
several of the houses that formed Leicester Square, and the houses' occu-
pants were entitled to use the Pleasure Garden under the terms of the
servitude.' 1 8 Their benefit from the servitude is obvious. Third, the servi-
tude must satisfy some appropriate purpose appurtenant to the dominant
tenement, and must not impose a "new and unusual" incident on land
ownership. 119 This may be translated into a requirement that the servi-
tude must be something of the sort that a purchaser of property might
ordinarily expect to find, and not something that would impose an ex-
traordinary or bizarre burden on the purchaser. In Tulk v. Moxhay, the
obvious purpose was to enhance the value of properties in Leicester
Square by preserving a park-like enclosure that the plaintiff's tenants
could enjoy. Thus, one purchasing a park-like area in an otherwise resi-
dential neighborhood might reasonably expect that there is some reason
why no one has previously built on the park. In later cases, particularly in
the United States, this third requirement has been supplemented with the
111. Id.
112. Id. at 775.
113. Id. at 779.
114. The precise holding of Tulk v. Moxhay was that equity would enforce a servitude that
would not "run" with the land as a matter of law. CASNER & LEACH, supra note 10, at 1117
n.13. In England, covenants would "run" as a matter of law only if there were a tenurial
relation between the original covenantor and covenantee. CHARLES M. HAAR & LANCE LIEB-
MAN, PROPERTY ANn LAw 9589 (2d ed. 1985). Under this rule, the covenant in Tulk v. Moxhay
would not have "run" at law because it was contained in a deed conveying fee simple as
opposed to a deed conveying a tenancy. This limitation is not applicable in the United States
where, as has been noted, the feudal or tenurial system of land ownership was never effec-
tively established. Thus, for example, in Neponsit Property Owners' Ass'n v. Emigrant Indus.
Say. Bank, 15 N.E.2d 793, 795 (N.Y. 1938), the court enforced a covenant contained in a
deed that was not in the nature of a leasehold. Although technical differences between cove-
nants running at law and at equity may remain, they are both beyond this Article's scope, and
not immediately pertinent to the possible extension of the real property principles to the
field of intellectual property licensing discussed in the text.
115. See, e.g., Smith v. Wedgwood Builders Corp., 590 A.2d 186, 189 (N.H. 1991) (notice
requirement in statute not met). For these requirements, see generally CASNER & LEACH,
supra note 10, at 1115-32.
116. Smith, 590 A.2d at 190 (bona fide purchaser has duty to investigate).
117. See Werner v. Graham, 183 P. 945, 947 (Cal. 1919).
118. 2 Ph. at 774.
119. Norcross v. James, 2 N.E. 946, 949 (Mass. 1855).
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principle that the servitude cannot violate public policy.1 20 Thus, for ex-
ample, a servitude that prevents the sale of property to persons of a partic-
ular race is unenforceable.
12 1
The law of equitable servitudes never found a stable home in the gen-
eral law of chattels.122 Attempted servitudes on chattels frequently took
the form of manufacturers' efforts to control the price at which, or territo-
ries in which, articles of commerce could be sold by distributors and retail-
ers. 123 Such restrictions were almost universally perceived as unlawful
restraints on alienation. 12 4 Chafee argues convincingly that this rationale
fails completely to appreciate the distinction between "conditions which
totally restrain alienation by enabling the seller to recover the sold prop-
erty" and those "which merely give the seller some measure of equitable
control over its disposition in the hands of later owners, who never cease
to retain the property."125 Nevertheless, he concedes that there are signif-
icant differences between a servitude on a chattel and one on land.
1 26
The principal differences Chafee cites are these: (1) "Land remains in the
same hands for comparatively long periods of time and is transferred after
an elaborate investigation of the title, whereas chattels are ordinarily sold
with rapidity";12 7 (2) "restrictions on land [use] arise from the desire to
protect a neighborhood as a rough unit... [for which there is no analogue
in chattels]";' 28 and (3) restrictions on land "do not endure forever, but
lapse when the preservation of the desired neighborhood standard can no
longer be accomplished." 12 9 With chattels it is very difficult to define a
"dominant tenement" that is benefitted by the servitude. Chafee postu-
lates that the manufacturer's business and marketing scheme should suf-
fice to fill this role. 130 However, this consideration is probably more than
counterbalanced by the fact that the benefit to the manufacturer is in di-
rect conflict with the interest of distributors, retailers and consumers in
paying a lower price for the manufacturer's goods.' 3 ' By contrast, many
equitable servitudes on land are mutual in nature: all of the members of a
120. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 21 (1948) (court would not enforce covenant
that promoted racial inequality).
121. Id. at 23.
122. Chafee I, supra note 103, at 977-87, 1011-13 passim. Chafee pointed to "the [counter-
vailing] economic claims of consumers and independent wholesalers and retailers, [and] the
immense judicial labor required for a satisfactory development of the operation and limits of
the proposed device." Id. at 1013.
123. See id. at 980-82 (summarizing and citing cases).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 983.




130. Id. at 964, 986.
131. This interest forms the basis for the antitrust principle that resale price maintenance
schemes are per se unlawful. See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S.
373, 408-09 (1911). Although Chafee questions the economic basis for this ruling, he seems
ultimately to have resigned himself to the strength of the interests represented by "consum-
ers and independent wholesalers and retailers," Compare Chafee I, supra note 103, at 988-995
with id. at 1013.
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neighborhood are both burdened and benefitted by the set of
restrictions. 1
3 2
The important question for our purposes is whether intellectual prop-
erty licensing in general, and software licensing in particular, is more like
real property, where equitable servitudes are widely enforced, or chattels,
where they are not. To analyze this question, it is useful to distinguish
among the types of restrictions that software vendors commonly seek to
impose on their licensees. Although a complete survey would be beyond
the scope of this paper, it is possible to describe and analyze a few broad
categories.
The first of these categories might be described as restrictions that are
necessary to preserve the commercial value of the software. The most ob-
vious are confidentiality obligations that are required to preserve trade
secret protection for the licensed software. 133 There is a compelling argu-
ment that restrictions in this first category should "run" with the licensed
right and be enforceable against transferees of the original licensee who
take with notice of them. In the first place, it is easy to determine a domi-
nant tenement that is benefitted by the servitude: the vendor's trade se-
cret.' 3 4 Second, the vendor can easily provide for notice by including a
simple statement on the diskettes or other media that contain the pro-
gram, and by causing the program to display a proprietary rights notice
when the software is first turned on. Third, the restriction is hardly novel
or unexpected. It serves the appropriate purpose of preserving the value
of the software not only for the vendor, but for all of its other licensees.
All licensees presumably paid for the right to use the software, and their
investments would be made worthless if the software became freely avail-
able to the public without charge.
Restrictions on the scope of the licensee's use, such as limitations to
use on a single central processing unit, or on a network of defined loca-
tion, should probably fall into the same enforceable category.' 3 5 Again,
such restrictions are entirely within the realm of what a purchaser of com-
132. See, e.g., Snow v. Van Dam, 197 N.E. 224, 226 (Mass. 1935). The servitude in Tulk v.
Moxhay was an exception to this principle, since it burdened only the Pleasure Garden parcel,
while benefitting all of the other parcels on Leicester Square. Nevertheless, as the court
noted in that case, "nothing could be more inequitable than that the original purchaser
should be able to sell the property the next day for a greater price, in consideration of the
assignee being allowed to escape from the liability which he had himself undertaken." 2 Ph.
at 776-77.
133. See supra note 7.
134. Chafee argues that a patent or copyright should also provide a dominant tenement
supporting a servitude. See Chafee I, supra note 103, at 998. But the courts have been less
than enthusiastic in enforcing patentees' and copyright proprietors' efforts to create servi-
tudes. Id. at 999-1005. There is, however, a distinctive difference between the confidentiality
required to support a trade secret and the price, territorial and other restrictions attempted
by patentees and copyright holders. Copyrights and patents arise by statute, and copyright
holders or patentees will retain substantial rights even if restrictions on resale price or terri-
tory are not enforced. By contrast, a trade secret will lose its protected status if enforceable
confidentiality obligations are not imposed on all who lawfully come into possession of the
secret.
135. A variation on such a restriction would be a license term that requires the licensee to
pay an additional license fee for expanded use.
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puter software would expect to find. Without such restrictions, every li-
censee would be entitled to unlimited use, and it would be impossible to
establish a price for the software. Furthermore, restrictions on the licen-
see's scope of use are consistent with statutory limitations on the rights of
the owner of a copy under the Copyright Act' 36 and with the rights of the
purchaser of a patented article under patent law.' 3 7 Thus, to the extent
that licensed rights become more freely transferable, public policy, as ad-
umbrated in the copyright and patent laws, would seem to support en-
forcement of the restrictions.1
3 8
Other covenants contained in many software licenses are more prob-
lematic. Suppose, for example, that the original licensee has agreed to
cross-license its own technology to the software vendor, to assist the ven-
dor in performing research and development, or to indemnify the vendor
for claims of third parties to whom the licensee provides goods or services
using the licensed software. Such covenants frequently form an important
part of the bargain in licensing transactions, and it would be just as inequi-
table to allow a transferee of the licensed rights to take free of them as it
would have been to allow the transferee of Elms' parcel to take free of the
restrictions Elms had agreed to in Tulk v. Moxhay. On the other hand,
covenants of this type are not usually essential to preserve the trade secret
status or commercial value of the licensed software.' 3 9 In addition, they
are almost always novel, unpredictable, and unexpected, and a transferee's
ability to meet such obligations is likely to be wholly different from that of
the original licensee. If, for example, part of the consideration for the
license was a cross-license from the original licensee, a transferee who was
not a successor to the original licensee's business would probably lack the
technology sought to be cross-licensed. In this event, the licensor would
lose a fundamental part of the benefit of its original bargain.
Some novel executory obligations may fail for reasons of public pol-
icy. For example, the licensor in Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds
140
sought to prevent its licensee from competing with the licensed product
for a period of 99 years. 14 1 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals found
this burden so onerous that it refused to entertain the licensor's action for
copyright infringement against the original licensee. 142 A fortiori, this re-
136. 17 U.S.C. § 109(b) (1988), amended by 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1992).
137. See DONALD S. CHISUM, PATNTrS: A TREATISE ON THE 1AW OF PATENTABILTY, VALIDrrY
AND INFUNGEMENT § 16.03[2] (1991).
138. Another class of covenants that should probably "run" with the software are warranty
limitations and limitations on liability. Subject to important public policy restrictions, such
covenants (to the extent that they constitute covenants of the licensee at all) commonly "run"
with chattels, as a result of the decline of privity of contract in the field of product liability.
See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 106, § 2-318 (West 1990). There is no reason to suppose
that they should not also "run" with license software rights.
139. See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text (requirements for trade secret
protection).
140. 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990).
141. Id. at 973.
142. Id. at 979. This rationale required an extension of very thin existing precedent, and
has been justifiably criticized on the ground that "it permits the misuse defense to be collater-
ally asserted by a willful infringer not personally injured by the copyright holder's conduct."
Philip Abromats, Anticompetitive Software Licensing Restrictions as Copyright Misuse, 10 SorrwARE
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striction should not be enforceable against a transferee of the licensed
software.
Even if restrictions falling into this third category do not violate an
obvious public policy, there is nevertheless a strong argument that they do
not meet the criteria for enforcement of an equitable servitude. This
brings us back to the question with which we began this section of this
paper. The First Nationwide court based its refusal to enforce a restraint on
the alienation of licensed software rights on a finding that the transferee
had complied with all material covenants of the software license. 143 This
led to the question whether the software licensors in First Nationwide could
have enforced those covenants against the transferees if there had been a
default. If the analogy to equitable servitudes on real property holds, the
author concludes that restraints of the type imposed in First Nationwide
would have been enforceable against the transferees, even in the absence
of their express consent, as long as they had notice of the restraints. The
restraints, which limited use of the software and protected against public
disclosure, were typical, predictable, and essential to the protection of the
licensed software rights. 14 4 The enforceability of the restraints supports
the conclusion that the license should be transferrable because the licen-
sor is no worse off after the transfer than it was before.
On the other hand, the analogy to equitable servitudes suggests that
many complex and novel restrictions and covenants would not be enforce-
able against subsequent transferees. This in turn suggests that restraints
on alienation of a license that contains such restrictions and covenants
should be enforced. In such a case, the relation between licensor and
licensee is truly personal in nature because no one but the particular licen-
see is likely to be in a position to satisfy the terms of the license. The
software license then retains its tenurial quality. The licensee should no
more be permitted to transfer its rights without the consent of the licensor
than a Twelfth Century tenant should have been able to transfer his land
without the consent of his lord.
It thus appears that the question of what rights in computer software
should be freely alienable depends in important measure on the question
of whether the licensor can enforce the terms of the license against the
transferee. If the traditional criteria for enforcement of an equitable servi-
tude against transferees are met-the existence of a dominant tenement,
notice, and absence of novelty145 -then the terms should be enforceable
against a transferee and the argument for enforcing a restraint against
transfer fails. However, if the license imposes terms that are enforceable
against the original licensee, but that otherwise do not meet the criteria
for enforcement of a servitude, then the argument for enforcing the re-
straint is compelling.
PRoTEcrION 3 (1991). See also Christina Ambrosio & Roni Schneider, Note, Copyright Misuse
... Getting Defensive: Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 6J. LEGAL COMM. 181 (1990).
143. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 104-132 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
We began this inquiry by asking why computer software is licensed at
all. The explanation is that the practice arose at a time when the only
effective means of protecting rights in software was by trade secret law, and
most software was tailor-made for a particular application. To accommo-
date these facts, lawyers re-created a system of software exploitation that is
surprisingly analogous to the feudal system of land tenure that existed in
England and Normandy prior to the Statute Quia Emptores. In each case,
the system is characterized by personal obligations flowing between licen-
sor (lord) and licensee (tenant) and restraints on alienation by the licen-
see (tenant) without the consent of the licensor (lord).
The feudal system of land tenure could not be sustained indefinitely.
It was always pardy fictional, was inconsistent with English traditions that
encouraged free alienability of land rights, and, to the extent that it had
been required as a quasi-military means of securing land use, became un-
necessary as the legal framework for land ownership stabilized. The Stat-
ute Quia Emptores, which permitted alienation of tenures by substitution
of a new tenant without the consent of the feudal law, both manifested
and accelerated its demise.
Computer software licensing is following a very similar course. Origi-
nally justified by the necessity of protecting software as a trade secret,
software licensing now appears to be both unnecessary, in light of ex-
panding copyright and patent protection, and inconsistent with the gen-
eral right of alienation that appears in the common law, the Copyright
Act, patent law, the Bankruptcy Code and the Uniform Commercial Code.
Furthermore, the personal nature of software programming services has
given way to widespread commerce in software as a basic commodity.
These changed circumstances have placed pressure on restraints on alien-
ation that are a hallmark of traditional software licensing.
To keep current with the changing environment, courts will need to
address the question of whether, and to what extent, restrictive covenants,
short of outright prohibition on alienation, should be enforceable against
transferees of licensed software rights. Real estate law governing the "run-
ning" of equitable servitudes provides a useful guide to the sorts of cove-
nants that should be enforceable against transferees and those that should
not. Where the material covenants in a license "run" under these criteria,
there will be a strong argument against the enforcement of outright re-
straints on alienation. These will generally be circumstances in which the
license does not impose restrictions on the licensee other than those af-
fecting the scope of use, nondisclosure, and warranties' limitations.
Where, on the other hand, the license imposes complex obligations such
as cross-licenses, the covenants will not "run." In combination with cove-
nants that do not "run," license terms limiting restraints on alienation
should be enforced.
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APPENDIX
[NAME OF LICENSOR]




The LICENSOR ("LICENSOR") and LICENSEE identified above
("LICENSEE") agree that LICENSOR's attached Terms and Conditions of
License, which are incorporated herein and made a part hereof, shall gov-
ern any license of computer software by LICENSOR to LICENSEE. LI-
CENSEE may license particular software programs from LICENSOR by







SCHEDULE TO SOFTWARE LICENSE AGREEMENT
The undersigned LICENSEE hereby agrees to license from LICEN-
SOR, INC. ("LICENSOR") the software identified below, pursuant to the
terms and conditions of the Software License Agreement previously exe-
cuted by LICENSEE and LICENSOR.
I. SOFTWARE:[2]_
II. DESIGNATED SYSTEMI3]:






LOCATION OF SYSTEM [4]:
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This Schedule is subject to and a part of the Software License








TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF SOFTWARE LICENSE
1. Definitions:.
a. This "Agreement" shall mean these Terms and Conditions, the
Software License Agreement to which these Terms and Conditions are at-
tached, any Schedules hereto.
b. "Designated System" for any individual item of Software shall
mean the computer system identified in a Schedule to this Agreement.
c. "Software" shall mean each computer program described in a
Schedule to this Agreement, and any update that may be furnished by
LICENSOR to user, provided that LICENSOR shall not be obligated to
furnish updates. [5]
d. "License" and "Licenses" shall mean the grant or grants of the
right to use Software made by LICENSOR to LICENSEE pursuant to Sec-
tion 3.
e. "Proprietary Material" shall mean Software and any information
or materials received by LICENSEE and identified by LICENSOR as pro-
prietary or confidential, including without limitation user manuals and
other documentation, but excluding information or material that be-
comes generally known to the public through no fault of LICENSEE. [6]
2. Preliminary Terms.
a. All licenses of Software by LICENSOR are subject to these Terms
and Conditions. By submitting an order to LICENSOR or by accepting
delivery of Software or a component thereof, LICENSEE agrees to be sub-
ject to these Terms and Conditions. Any provision of LICENSEE's order
which is inconsistent with or in addition to these Terms and Conditions
shall not be binding upon LICENSOR unless LICENSOR expressly agrees
in writing to such provision. [7]
b. LICENSOR may amend these Terms and Conditions from time
to time. The then current Terms and Conditions shall apply to all
Software delivered to LICENSEE after any such amendment. [8]
3. License
a. LICENSOR grants to LICENSEE a non-transferable and non-ex-
clusive license [9] to use each item of Software for which the license fee has
been paid in machine-readable object code[10] form on only the Desig-
nated System identified as such in the Schedule relating to such software.
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Such license shall include the right to operate and perform the Software
but shall not include any right to copy (except as provided in Section 8),
modify, market, sublicense or distribute the Software, to make the
Software available to any other person, whether on a time sharing basis or
otherwise, or to create works derivative of the Software. [11]
b. The Software may be used only on the Designated System. [12] No
title or ownership of the Software or any part thereof will be transferred to
LICENSEE. LICENSEE acknowledges that LICENSEE is acquiring only a
license to use the Software and not any title to or ownership of the
Software or any part thereof.[13]
c. The term of the license for each item of Software will continue
until LICENSOR terminates the license as provided herein.[14] LICEN-
SOR may terminate a license with respect to the Software covered by any
one or more Schedules if LICENSOR gives written notice to LICENSEE
specifying any failure or default in the performance of any provisions of
these Terms and Conditions and LICENSEE fails to cure said failure or
default to the reasonable satisfaction of LICENSOR within thirty (30) days
after such notice. LICENSEE shall, upon the termination of the license
for any item of Software, immediately cease all use of the Software covered
by such license and return to LICENSOR all copies of the Software and
related documentation covered by such license. LICENSEE's obligations
with respect to Software under this Section 3 shall survive any termination
of the license applicable to such Software. [15]
4. Patent and Copyright
Indemnification:[16]
a. LICENSOR shall defend or, at its option, settle, any claim or pro-
ceeding brought against LICENSEE to the extent that it is based on an
assertion that the Software infringes any United States patent, copyright,
or trade secret right[ 17] of any third party and shall indemnify LICENSEE
against all costs, damages and expenses finally awarded against LICENSEE
which result from any such claim[18], provided that LICENSOR shall have
no liability hereunder unless LICENSEE notifies LICENSOR promptly in
writing of any such claim or proceeding and gives LICENSOR full and
complete authority, information and assistance to defend such claim or
proceeding, and further provided that LICENSEE gives LICENSOR sole
control of the defense of any such claim or proceeding and all negotia-
tions for its compromise or settlement. [ 19] Should any Software become,
or in LICENSOR's opinion be likely to become, the subject of a claim of
infringement, LICENSOR shall have the right, at LICENSOR's option and
expense, (i) to procure for LICENSEE the right to continue using it, (ii)
to replace or modify it with a non-infringing version of substantially
equivalent function and performance or (iii) reasonably failing the above,
to pay to LICENSEE the depreciated value of the relevant Software upon
LICENSEE's return of the Software to LICENSOR. [20] The depreciated
value shall be determined by the straight line method, for a five (5) year
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life, applied to the amount actually paid by LICENSEE for the relevant
Software license.
b. LICENSOR shall have no liability or obligation to LICENSEE
hereunder for any infringement based upon (i) the combination of a LI-
CENSOR product with other products not produced by LICENSOR; (ii)
the use of other than a current, unaltered version of the Software; or (iii)
any use of Software in the practice of a process not specified by LICEN-
SOR[21] LICENSOR shall have no obligation for any costs incurred by
LICENSEE without LICENSOR's prior written authorization. In no event
shall liability hereunder exceed the charges paid by LICENSEE to LICEN-
SOR for the infringing Software. The provisions of this Section 4 are in
lieu of all other obligations, including without limitation the implied war-
ranty of noninfringement, and state the sole, exclusive and entire liability
of LICENSOR, and the sole, exclusive and entire remedy of LICENSEE,
with respect to any claim of patent, copyright, or trade secret infringement
by any Software.
5. Warranty-[22]
a. LICENSOR warrants that with normal use and service each item
of Software will conform substantially[23] to the user documentation LI-
CENSOR delivered with such Software for a period of ninety (90) days
from the date of such delivery, provided that such Software has not been
modified or altered by any one other than LICENSOR, has not been
abused or misapplied, and has not been used in combination with hard-
ware or software other than the Designated System.
b. The foregoing warranty shall be void if LICENSEE fails to submit
a completed Problem Report describing the condition that LICENSEE be-
lieves constitutes a breach of the said warranty, together with a floppy disk
on which LICENSEE has made a copy of that portion of the Software that
LICENSEE believes to contain such condition, within 10 days after LICEN-
SEE discovers such condition.
c. In the event of a breach of warranty, LICENSOR's sole responsi-
bility shall be to replace, at its own expense, the nonconforming Software
with a corrected copy upon the return to LICENSOR of all of LICENSEE's
copies of the nonconforming Software.
6. Disclaimer of Warranty EXCEPT AS EXPRESSLY SET FORTH IN
SECTIONS 4 AND 5, LICENSOR SHALL NOT BE DEEMED TO HAVE
MADE ANY REPRESENTATION OR WARRANTY, EXPRESS OR IM-
PLIED, AS TO THE CONDITION, MERCHANTABILITY, DESIGN, OP-
ERATION OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE OF THE
SOFTWARE OR ANY OTHER REPRESENTATION OR WARRANTY
WHATSOEVER, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, WITH RESPECT TO THE
SOFTWARE.
7. Limitation of Liability The liability of LICENSOR for any loss or
damages directly or indirectly suffered by LICENSEE as a result of the
Software shall in no event exceed the charges paid by LICENSEE for the
relevant copy of Software. If no separate fee or charge was paid by LICEN-
SEE in acquiring such copy, LICENSOR's liability shall be limited to the
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payment to LICENSEE of LICENSOR's suggested retail charge in effect at
the time LICENSEE acquired such copy for a license to use such copy on a
single Designated System. IN NO EVENT SHALL LICENSOR BE LIABLE
FOR SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL, CONSEQUENTIAL OR TORT DAMAGES,
EVEN IF LICENSOR HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
SUCH DAMAGES.
8. Proprietary Rights; Non-disclosure by LICENSEE:
a. LICENSEE acknowledges that all title and interest, including all
patents, copyrights and trade secret rights, in the Software are the exclu-
sive property of LICENSOR or its licensor.[24] LICENSEE further ac-
knowledges that Proprietary Material is proprietary and a trade secret of
LICENSOR.[25] LICENSEE agrees neither to do nor to permit any act
which may in any way jeopardize or be detrimental to the validity of LI-
CENSOR's patent, copyright, trade secret or other rights in the Software
or other Proprietary Material.
b. LICENSEE shall use its best efforts to maintain the confidentiality
of Proprietary Material and to protect LICENSOR's patents, copyrights
and trade secrets, including taking such steps as LICENSEE takes to pro-
tect its own patents, copyrights and trade secrets.[26]
c. Proprietary Material is provided for use only on the Designated
System and may not be copied, except that one copy of the Software may
be made for back-up purposes for use on the Designated System. The
back-up copy must include LICENSOR's patent, copyright and proprietary
rights notices and all labels or other features that disclose the Software
name and LICENSEE's site and designated system. [27]
d. LICENSEE's obligations here to protect the confidential and pro-
prietary nature of Proprietary Material under this Section 8 shall survive
any termination or expiration of a license for any reason. [28]
9. Quotations. Any quotation issued by LICENSOR is subject to these
Terms and Conditions. No quotation shall be valid unless in writing, and
any quotation shall expire 60 days after issuance, unless otherwise speci-
fied in writing by LICENSOR.
10. Orders. All orders are subject to acceptance by LICENSOR at its
principal place of business. LICENSOR will notify LICENSEE of the esti-
mated shipping date of the Software. LICENSOR may cancel any order or
delay the shipment thereof for failure of LICENSEE to make payment of
any amount due LICENSOR or if LICENSEE is insolvent, is subject of any
proceeding, voluntary or involuntary, under any bankruptcy or insolvency
law or executes an assignment for the benefit of creditors, or if a receiver
or trustee is appointed for LICENSEE. [29]
11. Prices and Terms of Payment.
a. Prices are exclusive of, and LICENSEE agrees to pay or provide
an appropriate exemption certificate for, all governmental taxes, fees and
duties (exclusive of taxes based upon LICENSOR's net income), including
but not limited to all sales, use, ownership, value added or other taxes.
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Prices are exclusive of all transportation and insurance charges; shipments
will be insured at LICENSEE's written request and expense.
b. LICENSEE shall pay LICENSOR the total price due hereunder
net thirty (30) days from the date of shipment. [30]
12. Shipmentr All shipments shall be F.O.B. LICENSOR and unin-
sured, unless LICENSEE specifies insurance in writing. LICENSOR will
use reasonable efforts to ship on or before the estimated shipping dates.
Shipping dates are approximate. LICENSOR shall have no liability for any
shipping delay. Unless otherwise specified in writing by LICENSEE, par-
tial shipments are allowed. [31]
13. Generat
a. This Agreement and the Schedules hereto constitute and incor-
porate the parties' entire agreement with respect to their subject matter,
and supersede any and all prior oral and written agreements, understand-
ings and quotations. No waiver, alteration, modification, or cancellation
of any of the provisions of this Agreement shall be binding unless made in
writing and signed by LICENSOR. The failure of either party at any time
or times to require performance of any provision hereof shall in no man-
ner affect its right at a later time to enforce such provision.
b. Neither LICENSOR nor LICENSEE shall be liable for any delay
or failure to take any action required hereunder (except for payment) due
to any cause beyond the reasonable control of LICENSOR or LICENSEE,
as the case may be, including, but not limited to, unavailability or
shortages of labor, materials, or equipment, failure or delays in the deliv-
ery of vendors and suppliers or delays in transportation. [32]
c. This Agreement, and the transactions to which it relates, will be
governed by and construed and enforced in accordance with the law of
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, excluding its choice of law rules
and also excluding the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods.[33] Any claims or legal actions by one party
against the other shall be commenced and maintained in any state or fed-
eral court located in Massachusetts, U.S.A., and both parties hereby sub-
mit to the jurisdiction and venue of any such court. [34] In any such
action, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover its reasonable attor-
neys fees, in addition to all other remedies and recoveries that may be
available to it at law or in equity.J[35] For purposes of the immediately
preceding sentence, "attorneys fees" shall include services relating to the
claim or dispute rendered prior to the litigation; at both the trial and ap-
pellate levels; subsequent to judgment in obtaining any execution or en-
forcement thereof; and in connection with any bankruptcy or similar
proceeding.
d. If any provision of this Agreement is held to be unenforceable
the remaining portions of this Agreement shall remain in full force and
effect [36]
e. Regardless of any disclosure by LICENSEE to LICENSOR of the
ultimate destination of any Software, LICENSEE will not directly or indi-
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rectly export any Software without first obtaining the appropriate United
States export license.
f. This Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of
the parties and their respective successors, assigns and legal representa-
tives; provided, however, that LICENSEE shall not sublicense, assign or
transfer any part or all of its rights and obligations under this Agreement
without the express written consent of LICENSOR. [37]
SoFTWARE TYING ARRANGEMENTS UNDER THE
ANTITRUST LAws: A MORE FLEXIBLE APPROACH
MELISSA HAMILTON*
INTRODUCTION
The computer software industry is plagued by the apparent conflict
between two major public policy issues: antitrust law and intellectual
property protection.1 The courts, as well as some commentators, view an-
titrust and intellectual property law as inherently adverse to each other.
2
This view, based on the assumption that antitrust laws are intended to pro-
mote vigorous competition while intellectual property laws provide an-
ticompetitive benefits to creators, incorrectly implies that intellectual
property protection inhibits the goals of the antitrust laws. As a conse-
quence, courts have developed rules in which certain conduct involving
intellectual property licensing is considered per se illegal under the anti-
trust laws.3
The belief that antitrust and intellectual property laws are naturally
adverse is erroneous because it fails to take adequately into consideration
the procompetitive impact of intellectual property laws. By allowing cre-
ators to benefit from their inventions, intellectual property laws encourage
the development of new technologies. Competition, and thereby con-
sumer interest, are advanced as a result of the availability of more choices,
new and better products and services, and lower prices.
4
* Assistant General Counsel, The Continuum Company, Inc.
1. "Intellectual property" is a term referring generally to patents, copyrights, trade
secrets and trademarks.
2. See Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 977-79 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding
that the anticompetitive language contained in a software license, which restricted the licen-
see from developing competing products, was in flagrant disregard of the public policy em-
bedded in copyright law); CVD, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 769 F.2d 842, 850 (1st Cir. 1985)
(noting "tension between the antitrust laws and the public interest in the licensing of trade
secrets"), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986); SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1203
(2d Cir. 1981) (stating that "patent and antitrust laws necessarily clash" when a patented
product is so successful that it evolves into its own economic market or engulfs a large share
of the preexisting product market), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1016 (1982); cf. United States v.
Loew's, Inc. 371 U.S. 38, 45 n.4 (1962) (affirming the rigorous antitrust rule that when a
tying product is patented or copyrighted, a presumption of sufficiency of economic power
exists); see also 1 ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS §§ 6.05, 6.05[4] (1993) (not-
ing the "seeming dichotomy between trade secret and antitrust philosophy," and the "seem-
ing antinomy between the dictates of free competition encouraged by the antitrust laws and
the monopolistic privileges granted under the patent laws"); Daniel K. Dik, Note, Copyrighted
Software and Tying Arrangements: A Fresh Appreciatin for Per Se Ilegality, 10 COMPtrER/L.J. 413,
at 413 (1990) (stating that copyright and antitrust laws conflict when the "advantages and
tools appropriate to one sphere of activity are used to upset the workings of another sphere
of activity").
3. See infra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
4. See, e.g., Charles F. Rule, Technology Licensing and the Second American Revolu-
tion: Storming the Ramparts of Antitrust and Misuse, Statement at The John Marshall Law
School (Feb. 22, 1985), in 4 MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS, supra note 2, app. H-3; Roger B.
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The general rule that the law tends to lag significantly behind techno-
logical advances finds no exception in the case of software. The primary
reason is that traditional legal concepts do not always operate well with
complex and innovative technologies, such as computer software. The ef-
fect of the law's failure to keep pace with the software industry is exempli-
fied by the obstacles encountered in gaining legal protection for software
using traditional laws. While advances have been made to the extent that
patent, copyright, and state trade secret laws, or a combination thereof,5
are now available as a general matter to software developers, there is still
much confusion concerning which features of a software product are pro-
tected under which law.6 One of the lessons learned in the struggle to
obtain intellectual property law protection is that the complex character
of software technology often demands special treatment in affected areas
of law.
Just as traditional intellectual property laws have required new inter-
pretations or formal amendments to include the protection of software,
the formalistic approach of the antitrust laws requires modification. Tech-
nological innovation is the key to competition in the software market. In
order to succeed in the marketplace, software developers must create
more functional and efficient programs.7 Intellectual property laws en-
courage innovation, which should not be abrogated by antitrust laws.
Perhaps the most prominent issue affecting the software industry in
terms of the interrelationship between antitrust and intellectual property
law occurs in tying cases. In a tying arrangement, the seller agrees to sell
one product, referred to as the tying product, on the condition that the
purchaser also buy from the seller a different product, referred to as the
tied product.8 Generally, a tying agreement is considered a per se viola-
tion of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.9
Andewelt, The Antitrust Division's Perspective on Intellectual Property Protection and Li-
censing - The Past, The Present and The Future, Remarks before the American Bar Associa-
tion, Patent, Trademark & Copyright Section (July 16, 1985), in 4 MitLGIM ON TRADE
SEcRET-rs, supra note 2, at App. H-4.
5. See discussion infra part I.
6. See infra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
7. The functionality of software generally means the tasks or jobs that a software pro-
gram is able to perform. The ability to perform a certain mathematical calculation or pro-
vide a layout for a spreadsheet are examples of software functionality. The efficiency of
software may be improved by enhancing the speed or accuracy of the program itself or alter-
ing the program so that it uses less computer central processing unit resources.
8. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958). Tying arrangements in
which the tying product is conditioned upon the purchase of the tied item are generally
known as "tie-ins." Another form of tying arrangement exists when the seller conditions the
sale of the tying product upon the purchaser's agreement not to deal with the seller's com-
petitors in the tied product. The latter form of tying is generally known as "tie-outs." Tying
arrangements apply both to the traditional sale of goods and services, as well as to licenses of
intellectual property. See discussion infra part IV.
9. Former Enters., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 502 (1969) (FortnerI)
(adopting language from Northern Pac. Ry. 356 U.S. 1, at 5-6).
Section 1 of the Sherman Act states in relevant part: "Every contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the sev-
eral States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988), amended by
Pub. L. No. 101-588, 104 Stat. 2880 (1990).
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Software vendors commonly bundle maintenance services10 with the
licensing of their software products. While there may be many reasons for
such bundling, some of the major motivations include discouraging re-
verse engineering1 1 and intellectual property infringement, enhancing
product efficiency and quality,12 and promoting consumer acceptance of
the tying product.13 By marketing the software license in conjunction
with maintenance services, the software licensor may, however, be expos-
ing itself to antitrust liability for illegal tying. The software license could
be construed as a tying product and the maintenance services as the tied
product. 14 Most tying arrangements are condemned as being per se an-
ticompetitive in nature. 15 Courts may inadvisably use the same rigid prin-
ciples developed in other cases to condemn bundling of software and
10. See genera/iy, John C. Yates & Anthony E. DiResta, Software Support and Hardware Main-
tenance Practices: Tying Considerations, 8 COMPUTER LAw. 17, 18-19 (1991) (software mainte-
nance services may include a variety of services; such as fixing errors, enhancing the
functionality or efficiency of the product, providing telephone support, education and train-
ing, software installation, and general consulting services).
The bundled maintenance services may be in the form of a warranty or an actual service
agreement. For example, a software license may contain an extended warranty period dur-
ing which the licensor may fix software defects and provide software upgrades. Alternatively,
the licensee may obtain a license contract, as well as a services agreement, requiring the
licensor to provide similar support. Whether by warranty or service contract, however, the
vendor is, in effect, providing maintenance services in addition to granting the software
license.
11. Reverse engineering is the act of "starting with the known product and working
backward to divine the process which aided in its development or manufacture." Kewanee
Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974). Computer software is generally written in
source code, understandable by a skilled computer programmer, but not by a computer. To
be processed by a computer, the source code is translated into machine readable language,
known as object code, consisting of a series of O's and l's. Object code is generally indeci-
pherable by humans. Because many software developers regard their source code as trade
secrets, they typically will allow their licensees access to object code only. To reverse engi-
neer, a licensee would have to work backward from the object code to reveal the structure
and organization of the program.
12. Producing a quality end product is another important goal in achieving market ac-
ceptance. See generally EUGENE M. SINGER, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 105
(1981) (stressing, from an economic viewpoint, that tying arrangements are both elementary
and commonplace market practices for goods).
13. As software invariably contains defects, or "bugs," developers desire a relationship
whereby the user is motivated to report errors and the developer has the opportunity to
correct them. This leads to establishing goodwill with current and future customers and to
improving product performance. There are many other reasons vendors bundle software
and maintenance. By gaining services revenues, the vendor assures itself an income stream,
as well as guaranteed funding for future research and development. A less laudable motive is
a desire to exclude competition in the service market. For a discussion of the benefits in
combining software with maintenance services, see Yates & DiResta, supra note 10, at 17-18.
Licensees also benefit from the purchase of software and maintenance services together.
This package allows the licensee to use the functionality currently in the software, and simul-
taneously obtain the rights to enhancements developed later. Also, the purchase fee for a
software and maintenance services package when the software is substantially incomplete may
be materially lower than the license fee would be when the development of the software has
significantly progressed.
14. A private party plaintiff may sue under the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1988 &
Supp. IV 1992), and if successful, recover treble damages, costs, attorney's fees, and interest
from the date the suit was filed. Id.
15. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949).
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maintenance without considering the underlying procompetitive
aspects.1 6
In general, this Article argues that the application of antitrust princi-
ples to software licensing arrangements requires special consideration.
Special treatment is particularly warranted because, unlike the traditional
sale of goods, the proper antitrust analysis for software technology often
involves the principles of both copyright and trade secrets. Moreover, the
inflexible application of the rigid tying rules would curtail the fundamen-
tal economic and functional benefits a software developer may achieve by
packaging software licenses with maintenance services, but would not pro-
vide any tangible benefit to consumers. The procompetitive effects of
software innovation should be recognized and a more flexible antitrust
approach for software taken. Consideration of the impact on competitive
conditions, rather than the application of the per se analysis to software
tying packages, would preserve the benefits of software innovation yet pro-
vide competitors some protection against blatant anticompetitive conduct.
Part I of this Article offers a brief review of intellectual property rights
and software technology. Part II provides a general overview of judicially
established antitrust tying rules. In Parts III and IV, certain elements of
per se tying cases are analyzed in the context of software/maintenance
packages. Part III focuses on the tying requirement that there be separate
products, and concludes that software and maintenance should be consid-
ered a single product. Part IV analyzes the judicial presumption that a
copyrighted software product creates unlawful market power. This section
concludes that this presumption is unsupported by economic reality, is
falsely based on an analogy to patent law, and is inappropriate for software
products, because the real value of software tends to be its underlying un-
copyrightable functionality and not any market power gained solely from
the copyright laws. Finally, Part V acknowledges that courts have been
willing to recognize exceptions to the per se rules when the challenged
activity is not likely to unreasonably restrict competitive conditions.
I. SUMMARY OF INTELLECrUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SOFTWARE
Legal protection for intellectual property is designed to balance the
policy of promoting intellectual creativity with the public interest in gain-
ing access to the creations.1 7 Innovators are motivated to release their
inventions to the public in return for certain exclusive rights which serve
to protect their investment.1 8 The public benefits from access to creative
16. SeeVirtual Maintenance, Inc. v. Prime Computer, Inc., 957 F.2d 1318, 1323 (6th Cir.
1992) (ruling that software support was itself a separate market from hardware mainte-
nance), vacated and remanded, 113 S. Ct. 315 (1992); ROGER M. MILGRAM, MILGRIM ON LICENS-
ING § 8.23, at 8-81 (1992) (stating that a software licensee might "forcefully assert that the
requirement that it procure maintenance services from the licensor of the copyrighted
software programs is improper").
17. The Constitution empowers Congress to "promote the Progress of Science and use-
ful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
18. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966).
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genius and possession of the creative results upon expiration of the crea-
tor's statutory control. 19
The unique nature of software technology has tested the limits of in-
tellectual property law. Attempts to apply traditional intellectual property
rules to software have been frustrated, due mainly to the limitations in the
statutory language and strict application of traditional laws.20 As a result
of such obstacles, and in recognition of the increasing importance of the
software industry in the economy today, the law is rapidly changing to
meet the needs of software developers in protecting the value and integ-
rity of their work. A variety of intellectual property laws now encompasses
software technology.
Copyright protection is one of the primary means of legal protection
for computer programs. In general, copyright law protects original works
of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.21 The scope of
the protection extends to the expression of an idea, rather than to the
idea itself.22 Thus, ideas are not in and of themselves copyrightable.
23
Moreover, when the idea and the expression are indistinguishable, the ex-
pression is not protected under copyright law. 24 In the context of
software, this means that copyright law will not protect a program if there
is only one essential means of accomplishing a certain task.
25
A copyright owner has the exclusive right to reproduce the work,
adapt or make derivative works, publicly distribute copies, publicly per-
form the work, and display the work.26 The exclusive rights last for the life
of the author plus fifty years in the case of a real person.2 7 If the author is
an entity or is anonymous, or if it is a work made for hire, 28 the rights last
for seventy-five years from publication or one hundred years from crea-
tion, whichever occurs first.29 Once registered with the Copyright Office,
a copyright holder may bring suit to recover damages and to obtain in-
junctive relief for infringement of the copyright.
30
19. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
20. See Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Am., Inc., 798 F. Supp. 1499, 1502 (D. Colo. 1992)
(recognizing that "copyright law was not designed to accommodate computer software pro-
tection"), affd in part, vacated in par, 9 F.3d 823 (10th Cir. 1993).
21. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
22. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954).
23. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988).
24. See M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 436 (4th Cir. 1986).
25. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521, 525 (9th Cir. 1984).
26. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
27. Id. § 302(a).
28. A work made for hire is typically created by an employee at the direction of his or
her employer. The ownership of a work for hire resides with the employer. 17 U.S.C.
§ 201(b) (1988). The Supreme Court delineated thirteen factors to guide courts in deter-
mining whether the work was performed as an employee or by an independent contractor.
See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751-52 (1989) (enumerating
relevant factors in determining whether a hired party is an employee under the general com-
mon law of agency).
29. 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (1988).
30. Id. §§ 501-02, 504-05. The prevailing copyright holder may be awarded actual dam-
ages and profits or statutory damages in certain circumstances. Id. § 504. In addition, costs
and attorneys' fees may be awarded. Id. § 505.
1994]
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Copyright protection has its limitations. Copyright law does not pro-
hibit others from borrowing the idea underlying a copyrighted product
and creating their own original expression.3 ' Likewise, others are free to
develop independently their own material.3 2 Provided that unlawful copy-
ing has not occurred, an independently developed product will not be an
infringement even if it is substantially similar to a prior copyrighted
product."3
Some of the uncertainty about the scope of the applicability of copy-
right law to software technology has been resolved. The Copyright Act of
1976 eliminated concern that computer programs were not fixed in a tan-
gible medium of expression (as required for copyright protection) by clar-
ifying that a work could be fixed even if it is readable only by a machine.
3 4
Further, Congress amended the Copyright Act in 1980 to include ex-
pressly computer programs as a literary work within the definition of
works of authorship.3 5 Copyright protection has been applied to the lit-
eral elements of a program, which include the source and object codes.
3 6
The real difficulty in determining whether copyright protection applies to
nonliteral aspects of a computer program lies in differentiating the idea
from the expression.
In a controversial decision, Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Labo-
ratory, Inc., the Third Circuit ruled that the structure, sequence, and or-
ganization of a program were protected by copyright.3 7 Whether Whelan is
correct and whether copyright protection exists for other aspects of
software than the source and object codes remain open issues.38 For in-
stance, copyright protection may not extend to data formats, program
structure, the "look and feel," data bases, or user interfaces. 39 Thus, while
most software developers use the copyright law to protect their software,
the extent of such protection is still open for interpretation.
31. 'Id. § 102(b).
32. See Ferguson v. National Broadcasting Co., 584 F.2d 111, 113-14 (5th Cir. 1978).
33. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217-18 (1954).
34. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553 § 101, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended
at 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)); see H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659.
35. Copyright Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517 § 10, 94 Stat. 3028 (1981) (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
36. See Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741, 750 (N.D. I1. 1983).
37. 797 F.2d 1222, 1236 (3d Cir. 1986) (the test for differentiating between idea and
expression focuses upon the end sought to be achieved by the work in question), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1031 (1987). Thus, the purpose or function of a program would be the work's idea,
and everything not necessary for such purpose or function would be part of the expression.
Id. at 1236.
38. See Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706-11 (2d Cir. 1992)
(rejecting Whelan in favor of a three part "successive filtration" test for detennining if the
offending software is substantially similar to the copyrighted software).
39. See, e.g., Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (rejecting
copyright claim for factual content of data base); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software
Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 57 (D. Mass. 1990) (holding that certain basic elements of the interface
were not copyrightable); Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F.
Supp. 1003, 1014 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (ruling that input formats are not copyrightable, nor are
the ordering and sequencing of a computer program).
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Software developers also commonly seek the protection of trade se-
cret laws. A trade secret can be generally described as any formula, pro-
cess, pattern, or compilation of confidential information that gives one a
business advantage over competitors who do not know it.4° State law,
rather than federal statute, generally governs trade secret protection. In
contrast to both the copyright and patent laws, there has been little doubt
that computer software may be a trade secret.41 It is also commonly ac-
cepted that copyright law does not preempt trade secret rights.
42
A trade secret owner obtains certain rights to prohibit unauthorized
use or disclosure by those to whom the secret is confidentially revealed.
43
Trade secret law also provides a remedy against those who have obtained
the secret through improper means, such as by theft or deception. 44
To obtain protection, the owner of a trade secret must take reason-
able steps to maintain its secrecy.4 5 Trade secrecy protection lasts only as
long as secrecy is maintained.4 6 Legal protection may therefore be lost
even if the secret is inadvertently disclosed. Consequently, software li-
cense agreements generally require the licensee to keep confidential the
software product licensed.
To a limited degree, patents may protect qualifying aspects of a com-
puter program. 47 To be patentable, an invention must be new, useful, and
nonobvious to one skilled in the particular subject matter.48 Though
ideas are excluded from copyright protection, the concrete embodiments
of ideas or principles are patentable if they meet the requirements for
patentability. This means that ideas reduced to practices, methods, or for-
mulas are patentable.
49
Patent law provides greater rights than either copyright or trade
secrets. By obtaining a patent, the holder may preclude independent cre-
40. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT § 1(4) (1985); RESTATEMENT (Firsr) OF TORTS § 757 CmL b
(1939).
41. See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1246-47
(3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984); Amoco Prod. Co. v. Lindley, 609 P.2d
733, 743 (Okla. 1980); Cybertek Computer Prods., Inc. v. Whitfield, 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
1020 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1977).
42. 17 U.S.C. § 301(B)(3) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (copyright law does not preempt
violations of law that are not equivalent to the exclusive rights granted by the copyright act);
cf. Motorola, Inc. v. Computer Displays Int'l, Inc., 739 F.2d 1149, 1157 (7th Cir. 1984) (af-
firming trial court's application of a patent law doctrine in an analogous trade secret case);
Warrington Assocs., Inc. v. Real-Time Eng'g Sys., Inc., 522 F. Supp. 367, 368 (N.D. Ill. 1981)
("[N]either Congress nor the courts have viewed the federal-Copyright Act as preempting the
common law of trade secret misappropriation."). But cf. Videotronics, Inc. v. Bend Elecs.,
564 F. Supp. 1471, 1476 (D. Nev. 1983) (protection under patent or copyright law precludes
relief under state unfair competition or misappropriation law).
43. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475-76 (1974).
44. RESTATEMENT (FIRsT) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. f (1939).
45. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1015 (5th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1971).
46. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS Acr § 1(4)(ii) (1985).
47. See generaUy D.C. TOEDT III, THE LAW AND BusiNEss OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE § 5
(1993).
48. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03 (1988).
49. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 474-78 (1974).
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ation of the work even where no copying has occurred. 50 Patents provide
exclusive rights to manufacture, use, and sell the product or process.5 1
These exclusive rights last for a period of 17 years.5 2 In return for receiv-
ing these exclusive rights, the patent applicant must publicly disclose the
invention.
5 s
Despite the broader exclusive rights provided by a patent, software
developers rarely seek patent protection. 54 The patent application pro-
cess is complicated, time-consuming, and expensive.55 Given the limited
instances in which software is patentable, the failure to patent software is
understandable. Also, to the extent a software developer discloses the in-
vention, any trade secret protection thereof may be lost. In such circum-
stances, protecting software under either copyright or trade secret laws
may be preferable.
Thus, copyright, trade secrets, and to a limited degree, patents, are
each available to protect computer software. Software developers com-
monly use a combination of the three. The extent to which each is used
depends upon the characteristics of the particular program, as well as indi-
vidual needs.
II. ANTITRUST TYING RuLEs
Tying arrangements are generally challenged under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act.56 Section 1 prohibits every contract, combination, or con-
spiracy in restraint of trade.57 Taken literally, the broad language of the
statute could be construed to prohibit virtually any joint activity that af-
fects trade, whether competitively desirable or not.58 Recognizing this co-
nundrum, the Supreme Court limited the scope of the statute to prohibit
only concerted restraints that unreasonably restrict competitive condi-
tions.5 9 Two general lines of analysis have been created regarding the
proof of an unreasonable restraint: per se analysis and the rule of reason.
50. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
51. Id
52. Id. § 154.
53. Id § 112.
54. Reback & Hayes, Copyright Gone Astray: The Misappropriation Alternative, COMPUTER
LAw. 1 (Apr. 1986).
55. See 1 GUIDE TO COMPUTER LAw (CCH) 3,000, at 5005 (1989).
56. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988 & Supp IV 1992). Tying arrangements may also
be unlawful under § 3 of The Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), if the tying
involves commodities. IBM v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 134-36 (1936). The Clayton Act
does not, however, prohibit conduct relating to services or intangibles. See Crossland v. Can-
teen Corp., 711 F.2d 714, 718 n.1 (5th Cir. 1983) (for a Clayton Act claim, both the tied and
tying products are required to be goods); infra note 132 and accompanying text.
57. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988), amended by Pub. L. No. 101-588, 104 Stat. 2880 (1990).
58. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 606 (1972) ("Were § 1 to be
read in the narrowest possible way, any commercial contract could be deemed to violate it.").
59. Cf Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20
(1979). In acknowledging that Congress did not intend to proscribe in the Sherman Act all
the types of conduct that may be anticompetitive, the Court drew upon the legislative history
which indicated that Congress expected the courts to give shape to the statute's broad lan-
guage. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978).
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The standard per se analysis holds that certain practices are so plainly
anticompetitive and without redeeming value that they are per se, or pre-
sumptively, unreasonable.60 The Supreme Court explained that use of the
per se analysis helps to "avoid a burdensome inquiry into actual market
conditions in situations where the likelihood of anticompetitive conduct is
so great as to render unjustified the costs of determining whether the par-
ticular case at bar involves anticompetitive conduct."6l The consequences
of applying per se analysis are severe. Once a plaintiff establishes that the
practice occurred, the plaintiff need not affirmatively prove the practice
was competitively unreasonable. 6 2 The per se rule assumes the negative
impact on the industry, and the defendant does not have the opportunity
to justify the action as being reasonable. 63 Because of the extreme handi-
cap it places on a defendant, courts generally apply the per se analysis only
to certain types of trade practices that, from long experience, "always or
almost always tend to restrict competition."
64
While it has been generally stated that a tying arrangement is pre-
sumptively illegal under the per se rule,65 in reality a quasi per se analysis
is used: after a plaintiff proves that a tying occurred, the defendant still
has the opportunity to vindicate its actions as being competitively reason-
able.66 The ability of the defendant to offer a business justification to de-
60. See Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472
U.S. 284, 289-90 (1985); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57-58
(1977).
61. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 15-16 n.25 (1984). See NCAA
v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 103-04 (1984) ("Per se rules are invoked when surrounding
circumstances make the likelihood of anticompetitive conduct so great as to render unjusti-
fied further examination of the challenged conduct."); Verson Wilkins Ltd. v. Allied Prods.
Corp., 723 F. Supp. 1, 6 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (certain activity is so predominantly anticompetitive
that it is considered to be illegal per se).
62. R.C. Dick Geothermal Corp. v. Thermogenics, Inc., 1987-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
67,483, at 60,031 (9th Cir. 1987).
63. Verson Wkins Ltd., 723 F. Supp. at 6.
64. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979).
One of the most common types of practices in which per se analysis is applied is horizontal
and vertical price fixing. See, e.g., Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); Dr. Miles
Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911). For other applications, includ-
ing horizontal market divisions, group boycotts and bad faith negotiations, see, e.g., United
States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972) (horizontal and vertical market re-
straints); United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966) (group boycotts and
refusals to deal). Cf R.C. Dick Geothermal Corp. v. Thermogenics, Inc., 1987-1 Trade Cas. 1
67,483, at 60,032 (9th Cir. 1987) (conspiracy to suppress megawatts of steam output).
65. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 15-16 (1984); Heatransfer
Corp. v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 553 F.2d 964, 976 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1087
(1978).
66. Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc., 833 F.2d 1342, 1350-51 (9th
Cir. 1987) (accepting business justification for tying as a legitimate means of maintaining
quality control, thereby protecting reputation of manufacturer), cert. denied 488 U.S. 870
(1988); Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505, 517 (2d Cir. 1964) (permitting tie to protect
trademark by ensuring product quality control), cert. dismissed, 381 U.S. 125 (1965); Dehy-
drating Process Co. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653, 656-57 (1st Cir.) (allowingjustification
that the two products did not work properly independently from each other and could not
reasonably be manufactured independently), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 931 (1961); United States
v. Jerrold Elecs. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 557 (E.D. Pa. 1960) (allowing tying arrangement
until business established), affid per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961); see aLso Xeta, Inc. v. Atex,
Inc., 852 F.2d 1280, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (no illegal tying shown where plaintiff failed to
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fend itself against a per se tying claim is, therefore, a variation of the strict
per se rule applied to other types of conduct.
The antitrust concern with tying arrangements is that they may fore-
close competition in the market for the tied product.6 7 When buyers are
forced to purchase a particular product, competition in the relevant mar-
ket is lessened.68 The Supreme Court has expressed its strong bias against
tying: "[t]ying agreements serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppres-
sion of competition." 69 Public policy disfavors the possibility that poten-
tially substandard products are insulated from competitive forces.
70
Like all other Section 1 claims, the plaintiff asserting an unlawful ty-
ing violation must prove an agreement or conspiracy by two or more per-
sons. For a software license/maintenance service package, concerted
action can be shown by direct or circumstantial evidence that the tying
party sold the software license to its customers on the condition that they
also purchase the maintenance services. 7 1 For instance, a conspiracy can
show that the alleged tie of software and hardware was unreasonable). But see United States
v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 51-52 (1962) (after a tying arrangement is proven, courts need
not make any "elaborate inquiry" into the business reasons for its use) (citing Northern Pac.
Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)).
If, however, the plaintiff does not demonstrate a Section 1 per se tying arrangement,
then the defendant's conduct is examined under the "rule of reason" test to determine if it
unreasonably restrained competition. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 17-18, 29; Foremost Pro
Color, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 703 F.2d 534, 541 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1038 (1984). Unlike the limited analysis dictated by the per se doctrine, the rule of reason
test requires a court to examine the various market factors that bear upon whether a particu-
lar practice is unreasonably restrictive of competitive conditions. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at
29.
[T] he purpose of the analysis is to form a judgment about the competitive signifi-
cance of the restraint; it is not to decide whether a policy favoring competition is in
the public interest, or in the interest of the members of an industry .... [T] hat policy
decision has been made by the Congress.
National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978). A court will
consider the adverse impact of the alleged illegal practice on competitive conditions in the
relevant industry. Id. at 688. A plaintiff's mere assertion that the defendant's action ad-
versely affected the plaintiff will not support an antitrust claim without proof of generalized
injury to the market. In addition to showing general market impact, the rule of reason re-
quires consideration of whether the restraint had a substantially adverse effect on competi-
tion which outweighs any positive competitive aspects of the restraint. R.C. Dick Geothermal
Corp. v. Thermogenics, Inc., 1987-1 Trade Cas. 67,483, at 60,033 (9th Cir. 1987); Cowley v.
Braden Indus., Inc., 613 F.2d 751, 755 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 965 (1980).
67. Northern Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 6. Tying arrangements "deny competitors free access to
the market for the tied product, not because the party imposing the tying requirements has a
better product or a lower price but because of his power or leverage in another market." Id.
68. See id. ("buyers are forced to forego their free choice between competing products");
Innovation Data Processing v. IBM, 585 F. Supp. 1470, 1475 (D.N.J. 1984) (quoting Northern
Pac. Ry.); see also Richard Craswell, Tying Requirements in Competitive Markets: The Consumer
Protection Issues, 62 B.U. L. REv. 661, 666-68 (1982); W. David Slawson, A New Concept of Compe-
tition: Reanalyzing Tie-In Doctrine After Hyde, 30 ANTITRusr BuL.. 257, 264 (1985); Note, The
Economic Interest Requirement in the Per Se Analysis of Tying Arrangements: A Worthless Inquiry, 58
FoRDHAm L. Rev. 1353, 1358-59 (1990).
69. Loews, 371 U.S. at 44 (quoting Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-
06 (1949)).
70. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 14-15 (citing, inter alia, Fortnerl, 394 U.S. at 509); see also
Innovation Data Processing, 585 F. Supp. at 1475.
71. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2072, 2080 (1992)
(rejecting the argument of a "unified market" because some consumers would purchase
either service or parts alone). But see McKenzie v. Mercy Hosp., 854 F.2d 365, 368 (10th Cir.
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be shown by an express refusal to license the software without the
purchase of the maintenance services or by other evidence that the licen-
sor would cancel the license if the customer refused to purchase mainte-
nance services.
7 2
In addition to proving concerted action, the plaintiff alleging a tying
violation must prove four elements. First, the plaintiff must show the ar-
rangement involves two distinct products or services.73 The plaintiff must
then show an actual tie exists. 74 Third, proof is required that the defend-
ant has appreciable economic power in the tying market.75 Finally, the
arrangement must affect a substantial volume of interstate commerce.
7 6
As relatively small sums are deemed to implicate a substantial volume of
commerce, this final element deserves scant review. 77 The remaining ele-
ments, however, will be discussed in more detail.
The rule that the tying product and the tied product must be separate
items implies separate customer demand for each product so that it is effi-
1988) (finding a single supplier's imposition of a tying arrangement upon its customers was
not sufficient evidence of concerted activity); Systemcare, Inc. v. Wang Labs., Inc., 787 F.
Supp. 179, 182 (D. Colo. 1992) (in a case involving the packaging of software maintenance
services and hardware maintenance services, court held that: "A contract between a cus-
tomer and the seller in an alleged tying scheme does not establish a [Sherman Act] Section 1
conspiracy.").
72. See, e.g., Amerinet, Inc. v. Xerox Corp., 972 F.2d 1483, 1499-1500 (8th Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1048 (1993).
73. Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Servs., 112 S. Ct. at 2080 (citing Jefferson Parish,
466 U.S. at 21-22).
74. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-7 (1958). Some courts combine the
first two elements as a single element. See, e.g., Virtual Maintenance, Inc. v. Prime Computer,
Inc., 957 F.2d 1318, 1323 (6th Cir.) (requiring "tying arrangement between two distinct prod-
ucts or services"), vacated and remanded, 113 S. Ct. 314 (1992); Portland Retail Druggists Ass'n.
v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, 662 F.2d 641, 648 (9th Cir. 1981) (requiring "[t]wo distinct
products or services [that] are in fact tied such that the products are offered as a single pack-
age"), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1229 (1985); see also Dik, supra note 2, at 428.
75. Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Servs., 112 S. Ct. at 2080 (citing Jefferson Parish,
466 U.S. at 13-14).
76. There is some debate as to the requirement of a fifth element, namely that the
plaintiff must also show that the defendant has an economic stake in the tied item. Although
there is no Supreme Court precedent on this issue, lower courts are divided on the require-
ment that the seller have an economic interest in the tying product market. Compare Beard v.
Parkview Hosp., 912 F.2d 138 142-43 (6th Cir. 1990) (requiring proof of economic interest in
the tying product market); Midwestern Waffles, Inc. v. Waffle House, Inc., 734 F.2d 705, 712
(11th Cir. 1984) (same); Carl Sandburg Village Condominium Ass'n No. 1 v. First Condo-
minium Dev. Co., 758 F.2d 203, 207 (7th Cir. 1985) (same) with Gonzalez v. St. Margaret's
House Hous. Dev. Fund Corp., 880 F.2d 1514, 1517 (2d Cir. 1989) (rejecting proof of eco-
nomic interest in the tied product as an element of a per se tying case) and Parts & Elec.
Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Elec., Inc., 826 F.2d 712 (7th Cir. 1987) (court's discussion on issue of
market power in the tied product market as a required element, in light of Supreme Court's
absence of direction on same issue, skirted by plaintiffs failure to preserve the issue for
judgment n.o.v. purposes), cert. denied 493 U.S. 847 (1989). See generally, Note, The Economic
Interest Requirement in the Per Se Analysis of Tying Arrangements, supra note 68, at 1362-63.
77. See, e.g., Fortner , 394 U.S. at 501-02 ($190,000); United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371
U.S. 38, 49 (1962) ($60,800); Yentsch v. Texaco, Inc., 630 F.2d 46, 58 (2d Cir. 1980)
($600,000). The volume of commerce affected must simply be "substantial enough in terms
of dollar-volume so as not to be merely de minimis." Fortner , 394 U.S. at 501. For a more
complete listing of dollar amounts which have been accepted as being a substantial amount,
or rejected, see 9 PiLntip E. AREEDA, AN-rrraus-r LAw 1721b4, at 273-75 (1991) (as little as
$10,000 has been accepted as "substantial").
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cient for a firm to offer the products separately.78 Relevant factors in de-
termining distinctness include whether the tying party or its competitors
offer the products separately or only as a single package, 79 whether the
prices for the products are set individually or only as a lump sum,80 and
whether purchasers perceive the items as separate or as a single, combined
package. It may be evident in many cases that products are indeed sepa-
rate. Salt machines and salt are distinct products,8 ' as are film projectors
and film.8 2 In close cases, nonetheless, the standards for determining
whether two distinct products exist are less clear.83 Products may still be
considered distinct although they are functionally co-dependent in the
sense that one is worthless without the other.84 Thus, tabulators and
punch cards are distinct items despite the uselessness of the tabulator
without the cards.
8 5
The second element of a tying claim requires a showing that the ac-
quisition of the tying product was conditioned upon the purchaser also
buying the tied product.86 A tie occurs when the buyer is coerced or
forced into taking the tied item as a condition of acquiring the tying prod-
uct. The condition may be clearly set forth in an explicit agreement, or it
may be shown by the tying party's policy, which results in the purchase of
the tying and tied products together, as being "the only viable economic
option."8 7 However, no illegal tie exists when the purchaser desires to buy
the tied item from the same seller or if the purchaser can buy the tying
product elsewhere; in either case, the purchaser's freedom to buy the ty-
ing and tied items separately is not restrained.8 8 Likewise, antitrust liabil-
ity will not arise in situations where the seller offers the tying product
separately from the tied product at a reasonable price.
8 9
78. See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 21-22.
79. Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Servs., 112 S. Ct. at 2080 (evidence that service
and parts had been sold separately in the past deemed relevant).
80. ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM, 448 F. Supp. 228, 233 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (deter-
mining that disk drive unit and head/disk assembly were a single product, because of an
industry practice to sell the combined unit for a single price).
81. Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 491-92 (1942); International Salt
Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 395-97 (1947).
82. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 518 (1917).
83. Compare Principe v. McDonald's Corp., 631 F.2d 303, 308 (4th Cir. 1980) (finding no
tie existed where a license to use the franchisor's trade name, lease of the restaurant prop-
erty, and note were part of a single franchise package), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 970 (1981) with
Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704 (7th Cir. 1979) (finding a tie could exist
between a trademark license and a lease of the locational property used by the franchisee),
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980).
84. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 19 n.30 (1984).
85. IBM v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 135 (1936).
86. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958).
87. Ways & Means, Inc. v. IVAC Corp., 506 F. Supp. 697, 701 (N.D. Cal. 1979), affid, 638
F.2d 143 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 895 (1981).
88. See, e.g., Stephen Jay Photography, Ltd. v. Olan Mills, Inc., 903 F.2d 988, 991 (4th
Cir. 1990) (no tying of school class photos to individual portraits where students could
purchase their portraits elsewhere).
89. Northern Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 5-6 n.4 (noting no tying arrangement where the buyer
may buy either product by itself, even though the seller also offers the two products together
at a single price); Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 972-74 & n.6 (4th Cir 1990)
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This concept of forcing is not difficult to prove in the case of a
software and maintenance service package when the vendor refuses to li-
cense the software separately. Obviously, there is no tying violation if the
vendor offers the software license alone. But if development of the
software is substantially incomplete, then a license of such undeveloped
software may not be practical and the licensor would lose funding for fur-
ther development. Yet the vendor with a viable software product may still
find marketing a license without maintenance an unacceptable alterna-
tive, considering that the licensor would lose the economic and functional
advantages derived from the bundling.90 Accordingly, the software ven-
dor who markets the software/maintenance package must rely upon the
absence of the first element of a tying claim, separate products, or the
third element, appreciable economic power.
The third element in proving a tying claim requires that the defend-
ant have appreciable economic power in the tying product that gives the
defendant a significant advantage over competitors and thus enables the
defendant to condition effectively the availability of the tying item on ac-
ceptance of the tied item.9 1 In tying cases, courts have made it clear that
in some circumstances only a modest degree of market power is needed to
show appreciable economic power.92 Neither monopoly power nor a sig-
nificant market share is always required.93 Economic power in the tying
market, therefore, need not be absolute so long as the power exists as to
some buyers in the market.
94
Appreciable economic power can be shown in one of three ways.
First, economic power arises when the defendant has a dominant position
in the tying market.95 While monopoly power is not required, a tying
party with a significant market share is likely to hold a dominant position
in the tying market.9 6 Second, even without a significant market share,
economic power can be shown when a substantial number of individuals
acquiesce to the tie and there is no rational reason for that acquiescence
other than the tying arrangement itself.97 The third method of proving
(computer hardware and software were held not tied when the software could be licensed
separately at a reasonable price).
90. See Glen P. Belvis, Computers, Copyright & Tying Agreements: An Argument For the Aban-
donment of the Presumption of Market Power, 28 B.C. L. REv. 265, 279 (1987).
91. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2072, 2080 (1992); see
Fortner , 394 U.S. at 503. Some economists, though, believe that ties effectively reduce com-
petition, regardless of the presence of market power. See Slawson, supra note 68, at 270-72.
92. United States Steel Corp. v. Former Enters., Inc., 429 U.S. 610, 620 (1977) (Fortner
I); Fortner 1, 394 U.S. at 502-04.
93. Fortner II, 429 U.S. at 620; Fortner L 394 U.S. at 502-04. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker,
et al., Monopoly Power and Market Power in Antitrust Law, 76 GEO. L.J. 241, 259 (1987) (analysis
of the difference between economic power, monopoly power and market share).
94. FortnerL, 394 U.S. at 503; Digidyne Corp. v. Data General Corp., 734 F.2d 1336, 1340-
41 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 908 (1985).
95. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 17 (1984).
96. See IBM v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936) (control of over 80% of the tying
market represented a dominant position in that market). But see Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at
26 (30% of market share was insufficient to establish market power).
97. Cf Fortneri, 429 U.S. at 618 n.10; Carpa, Inc. v. Ward Foods, Inc., 536 F.2d 39, 46-49
(5th Cir. 1976).
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appreciable economic power arises in the case of tying products that are
somehow unique. A presumption of economic power is created when the
tying product is substantially cheaper than competing products98 or the
product has no substitutes.99 The presumption also has been applied
when the uniqueness of the product results from legal advantages ob-
tained from patent laws.' 0 0
If the proof is sufficient to establish a tying arrangement, the defend-
ant may offer evidence of business justifications for the tie.10 ' In Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.,10 2 Kodak offered three business
justifications for its tying of parts and services: maintaining high quality
service, reducing inventory costs, and preventing third party service prov-
iders from free-riding on Kodak's investment in equipment, parts, and ser-
vice.103 The Court, however, rejected each justification, concluding that
the first was pretextual, the second was contrary to the evidence, and the
third had "no support in our caselaw." 10 4 Thus, if the Kodak decision is
any indication, the modern view appears to be that a business justification
will undergo tough scrutiny by the courts.10 5 It is unclear what type of
justification a court would likely accept. Accordingly, in examining the
antitrust implications of a software/maintenance package, it is necessary
to focus on the two weakest elements of a software tying case: separate
products and market power.
III. SINGLE PRODUCT ISSUE
An illegal tying arrangement requires the existence of two distinct
products. 10 6 Courts have addressed this issue in several cases involving
computer hardware and software industries. Both Virtual Maintenance, Inc.
v. Prime Computer, Inc.,10 7 and Datagate, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 10 8 in-
volved purported ties between software maintenance services and hard-
ware maintenance. In Virtual Maintenance, the defendant sold software
support services10 9 separately at a large premium above the price it
charged for software support and hardware maintenance together.
10
98. E.g., Fortner II, 429 U.S. at 622.
99. E.g., Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 1 (1958) (control over large
tracts of land); Monument Builders, Inc. v. American Cemetery Ass'n, 891 F.2d 1473 (10th
Cir. 1989) (burial markers to burial plots), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 930 (1990).
100. E.g., International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
101. See IBM v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936).
102. 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992).
103. Id. at 2091.
104. Id. at 2091-92.
105. A number of business justifications have been struck down by the Court over the
years. See, e.g., United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 51 (1962) (the need to fulfill con-
tractual commitments involving restrictive covenants); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337
U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949) (quality control); IBM v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936) (same).
106. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
107. 957 F.2d 1318 (6th Cir. 1992), vacated and remanded, 113 S. Ct. 314 (1992) (vacated
and remanded for further consideration in light of Kodak).
108. 941 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1667 (1992).
109. The support services in this case included revisions, modifications, and updates. Vir-




The defendant in Datagate was accused of threatening to withhold software
maintenance unless customers also purchased hardware maintenance
services."' In both cases, the courts found software maintenance and
hardware maintenance to be distinct products because of separate con-
sumer demand for each product. 112 Although neither court directly ad-
dressed the distinctions between software maintenance and the
underlying software, both recognized that software maintenance services,
at least in some circumstances, will be considered separate products.
In Data General Corp. v. Grumman Systems Support Corp.,113 the district
court ruled that a manufacturer's diagnostic software and its computer
equipment repair services were separate products, despite evidence that
the diagnostic software was useful only in servicing the same computer
equipment. The manufacturer denied a software license request from
some customers who desired to have a third party service provider use the
diagnostic software to provide them with computer repair services. Be-
cause the manufacturer was willing to license the diagnostic software inde-
pendently to companies who provided their own repair services, it was
feasible to offer the software and repair services separately.
114
The same defendant and virtually the same set of facts arose in Service
& Training Inc. v. Data General Corp.1 15 The district court ruled that since
the diagnostic software was "merely one feature of Data General's inte-
grated and unified product - computer servicing," and the only purpose
of the software was to repair computer systems, the diagnostic software
and repair services were "inextricably bound together." 116 The appellate
court overruled the trial court, agreeing with the Grumman Systems court
that diagnostic software and repair services were two distinct products.
117
The Fourth Circuit found insufficient evidence of separate products be-
cause the defendant, while willing to license the diagnostic software alone
to certain companies, produced no evidence that there was consumer de-
mand for such services.
11 8
The same defendant reappeared in Digidyne Corp. v. Data General
Corp.' 19 This time, however, the defendant tied the sale of its central
processing unit to the licensing of its operating system. Because there was
customer demand for each product separately and the products could be
provided separately, the court found that the central processing unit and
the software were separate items capable of being tied.120 The central
111. Datagate, 941 F.2d at 866.
112. Virtual Maintenance, 957 F.2d at 1323; Datagate, 941 F.2d at 870.
113. 761 F. Supp. 185 (D. Mass. 1991).
114. Id. at 193.
115. 963 F.2d 680 (4th Cir. 1992).
116. Id. at 684 (citing Service & Training, Inc. v. Data General Corp., 737 F. Supp. 334,
343 (D. Md. 1990)).
117. Id. at 684.
118. Id. at 685. In the end, though, the court found no tie because of the lack of proof of
a conspiracy. Id. at 685-88.
119. 734 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 908 (1985).
120. Id. at 1338-39; see also Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 972-73 & n.6
(4th Cir. 1990) (computer hardware and software could be distinct items); 3 P.M., Inc. v.
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theme of Digidyne and similar cases is that courts are quite willing to find
distinct products in computer-related industries.
The recent decision in Kodak, while not involving computer systems,
also may have a strong impact on analyzing the existence of distinct mar-
kets where services for technology products are involved. The Supreme
Court in Kodak noted that "the development of the entire high-technology
service industry is evidence of the efficiency of a separate market for ser-
vice." 12 1 The Court thereby found that there could be a market for serv-
icing Kodak copier equipment that was separate from the market for
Kodak copier parts. The Court possibly was influenced by the number of
third party suppliers of copier maintenance services already in existence
that were affected adversely by Kodak's policy. Some believe that Kodak
stands for the rule that, in cases of tying a high-technology product and
related services, there is always a services market separate from the market
for the product itself.1 22 Thus Kodak, together with Virtual Maintenance,
Datagate, and the rest, may form the basis for a court to conclude that
software and services are separate markets.
Despite this case law, a tying claim involving software and services war-
rants a different conclusion based upon the unique characteristics of
software technology. The impact of Kodak on a software tie ought to be
minimal. The decision was on a summary judgment ruling, holding only
that the existence of separate products is properly a fact determination
that requires a trial on the merits.' 23 Moreover, the Kodak Court's com-
ment concerning the high-technology industry should properly be consid-
ered dictum, or in any case, not applied to software. Contrary to Kodak's
broad pronouncement of the distinctness of service markets in high tech-
nology industries, maintenance services for software products are funda-
mentally different. Likewise, tying arrangements between hardware and
software are not entirely analogous to those between software and related
services. While there is reason to believe that the hardware and software
markets are distinct markets, any division between software and mainte-
nance services is not so clearly defined. Consumers commonly purchase
licenses to software and maintenance services in packages, or at least
purchase software maintenance from the same vendor that developed the
software.
Bundling of software licenses with maintenance services is a common
practice. Such practice promotes efficiency by allowing the developer to
improve product performance after the initial license sale, which in turn
serves to promote consumer acceptance of the product. Customers, con-
sequently, benefit by access to the developer's improvements. Indeed, the
innovative capability of the developer can be a primary consideration of
Basic Four Corp., 591 F. Supp. 1350, 1354-55 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (computer hardware prod-
ucts and computer maintenance services were distinct items).
121. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 112 S. CL 2072, 2080 (1992).
122. See, e.g., Donald F. Blumberg, Eastman Kodak: The Strategic Implications for the Field
Service Industhy, 9 COMPUTER LAW. 18, 19 (1992).
123. See Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Servs., 112 S. CL at 2080 ("Enough doubt is
cast on Kodak's claim of a unified market that it should be resolved by the trier of fact.").
[Vol. 71:3
SOFTWARE TYING ARRANGEMENTS
potential software licensees who appraise the future promise of the
software in addition to evaluating the current technology. Inasmuch as
the item being purchased is the right to use the software as further cor-
rected, modified and enhanced, customers may reasonably view software
and maintenance services as a single product.
Furthermore, the functional integration of the results of mainte-
nance service-such as software code fixes, modifications, and enhance-
ments-with the underlying software code seems to argue for a finding of
a single product. This conclusion does not undermine the admonition of
the Court that the determination as to whether a single product exists
"turns not on the functional relation between them, but rather on the
character of the demand for the two items."124 Clearly, there is no de-
mand for the purchase of software maintenance services apart from the
purchase of the software license itself since the maintenance is useless
without the software.' 25 At the same time, other software maintenance
providers may not be able to lawfully provide similar services.
Maintenance of a software product generally requires access to the
human-readable source code. But many vendors do not provide their
licensees with source code, giving them only the object code necessary to
run the program. Those that do provide the source code concurrently
prohibit licensees from disclosing it to any third party. These measures
are legitimate precautions necessary to protect the trade secrets revealed
in the source code. Further, copyright law provides that software develop-
ers have the sole right to maintain copyrighted source code and to create
derivative works therefrom. By virtue of trade secret and copyright protec-
tion, then, third party service providers are precluded from accessing the
source code necessary to render maintenance services on the software. As
a result, no separate market for maintenance of proprietary software pro-
grams can exist without the authorization of the software developer.
Where no service competitors are foreclosed from providing maintenance
services, no antitrust concerns are implicated.
Before enjoining software tying arrangements by concluding that dis-
tinct products exist, courts should consider the policy implications. Prod-
uct innovation is the mainstay of the software industry. For software
developers, license and maintenance services packages allow them to con-
tinue improving the performance and efficiency of the software. The still
maturing software industry needs room to grow, and this requires that a
more flexible approach be applied than the traditional tying analysis.
Courts must recognize the competitive needs of the software industry in
determining whether software and related services are two distinct prod-
ucts or merely a single product composed of technology, both current and
124. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 19 (1984).
125. For example, the court in Allen-Myland, Inc. v. IBM, 693 F. Supp. 262 (E.D. Pa.
1988), dealt with a hardware vendor who sold upgraded hardware parts with services to in-
stall such parts. Because there was no demand for the services separate from the demand for
the parts themselves, the plaintiff was unable to establish a separate demand for the services.
Id. at 289.
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future. The courts' failure to recognize the software industry's competi-
tive needs results in uncertainty for software developers. This uncertainty
would naturally inhibit further research and development following the
initial marketing of a software product, without any corresponding value
to the interests of consumers. Software developers would then have to
choose between foregoing the economic advantages of combining
software and services or risk incurring antitrust treble damages. A flexible
approach to resolving the single product issue, however, allows software
developers to enhance and improve their product, thus enabling them to
compete vigorously. The goals of encouraging innovation, of properly
recognizing industry practice, and of promoting competition would
thereby equitably be met.
IV. PRESUMPTION OF MARKET POWER
Appreciable economic power is presumed to exist in Sherman Act
tying cases when the tying product is patented. 126 The rationale for this
judicially-created presumption is that the grant of a patent or similar mo-
nopoly over a product means that the buyer cannot purchase the product
elsewhere, thus giving the seller market power. 127 The presumption de-
rives from cases involving "patent misuse," a doctrine which prevents a
patentee from exceeding its lawful monopoly rights granted under the
patent laws to gain advantage in another market. 128 Patent misuse is tradi-
tionally an affirmative defense to an infringement action that, if proven,
results in the effective suspension of the holder's statutory patent rights
during periods of misuse. 12 9 Conduct may constitute patent misuse with-
out rising to the level of an antitrust violation.' 3 0 While today the doctrine
of patent misuse is applied to a variety of conduct,' 8 ' it originated from
tying arrangements in which unpatented staple goods were tied to pat-
ented products.'
3 2
126. United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 (1962).
127. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 15-17. The concurrence in Jefferson Parish recognized,
however, that the presumption of market power is not always justified since "a patent holder
has no market power in any relevant sense if there are close substitutes for the patented
product." Id. at 37 n.7 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
128. For a historical discussion of "patent misuse," see Rohm & Haas Co. v. Dawson
Chem. Co., 191 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 691, 696-97 (S.D. Tex. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 599 F.2d
685 (5th Cir. 1979).
129. Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942).
130. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 140 (1969).
131. For example, patent misuse has been applied to the following practices: price fix-
ing, Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964); covenants not to compete by the patentee,
Stewart v. Mo-Trim, Inc., 192 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 410 (S.D. Ohio 1975); territorial limitations,
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), overrded on other grounds by 433
U.S. 36, 58 (1977); payment of royalties after expiration of the patent, Scott Paper Co. v.
Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249 (1945); and payment of royalties based on sales of unpat-
ented products, Zenith Radio Corp., 395 U.S. at 100-102.
132. Kenneth J. Burchfiel, Patent Misuse and Antitrust Reform: "Blessed Be the Tie?, "4 HAxv.
J.L. & TECH. 1, 12 (1991).
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After Congress indicated its disdain for tying by enacting the Clayton
Act, which expressly prohibited tying arrangements in goods,153 the
Supreme Court eventually borrowed the standard for patent misuse and
adapted it for antitrust tying claims.' 34 The Court announced that the use
of a patent monopoly to control competition in the market for an unpat-
ented product was, without more, an antitrust violation. 135 This "cross-
fertilization" between antitrust and patent misuse doctrine' 36 resulted in
the creation of the Sherman Act per se tying doctrine and the presump-
tion of market power.'
3 7
The Supreme Court extended the presumption to copyrighted prod-
ucts in United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.138 The defendant in Para-
mount engaged in block booking of copyrighted feature films for movie
theaters. By block booking, the defendant tied the license of a desired
film to acceptance of the block of unwanted films. The Court reviewed
congressional intent behind the intellectual property laws, noting that the
"copyright monopoly" granted by Congress was intended to benefit pri-
marily the public by inducing creators to release their work, whereas re-
ward to the copyright owner was merely a secondary consideration. 1 39
Drawing upon prior patent misuse cases, the Paramount Court essentially
adopted the reasoning underlying the patent misuse rule. Any attempt to
extend the scope and value of one copyright to another product by way of
a tie, the Court ruled, should be condemned.' 40 Accordingly, the defend-
ant violated the Sherman Act for block booking copyrighted films.14 1 In
so ruling, the Paramount Court made no distinction between the rights
granted by patent law and the more limited rights granted by copyright.
Nor did the Court undertake any real analysis of antitrust principles. The
Paramount decision seems to be based simply on the finding that the de-
fendant improperly exceeded its intellectual property rights rather than
finding any separate violation of the antitrust laws.
133. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 3, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 15 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Section 3 of the Clayton Act provides, in relevant part:
[1]t shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, to ... make a sale or contract for sale of goods, wares, merchandise,
machinery, supplies or other commodities, whether patented or unpatented, .. . on
the condition, agreement or understanding that the ... purchaser thereof shall not
use or deal in the goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies or other com-
modities of a competitor or competitors of the . . . seller, where the effect of such
... sale, or contract for sale or such condition, agreement or understanding may be
to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of
commerce.
Id.
134. See, e.g., Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Invest. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944); Mercoid
Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944).
135. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator, 320 U.S. at 684.
136. Burchfiel, supra note 132, at 35.
137. See International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947) ("Not only is
price-fidng unreasonable, per se,... but also it is unreasonable, per se, to foreclose competi-
tors from any substantial market.").
138. 334 U.S. 131, 156-59 (1948).
139. Id. at 158.
140. Id. at 159.
141. Id. at 157-58.
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In United States v. Loew's InC.,14 2 the Supreme Court revisited its hold-
ing in Paramount. Again, the tie at issue involved the block booking of'
movies. 143 Though making no effort to consider the differences between
patents and copyright, the Loew's Court improved upon Paramount by ana-
lyzing independently the issues in an antitrust context. In affirming the
presumption of market power for copyrighted products, the Court first
appraised the anticompetitive effects of patent rights. The Court posited
that since the goal of patent law is to reward uniqueness, a patented prod-
uct must therefore itself be unique. 144 In turn, a patent's distinctiveness
meant that any tying arrangement involving a patented product necessar-
ily has anticompetitive consequences. 145 Citing Paramount, the Court sum-
marily adopted this logic for copyrighted products, thereby indicating that
any copyrighted product was legally and economically unique.146 Consid-
erations of market share and the availability of alternative products were
deemed irrelevant.147 The Court further noted that in the battle between
the "statutorily dispensed monopoly" in patented or copyrighted products
and principles of free competition, the latter must prevail. 148 Nonethe-
less, the Court did allow for future arguments that the presumption of
economic power does not apply to particular patented or copyrighted
products:
There may be rare circumstances in which the doctrine we have
enunciated under § 1 of the Sherman Act prohibiting tying ar-
rangements involving patented or copyrighted tying products is
inapplicable. However, we find it difficult to conceive of such a
case, and the present case is clearly not one.
14 9
Citing the decisions in Paramount and Loew 's, other courts have ap-
plied the presumption of economic power when the tying product was
copyrighted software. For example, the defendant in Digidyne Corp. v. Data
General Corp.150 bundled the license of its copyrighted operating system
with the purchase of its central processing units. Expressly following
Loew's, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the copyright monopoly in the
software was sufficient to give rise to a presumption of requisite economic
power in that market.15 1 The court declined to consider evidence of func-
tionally equivalent operating systems, stating that competing substitutes
142. 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
143. The facts were slightly different, though, in that the films in Loew's were sold to
television stations rather than movie theaters. Still, the factual difference was immaterial to
the Court's resolution. Loew's, 371 U.S. at 47-48.
144. Id. at 46.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 47 (citing United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948)).
147. Id. at 47-48.
148. Id. at 49.
149. Id. at 49-50. More recently, the Supreme Court cited the Paramount and Loew's rule
that a patent or similar monopoly will give rise to a presumption of market power. Jefferson
Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 16 (1984); Fortner II, 429 U.S. 610, 621 (1977).
150. 734 F.2d 1336, 1338 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 908 (1985).
151. Id. at 1342. One lower court construed the Digidyne decision as relying upon more
than just the copyrighted software. The district court in Telerate Sys., Inc. v. Caro, 689 F.
Supp. 221, 236 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), noted that the basis of the market power in Digidyne was the
fact that many users were financially locked into the defendant's operating system because it
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did not destroy the legal or economic distinctiveness of a copyrighted
product.152
In contrast to the Ninth Circuit's decision in Digidyne, the Sixth Cir-
cuit flatly rejected an absolute presumption of market power for copy-
righted or patented products. In A.I. Root Co. v. Computer/Dynamics,
Inc.,153 the Sixth Circuit acknowledged that a patent or copyright holder
had no market power if close substitutes to the patented or copyrighted
item were available. The court described Loew's as "overbroad and inappo-
site to the instant case,"1 54 and further distinguished Digidyne based on a
fundamental difference in the facts.155 Whereas the Ninth Circuit found
that the software in Digidyne was particularly unique and recognized as the
best in the industry, the operating software in question in A.I. Root was not
especially unique or appealing. 156 Because the A.L Root software had close
substitutes, the fact that the software was copyrighted was not determina-
tive of market power. 157 With no further proof of market power present,
the court found no illegal tying arrangement.'
5 8
As the Sixth Circuit implicitly realized, the presumption of market
power as applied to copyrighted products is archaic and misapprehends
the fundamental nature of copyright law. There are generally three argu-
ments for the elimination of any presumption of market power for copy-
righted software products: (1) the casual application of a rule developed
for patent misuse defenses to cases involving copyrights ignores the tre-
mendous disparity between patent and copyright law;159 (2) the minimal
legal power attained under the copyright law does not equate with the sort
of economic force that is the basis of antitrust market power;' 60 and (3)
would be prohibitively expensive to reacquire application software designed to function with
a new operating system.
152. Digidyne, 734 F.2d at 1342. The appellate court also noted that there was evidence
that the defendant's software could not be reproduced without infringing on the defendant's
copyright and utilizing the defendant's trade secrets, which would require millions of dollars
and years of effort. The defense attempted to justify the tying by arguing that it was necessary
to allow the defendant to recover its research investment in developing the software. Unper-
suaded, the Ninth Circuit commented that an obvious, less restrictive alternative was simply
to restructure its prices for the software to reflect the relevant investment costs. Id. at 1344.
The First Circuit impliedly agreed with Digidyne in Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of New England,
Inc., 858 F.2d 792, 798 (1st Cir. 1988) (concluding that the plaintiff had not shown the
existence of market power, the court, citing Digidyne, noted that the "plaintiff has made no
showing that [the tying product] had any special or unique features, such as patent or copy-
rights, that might demonstrate market power.")
153. 806 F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 1986).
154. Id at 676.
155. Id. at 677.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 676. In criticizing A.I. Root, one commentator states that the decision "was
based upon a law review Note, dicta by a single Supreme Court justice in a footnote unre-
lated to the case decided, an overruled district court decision, a disingenuous distinguishing
of a contrary Ninth Circuit decision squarely on point, and a rule of its own making with no
basis in Supreme Court antitrust law." Dik, supra note 2, at 440.
158. A.I. Root, 806 F.2d at 675.
159. See infra notes 162-171 and accompanying text.
160. See infta notes 172-181 and accompanying text.
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the presence of alternative software products demonstrates that any pre-
sumption of market power is inappropriate to computer software. 16 1
A. Application of Patent Rule to Copyrights
The historical basis for applying the presumption to copyrighted
products is founded upon an inherently flawed analogy to patent misuse
cases. For instance, Paramount and Loew 's relied upon considerations of
patent misuse and were not based on any concept of copyright misuse.
The obvious reason was that, at the time of those decisions, copyright mis-
use was not an accepted doctrine. The Court made no mention of this
crucial inconsistency in either case, apparently ignoring the issue in its
unwavering attempt to link patent misuse with antitrust claims involving
tying of copyrighted films. Indeed, even today, much skepticism remains
as to whether copyright misuse is a valid theory or simply a mistaken ex-
pansion of the patent misuse doctrine.
162
Patent misuse is not an independent antitrust violation, but is more
properly a defense to an action for patent infringement.16 3 Because a
party need not show any anticompetitive effects to establish misuse, con-
duct that may qualify as patent misuse in an infringeient action will not
necessarily qualify as an antitrust violation.'6 Similarly, to show misuse a
party does not have to prove that it was harmed, while an antitrust plaintiff
must establish injury in his or her business or property.165 Thus, when
patent misuse is proven in an antitrust action, a court must still conduct a
separate analysis to determine if the patent misuse violates the antitrust
laws. In this respect, the Paramount decision, 166 in which the Court con-
cluded that an antitrust violation had occurred based solely on the finding
that the defendant had attempted to expand its copyright to other prod-
ucts, is clearly unjustified.
Congress itself perceived the inappropriateness of the presumption of
market power. After much debate about the inequity of the presumption,
Congress amended the Patent Act to provide that a patent holder will not
be guilty of patent misuse by reason of having
161. See infra notes 182-187 and accompanying text.
162. See, e.g., Reliability Research Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., 3 Computer Cas.
(CCH) 46,720, at 64,531 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (noting that copyright misuse is "an open and
disputed question of law"); Philip Abromats, Comment, Copyright Misuse and Anticompetitive
Software Licensing Restrictions: Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 52 U. Prrr. L. Rav. 629
(1991) (concluding that copyright misuse is too penalizing a remedy). In Lasercomb Am., Inc.
v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990), copyright misuse was applied by the court to a
software license prohibition against the licensees' developing or selling software which would
compete with the licensed software. Two commentators describe the Lasercomb decision as "a
software licensor's worst nightmare." SeeJere M. Webb & Lawrence A. Locke, Recent Devel-
opment, Intellectual Property Misuse: Developments in the Misuse Doctrine, 4 HARv. J.L. & TECH.
257, 258 (1991).
163. Windsurfing Int'l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 477
U.S. 905 (1986).
164. See Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942) (upholding patent
misuse defense while denying antitrust claim).
165. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
166. See supra notes 138-141 and accompanying text.
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conditioned the license of any rights to the patent or the sale of
the patented product on the acquisition of a license to rights in
another patent or purchase of a separate product, unless, in view
of the circumstances, the patent owner has market power in the
relevant market for the patent or patented product on which the
license or sale is conditioned.
167
Thus, Congress expressed its disagreement with the judicially-created pre-
sumption of market power, at least in the context of patent misuse de-
fenses. Inasmuch as the presumption of market power in antitrust tying
cases is historically based on rules developed in patent misuse, and not
copyright misuse cases, the fact that the patent misuse law has now
changed to eliminate any presumption of market power provides ample
grounds for courts to abolish the presumption in antitrust actions involv-
ing copyrights.
16 8
It is equally incongruous to apply mechanically a rule developed in
the context of patents to cases involving copyrights. Any analogy between
patents and copyrights is intrinsically suspect. A copyright holder's exclu-
sive rights are much more limited than patent rights. A patent provides a
strong exclusionary power: once a patent is granted, no one else has the
right to develop independently the same or a substantial equivalent to the
patented product. 169 The copyright holder, however, simply retains the
sole right to reproduce, distribute, and create derivative works of the copy-
righted work. 170 Copyright law does not forbid others from indepen-
dently creating identical works, nor does it protect the ideas underlying
the copyrighted work. Thus nothing in the Copyright Act prohibits a po-
tential licensee from using the ideas derived from a copyrighted product
and creating a similar work, provided that the underlying copyrighted
product is not unlawfully copied.
In sum, the exceptional disparity in the exclusive rights granted by
patent law as opposed to copyright law makes blind analogies between pat-
ent and copyright dubious at best.17 ' As the Paramount and Loew's hold-
167. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
168. Still, the House of Representatives deleted a corresponding proposal to eliminate
the patent and copyright presumption of market power applied in antitrust tying cases. 134
CONG. REc. H10,649 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1988). Compare 134 CONG. Rac. S17,148 (daily ed.
Oct. 21, 1988) (even after the House deleted the proposal to destroy the presumption in
antitrust cases, Senator Leahy averred that "the Senate is clearly sending a message to the
courts that they would be mistaken to continue to apply any presumption of market power
involving intellectual property rights as automatically granting meaningful economic power
over a particular market in antitrust cases") with Grid Sys. Corp. v. Texas Instruments, Inc.,
771 F. Supp. 1033 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (ruling that the amendment to the Patent Act did not
implicitly revoke Supreme Court precedent establishing a presumption of market power in
antitrust tying cases). If the court in Grid Systems is correct, the following anomaly results: in
the same case, the court will require evidence of market power in analyzing the patent misuse
defense to an infringement action, while at the same time presuming market power in ruling
on the antitrust claim. See Burchfiel, supra note 132, at 23.
169. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
170. Id. § 271. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
171. See Ralph C. Wilson Indus., Inc. v. Chronicle Broadcasting Co., 794 F.2d 1359 (9th
Cir. 1986) (using a different standard to analyze territorial restraints under copyright than
that which would have been applied to similar restraints under a patent).
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ings rest on an analogy to patent cases, the precedential value of such
decisions should now be highly questionable.
B. Presumption of Market Power Is Not Economically Sound
Perhaps the most fundamental criticism of the presumption of mar-
ket power is that the presumption finds little basis in economic reality. A
copyright does not truly confer market power by itself.17 2 As many artists
have experienced, the creation of a copyrighted product does not dictate
that there will be any demand for it or that the product will be more entic-
ing to consumers than any other product.1 73 Rather, the various attrib-
utes of the particular product and the reputation of the creator will
determine its desirability. For instance, an unknown singer may record
her music, but the mere fact that the music is copyrighted will not foster
any demand for the recording. There is no singular characteristic, then,
that makes copyrighted material inherently more desirable to the public
than any other product.
The presumption of market power assumes that there are no substi-
tutes because of the legal power granted by the copyright. One obvious
deficiency in that assumption is based on the copyright rule, which pro-
vides that ideas that can be expressed only in one way are not copyright-
able. 17 4 Thus, material is by statute copyrightable only if functional
equivalents are possible. 175 Similarly, copyright law does not prevent
others from duplicating the ideas and developing equivalent products. 176
Nor does copyright law prohibit independent development of even the
copyrightable aspects of a product. Where others are thereby free to pro-
duce their own equivalents, copyright holders may achieve little market
power. The availability of substitutes from competitors necessarily defies
any presumption of market power.
177
172. For this reason, a number of commentators have argued against the presumption of
market power. See Warren G. Lavey, Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks as Sources of Market
Power in Antitrust Cases, 27 ATrrRusr BuLL. 433 (1982); William Montgomery, Note, The 1e-
sumption of Economic Power for Patented and Copyrighted Products in Tying Arrangements, 85
COLUM. L. REv. 1140 (1985); Note, An Economic Analysis of Royalty Terms in Patent Licenses, 67
MINN. L. REv. 1198 (1983).
173. See Rosemary S. Thompson, Comment, Old Laws v. New Technology: Antediluvian Anti-
trust Tying Prohibitions and Operating System Software, 2 SorwAR L.J. 221, 238 (1988) ("As
many poor software developers, authors, and artists can attest, the granting of copyright does
not automatically create economic power resulting from demand for a product.").
174. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879). See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l Inc.,
725 F.2d 521, 525 (9th Cir. 1984) (recent application in a computer context).
175. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
176. See Data Cash Sys., Inc. v.JS&A Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. I1. 1979), aftd,
628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980).
177. SeeJefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 37 n.7 (1984) (O'Connor,
J., concurring) (recognizing that sellers of patented or copyrighted products have no market
power "in any relevant sense if there are close substitutes for the patented product"); Loctite
Corp. v. Ultraseal, Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 875 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (commenting that a patent
does not necessarily confer market power); Telerate Sys., Inc. v. Caro, 689 F. Supp. 221, 235-
39 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (the existence of a copyright is not the only factor in determining market
power); 3 P.M., Inc. v. Basic Four Corp., 591 F. Supp. 1350, 1359 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (the fact
that defendant's software was copyrighted did not establish the defendant possessed eco-
nomic power); see also Burchfiel, supra note 132, at 74 ("It is clear that in an economic sense,
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The "fair use" exception to the copyright law, which permits limited
free use of a copyrighted product for news reporting and educational pur-
poses,178 further diminishes the market power that a copyright accords.
Additional handicaps to obtaining market power by virtue of a copyright
include the public's right to library and archival reproduction of copy-
'righted material.
1 79
The presumption of market power also fails because it does not con-
sider cross-elasticity of demand by consumers. Where substitutes are avail-
able, consumer demand may be quite responsive to price changes in any
particular product. This means that if two products are essentially
equivalent in the eyes of the public, an increase in the price of one will
cause consumers to shift their purchase to the other product.18 0 Thus,
cross-elasticity of demand would tend to negate market power. Because
the subject matter of copyrighted products is highly substitutable, the pre-
sumption of market power makes no economic sense.
These arguments make clear the importance of distinguishing be-
tween legal and economic power. The limited legal power granted by in-
tellectual property law does not automatically equate to any economic
power that may result therefrom.1 8 1 Because a copyright does not in-
nately create economic power in any relevant sense, the presumption of
market power is unwarranted.
C. The Presumption Is Inappropriate for Software
Even assuming that the presumption of market power is conceivably
justified in some copyrighted product markets, it is inappropriate for
software technology. As an example, the presumption of economic power
may be more acceptable as applied to movies since it is the expression
itself that makes a movie valuable. The trial court in Loew's recognized
that the block-booked feature films "varied in theme, in artistic perform-
ance, in stars, in audience appeal, etc."18 2 Certainly Havana will not suf-
fice for viewers who wish to see Casablanca, although both carry the same
underlying theme.18 3 It is the expression, then, that bestows the essential
the essential element of market power is negated if there are acceptable substitutes for the
tying product available from others at comparable prices.").
178. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
179. Id. § 108.
180. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 400 (1956).
181. See Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of North Am., Inc., 833 F.2d 1342, 1346 & n.4 (9th
Cir. 1987) (dicta suggesting that the court might be inclined to reverse its holding that eco-
nomic power should be presumed simply from the fact that a product is copyrighted), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 870 (1988); see also Terry M. Kee, Note, The Presumption of Market Power in Sales
of Legally Differentiated Tying Products, 56 TEx. L. REv. 1305, 1306 (1978) (demonstrating the
economic invalidity of the presumption of sufficient market power with legally differentiated
products). But see Dik, supra note 2 (attacking tying arrangements involving copyrighted
software as being undesirable and unnecessary restraints and arguing that the presumption
of economic advantage is appropriate to copyrighted software).
182. United States v. Loew's, Inc., 189 F. Supp. 373, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), vacated, 371 U.S.
38 (1962).
183. Both movies occur in cities on the brink of war. The suave male lead in both begins
a romantic liaison with a beautiful woman whose husband is presumed dead. When the hus-
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value of the film. Unlike movies, however, the primary value of software
tends to be the ideas or the underlying functionality contained in the
software, rather than the expression.' 8 4 Typically, users are principally
concerned with the functions that a program provides and may well be
unable to distinguish between two functionally equivalent programs, de-
spite the fact that neither is a copy of the other. In such circumstances,
neither of the equivalent programs would necessarily capture any signifi-
cant market power, particularly if other alternatives are available.
Perhaps an example will best illustrate the point. ABC Company in-
dependently develops a computer program for balancing a checkbook.
ABC's program is rather basic, without exceptional features not found in
any of the other checkbook balancing programs. If ABC were to tie its
program to the purchase of pre-printed checks, it would be presumed
under the Paramount edict to have market power in the market for the
computer software program. But the facts may strongly refute the pres-
ence of any economic power capable of forcing consumers to purchase
the package. Assuming ABC Company has no other copyrighted pro-
grams that provide similar functionality, it would have minimal market
share, if any. Despite Loew's contention that all copyrighted products are
unique, the program may not be particularly unusual or distinctive in a
way discernible to consumers. Yet ABC Company would be penalized by a
presumption that, in this instance, bears no relation to economic
reality.
185
Furthermore, even if a software developer attains some competitive
advantage upon the introduction of an innovative new software product,
any corresponding market power may be short-lived. Technology changes
rapidly in software markets, with consumer demand quickly shifting to the
latest innovation. As with other high technology industries, software devel-
opers attempt to duplicate or even to improve the functionality of their
competitors' products. Consequently, the development of a desirable new
product may actually serve to encourage competition and lead to the crea-
tion of better products. In short, because the desire for software is sub-
stantially different from that for movies, courts should not extend the
presumption of market power created under Paramount and Loew's to
software products.
band miraculously reappears alive, the hero in each risks his life in order to save the woman
and her husband, allowing the couple to escape the husband's political enemies, together
and unharmed, leaving the hero alone. Despite Robert Redford's playing the male lead in
Havana, the movie achieved less than rave reviews and is relatively unrenowned. Casablanca,
on the other hand, starring Humphrey Bogart and Ingrid Bergman, received several Acad-
emy Awards and is one of the best-loved movies of all time.
184. Thomas L. Hazen, Contract Principles as a Guide for Protecting Intellectual Property Rights
in Computer Software: The Limits of Copyright Protection, the Evolving Concept of Derivative Works,
and the Proper Limits of Licensing Arrangements, 20 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 105 (1986), reprinted in 4
MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS, supra note 2, app. B-7, at B74.
185. Although examples can invariably be drafted to prove there are exceptions to virtu-
ally every rule, the illustration provided is not an extreme one. With computer programming
rapidly becoming a standard skill, the number of copyrightable computer programs in exist-
ence is abundant. Many functions may each be accomplished by a variety of programs, thus
leading to the conclusion that few program functions are actually unique or distinctive.
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It is clear that the market power presumption developed in yester-
year's world of goods does not always apply to today's complex technology.
Existing case law reflects the courts' willingness to modify certain antitrust
rules in the face of changing market practices.18 6 Courts should do the
same in this context. Recognition that the presumption of market power
is inapposite to copyrighted software would properly account for the rele-
vant market realities, while not diminishing the goals of antitrust law.
18 7
Despite the convincing arguments against the presumption of market
power, it would be equally senseless to disregard entirely the fact that a
tying product is copyrighted. Certainly, the advantages obtained from a
patent, copyright, trade secret, or similar right, may have some bearing on
the analysis. The point is that a copyright should not by itself prove eco-
nomic power.
VI. VALIDITY OF A FLEXIBLE APPROACH
Recognition that a particular industry exhibits unique competitive cir-
cumstances that mandate the use of a more flexible approach is not with-
out precedent. The Supreme Court has approved of less restrictive rules
when circumstances failed to justify per se rules. For example, in NCAA v.
Board of Regents,188 the Supreme Court considered horizontal price fixing
and output limitations by the athletic association. Typically, horizontal re-
straints of trade are among the classes of activity considered per se viola-
tions of the antitrust rules.1 8 9 However, the Court concluded that despite
the general rule, it would be inappropriate to apply the per se rule be-
186. See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 54-59 (1977) (ac-
knowledging that the previous per se rule against territorial restraints might preclude clearly
pro-competitive conduct); Moraine Prods. v. ICI Am., Inc., 538 F.2d 134, 143-46 (7th Cir.)
(conceding that a per se rule condemning the practice of licensing only certain persons
could critically affect technology development), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 941 (1976).
In his renowned treatise on trade secrets, Professor Milgrim argues for judicial review,
from time to time, of archaic per se rules and policies which may no longer suffice:
[My] bias is not necessarily against the antitrust laws insofar as they serve the in-
tended purpose, but rather against a blind adherence to rules and principles enun-
ciated in one context and then slavishly, perhaps unthinkingly, applied to all
following factual configurations, no matter how imperfectly the concepts and their
formulations fit the later facts. Most simply put, the antitrust rules enunciated in
simpler times and a less trying economic, social and political climate, cannot possi-
bly be exempt from scrutiny, discussion, criticism and question if our country is to
face the challenges of today.
2 MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS, supra note 2, § 10.01 [2] [a], at 10-40.
187. While it is fallacious to presume market power simply because a software product is
copyrighted, such a presumption is more clearly erroneous when applied to trade secrets. A
software program's source code may be protected under trade secret laws, and the exclusion-
ary rights associated with trade secrets are far less extensive than those granted by patents or
copyrights. So long as they do not employ unfair or dishonest means, any competitor or
customer is free to develop identical trade secrets. Such freedom greatly decreases the an-
ticompetitive effect of restraints that trade secret licensors may attempt to impose. As a result,
trade secrets should not induce a presumption of market power. See 3 P.M., Inc. v. Basic Four
Corp., 591 F. Supp. 1350, 1359 (E.D. Mich. 1984); Belvis, supra note 90, at 272 n.33 (noting
that the presumption of market power has never been applied to trade secrets).
188. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
189. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20
(1979).
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cause the case involved "an industry in which horizontal restraints on com-
petition are essential if the product is to be available at all." 190 The Court
therefore applied the rule of reason, noting that regardless of the type of
analysis-per se or rule of reason-the ultimate inquiry to determine
whether the challenged restraint lessened competition remained the
same.191
In Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationeyr & Printing
Co.,' 19 2 the Supreme Court was confronted with a group boycott by whole-
sale purchasing cooperatives. While acknowledging that group boycotts
are normally considered per se anticompetitive, the Court conceded that
the conduct in question was "not a form of concerted activity characteristi-
cally likely to result in predominantly anticompetitive effects." 193 Accord-
ingly, the Court ruled that the district court properly rejected application
of the per se rule to the group boycott in question.
1 94
Indeed, the Court has affirmatively stated that there should be a pre-
sumption in favor of using the rule of reason.19 5 Based on such prece-
dent, and recognizing that software tying arrangements may have
procompetitive effects, the courts should be willing to use more flexible
standards in examining the anticompetitive impact of software tying
arrangements.
CONCLUSION
Applying the rigid rules developed in decisions involving tying ar-
rangements to software and maintenance packages is contrary to the im-
portant policy of encouraging innovation. The survival of the software
industry and of its members depends upon the ability of software develop-
ers to improve the performance, functionality, and efficiency of their
software. It seems entirely inconsistent with the goal of fostering research
and development to use the antitrust label to prohibit mechanistically a
software licensor from selling a combination of software and maintenance
services, when the net effect of such a package is socially and economically
desirable. Accordingly, the courts should use a more flexible standard in
testing the antitrust implications of software/maintenance packages. A
good starting point would be to recognize that such packages may indeed
be an integrated, single product and that the presumption of market
power applied to copyrighted products is inapplicable to software technol-
ogy and unsupported by economic reality. By making an effort to inter-
pret antitrust laws as consistent with the goals of intellectual property
protection, the courts will properly foster an- innovative spirit that will ben-
efit software developers and society alike.
190. NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101.
191. Id. at 103-04.
192. 472 U.S. 284 (1985).
193. Id at 295.
194. Id. at 298.
195. Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 726 (1988).
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In October 1993, the Bell Atlantic Corporation and Tele-Communica-
tions Inc. proposed the largest merger in history for media companies.1
The now abandoned $33 billion deal2 is the latest in a series of announce-
ments of mergers and working partnerships as entertainment, communi-
cations, computer software, and computer equipment manufacturing
companies attempt to position themselves to best exploit the emerging
multimedia technologies.3
Multimedia has become a catch-phrase which refers to an ever-widen-
ing range of developing technologies promising "interactive" home en-
tertainment, virtual reality, and the delivery of fully manipulative sound,
images, and text into the computers of the average consumer. 4 Nineteen
ninety-three saw a "gold rush" of sorts in the burgeoning multimedia in-
* J.D., University of Denver College of Law, 1985. Mr. Sprague would like to thank
Bobbie McMorrow and the associates of McMorrow Associates for their kind efforts in ar-
ranging interviews with various legal experts in the emerging fields of multimedia law.
1. John Markoff, A Phone-Cable Vehicle for the Data Superhighway, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14,
1993, at Al.
2. Id.
3. Lawrence M. Fisher, Computer and Phone Link Is Studied by Intel and MCI, N.Y. TiMES,
Sept. 10, 1993, at C4.
The Intel Corporation and the MCI Communications Corporation said... that
they had agreed to explore and develop ways to integrate the personal computer
and the telephone.
The first product to emerge from the agreement ... will be an add-on circuit
board for personal computers that will allow users to simultaneously transmit data,
audio and video over telephone lines. Such a device would facilitate video confer-
encing, and allow co-workers across the globe to collaborate on projects.
Analysts said Intel was well positioned to broaden its dominance of the per-
sonal computer market to include telephones as the computer, communications
and media industries converged.
"It's the hottest game in town, the market opportunity every semiconductor
maker is chasing," said Richard Whittington, an analyst with Gruntal & Company.
"This will be the boom business for the next 10 years, and Intel will be a major
player."
Id. See also infra note 11.
4. L.R. Shannon, On Getting Started in Multimedia, N.Y. TrMsS, Sept. 21, 1993, at B6.
,The "Computer Dictionary" (Microsoft Press) defines "multimedia" as: "The combination of
sounds, graphics, animation, and video. In the world of computers, multimedia is a subset of
hypermedia, which combines the elements of multimedia with hypertext, which links the
information." Less formally, "Jargon" (Peachpit Press) defines "multimedia," in part, thus:
"The buzzword of the 90's." Id. See infra Part I and accompanying text for more detailed
discussions of specific multimedia-related products and services.
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dustry, despite the fact that most participants have no idea what the indus-
try will fully entail or how it will be received by the public. 5 "Every
company in the entertainment and communications business is going to
be under pressure to form partnerships... "6 This cacophony of technol-
ogies, industries and strategic alliances raises a substantial number of legal
issues.
7
This Article focuses on Copyright Act issues as they relate to the
emerging industry commonly known as multimedia. Part I discusses the
basic elements of multimedia in order to provide an understanding of its
constituent parts. Most multimedia products and services are either a
technological extension or derivative of computer software. Part II sets
forth how copyright law provides protection for computer software and its
5. Peter H. Lewis, The Next Tidal Wave? Some Call It 'Social Computing,' N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
19, 1993, § 3, at 8.
Perhaps without knowing exactly what it will all mean, everyone seems to be
talking about the impending convergence of computer networks, groupware, tele-
phone services, handheld electronic devices, cable television, the Internet and
other on-line information services, mixed in with the entertainment industry, tradi-
tional news media and other communications technologies.
"A technological shock wave is about to strike society and the workplace," Mr.
[William M.] Bluestein[, a senior analyst with Forrester Research Inc.] said. "In the
last six months, computer hardware manufacturers, software providers, cable TV
operators, and phone companies have been caught up in a frenzied mating dance."
Id. Peter H. Lewis, What Evil Lurks in the Chips Of Men? The Shadow Knows, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
19, 1993, § 3, at 8.
For the first time, there will be people from broadcasting and telecommunica-
tions. This has everything to do with the convergence of computing, communica-
tion and entertainment. Everyone in all three industries is trying to be uniquely
positioned to take the money of the people in the other two industries. I wonder,
though, once the PC guys learn that Joe Eszterhas gets $3 million for a 135-page
screenplay, whether some of them will want to switch from writing software to
dialogue.
Id. (Interview with Robert X. Cringely, nom-de-poison-plume for the back-page gossip colum-
nist of Infoworld, a computer industry weekly newspaper, discussing the recent Agenda 94
conference, which attracted 450 of the biggest names in the personal computer industry);
William M. Bulkeley &John R. Wilke, Can the Exalted Vision Become Reality? Early Attempts Show
Buyers May Be Leery, WALL ST. J., Oct 14, 1993, at BI.
[I]n a few early experiments, consumers did not enthusiastically embrace the idea
[of interactive systems]. In the early 1980s Knight-Ridder Inc. lost millions on an
interactive video-text experiment in Florida that let people request and read news
on their TV screens. J.C. Penney & Co. spent $106 million on Telaction, an interac-
tive shopping system, before shutting it down in 1989. Sears Roebuck & Co. and
International Business Machines Corp. have spent an estimated $800 million on
their jointly owned, and unprofitable, Prodigy Services Corp., in part because they
overestimated the desire of computer users to shop on-line.
"The technology is all there," says Nancy Bushkin, a spokeswoman for Viacom
Inc., which is building a test interactive cable system in Castro Valley, California.
"What's missing is the consumer and exactly what the consumer wants and what
they'll pay for."
Id. Prodigy Services, the IBM-Sears joint venture, is redesigning its service and is "seeking
opportunities to offer the Prodigy lineup of information and games, stock trading, home
shopping and electronic mail directly to the television sets of cable customers." Glenn Rifkin,
At Age 9, Prodigy On-Line Reboots, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1993, at DI.
6. Richard Turner, Bell-TCI Deal Puts Hollywood in the Spotlight WALL ST. J., Oct. 14,
1993, at BI.
7. For an excellent overview of the various multimedia-related intellectual property is-
sues, see William A. Tanenbaum & William K. Wells,Jr., Multimedia Works Require Broad Protec-
tion, NAT'L. L.J., Nov. 1, 1993, at Sll.
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relevance to multimedia applications. The scope of copyright protection
available to computer software is not precisely defined, however, and con-
tinues to evolve in reaction to the ever-changing role of software in our
society. Part II.A. reviews the current scope of copyright protection avail-
able to computer software. Part II.B. discusses specific copyright issues
related to multimedia. The various analyses and controversies in software
copyright protection should prove insightful and will most likely serve as a
precursor to the issues confronting copyright protection for multimedia
applications.
I. MULTIMEDIA APPLICATIONS
Multimedia may best be viewed as a convergence of technologies
from which a vast number of specific products and services will emerge.
8
In general, multimedia refers to a variety of information media-text,
sound, images (both still and motion)-delivered in digital form. 9 The
key element of multimedia is that the recipient no longer passively re-
ceives the information but actually "interacts" with it. The recipient can
control the manner in which the information is delivered, change the or-
der and method in which it is presented, and alter the final product.
While this description of multimedia may be vague, that is partially
due to the fact that all the resultant products and services have yet to be
designed or even conceived. 10 The common thread throughout these
multimedia products and services is their interactive capability. The ability
of individuals to interact with the delivered information makes the emerg-
ing products and services unique.
One element of multimedia which has received a great deal of atten-
tion is the creation of an "information superhighway" incorporated in "a
single powerful box on top of each home television set that would com-
bine the diverse streams of information that now flow separately into the
home: telephone calls, television shows, video rentals, newspapers and
even books."1" The convergence of cable operators and telephone com-
8. Steve Lohr, For Computer Convention, Be Sure to Pack Vision, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1993,
§ 1, at 37.
"[D]igital convergence," . . . means the expected technological melding of com-
puters, telecommunications, television and publishing.
Convergence is a big conceptual ball of string that wraps in 500 television chan-
nels and the information superhighway, hand-held personal digital assistants and
massively parallel supercomputers, computers that talk back and intelligent software
"agents" programmed to act as a person's alter ego. It is the ultimate high-tech
vision - and a $3.5 trillion business, by one estimate - beckoning on the horizon.
Id.
9. Information (data), whether it is text, images or sounds, is converted to an electrical
impulse represented by either a one or a zero. For example, music is initially composed of
analog sound waves which can be converted into digital code by breaking the waves into
small bits that are represented by a number. See A New Spin on Music Sampling: A Case for Fair
Play, 105 HARv. L. REv. 726, 726-27 n.2 (1992). Computers manipulate (process) informa-
tion in digital form. For example, computer programs are ultimately converted into a series
of ones and zeros for use by the computer. See generally infra note 76.
10. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
11. Markoff, supra note 1, at Al. In the information superhighway, "this set-top device
will be the steering wheel, combining the video controls of a cable converter box, the two-way
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panies exploits the resources of each industry, allowing not only the deliv-
ery of information to consumers, but also providing the channels through
which consumers can communicate (interact) with the service providers as
well as other consumers. 12 At present, the interactive products which ap-
pear closest to being market-ready are systems focusing on electronic pro-
gram guides to help viewers navigate the maze of channels available on
cable systems.13 These systems are designed to offer to viewers informa-
tion, commercial opportunities, and games.
14
capabilities of a telephone and the information-processing power of a personal computer."
I.
12. See id.
Currently, cable networks have the capacity to carry hundreds of channels of
television programs or other information, but most cable systems are not very good
at letting consumers send information back over the network, whether to order a
movie or play video games with other cable customers.
Telephone "channels," by contrast, can handle only limited amounts of infor-
mation, but they have an almost magical ability through switching systems to let
anyone on the network communicate with anyone else.
Therein lies the promise of this [the Bell Atlantic Corporation and Tele-Com-
munications Inc.] mega-merger, which will blend the information cargo-carrying ca-
pacity of the nation's largest cable company and the traffic-control talents of one of
America's most technically sophisticated telephone companies.
Id. The now-abandoned Bell Atlantic/Tele-Communications merger is not the only alliance
between telephone and cable companies. Time Warner Inc., the second-largest cable televi-
sion company in the country, has teamed up with U.S. West; The Nynex Corporation is team-
ing with Viacom Inc. in its bid for Paramount Communications; and Southwestern Bell has
recently purchased two cable systems outside Washington. Edmund L. Andrews, A Marriage
of Media, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1993, at D10. There are a number of examples of computer,
cable and communications companies forming alliances. Silicon Graphics has agreed to pro-
vide Time Warner Inc., a cable, media and entertainment concern, with technologies for
cable-TV boxes. See Don Clark & Stephen K. Yoder, Computer Industry Sees A Feast of New
Markets, WALL ST. J., Oct. 14, 1993, at A7. Hewlett-Packard Co. will develop technologies to
let interactive-TV subscribers use color printers. Id. International Business Machines Corp.
(IBM) is developing products for everything from the wiring for the back of TV sets and
chips for set-top boxes to mainframe computers that work as "servers," storing data and play-
ing traffic cop in huge interactive networks (IBM and Ameritech Corp., a Midwest regional
Bell company, are testing out mainframes as servers in the Chicago area). Id. IBM is also in
trials with Bell Atlantic using smaller computers to serve up full-motion videos. Id. Intel
Corp., the big semiconductor maker, is working with Microsoft and General Instrument
Corp. to make sophisticated set-top boxes for interactive TV; as is 3DO Co., a startup com-
pany that just began selling a new interactive entertainment system that plays software on
compact disks. Id. "These companies' plans require networks that can carry more data,
along with sophisticated switching systems to move interactive video information around.
Today's cable systems, for the most part, are one-way networks without that switching capabil-
ity. Phone companies are good at switching but need cable companies' higher data capac-
ity." Id.
13. See Software Patent Hearings, CONSUMER ELECRONICS, Feb. 7, 1994, § 6.
14. See Anthony Ramirez, Challenge Within a Single Wire, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1993, at Cl
(graphics). In a hypothetical example of how the combined technologies of telephone and
cable companies may provide services, a football fan in Chicago can watch a televised game
with a friend located in Los Angeles. Id. In addition, the Chicago fan could supplement the
viewing with past highlights from a video archive and team statistics from a remote data base.
See id.
Software publishers are eagerly anticipating the arrival of interactive television as a
means of delivering computer programs to customers who will be able to permanently ac-
quire the software or merely temporarily use it for a reduced fee. The software publishers
believe interactive television will lead to a greater number of software titles, available to more
persons, at reduced costs. "[M] any software companies are looking at ways to use interactive
television to get their titles into more homes .... " Tim Deady, Software Companies Gearing Up
To Travel On 'Superhighway, L. A. Bus. J., Oct. 18, 1993, at 1.
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Virtual reality, another form of multimedia product, is an interactive
experience which presents a synthetically generated environment to the
user through visual, auditory, and other stimuli.' 5 Although motion pic-
tures also attempt to place the user in synthetically generated environ-
ments, the two major differences between virtual reality and traditional
motion pictures are that virtual reality technology can create a much
stronger illusion and that it is an interactive, not passive, experience.
16
Virtual reality experimentations and applications include: allowing doc-
tors and medical students to practice surgery on three dimensional "pa-
tients"; 17 remote operation of robots by NASA;18 remote operations by
surgeons; 19 allowing architects and engineers to "walk" through a building
before it is built;20 flight simulation 2 ' and aircraft design; 22 arcade
games;23 and to generally allow individuals to "journey" to places they
would otherwise not be able to go.
24
Combined interactive movies and video games are an additional
emerging multimedia product. These video games are actually movies
with multiple plot lines and endings. Players interact with the characters
in the movies/games and determine the course of events by their (the
players') actions.
25
15. Randy Pausch, Three Views of Virtual Reality: An Overview, COMPUTER, Feb. 1993, at 79.
16. Id. Virtual reality completely immerses the user in the synthetic environment by
mounting small displays inside a headset placed on the user's head. Id. Because the display
is computer generated, different views are created for each eye, providing a true stereo dis-
play that gives depth information. Id. In addition, both the user's head position and orienta-
tion are tracked, resulting in the views changing in relation to the movement of the user. See
id. The result is that users perceive themselves as being inside the scene, with a three-dimen-
sional understanding of objects' location with respect to the user's own body. See id. Users
can also interact with virtual objects contained within the three-dimensional space by wearing
instrumented gloves-reaching out and manipulating objects. See id. When combined with
directional audio, the illusion of interacting with "real" objects is quite strong. See id.
17. John Holusha, Carving Out Real-Life Uses for Virtual Reality, N.Y. TiMES, Oct. 31, 1993,
§ 3, at 11. It is predicted that patient-specific diagnostic data will be entered into a computer
which will allow the doctor to "operate" in virtual reality to determine the best approach to
an operation for that patient. See id.
18. See Pausch, supra note 15, at 79.
19. See Holusha, supra note 17, at 11. The Army is developing a system using virtual
reality to link doctors behind battle lines with mobile operating rooms near the front lines.
Id.
20. See Pausch, supra note 15, at 79; see also Andrew H. Rosen, Virtual Reality: Copyrightable
Subject Matter and the Scope ofJudicidal Protection, 33JuoimETiucsJ. 35, 37 n.5 (1992) (explaining
how researchers converted an architect's plans to a 3-D model before actually building, to
show future occupants how the building would look and feel).
21. See Michael Moshel, Virtual Environments in the US Military, COMPUTER, Feb. 1993, at
81.
22. See Holusha, supra note 17, at 11.
23. See Richard Brandt, et al., It's Blasting Beyond Games and Racing to Build a High-Tech
Entertainment Empire, Bus. Wt., Feb. 21, 1994, at 66.
24. SeeJohn Tierney, Jung in Motion, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 16, 1993, at C1.
25. John Tierney, Movies That Push Buttons, N.Y. TimEs, Oct. 3, 1993, § 2, at 1. Examples
of interactive movie/video games include: "Mortal Kombat," a graphics image-based kick-
and-punch game; "Aladdin," based upon the Disney Company movie, which combines graph-
ics and hand-drawn animated characters; and "Voyeur," a game which shows real motion
pictures on the screen while players control which of hundreds of twists and turns the plot
will take. Philip Elmer-Dewitt, The Amazing Video Game Boom, TIME, Sept. 27, 1993, at 66.
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Multimedia also encompasses the intermingling of text, sound and
graphics images (both still and moving) in personal computers. Interac-
tive encyclopedias allow users to not only read text about a given person or
historical event, but also to view and hear newsclips of the event.26 Most
of these sounds and images can be captured by the user and altered or
combined with other electronic works.
27
II. COPYRIGHT LAW AS APPLIED TO MULTIMEDIA
There are myriad legal issues inherent in combining multiple indus-
tries in order to create new technologies. Antitrust and regulatory issues
raised by the recently announced mergers and partnerships deserve their
own detailed commentary, which is certainly beyond the scope of this arti-
cle. While mergers such as the now-abandoned merger announced by
Bell Atlantic and Tele-Communications 28 caused some members of Con-
gress to urge the Justice Department's antitrust division and other agen-
cies to investigate before approving the deal, the Clinton Administration
cautiously supported the merger.29 In addition, as entertainment, com-
munications and computer companies seek strategic alliances, they are
not raising antitrust objections; they are instead urging the federal govern-
ment not to interfere with the mergers.30 Whether the Clinton Adminis-
26. For example, Britannica Software has put Compton's Encyclopedia, which contains
nine million text words, 15,000 still images, 45 moving-image sequences and 60 audio min-
utes, on one CD-ROM disk. Barbara Zimmerman, The Tangle of Multimedia Rights, PUBLISHERS
WKL, Nov. 22, 1991, at 17.
Leonard Bernstein's personal archive, including correspondence, musical manuscripts,
photographs, recordings and memorabilia, is to be donated to the Library of Congress,
which plans to digitally copy the materials. Allan Kozinn, Bernstein Archive to be Digitized for
Public Access, N.Y. TiwEs, Nov. 9,1993, at C17. It is planned that sometime in the future other
researchers and music lovers will be able to use computers, for example, to view correspon-
dence by the composer, note a reference to a piece of music, retrieve music, as well as watch
a video of the piece being performed-all from a computer workstation thousands of miles
away. Id.
27. Eastman Kodak has, for example, a system for storing images with color-photo reso-
lution. Zimmerman, supra note 26, at 17. If a personal computer user can see it or hear it,
he or she can essentially capture and digitally manipulate it with the addition of a few pieces
of equipment:
(I] have now heard the famous fake-orgasm scene from When Harry Met Sally ...
approximately a million times as a ... file in PC multimedia soundtracks. It's funny,
it's unexpected, audiences (usually) love it. That track must be a close second to the
collected works of the [Monty] Python [sound bytes] in terms of multimedia copy-
right abuse. Meg Ryan's coital exclamations and "Bring out yer dead" are an odd
pair, but some apparently think they have broad meaning for our times.
Jim Seymour, The Multimedia Copyright Swamp, PC MAG., Feb. 23, 1993, at 99.
28. Markoff, supra note 1, at Al.
29. See Edmund L. Andrews, Sudden Synergy Among Communications Rivals, N.Y. TimEs,
Oct. 21, 1993, at DI; Geraldine Fabrikant, Bell Atlantic Deal for 2 Cable Giants Put at $33 Billion,
N.Y. TIMrs, Oct. 13, 1993, at Al; Daniel Pearl & Mark Robichaux, First White House Signal Has
Look of a Green Light, WALL ST. J., Oct. 14, 1993, at A6; John J. Keller & Laura Landro, Bell
Atlantic, Viacon Chairmen Snipe At Each Other as Senators Study Deals, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 1993,
at B8.
30. Andrews, supra note 29, at 101.
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tration will take any antitrust action related to the various mergers and
strategic alliances is unknown.
3 1
The aggressive participation of telecommunications and cable compa-
nies in multimedia also raises FCC concerns. 3 2 The FCC has cleared the
way though for local telephone companies to transmit video services pro-
vided by third parties, and has further allowed them to own as much as five
percent of video programmers.
33
Licensing issues complicate the multimedia picture. As a result of the
mixture of different publishers involved in multimedia (software, text,
images, and music), legal issues related to general contracting and licens-
ing remain undefined. Licensing concepts and procedures familiar to the
entertainment industry may be foreign to the computer industry, and vice
versa.3
4
As the software, film, music and book publication industries merge
into the multimedia publishing world, rights acquisition must now include
a number of new permissions, such as digital rights, transmittal rights, and
rights for multiple showings of a work.3 5 These industries operate under
different practice histories and statutory controls. Music composers, for
example, have a statutorily mandated right to record any song.36 Rather
than attempt to retain control over their individual works, composers gen-
erally accept public performance license fees administered and enforced
by their major rights collectives, ASCAP and BMI. 37 The rights situation
for still images-photos, art, cartoons, etc.-is, on the other hand, cha-
otic.3 8 "Rights to copyrighted works are owned by individual artists and
their estates, who are completely unorganized and whose fees and terms
vary too widely to be described at all."
3 9
"The movie companies that own the rights to their films, and TV pro-
duction companies that own most TV shows have been accustomed to sell-
31. Bob Davis & Joe Davidson, Clinton Team Is Split About Antitrust Policy As Big Mergers
Wait, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 1993, at Al.
Antitrust policy runs along one of the fault lines of the Clinton administration,
separating populist trustbusters from new-age technologists. Right now, the two
forces exist in a relatively stable condition. But that could explode in dissension as
the government takes up such high-profile deals as the Bell Atlantic Corp.-Tele-
Communications Inc. merger and sorts out its policy in the high-tech, health and
defense industries.
Id.
32. SeeJames Gleick, We Are the Wired: Some Views on the Fiberoptic Ties That Bind: A Frontier
That Is Building Itself N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1993, § 4, at 16 (explaining that the blending of
telephones and television will require more than FCC approval).
33. Beth Melville, Interactive Video Projects Test Technology, Limits of Law, TELEPHONE WE.,
Aug. 31, 1992, at 5, 6.
34. Michael D. Scott & James L. Talbott, Multimedia: What Is It, Why Is It Important And
What Do I Need To Know About It?, COMPUTER L. ASS'N BULL., Vol. 8 No.3, 1993, at 14.
35. See Multimedia Seminar Stresses Control of Rights, PUBLISHERS WKL, May 17, 1993, at 16;
Billie Munro, Copyrights and Multimedia, MULTIMEDIA & VIDEOOIsc MONITOR, Mar. 1993.
36. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (1988). See also Zimmerman, supra note 26, at 18 (explaining that
the right to record any song is the only permission in the United States whose basic terms are
statutorily mandated).
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ing short clips for use in television productions or for commercials."40
While short clips from old films and TV shows are relatively easy to license,
longer sections and clips of any size from very well-known and recent
works are almost impossible to obtain.4 1 In addition, permissions are
needed from all the creators involved-writers, directors, musicians and
every actor appearing on the clip.
42
At present, consistent industry practices for licensing all multimedia
elements do not exist.43 The result is that multimedia publishers will
often find it more economical and practical to create all the various works
incorporated in a product.44 Efforts are underway, however, to improve
the multimedia licensing environment.
4 5
The technology complicates multimedia licensing issues. Scanners,
sound boards, and multimedia authoring programs make it very easy to
record sights and sounds.46 "Therein lies a dilemma for most new PC
[personal computer] multimedia devotees: How far can you go, both le-
gally and practically, in lifting pictures, sound, and video from the world
around you for PC use?" 47 The industry response has been inconsistent.
Some multimedia publishers distribute electronic images which require
the purchase of publication rights for any additional reproduction while
others allow the user to freely reproduce the information (short of whole-
sale verbatim copying in competition with the original publisher). 48 Li-
censing issues are moot, however, unless the medium is subject to
copyright protection.
To properly anticipate the level of copyright protection that will be
available to multimedia products, it is imperative to understand the cur-
rent scope of protection afforded multimedia's principal precursor-com-
puter programs. A brief overview of the historical development of
computer software copyright protection is insightful.
40. Id. These sales come at a very steep price, however. Id.
41. Id.
42. Zimmerman, supra note 26, at 17-18.
43. Id.; Seymour, supra note 27 at 99; Multimedia Seminar Stresses Control of Rights, supra
note 33 at 16; Kozinn, supra note 26, at C17 (discussing the fact that licensing and technolog-
ical hurdles must be overcome before Leonard Bernstein's personal archive can be copied to
a computer by the Library of Congress).
44. See generally Zimmerman, supra note 26, at 19; Seymour, supra note 27, at 99.
45. See Brian Kahin, The IMA Intellectual Property Projet, MULTIMEDIA & VIDEODISC MONI-
TOR, Mar. 1993. The Interactive Multimedia Association has created the Intellectual Property
Project with the goal of facilitating the licensing of content to multimedia applications and
the licensing of multimedia applications to users. Id.
46. See Seymour, supra note 27, at 99. Some of the concerns go beyond licensing issues.
The Computer Emergency Response Team, established by the Pentagon's Advanced Re-
search Projects Agency, recently issued a warning advisory to users of Sun Microsystems work
stations with built-in microphones that someone could electronically eavesdrop on conversa-
tions taking place near the computer. John Markoff, Kping Things Safe and Orderly In the
Neighborhoods of Cyberspace, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1993, § 4, at 7.




A. Computer Software Copyright Issues
Identifying the specific copyright issues raised by emerging mul-
timedia technologies is difficult because the technology is both new and
evolving.49 In addition, United States copyright protection has historically
lagged behind technological developments. From the first Copyright Act
in 179050 up to the present Copyright Act,5 1 Congress has amended
the Act numerous times specifically to incorporate technological
developments.
52
Copyright protection arises from the constitutional provision granting
Congress the power to pass laws "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."5 3 " [T] he pur-
pose of the copyright law is to create the most efficient and productive
balance between protection (incentive) and dissemination of information,
to promote learning, culture and development."
54
In 1976, Congress attempted to embrace current and future techno-
logical developments by enacting an all-encompassing scope of copyright
protection. The Copyright Act of 1976 5 extends copyright protection to
"original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression,
now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, repro-
duced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a
machine or device."5 6 This broad definition of protection would appear
49. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
50. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (repealed 1831). This first Copy-
right Act limited protection to "any map, chart, book or books already printed." Id.
51. The Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541, amended by Act of Dec.
12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, §§ 9-10, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1010
(1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
52. Congress extended copyright protection to designs, prints, etchings and engravings
in 1802, musical compositions in 1831, dramatic compositions in 1856, photographs and the
"negatives thereof" in 1865, and statuary and "models or designs intended to be perfected as
works of the fine arts" in 1870. Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 36, § 2, 2 Stat. 171, 171, repealed by
Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, §§ 1, 14, 4 Stat. 436, 436, 439, amended byAct of Aug. 18, 1856, ch.
169, 11 Stat. 138, 139, amended by Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 126, §§ 1, 2, 13 Stat. 540, 540,
repealed by Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212 (repealed 1909).
In 1909, Congress attempted a broader approach to the types of works to be protected
by extending protection to "all the writings of an author." Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 4,
35 Stat. 1075, 1076 (previously codified at 17 U.S.C. § 4, reprinted in 17 U.S.C.A. App. § 4
(West Supp. 1990); recodified 1947; repealed 1976). Again, Congress was forced to amend
the Copyright Act in response to technological developments. In 1912, motion pictures were
added (Act of Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 356, § 5(l)-(m), 37 Stat. 488, 488 (previously codified at 17
U.S.C. § 5(l)-(m), reprinted in 17 U.S.C.A. App. § 5(l)-(m), recodified 1947, repealed 1976)),
as were sound recordings in 1972 (Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, § 1 (b), 85 Stat.
391, 391 (previously codified at 17 U.S.C. § 5(n), reprinted in 17 U.S.C. App. § 5(n), re-
pealed 1976)).
53. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
54. Whelan Assocs. v.Jaslow Dental Lab., 797 F.2d 1222, 1235 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
55. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541, amended by Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
517, §§ 9-10, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1010 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
56. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988).
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to encompass every conceivable multimedia product.5 7 The actual scope
of copyright protection available to multimedia is in reality unclear, re-
gardless of the 1976 Copyright Act.
Despite the fact that Congress made significant attempts to incorpo-
rate technology into the copyright framework, 58 defining the scope of
copyright protection available to electronic-based works, particularly com-
puter software, has been wrought with confusion and imprecise judicial
analysis. 59 "Defining the scope of software copyright has become one of
the most intractable problems in the emerging field of computer law." 60
In order to establish computer software copyright infringement, the
owner of the allegedly infringed work (usually the plaintiff) must both
establish ownership of that work and that it was copied.61 A Certificate of
Registration, if timely obtained, constitutes prima facie evidence of the
validity of the copyright. 62 Because the act of copying is rarely proved
through direct evidence,6s copying may be proved inferentially by showing
that the alleged infringer (usually the defendant) had access to the copy-
righted work and that the allegedly infringing work is substantially similar
to the copyrighted work.6 4 "Ultimately, to prove factual copying, the
plaintiff must come forward with sufficient evidence that a reasonable fact
finder, taking together the evidence of access and the similarities between
57. This statement is probably only true for the near term. See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller,
Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, Databases, and Computer-Generated Works: Is Anything
New Since CONTU?, 106 ELARv. L. REv. 977, 1073 (1993). Mr. Miller concludes that for the
foreseeable future, copyright protection extends to computer programs created by other
computer programs because of the human involvement in the creation of the programs
through artificial intelligence. Id.
58. In 1974, Congress created the National Commission for New Technological Uses of
Copyrighted Works (CONTU) with the purpose of studying the use of the copyright laws for
"automatic systems capable of storing, processing, retrieving, and transferring information,"
and to make recommendations to ensure that such works were protected by the copyright
laws. Pub. L. No. 93-573, § 201 (b)-(c), 88 Stat. 1873, 1873-74 (1974). For a thorough discus-
sion of CONTU and its impact on current computer software copyright protection, see
Miller, supra note 57.
59. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 57, at 980; John W. L. Ogilvie, Defining Computer Program
Parts Under Learned Hand's Abstractions Test in Software Copyright Infringement Cases, 91 MicH. L.
REy. 526, 526-27 (1992); Mary L. Mills, New Technology.and the Limitations of Copyright Law: An
Argument for Finding Alternatives to Copyright Legislation in an Era of Rapid Technological Change,
65 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 307, 309 (1989); Pamela Samuelson, The Ups and Downs of Look and Fe
COMMUNICATIONS OF THE A.C.M., Apr. 1993, at 29; and BriefAMICUS CURIAE of Eleven Copy-
right Professors in Sega Enterprises, Inc. v. Accolade, Inc., 33 JuiMETRics J. 147, 148 (1992).
60. Richard A. Beutel, Software Engineering Practices and the Idea/Expression Dichotomy: Can
Structured Design Methodologies Define the Scope of Software Copyright?, 32 JuIMEamTcs J. 1, 1
(1991). For additional commentaries regarding the difficulty in defining the scope of com-
puter software copyright protection, see id. at 1 n.1.
61. See Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., 797 F.2d 1222, 1231 (3d Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald's, 562 F.2d
1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 1977); Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 90 (2d
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976); 3 MELvIL.E B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER
ON CoPYRGHT, § 13.01 at 13-15 (1993).
62. 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (1988); Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., 9 F.3d 823, 831
(10th Cir. 1993).
63. Whelan Assocs., 797 F.2d at 1231; Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d
1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970).
64. Whelan Assocs., 797 F.2d at 1231-32.
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the programs, could find that the second work was copied from the
first."6 5
Critical to the determination of illicit copying is the differentiation
between a work's expression and its underlying ideas. The overriding con-
cern of courts has been to ensure that copyright protection is not ex-
tended to ideas but only to the expression of ideas.6 6 This principle was
first expressed by the Supreme Court67 and recently codified in the Copy-
right Act.6 8 As modestly stated by the Second Circuit, "[d]rawing the line
between idea and expression is a tricky business."
69
Initially, computer software was viewed primarily as a utilitarian form
of literary work.70 Faced with a new form of an original "work," courts had
no choice but to turn to more traditional examples of literary works, such
as dramatic performances and fictional works, to formulate methods to
determine the scope of copyright protection available to computer
programs.
7 1
Before 1980, the Copyright Act never specifically mentioned com-
puter programs, though Congress did intend that software and other
forms of electronic works be provided protection. 72 The 1980 amend-
65. Gates Rubber Co., 9 F.3d at 833.
66. E.g.,Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d. 693, 703 (2d Cir. 1992).
67. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954); see also Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879)
(holding that a copyrighted book on a peculiar system of bookkeeping was not infringed by a
similar book, using a similar plan, which achieved similar results, where the alleged infringer
made a different arrangement of the columns and headings).
68. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1988) provides: "In no case does copyright protection for an
original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of opera-
tion, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, ex-
plained, illustrated, or embodied in such work."
69. Computer Assocs. Int', 982 F.2d at 704.
70. See id.
71. See, e.g., id. at 706-07. Computer programs and software are synonymous. The Copy-
right Act defines a computer program as "[a] set of statements or instructions to be used
directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result." 17 U.S.C. § 101
(1988). Software is a generic reference to computer programs, as contrasted with computer
hardware, which refers to the computer equipment itself, including its electronic compo-
nents and peripheral devices (such as printers and disk drives).
72. Lotus Dev. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 48 (D. Mass. 1990).
The history of copyright law has been one of gradual expansion in the types of
works accorded protection, and the subject matter affected by this expansion has
fallen into two general categories. In the first, scientific discoveries and technologi-
cal developments have made possible new forms of creative expression that never
existed before. In some of these cases the new expressive forms - electronic music,
filmstrips, and computer programs, for example - could be regarded as an extension
of copyrightable subject matter Congress had already intended to protect, and were
thus considered copyrightable from the outset without need of new legislation. In
other cases, such as photographs, sound recordings, and motion pictures, statutory
enactment was deemed necessary to give them full recognition as copyrightable
works.
Authors are continually finding new ways of expressing themselves, but it is
impossible to foresee the forms that these new expressive methods will take. The
bill [to enact the 1976 Copyright Act] does not intend either to freeze the scope of
copyrightable subject matter at the present stage of communications technology or
to allow unlimited expansion into areas outside the present congressional intent.
H.R.RP. No. 1476,94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. ADMiN. NEws 5659,
5664 (emphasis added); Lotus Dev. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 48 (D. Mass.
1990).
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ment to the Copyright Act 73 and initial judicial decisions clearly estab-
lished that computer programs are, if original, proper subject matter for
copyright protection:
[T] he category of "literary works".. is not confined to literature
in the nature of Hemingway's For Whom the Bell Tolls. The defini-
tion of "literary works" in section 101 [of the 1976 Copyright Act]
includes expression not only in words but also "numbers, or
other.., numerical symbols or indicia," thereby expanding the
common usage of "literary works." Thus a computer program,
whether in object code or source code, is a "literary work" and is
protected from unauthorized copying, whether from its object or
source code version.
7 4
The focus of early software copyright cases such as Apple Computer v.
Franklin Computer75 was upon the copyrightability of computer programs
in their various forms.7 6 At issue in the early cases was not so much
whether the computer programs in question had been copied by the de-
fendants (or were substantially similar), but whether the programs them-
selves were subject to copyright protection. 77 At present, it is undisputed
that literal manifestations of computer programs, provided they are origi-
nal, are copyrightable.
78
What degree of copyright protection is available for non-literal mani-
festations of computer programs has proved to be an issue of concern for
judges, commentators, attorneys, and software professionals. Whelan Asso-
73. The Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541, amended by Act of Dec.
12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, §§ 9-10, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1010
(1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
74. Apple Computer v. Franklin Computer, 714 F.2d 1240, 1249 (3d Cir. 1983), cert.
dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984) (citations omitted).
75. Id.
76. See id. Computer programs are represented in two literal forms: source code is the
literal text of a program's instructions written in a human-readable programming language.
Ogilvie, supra note 59, at 531; Lotus Dev., 740 F. Supp. at 44. Source code is then translated
into a machine-readable form, known as object code, which the computer uses to actually
implement the program's instructions. Ogilvie, supra note 59, at 531; Lotus Dev., 740 F. Supp.
at 44.
The purpose of a computer program is also generally categorized by whether it is an
application program or an operating system program. See Apple Computer, 714 F.2d at 1249-
52. An application program is one that a computer user generally uses to interact with a
computer, such as a word processing program, a spreadsheet program, or an accounting
program. An operating system program is one that provides basic instructions to the com-
puter for its internal operations. A computer user may instruct an application program to
save a spreadsheet file; it is the operating system program that will receive the instruction
from the application program and provide the instructions to the computer hardware to
carry out the actual file saving procedures.
In Apple Computer, Franklin had argued that operating system programs were not copy-
rightable under the premise that they were methods or processes, which are not copyright-
able subject-matter pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). Id. at 1250; supra note 68. The court in
Apple Computer flatly rejected Franklin's argument, relying on the CONTU Final Report
which stated that works of a program which are "used ultimately in the implementation of a
process should in no way affect their copyrightability." Apple Computer, 714 F.2d at 1252.
77. See Apple Computer, 714 F.2d at 1253; Apple Computer v. Formula Int'l, 725 F.2d 521,
524-25 (9th Cir. 1984).




ciates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratoy,79 was one of the first cases to specifically
address this issue and provides a perfect example of how it is raised. Whe-
lan developed a dental laboratory management computer program forJas-
low, with Whelan retaining the ownership of the program.80 Jaslow later
decided to create its own version of the program.81 Because the programs
were written in two different programming languages, they were not liter-
ally similar.8 2 The court in Whelan Associates found, however, that the two
programs were substantially similar, not in their literal manifestations, but
in their overall structure and organization.
8 3
The rule of law that literal similarities are not necessary to establish
infringement was established long before the creation of computer pro-
grams: "[A] n infringement is not confined to literal and exact repetition
or reproduction; it includes also the various modes in which the matter of
any work may be adopted, imitated, transferred, or reproduced, with more
or less colorable alterations to disguise the piracy."84 Copyright protec-
tion "cannot be limited literally to the text, else a plagiarist would escape
by immaterial variations."
85
Rather than dealing with exact, literal copying, courts have been
forced to consider whether similarities between two works are the result of
impermissible copying by the alleged infringer.8 6 Critical to determining
whether there has been a copyright infringement in these situations is
whether the defendant has impermissibly copied too much of the plain-
tiff's original expression.8 7 Separating protectable expression from its un-
derlying ideas, however, has proved difficult and controversial.88
The real task in a copyright infringement action, then, is to de-
termine whether there has been copying of the expression of an
idea rather than just the idea itself. "[N] o one infringes, unless
he descends so far into what is concrete [in a work] as to invade
... [its] expression." Only this expression may be protected and
only it may be infringed.
8 9
79. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
80. Id. at 1225.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1225. "Each programming language has a unique grammar and set of mean-
ings. Two programs may perform the same functions despite differences in their source
code. Conversely, two programs with nearly identical source code can perform very differ-
ently." Ogilvie, supra note 59, at 531.
83. WWIan Assoc., 797 F.2d at 1248.
84. Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir. 1947).
85. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282
U.S. 902 (1931).
86. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1162 (9th
Cir. 1977).
87. Id. at 1163.
88. "The difficulty comes in attempting to distill the unprotected idea from the pro-
tected expression." Id.
89. Id. (quoting National Comics Publications v. Fawcett Publications, 191 F.2d 594, 600
(2d Cir. 1951)).
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This separation between idea and expression is accomplished
through the "abstractions test" first articulated by Judge Learned Hand in
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.90
Upon any work, and especially upon a [dramatic] play, a
great number of patterns of increasing generality will fit equally
well, as more and more of the incident is left out. The last may
perhaps be no more than the most general statement of what the
play is about, and at times might consist of only its title; but there
is a point in this series of abstractions where they are no longer
protected, since otherwise the playwright could prevent the use
of his "ideas," to which, apart from their expression, his property
is never extended.9 1
Courts must therefore determine not only whether two works are sub-
stantially similar, but also whether the similarities involve protected ex-
pression.92 Courts have been faced with the dual roles of determining
whether the works, as a whole, are so similar that copying is inferred by the
similarity, and whether protectable expression was indeed copied.
9 3
There "must be substantial similarity not only of the general ideas but of
the expressions of those ideas as well."9 4 Initially, courts applied an "ex-
trinsic/intrinsic" analysis to determine substantial similarity.95
The "extrinsic" test determines whether there is substantial similarity
of ideas. 96 The "intrinsic" test determines whether there is substantial sim-
ilarity in expressions.97 This second test has also been referred to as the
'ordinary observer"9 8 test because it is made solely from the perspective of
the lay observer without the assistance of experts. 99 Application of the
intrinsic test is particularly difficult. "As Judge Hand candidly observed,
'Obviously, no principle can be stated as to when an imitator has gone
beyond copying the "idea," and has borrowed its "expression." Decisions
must therefore inevitably be ad hoc.'"100
If a substantial similarity of ideas is established through the extrinsic
test, then the trier of fact must apply the intrinsic test to determine
whether the expression of the ideas is substantially similar so as to consti-
90. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931)).
91. Id. at 121.
92. Sid & Many Kroffi Television Prods., 562 F.2d at 1164.
93. See id.
94. Id. at 1164.
95. See id. at 1164-66.
96. Id. at 1164.
It is extrinsic because it depends not on the responses of the trier of fact, but
on specific criteria which can be listed and analyzed. Such criteria include the type
of artwork involved, the materials used, the subject matter, and the setting for the
subject. Since it is an extrinsic test, analytic dissection and expert testimony are
appropriate. Moreover, this question may often be decided as a matter of law.
Id.
97. Id.
98. See Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., 797 F.2d 1222, 1232 (3d Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
99. Id.
100. Sid & Many Kroffi Television Prods., 562 F.2d at 1164 (quoting Peter Pan Fabrics v.
Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960)).
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tute infringement.1 0 ' The Whelan Associates court followed this basic line
of reasoning to find infringement resulting from the substantial similarity
of non-literal expressions.
10 2
As the Whelan Associates court noted, applying the extrinsic/intrinsic
test to determine whether the non-literal elements of computer programs
are substantially similar is not without its failings. "The ordinary observer
test, which was developed in cases involving novels, plays, and paintings,
and which does not permit expert testimony, is of doubtful value in cases
involving computer programs on account of the programs' complexity
and unfamiliarity to most members of the public."' 0 3 This criticism has
gained acceptance in infringement cases not involving software,' 0 4 and
was also adopted by the Federal District Court for the District of Colorado
in Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando American.'
0 5
The result is that courts have been relying upon experts to dissect the
works in question and to assist in determining whether the dissected ele-
ments are substantially similar.' 0 6 There is a threat, however, that in fo-
cusing on the second element of this test, whether protectable expressions
have been copied, courts are ignoring the first element of the test, namely
whether the works as a whole are substantially similar.
01 7
101. Id.
102. Whelan Assocs., 797 F.2d at 1232-33, 1238-40.
103. Id. at 1232.
Moreover, the distinction between the two parts of the ... [extrinsic/intrinsic]
test may be of doubtful value when the finder of fact is the same person for each
step: that person has been exposed to expert evidence in the first step, yet she or he
is supposed to ignore or "forget" that evidence in analyzing the problem under the
second step. Especially in complex cases, we doubt that the "forgetting" can be
effective when the expert testimony is essential to even the most fundamental un-
derstanding of the objects in question.
Id. at 1232-33.
104. In Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, the Fourth Circuit stated:
We suspect that courts have been slow to recognize explicitly the need for refin-
ing the ordinary observer test in such a way that it would adopt the perspective of
the intended audience because, in most fact scenarios, the general lay public fairly
represents the works' intended audience.... Fortunately, the advent of computer
programming infringement actions has forced courts to recognize that sometimes
the non-interested or uninformed lay observer simply lacks the necessary expertise
to determine similarities or differences between products.
As Whelan reveals, only a reckless indifference to common sense would lead a
court to embrace a doctrine that requires a copyright case to turn on the opinion of
someone who is ignorant of the relevant differences and similarities between two
works. Instead the judgment should be informed by people who are familiar with
the media at issue.
Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, 905 F.2d 731, 735 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 981 (1990).
105. 798 F. Supp. 1499, 1513 (D. Colo. 1992), affid inpart, vacated inpart, 9 F.3d 823 (10th
Cir. 1993).
106. Id. at 1513-14.
107. See, e.g., Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., 9 F.3d 823, 834-35 (10th Cir.
1993).
We suggest that a court will often be assisted in determining the factual issue of
copying if both programs are first compared in their entirety without filtering out
the unprotected elements. Such a preliminary step does not obviate the ultimate
need to compare just the protected elements of the copyrighted program with the
alleged infringing program. However, an initial holistic comparison may reveal a pattern
of copying that is not obvious when only certain components are examined
Id. at 841 (emphasis added).
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Again, because the Copyright Act does not protect ideas, only their
expressions,10 8 courts must delineate between abstract ideas and protect-
able expression. In Whelan Associates, the court held that "the purpose or
function of a utilitarian work would be the work's idea, and everything
that is not necessary to that purpose or function would be part of the ex-
pression of the idea."1° 9 This holding has been severely criticized as being
overly simplistic when confronting the intricacies of computer
programming. 110
Unfortunately, however, courts can only give general guidance as to
how to differentiate between ideas underlying a computer program and
protectable expressions of those ideas. "Application of the abstractions
test will necessarily vary from case-to-case and program-to-program. Given
the complexity and ever-changing nature of computer technology, we de-
cline to set forth any strict methodology for the abstraction of computer
programs."
111
The "abstractions test" is not the only method employed by courts to
ensure that copyright protection is extended only to protectable expres-
sion. If there is only one way to express an idea, the idea and its expres-
sion will be deemed to have merged. Under the "merger" doctrine, no
protection will be granted the expression because doing so would effec-
tively grant copyright protection to the underlying idea.
1 12
108. See supra text accompanying notes 66-69.
109. Whelan Assoc., 797 F.2d at 1236. As the court stated in relation to the infringed
Dentalab program:
[T] he idea of the Dentalab program was the efficient management of a dental labo-
ratory (which presumably has significantly different requirements from those of
other businesses). Because that idea could be accomplished in a number of differ-
ent ways with a number of different structures, the structure of the Dentalab pro-
gram is part of the program's expression, not its idea.
Id. at 1236 n.28.
110. For a discussion of the specific criticisms leveled at this aspect of the Whelan deci-
sion, see Computer Assoc. Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 705-06 (2nd Cir. 1992),
111. Gates Rubber Co., 9 F.3d at 834-35. Lotus Dev. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F.
Supp. 37 (D.Mass. 1990) provided the same guidance:
[I]n making the determination of "copyrightability," the decisionmaker must focus
upon alternatives that counsel may suggest, or the court may conceive, along the scale
from the most generalized conception to the most particularized, and choose some formula-
tion-some conception or definition of the "idea"-for the purpose of distinguish-
ing between the idea and its expression.
Id. at 60. One commentator has suggested that courts adopt a standardized approach to
separating the basic elements of computer programs into six levels of generally declining
abstraction: (i) the main purpose, (ii) the program structure or architecture, (iii) modules,
(iv) algorithms and data structures, (v) source code, and (vi) object code. See Ogilvie, supra
note 59, at 533. This approach was applied in Gates Rubber Co., 9 F.3d at 835. But see Computer
Assoc., 982 F.2d at 707:
Initially, in a manner that resembles reverse engineering on a theoretical
plane, a court should dissect the allegedly copied program's structure and isolate
each level of abstraction contained within it. This process begins with the code and
ends with an articulation of the program's ultimate function. Along the way, it is
necessary essentially to retrace and map each of the designer's steps - in the oppo-
site order in which they were taken during the program's creation.
Computer Assoc., 982 F.2d at 707.
112. Gates Rubber Co., 9 F.3d at 838; Concrete Machinery Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments,




Closely related to the merger doctrine are concerns about efficiency:
[W] hen one considers the fact that programmers generally strive
to create programs "that meet the user's needs in the most effi-
cient manner," the applicability of the merger doctrine to com-
puter programs becomes compelling. In the context of computer
program design, the concept of efficiency is akin to deriving the
most concise logical proof or formulating the most succinct
mathematical computation. Thus, the more efficient a set of modules
are, the more closely they approximate the idea or process embodied in that
particular aspect of the program's structure.
1 13
There are three additional restrictions to protection which relate to
originality. "To qualify for copyright protection, a work must be original
to the author."1 14 Under the scenes afaire doctrine, protection is denied to
expressions which are standard, stock, or common to a particular topic or
that necessarily follow from a common theme or setting such as hardware
specifications. 1
1 5
Granting copyright protection to the necessary incidents of
an idea would effectively afford a monopoly to the first program-
mer to express those ideas. Furthermore, where a particular ex-
pression is common to the treatment of a particular idea,
process, or discovery, it is lacking in the originality that is the sine
qua non for copyright protection.
i 1 6
The second restriction is that facts are not afforded copyright protec-
tion. Facts exist independently of the discoverer, who is not the author of
the facts but merely the recorder.1 17 Finally, the third restriction is that
expressions which are in the public domain, and therefore not original to
the author, are not afforded protection. 118
While some subsequent courts agree that the Whelan Associates court's
overall approach for determining infringement for non-literal elements
was basically sound,11 9 significant attempts have been made to formulate
more precise analyses.' 20 In Lotus Development v. Paperback Software Interna-
tional1 2 1 Judge Keeton formulated a three-part process: 1) the underlying
idea of the work must be identified; 2) individual elements of expression
which comprise the work must be evaluated to determine whether each
expression is limited to the functional requirements of the work or is in
the public domain, or whether, conversely, it constitutes an original ex-
113. Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 705 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Computer As-
sociates essentially states that if a programmer selects a particular implementation methodol-
ogy because it is the most efficient approach, that expression merges with its underlying idea
and is unprotectable. Id.
114. Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
115. Gates Rubber Co., 9 F.3d at 838.
116. Id. (citation omitted).
117. See Feist Publications, 499 U.S. at 348; Gates Rubber Co., 9 F.3d at 837.
118. See Gates Rubber Co., 9 F.3d at 837-38; Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 710.
119. See, e.g., Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 7050; Gates Rubber Co., 9 F.3d at 840.
120. See, e.g., Ogilvie, supra note 59 at 550-59 (identifying four distinct substantial similar-
ity tests: (1) the iterative test; (2) the structure, sequence and organization (SSO) test; (3)
the "look and feel" or "total concept and feel" test; and (4) the successive filtering test).
121. 740 F. Supp 37 (D. Mass. 1990).
1994]
DENVER UNIWRITY LAW REVIEW
pression; and 3) to determine copyrightability of the work, it must be de-
termined whether any of the elements not determined to be limited to the
functional requirements of the work or in the public domain constitute a
substantial part of the work.
122
Currently, the analysis gaining the most acceptance by courts is the
"Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison" test adopted by the Second Circuit in
Computer Associates International v. Altai, Inc.123 In step one of this test, the
court applied a traditional abstractions test.124 In step two, expressive ele-
ments which do not qualify for protection were filtered out in order to
separate protectable expression from non-protectable material. 125 In the
third and final step:
Once a court has sifted out all elements of the allegedly infringed
program which are "ideas" or are dictated by efficiency or exter-
nal factors, or taken from the public domain, there may remain a
core of protectable expression.... At this point, the court's sub-
stantial similarity inquiry focuses on whether the defendant cop-
ied any aspect of this protected expression, as well as an
assessment of the copied portion's relative importance with re-
spect to the plaintiff's overall program. 126
The "Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison" test was substantially
adopted by the Tenth Circuit in Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chemical Indus-
tries. 2 7 Judge Keeton applied his three-part substantial similarity test in
the subsequent case of Lotus Development v. Borland International,128 and
ruled that it is fundamentally compatible with the "Abstraction-Filtration-
Comparison" test. 12 9 The Ninth Circuit and the District Court for the
122. Id. at 60
FIRST, in making the determination of "copyrightability," the decisionmaker
must focus upon alternatives that counsel may suggest, or the court may conceive,
along the scale from the most generalized conception to the most particularized,
and choose some formulation - some conception or definition of the "idea" - for
the purpose of distinguishing between the idea and its expression.
SECOND, the decisionmaker must focus upon whether an alleged expression
of the idea is limited to elements essential to expression of that idea (or is one of
only a few ways of expressing the idea) or instead includes identifiable elements of
expression not essential to every expression of that idea.
THIRD, having identified elements of expression not essential to every expres-
sion of the idea, the decisionmaker must focus on whether those elements are a
substantial part of the allegedly copyrightable "work."
Id. at 61.
123. 982 F.2d 693, 706 (2d Cir. 1992).
124. Id. at 706-07
125. Id. at 707. This process entails examining the structural components at each level of
abstraction to determine whether their particular inclusion at that level was "idea" or was
dictated by considerations of efficiency, so as to be necessarily incidental to that idea; re-
quired by factors external to the program itself; or taken from the public domain and hence
nonprotectable expression. Id.
126. Id. at 710.
127. 9 F.3d 823, 824 (10th Cir. 1993).
128. 799 F. Supp. 203 (D. Mass. 1992).
129. Id. at 211-12.
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Northern District of California have also effectively adopted the "Abstrac-
tion-Filtration-Comparison" test.
13 0
The principal difficulty with the Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison
test is that, taken to its logical extreme, a work may be found to contain no
protectable elements of expression, and is, therefore, not subject to copy-
right protection. The Whelan Associates court found support in the Copy-
right Act as well as prior decisions for its holding that the structure and
organization of a computer program can be proper subjects of copyright
protection.1 31 Recently, the Supreme Court expressly reinforced that a
work containing no individual protectable expressions can still be subject
to copyright protection.13 2 In language very similar to Whelan Associates,
the Supreme Court stated:
The compilation author typically chooses which facts to in-
clude, in what order to place them, and how to arrange the col-
lected data so that they may be used effectively by readers. These
choices as to selection and arrangement, so long as they are
made independently by the compiler and entail a minimal de-
gree of creativity, are sufficiently original that Congress may pro-
tect such compilations through the copyright laws. Thus, even a
directory that contains absolutely no protectable written expres-
sion, only facts, meets the constitutional minimum for copyright
protection if it features an original selection or arrangement.' 33
Granted, the level of protection provided is very thin.1 3 4 "[A] subse-
quent compiler remains free to use the facts contained in another's publi-
130. Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1525 (9th Cir. 1993); Atari Games v.
Nintendo of Am., No. C 88-4805 FMS, C 89-0027 FMS, 1993 WL 207548, at *1-3 (N.D. Cal.
May 18, 1993); Apple Computer v. Microsoft, 821 F. Supp. 616, 623 (N.D. Cal 1993).
131. Whelan Assoc., 797 F.2d at 1239.
The Copyright Act of 1976 provides ... support... that Congress intended
that the structure and organization of a literary work could be part of its expression
protectable by copyright. Title 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1982) specifically extends copyright
protection to compilations and derivative works. Title 17 U.S.C. § 101, defines
"compilation" as "a work formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting
materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the
resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship," and it defines
"derivative work," as one "based upon one or more preexisting works, such as ...
abridgement, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, trans-
formed, or adapted." Although the Code does not use the terms "sequence," "or-
der" or "structure,"'it is clear from the definition of compilations and derivative
works, and the protection afforded them, that Congress was aware of the fact that
the sequencing and ordering of materials could be copyrighted, i.e., that the se-
quence and order could be parts of the expression, not the idea, of a work.
Id. The Whelan Court also based its decision on early cases which held that a copyright
infringement can exist in the absence of literal similarities. Id. at 1234; see also Twentieth
Century-Fox Film Corp. v. MCA, Inc., 715 F.2d 1327, 1329 (9th Cir. 1983) (thirteen alleged
distinctive plot similarities between Battlestar Galactica and Star Wars may be basis for a finding
of copyright violation); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d
1157, 1167 (9th Cir. 1977) (similarities between McDonaldland characters and H.R. Pufnstuf
characters can be established by " ' total concept and feel'" of the two productions).
132. Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348-49 (1991). Compilations
of facts generally are copyrightable. Id. at 344
133. Id. at 349 (citations omitted).
134. Id.
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cation to aid in preparing a competing work, so long as the competing work
does not feature the same selection and arrangemenL"'
3 5
Courts must be careful in their pursuit of this "protectable core" I3 6 of
a compiler's work. As noted by one commentator:
Hypothesize two computer programs that contain many of
the same nonliteral elements, and an efficiency and scenes a faire
analysis that revealed that, in each instance, several practical op-
tions to those nonliteral elements existed. The correspondence
between the programs, taken in the aggregate, would be beyond
coincidence. Nevertheless, a mechanical application of an ex-
pansive merger doctrine might dictate that these similarities
should be eliminated from consideration in the court's filtration
analysis, and could lead the court to conclude that the plaintiffs
program was completely unprotectable. Unless the Altai process
is invested with some flexibility, it could defeat Congress's desire
to accord computer programs full copyright protection, and de-
prive authors of these works of Congress's intended incentives
and rewards 137
The Computer Associates International v. Altai, Inc. court itself recognized, to
a limited degree, the potential pitfalls of its analysis.
1 38
In order to impose liability for copyright infringement, the basic ap-
proach taken by courts is to "find that the defendant copied protectable
elements of the plaintiffs program and that those protectable elements
comprise a substantial part of the plaintiff's program when it is considered
as a whole."' 3 9 At present, there is very little guidance as to what non-
literal elements of an allegedly infringed computer program are protect-
able, as well as whether those elements comprise a substantial part of the
program. For example, in Lotus Development v. Paperback Software Interna-
tional'40 Judge Keeton examined the non-literal elements of the popular
Lotus 1-2-3 spreadsheet program.' 41 It is not exactly clear which specific
element Judge Keeton found to be protectable. On the one hand, Judge
Keeton found that the structure, sequence, and organization of the pro-
gram's menu command system constituted a substantial part of the alleged
135. I& at 349 (emphasis added).
136. "Protectable core" means those compilations of facts that are sufficiently original in
their use, order of placement, and arrangement. See supra note 133-35 and accompanying
teXL
137. Miller, supra note 57, at 1010 n.156.
138. Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706 (2d Cir. 1992).
[W]e are cognizant that computer technology is a dynamic field which can quickly
outpace judicial decisionmaking. Thus, in cases where the technology in question
does not allow for a literal application of the... [Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison
test], our opinion should not be read to foreclose the district courts of our circuit
from utilizing a modified version.
Id.
139. Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., 9 F.3d 823 (10th Cir. 1993) (citing Autos-
kill v. National Educ. Support Sys., 1476, 1496-98 (10th Cir. 1993)).
140. 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990).
141. Id. at 51-52.
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copyrighted work.142  Judge Keeton then merely concluded that
"copyrightability of the user interface of [Lotus] 1-2-3 is established." 143
It is interesting to note that Judge Keeton's determination that the
Lotus 1-2-3 menu command system is a substantial part of the program is
based solely upon the finding that "[t] he user interface of [Lotus] 1-2-3 is its
most unique element, and is the aspect that has made 1-2-3 so popular.
That defendants went to such trouble to copy that element is a testament
to its substantiality."144
The defendants in Lotus Development attempted to create a "feature-
for-feature work-a-like for [Lotus] 1-2-3." 14 5 Because infringement was
based solely upon the copying of the Lotus 1-2-3 user command system,
one must wonder if Lotus may have found itself with an essentially unpro-
tected computer program if the defendants had not copied the Lotus 1-2-3
menu command system essentially verbatim.
Judge Keeton then found the Lotus 1-2-3 menu command system to
be an original expression and thus protectable, 146 despite the fact that the
ordering of the menu command structure was presented in predicted or-
der of "frequency of use rather than alphabetically." 147 In other words,
the structure of the Lotus 1-2-3 menu command system was significantly
dictated by considerations of efficiency. The Second Circuit has indicated
that when programmers strive to "meet the user's needs in the most effi-
cient manner"; however, idea and expression may have merged and there-
fore, protection is not available.
1 48
Copyright protection arises from the Constitutional provision grant-
ing Congress the power to pass laws "[t] o promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." 149 "[T]he
purpose of the copyright law is to create the most efficient and productive
142. Id. at 68.
143. Id.
144. I. The defendants in Lotus had attempted to create a spreadsheet which was com-
pletely "compatible" with Lotus 1-2-3, hence the decision to copy Lotus 1-2-3 as closely as
possible. Id. at 69. Judge Keeton pointed out, however, that the defendants' premise that
they had to have an identical menu command structure proved "incorrect in hindsight." Id.
For example, a spreadsheet program created by Microsoft has proved commercially success-
ful despite having a different menu command system. Id. It is difficult to understand how
the Lotus 1-2-3 user command system can be so substantial, based partly on the fact that
defendants had gone to the trouble of copying it, when the defendants' purpose for copying
it is essentially commercially pointless. See id. at 68.
145. Lotus Dev., 740 F. Supp. at 69.
146. Id. at 68. "I conclude that a menu command structure is capable of being expressed
in many if not an unlimited number of ways, and that the command structure of 1-2-3 is an
original and nonobvious way of expressing a command structure." I&
147. I. at 67.
148. Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 708 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting Peter
S. Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Cpyright Protection for Application Programs, 41 STAN. L REV.
1045, 1052 (1989)). See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
149. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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balance between protection (incentive) and dissemination of information,
to promote learning, culture and development."
150
The defendants in Lotus had made every effort to produce an identi-
cal version of the plaintiff's program in order to achieve commercial suc-
cess. 151 In fact, they even discarded certain improved features because
they were not completely compatible with Lotus 1-2-3.152 Protecting
against such illicit copying clearly falls within the balance the copyright
laws are designed to achieve.
155
The issue arises whether the same analysis applied by Judge Keeton in
Lotus should be applied when a competing program, which contains a
completely different menu command structure and is considered superior
to Lotus 1-2-3,154 also contains a feature which emulates the Lotus 1-2-3
menu command system. 155 When a computer program is independently
created and is considered an improvement over its competing works,
keeping in mind the balance to be struck between protecting authors and
promoting learning, culture and development, it is arguable that incorpo-
ration of the Lotus 1-2-3 menu command system into an optional feature
is not copying a substantial part of the Lotus 1-2-3 program. 15 6 Regard-
less, judge Keeton subsequently ruled in Lotus Development v. Borland Inter-
national that Borland's Quattro programs infringed upon Lotus 1-2-3:
150. Whelan Assocs. v.Jaslow Dental Lab., 797 F.2d 1222, 1235 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
151. Lotus Dev. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 69 (D. Mass. 1990).
152. Id.
153. See Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., 797 F.2d 1222, 1231 (3d Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald's, 562 F.2d
1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 1977); Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 90 (2d
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976); 3 MvLviLLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.01 at 13-15 (1993).
154. See Peter H. Lewis, When Computing Power Is Generated By The Lauyers, N.Y. TIMES, July
22, 1990, at F4.
155. See Lotus Dev. v. Borland Int'l, 799 F. Supp 203, 222 (D. Mass. 1992). The Lotus
court stated:
That Borland, in developing the Quattro programs, has added functional and
expressive elements that do not exist in [Lotus] 1-2-3 is irrelevant in view of the fact
that Borland copied virtually the whole menu command structure of 1-2-3 into its
emulation interfaces. Borland's additions have caused some variation in the man-
ner in which the elements taken from 1-2-3 are expressed in the Quattro pro-
grams.... A decisionmaker in this case (whether judge or jury) must ignore the
added expression to the extent that it does not change the expression Borland cop-
ied from Lotus. I conclude that no reasonable jury could find for Borland that Bor-
land did not take the menu commands, menu command structure . . . and
keystroke sequences substantially as they were.
Id.
156. It is interesting to note that Microsoft offers a feature in its spreadsheet program,
Excel, which allows users to display a menu system with the same Lotus 1-2-3 commands
(though expressed vertically instead of horizontally). By pressing the same keystrokes as if
they were using Lotus 1-2-3, Excel will then execute the equivalent command through its own
menu command system. To date, Lotus has not instituted a suit for infringement against




"The extent of copying of copyrightable elements of 1-2-3 rendered the
Quattro programs substantially similar to 1-2-3."157
The Tenth Circuit also addressed the question of which non-literal
elements are copyrightable. In Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando American158 the
district court found that the defendants had infringed the plaintiff's copy-
right for a computer program it used in its course of business. 15 9 Many of
the individual defendants were former employees of the plaintiff who
worked for one of the corporate defendants.16  One of the individual de-
fendants allegedly stated that when he left the plaintiffs employ, he
brought with him to the defendant all the computer files he could "get his
hands on."1 61 In addition, the district court found the testimony of the
individual defendant who claimed to have independently created the al-
legedly infringing program unbelievable.
1 62
In this case, significant evidence was presented that the defendants
illicitly copied the plaintiff's copyrighted computer program. 16 3 The
Tenth Circuit, however, has remanded the case back to the district court
on the issue of copyright infringement.1 64 They instructed the district
court to determine through application of the Abstraction-Filtration-
Comparison test whether the defendants' copying constitutes actionable
infringement. 165
While these cases indicate that courts are willing to provide only a
very narrow range of protection for non-literal elements of computer
programs, it must be kept in mind that Congress intended that computer
programs be provided copyright protection.1 66 The balancing between
protecting an author's work and dissemination of information' 6 7 has,
however, tilted toward dissemination. 1  Moreover, the fact that an au-
thor has expended considerable effort to produce an original work is of
no consequence. 169 The sine qua non of copyright is originality.
170
157. Borland Int'l, 799 F. Supp. at 221. For an excellent review of this decision, see Martin
Glenn & Dale M. Cendali, Lotus Case Highlights Copyright Issues and High-Tech Problems, NAT'L.
L.J., Nov. 1, 1993, at S17.
158. 798 F. Supp. 1499 (D. Colo. 1992).
159. Id. at 1516.
160. Id. at 1502.
161. Id. at 1509.
162. Id. at 1520.
163. See id. at 1515, 1519-20.
164. Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., 9 F.3d 823, 849 (10th Cir. 1993).
165. Id.
166. See supra note 72.
167. Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., 797 F.2d 1222, 1235 (3rd Cir. 1986), cert. de-
nied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
168. See supra notes 135-65; infra notes 170-81 and accompanying text.
169. Over time courts developed a theory known as the "sweat of the brow" doctrine with
"the underlying notion ... that copyright was a reward for the hard work that went into
compiling facts." Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 352. In Feist,
the Supreme Court expressly rejected the "sweat of the brow" doctrine: "[T ] he 1976 revisions
to the Copyright Act leave no doubt that originality, not 'sweat of the brow,' is the touchstone
of copyright protection in directories and other fact-based works." Id. at 359-60.
170. Id. at 355.
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Computer programmers are then free to use the ideas contained in
other programs as long as they do not impermissibly copy protected ex-
pression.1 71 Developers have therefore examined computer programs to
extract the underlying ideas, and then passed those ideas to programmers
who have not seen the other program, and who then create their own
expression based on those ideas in a "clean room" environment.
172
Necessary to this "clean room" process is the making of intermediate
verbatim copies of the other work.173 Both the Federal and the Ninth
Circuits have held that making such intermediate copies is excused under
the "fair use" provisions of the Copyright AcL174 Noting that the legisla-
tive history of the fair use provisions of the Copyright Act "suggests that
courts should adapt the fair use exception to accommodate new techno-
logical innovations,"175 the Federal Circuit in Atari Games v. Nintendo of
America176 held that "[w]hen the nature of a work requires intermediate
copying to understand the ideas and processes in a copyrighted work, that
nature supports a fair use for intermediate copying." 177 Likewise, the
Ninth Circuit held in Sega Enterprises v. Accolade,178 "that where disassem-
bly179 is the only way to gain access to the ideas and functional elements
embodied in a copyrighted computer program and where there is a legiti-
mate reason for seeking such access, disassembly is a fair use of the copy-
righted work, as a matter of law."' 80
The Sega court further stated:
Disassembly of object code necessarily entails copying .... If dis-
assembly of copyrighted object code is per se an unfair use, the
owner of the copyright gains a de facto monopoly over the func-
tional aspects of his work-aspects that were expressly denied
copyright protection by Congress.... In order to enjoy a lawful
monopoly over the idea or functional principle underlying a
work, the creator of the work must satisfy the more stringent stan-
dards imposed by the patent laws.181
171. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
172. See NEC v. Intel, 645 F. Supp. 590 (N.D. Cal. 1989); Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Altai,
Inc., 775 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
173. See Sega Enters. v. Accolade, 977 F.2d 1510, 1518 (9th Cir. 1993).
174. See Atari Games v. Nintendo of Am., 975 F.2d 832, 842-43 (Fed. Cir. 1992). The
Atari court stated: "Section 107 of the Copyright Act states that 'fair use of a copyrighted
work, including such use by reproduction in copies.., for purposes such as criticism, com-
ment, news reporting, teaching ... scholarship or research' is not an infringement.'" Id.
(quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d
1510 (9th Cir. 1993).
175. Id. (referring to H.R. Rep. No. 1476,94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5679-80).
176. 975 F.2d 832 (Fed Cir. 1992).
177. Id. at 843.
178. 977 F.2d 1510, 1514 n.2 (9th Cir. 1993).
179. Computer programs are translated from source code to object code through the use
of an "assembler" or "compiler." Disassembly, or decompiling, is the process of reconverting
object code into human-readable source code. See id.; see also supra note 76.
180. Id at 1514 n.2. In this case, the "legitimate" use was Accolade's attempts to bypass a
security system Sega had designed for its game cartridge consoles. Id. at 1527-28.
181. Id. at 1526 (citation omitted).
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Partly as a result of the latest decisions regarding software copyright pro-
tection, more and more software developers are seeking patent protec-
tion.1 82 Patent protection, however, will not necessarily provide a stable
environment for protection of the multimedia industry. The patent office
recently issued a patent to a publisher of an interactive CD-ROM encyclo-
pedia. Industry protests over the breadth of this particular patent led to
the patent office ordering a rare re-examination of the patent.
18 3
It is with this perspective of the copyright protection granted to com-
puter programs that this Article examines copyright protection as it ap-
plies to emerging multimedia applications. Because multimedia
applications are for the most part inextricably linked to computer
software,18 4 the above analysis is particularly applicable.
B. Multimedia Copyright Issues
The interactive aspect of multimedia which allows users to manipulate
sounds and images raises the most significant copyright issues. Sounds
and images (both still and motion) are, if original, copyrightable subject
matter. They are works of authorship fixed "in [a] ... tangible media of
expression... from which they can be perceived, reproduced or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device." 185
The Copyright Act grants to the copyright owner the exclusive right to
reproduce, distribute, perform, display, and to prepare derivative works
based upon their works.
186
182. See Michael J. Lennon, A Statistical Analysis of the Enforcement of United States Patents
Relating to Computer Software, THE COMPUTER L. Ass'N BULL., No. 2, 1993, at 3, 6 (concluding
that software-related patents appear to have fared at least as well, and possibly somewhat
better, as those issued for other technologies, when litigated in the federal district courts and
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit); see asoJohn S. Wiley, Jr., Copyright at the School
of Patent, 58 U. CHI. L. Rav. 119 (1991) (discussing how patent law can be applied to copy-
right protection issues).
183. See generallyJohn Markoff, A High-Technology Outcry Against the US. Patent System, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 3, 1994, at C16; James Evans, Patently Offensive: Compton's CD-ROM Coup Could
Unleash Multimedia Litigation, L.A. DAiLYJ., Dec. 29, 1993, at 1; Peter H. Lewis, The New Patent
that is Infuriating the Multimedia Industry, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1993, § 3, at 10.
184. See supra Part I.
185. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988 & Supp IV 1992).
186. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988) states:
Subject to sections 107 through 120 [17 U.S.C. §§ 107-120], the owner of copy-
right under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the
following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public
by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the
copyrighted work publicly, and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual
images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted
work publicly.
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Computer technology makes it possible to make exact copies of origi-
nal sounds and images.' 87 Entire works, as well as "samples," are easily
copied. 188 The music industry has some experience with this form of
copying. Digital sampling was first introduced in the music industry in the
1970s. 189 The principal implication of digital sampling is that a person
may record small pieces (samples) of pre-existing works by others and
recombine those samples into a completely different work.190 While digi-
tal sampling may involve as little as three words, 19 1 it can also involve sub-
stantial portions of a previous recording.192 Digital sampling has been
applied to sound clips from movies and television shows' 9 3 as well as visual
images.
194
It initially appears that copying the original, as well as distributing or
displaying the digital copies, constitutes an infringement. The phenome-
non of digital sampling has been pervasive in the music industry 195 and
will most certainly increase as digital technology becomes more widely
available.
While an artist is permitted to make a new sound recording based
upon the same composition upon which the first sound recording is
based, the Copyright Act expressly prohibits the reproduction, distribu-
187. See Mary B. Percifull, Digital Sampling: Creative or just Plain "CFEEZ-OLD?', 42 CASE W.
REs. L. REv. 1263, 1263 (1992).
188. Id.
189. See id. Musical digital sampling involves recording sounds and storing them in digi-
tal format in a computer. The samples can then be replayed and edited, allowing a musician
"to create virtually any type of recording instead of hiring individual instrumentalists to play
each part." For a complete description of the digital sampling process, see id at n.4-6. For a
discussion of the technical aspects of digital sampling of sounds, see id. at 1264-66 n. 11-29
and accompanying text. See also Note: A New Spin on Music Sampling: A Case for Fair Play, 105
H.stv. L. REV. 726, 726-27 (1992).
190. See Percifull, supra note 187, at 1264-66.
191. See Grand Upright Music v. Warner Brothers Records, 780 F. Supp. 182, 183
(S.D.N.Y. 1991).
192. One example of the capabilities of digital sampling is the ability of singer Natalie
Cole to record a "duet" with her deceased father Nat "King" Cole. Jeffrey H. Brown, Com-
ment, "They Don't Make Music the Way They Used To": The Legal Implications of "Sampling" in
Contemporary Music, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 1941, 1942 (1992). Another recent recording session
exemplifies also the convergence of the various multimedia technologies. A new Frank Sina-
tra album, "Duets," was released November 3, 1993. On the album, Mr. Sinatra sings duets
with a number of different singers. The duets were recorded while Mr. Sinatra was in a
studio with the band in Los Angeles and his singing partners were located around the world,
some recording their parts at later dates with others almost literally phoning in their contri-
butions via a fiber-optic system that links recording studios by telephone. Stephen Holden,
Pop's Patriarch Makes Music Along With His Heirs, N.Y. TiMEs, Oct.'31, 1993, § 2, at 1; Steve
Eddy, Frankie: Sinatra Returns With Duets,' His First New Material In a Decade, ORANGE COUNTY
REGISTER, Oct. 29, 1993, at 1.
193. See Seymour, supra note 27, at 99; Brown, supra note 192, at 1943-44.
194. Brown, supra note 192, at 1943 n.9. One of the most popular examples of digital
sampling of images is a Diet Coke commercial in which the actors Humphrey Bogart and
James Cagney and the musician Louis Armstrong join the contemporary musician EltonJohn
and other actors in a nightclub. Id.
195. Percifull, supra note 187, at 1264-66 and accompanying text. For an example of
copyright infringement based on digital sampling, see Grand Upright Music, 780 F. Supp. at
183, at 1264-66 "[T]he defendants in this action for copyright infringement would have this
court believe that stealing is rampant in the music business and, for that reason, their con-
duct here should be excused." Id.
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tion, or the making of a derivative work based upon, the actual copy-
righted work.1 96 Digital sampling, whether of sounds or images, therefore
appears to be prohibited without the authorization of the copyright
owner. 197 Before there can be infringement, however, a substantial por-
tion of the copyright holder's work must be appropriated.
198
Determining what constitutes a substantial portion is a qualitative, not
a quantitative, analysis.1 99 Although a digital sample may consist of only a
196. 17 U.S.C. § 114(a) (1988) provides that the exclusive rights of the owner of the
copyright in a sound recording are limited to the rights specified in 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1)-(3).
Further, § 114 (b) provides that the exclusive right to reproduce (§ 106(1)) a sound record-
ing is limited to the right to duplicate the sound recording in the form of phonorecords, or
of copies of motion pictures and other audiovisual works, that directly or indirectly recapture
the actual sounds fixed in the recording; the exclusive fight to prepare a derivative work
(§ 106(2)) based upon a sound recording is limited to a work in which the actual sounds fixed
in the sound recording are rearranged, remixed, or otherwise altered in sequence or quality,
and the exclusive rights granted under §§ 106(1) & (2) do not extend to the making or
duplication of another sound recording that consists entirely of an independent fixation of
other sounds, even though such sounds imitate or simulate those in the copyrighted sound
recording.
In addition, 17 U.S.C. § 115 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) provides that in the case of nondra-
matic musical works, the exclusive rights provided under §§ 106(1) & (3), to make and to
distribute phonorecords of such works, are subject to compulsory licensing as specified in
§ 115. Section 115(a)(1) provides that a person may obtain a compulsory license to make
and distribute phonorecords of a nondramatic musical work once phonorecords of the work
have been distributed to the U.S. public under the authority of the copyright holder, pro-
vided the compulsory licensee's primary purpose in making phonorecords is to distribute
them to the public for private use. Section 115(a) (2) further provides that the compulsory
license does not permit the licensee's arrangement of the nondramatic musical work to
change the basic melody or fundamental character of the work.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) defines "phonorecords" as material objects in which sounds,
other than those accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work, are fixed by any
method now known or later developed, and from which the sounds can be perceived, repro-
duced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.
The term "phonorecords" includes the material object in which the sounds are first fixed. Id.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) defines "sound recordings" as works that result from the fixation
of a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds, but not including the sounds accompanying a
motion picture or other audiovisual work, regardless of the nature of the material objects,
such as disks, tapes, or other phonorecords, in which they are embodied.
197. Percifull, supra note 187, at 1272.
It seems that digital sampling would be explicitly proscribed by the copyright
act. After all, digital samples "directly or indirectly recapture the actual sounds
fixed in the recording," and the samples are not entirely "independent fixations[s]"
of new sounds. Congress, however, has not prohibited all copying. The House Re-
port accompanying the Copyright Act of 1976 states that "infringement takes place
whenever all or any substantial portion of the actual sounds that go to make up a
copyrighted sound recording are reproduced.., by repressing, transcribing, recap-
turing off the air, or any other method" The report indicates that the purpose of the
statute was to protect "substantial portions" of a copyrighted piece, rather than indi-
'vidual notes. Digital sampling technology was not readily available at the time this
report was released.
Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 106, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.CAN.
5659, 5721).
198. Id.
199. Feder v. Videotrip, 697 F. Supp. 1165, 1173 (D. Colo. 1988).
[Sluppose the similarity, although literal, is not comprehensive, that is, the funda-
mental substance, or skeleton or overall scheme of the plaintiff's work has not been
copied.... At what point does such fragmented similarity become substantial so as
to constitute the borrowing an infringement?
No easy rule of thumb can be stated as to the quantum of fragmented literal
similarity permitted without crossing the line of substantial similarity. The question
in each case is whether the similarity relates to matter which constitutes a substantial
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few seconds of another's sound recording, it can still be considered a sub-
stantial portion of the original work. "Even if the similar material is quan-
titatively small, if it is qualitatively important, the trier of fact may properly
find substantial similarity."
20°
This approach was followed in the recent sampling case of Jarvis v.
A&M Records.2 01 In particular, thejarvis court noted that while determin-
ing substantial similarity, non-copyrightable elements must be removed
from the analysis. 202 The court recognized, however, that although the
copying involved cliched phrases typical in the musical field, their use to-
gether in a particular arrangement and in the context of a particular mel-
ody could constitute copyrightable expression.20 3 The court held that
"the precise relationship of the phrases vis a vis each other was copied"
20 4
and denied the "defendant's motion for summary judgment as to liability
on plaintiff's musical composition copyright claim."20 5
Although different types of works were involved (sound recordings
versus computer programs), the Jarvis court used an analysis very similar to
that used in Computer Associates International v. Altai, Inc.20 6 Because the
Jarvis court was dealing with fragmented literal copying, as opposed to
non-literal copying, there was no need to apply an abstractions test.20 7 As
in Computer Associates, however, theJarvis court made sure to filter out non-
protectable elements before making a comparison between the works to
determine whether they were substantially similar.20 8 Courts must be
careful not to carry this analysis too far in their attempt to ascertain a
protectable core of material, otherwise they may find themselves limiting
Congress' intended scope of copyright protection.2° 9
To avoid restricting the scope of copyright protection, courts, as well
as multimedia users, should keep in mind the balancing of interests re-
quired by the Constitution.210 "Digital technology requires a balancing of
the interests of artists in retaining artistic and economic control over their
works against the interest of artists in having access to raw material for use
in creative works."
211
portion of plaintiffs work - not whether such material constitutes a substantial
portion of defendant's work.
Id. (citations omitted).
200. Id. at 1176; see also Percifull, supra note 187, 1274-75.
201. 827 F. Supp. 282 (D. N.J. 1993).
202. Id. at 291. "Since it is not unlawful to copy non-copyrightable portions of a plaintiff's
work, non-copyrightable elements must be factored out in an inquiry into infringement." Id.
203. Id. at 292. "There is no question that the combined phrase 'ooh ooh ooh ooh ooh
move . .. Free your body' is an expression of an idea that was copyrightable." Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992); see supra text accompany notes 123-26.
207. Jarvis, 827 F. Supp. at 290 (abstraction test used to separate idea from underlying
expression where copied material consisted of general statement of what original material
was about).
208. Id. at 291.
209. See supra notes 113-18, 133 and accompanying text.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 149-50.
211. Percifull, supra note 187, at 1269.
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Despite the fact that a substantial portion of a copyrighted work may
have been copied, infringement may be excused under the Copyright
Act's "fair use" doctrine. 2 12 Acuff-Rose Music v. Campbel42 13 concerned the
2 Live Crew's version of the Roy Orbison/William Dees song "Oh, Pretty
Woman."2 14 Although the plaintiff's expert witness testified that portions
of the original recording may have been sampled and incorporated into
the 2 Live Crew's version, 215 the case did not involve literal copying of any
portion of the original sound recording.2 16 Initially, 2 Live Crew (defend-
ants) had sought to make payments to the plaintiff under the Copyright
Act's compulsory license provisions.2 17 They later raised the affirmative
defense that their song was a parody of the original and therefore not an
infringement.
2 1 8
Parody and satire are considered an extension of "comment" and
"criticism" allowed under § 107 of the Copyright Act.2 1 9 The Acuff-Rose
Music court was quick to point out that all parodies are not fair uses.
220
Instead, courts analyze each of the four factors expressed in § 107.221
The purpose and character of the use of the original song is the first
factor analyzed.22 2 The Acuff-Rose court initially noted that the purpose of
the use was parody and that the character of the use was commercial.
223
The second factor to consider is the nature of the copyrighted work.
2 2 4
"As a general rule, creative works-literary works of fiction or artistic
212. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), provides, in part:
[T] he fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies
or phonorecords . . . for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching.... scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In deter-
mining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the
factors to be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of use, including whether such use is of a com-
mercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copy-
righted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
righted work.
213. 972 F.2d 1429, 1451 (6th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994) (addressing the
issue of whether the alleged infringers' commercial parody was a 'fair use' within the mean-
ing of 17 U.S.C. § 107).
214. Id. at 1432.
215. Id. at 1433.
216. Id. at 1432.
217. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); Acuff-Rose Music, 972 F.2d at 1432.
218. Acuff-Rose Music, 972 F.2d at 1432.
219. Id. at 1432. "Indeed, the fair use formulation found in section 107 is a reflection of
Congress's intent to codify the common law fair use doctrine, which has long included par-
ody." Id. at 1435 (citing Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 549,
(1985)).
220. Acuff-Rose Music, 972 F.2d at 1435.
221. See supra note 212.
222. Id.
223. 972 F.2d at 1435-36. It should be noted, however, that the Sixth Circuit concluded
with great reluctance that the defendants' song was a parody of the original, as found by the
district court. Id. at 1435. The Court of Appeals in its parody analysis noted that the second
work must at least make a comment on, and not just copy, the original work in order to
constitute a parody. Id. at 1436.
224. Id.; 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
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works-are afforded greater protection from the fair use determination
than are works of fact."2 25 The third factor to consider is the amount and
substantiality of the portion of the copyrighted work used in the second
work.2 26 At first glance, this analysis seems redundant to the requirement
that a substantial portion of the copyrighted work be copied before there
can be infringement.22 7 The final factor, and "undoubtedly the single
most important element of fair use,"2 28 is the effect of the use upon the
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
2 29
Actual present harm need not be shown; such a requirement
would leave the copyright holder with no defense against predict-
able damage. Nor is it necessary to show with certainty that fu-
ture harm will result. What is necessary is a showing by a
preponderance of the evidence that some meaningful likelihood
of future harm exists. If the intended use is for commercial gain,
that likelihood may be presumed. But if it is for a noncommer-
cial purpose, the likelihood must be demonstrated.
230
The "inquiry under the fourth statutory factor not only considers harm to
the market for the original but harm to the market for derivative works as
well."
231
As noted previously, courts have applied the fair use doctrine to the
making of intermediate copies of computer programs.23 2 In Sega Enter-
prises v. Accolade,213 the parties developed, manufactured and marketed
competing video games.2 34 The defendant, Accolade, produced video
game cartridges that could be played in consoles manufactured by other
video game manufacturers, including those manufactured by Sega.23 5
Sega incorporated a security system into its video game console so that
only game cartridges Sega manufactured or licensed could be used with
the console.23 6 Accolade then "reverse engineered" Sega's video game
programs in order to bypass Sega's security system.
23 7
Like the Sixth Circuit in Acuff-Rose Music, the Ninth Circuit in Sega
Enterprises analyzed the four principal considerations under § 107 of the
Copyright Act. As to the first factor, the Sega Enterprises court ruled that
225. Acuff-Rose Music, 972 F.2d at 1437 (citing Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 563).
226. Id.; 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
227. See supra notes 198-204 and accompanying text.
228. Acuff-Rose Music, 972 F.2d at 1438.
229. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
230. Acuff-Rose, 972 F.2d at 1438.
231. Id. at 1439. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988), defines a "derivative work" as:
[A] work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical
arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound record-
ing, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work
may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions,
annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an
original work of authorship, is a "derivative work".
232. E.g., Sega Enters. v. Accolade, 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1993). See supra notes 163-74
and accompanying text.
233. 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1993).
234. Id. at 1514.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 1515.
237. Id. at 1514-15.
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the presumption of unfairness arising from the copying for a commercial
purpose was rebutted for the following reasons: the copying was interme-
diate, and done solely to discover the functional requirements of compati-
bility with Sega's game console-aspects of Sega's programs not protected
by copyright.2 8 Therefore, any commercial exploitation resulting from
the copying was indirect.
23 9
The nature of the copyrighted work is the second factor to consider,
and was fundamental to the Ninth Circuit's decision in Sega Enterprise. As
noted previously, fictional works receive much greater protection than
fact-based or functional works.2 40 The Sega Enterprise court, noting the dif-
ficulties courts have had defining the copyrightable nature of computer
programs, 24 1 did not determine whether they should be classified as pri-
marily fictional or fact-based works.24 2 Instead, the court focused its atten-
tion on the one element that makes computer programs unique:
computer programs are generally distributed in object code form.243 As a
result, the unprotected ideas they may contain are not readily ascertain-
able.2 44 On this basis, the court concluded that disassembly of the object
code, which included intermediate copying, was permissible.24 5 Other-
wise the copyright holder would be effectively granted protection for the
underlying ideas which could only be discerned through the disassembly
process.
2 46
The court next evaluated the amount and substantiality of the portion
of the copyrighted work used in the second work.247 Although the de-
fendant copied the plaintiffs entire work, the court indicated this third
factor had very little weight in light of its consideration of the second fac-
tor.248 Finally, even though the defendant was making copies of the plain-
tiff's work in order to directly compete with the plaintiff, the Ninth Circuit
actually believed this factor weighed in favor of the defendant. 249 Con-
trary to the decision of the Sixth Circuit in Acuff-Rose Music v. Campbel
250
the Ninth Circuit in Sega Enterprise obviously did not believe that the de-
fendant's "blatantly commercial purpose" for copying prevented a finding
of fair use.
25 1
The varying emphases on different factors by the Sixth and Ninth Cir-
cuits illustrate the differing views courts take as to whether a particular use
is a fair use.25 2 As works traditionally considered fictional in nature be-
238. Id. at 1522. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988).
239. Sega Enters., 977 F.2d at 1522.
240. See supra notes 115-18; Sega Enters., 977 F.2d at 1524.
241. Id.
242. See id.
243. Id. at 1525.
244. I
245. Sega Enters., 977 F.2d at 1526.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 1526-27.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 1525-26.
250. 972 F.2d 1429, 1451 (6th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 114 S. CL 1164 (1994).
251. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
252. See supra notes 212-51 and accompanying text.
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come more integrated into computer technology, it is unknown which of
the four factors courts will determine dispositive of the issue of fair use.
For example, computer users seem to enjoy playing sound "bytes"
from movies on their computers.2 53 The author has personally witnessed
a number of personal computers configured so that the famous line spo-
ken by Arnold Schwarzenegger in the movie The Terminator-"I'll be
back"-is heard when the computer is shut down. While this portion of
the motion picture is quantitatively small, it is qualitatively significant. For
most of the public, the phrase is synonymous with Mr. Schwarzenegger
and the movie.
Its unlicensed use appears to constitute an unfair use. Although it is a
qualitatively substantial portion from a fictional work, most people use it
for their own personal amusement, and not for commercial gain. Such
use will unlikely have an effect on the potential market for, or value of, the
copyrighted work. Such use is not for purposes of criticism, comment,
news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research as required by the
Copyright Act of 1976.254 As noted previously, however, commentators
have argued that the fair use doctrine should be adaptable.
255
Could someone instead permissibly imitate Mr. Schwarzenegger's
voice and make a recording of the exact phrase? In general, the substan-
tial similarity analysis under the Copyright Act must be made for fictional
characters.2 5 6 However, "[a] character in a work in which the character is
central to the story is copyrightable."2 57 For example, in Universal City Stu-
dios v. Kamar Industries,258 the defendant marketed merchandise copied
from E. T., Universal's copyrighted motion picture, 259 with inscriptions
such as "I love You E.T." and "E.T. Phone Home!" 26° The court held that
"[t] he inscriptions on the defendant's products would be readily recogniza-
ble to the lay observer as key lines of dialogue from the copyrighted movie
and, therefore, the test for copyright infringement has been satisfied."
26 1
Multimedia applications are much more manipulative and powerful
than the mere fragmented literal copying that digital sampling provides.
Works, or portions of works, including sound recordings, 262 motion pic-
253. See Seymour, supra note 27 at 99.
254. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). But see Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 552, 554 (1985) (list of examples in § 107 is not intended to be
exhaustive).
255. See supra note 175.
256. See generally Note, Michael T. Helfand, When Mickey Mouse Is as Strong as Superman:
The Convergence of Intellectual Property Laws to Protect Fictional Literary and Pictorial Characters, 44
STAN. L. REv. 623 (1992) (explaining the nature of fictional characters and how their unau-
thorized use can result in a judgement of infringement); David B. Feldman, Finding a Home
for Fictional Characters: A Proposalfor Change in Copyright Protection, 78 CALIF. L. Rav. 687 (1990)
(considering the varying ways in which courts apply copyright protection for fictional
characters).
257. Universal City Studios v. Kamar Indus., 217 U.S.P.Q. 1162 (D.S.D. Tex. 1982)
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 1166.
261. Id.
262. See supra note 196 for the Copyright Act definition of sound recording.
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tures,263 and audiovisual works,2 64 may also be altered. Consider, for ex-
ample, Humphrey Bogart appearing in a scene in which he was never
physically present and performing an act which he never would have done
while he was alive (e.g., ordering a Diet Coke).2 65 Creating such altera-
tions constitutes preparing a derivative work260-an exclusive right of the
copyright holder26 7 -subject only to a fair use defense.268 The ability to
alter a broad range of expression creates myriad problems.
For the most part, however, once certain types of works (including
sound recordings, motion pictures, and audiovisual works) are no longer
protected by copyright (through lapse or expiration of the copyright), or
ownership of the copyright has been transferred (without express lan-
guage to the contrary in the transfer of copyright ownership), they may be
freely altered.2 69 For example, a multimedia-type application in use for
some time now is a process known as "colorization."270 Colorization is a
process by which motion pictures originally recorded in black and white
are altered so that they appear to have been recorded in color.
2 71
The opposition to colorization was swift and extreme, with exclama-
tions of moral outrage and "cultural butchery."272 While supporters of
colorization claim they are merely providing older and classic films in a
form desired by the public,27" its opponents raise two basic arguments
against colorization: colorization will inhibit the availability of classic mo-
tion pictures in their original black and white form, and colorization is
inconsistent with the artist's original creative intent.274 Alteration of an
existing work, however, particularly a type of work which may be incorpo-
rated into a multimedia application, (therefore a derivative work), is es-
sentially limited only by the exclusive rights granted under § 106 of the
Copyright Act 2 75 and the fair use doctrine.
276
263. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988), defines "motion pictures" as "audiovisual works consisting of
a series of related images which, when shown in succession, impart an impression of motion,
together with accompanying sounds, if any."
264. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), defines "audiovisual works" as:
[W]orks that consist of a series of related images which are intrinsically intended to
be shown by the use of machines or devices such as projectors, viewers, or electronic
equipment, together with accompanying sounds, if any, regardless of the nature of
the material objects, such as films or tapes, in which the works are embodied.
265. See supra note 194.
266. See supra note 231 for the Copyright Act definition of derivative work.
267. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1988).
268. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); see also supra notes 212-51 and accompany-
ing text.
269. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106-120 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
270. See Comment, Anna S. White, The Colorization Dispute: Moral Rights Theory As a Means
ofJudicial and Legislative Reform, 38 EMOfv L J. 237, 237 (1989). Colorization is a registered
trademark of Colorization, Inc. Id. at n.1
271. Id. For a more detailed discussion of the colorization process, see id. at 237 n.2.
272. Id. at 240-41.
273. Id at 239.
274. Brown, supra note 192, at 240-43.
275. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988). In response to the colorization controversies, Congress
passed the National Film Preservation Act of 1988. Pub. L. No. 100-446, 102 Stat. 1782
(1988) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 178 (1988)). It essentially allows a limited number of motion
pictures to be protected and requires a notice on colorized films that such films have been
materially altered. See White, supra note 270, at 238.
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Lewis Galoob Toys v. Nintendo of America2 7 7 involved the alteration of a
copyrighted work and the alleged creation of a derivative of that work.
Galoob manufactured a device which allowed players to alter features of
Nintendo games. 278 Nintendo alleged that Galoob's device created a de-
rivative work in violation of Nintendo's exclusive rights under 17 U.S.C.
§ 106(2).279
The Ninth Circuit held that Galoob's device did not create an in-
dependent work; it merely enhanced the audiovisual displays that origi-
nate in Nintendo game cartridges.280 "The altered displays do not
incorporate a portion of a copyrighted work in some concrete or perma-
nent form."
2 8 1
The court also considered whether the Galoob device constituted a
fair use under § 107 of the Copyright Act even if the device was found to
be a derivative work.2 8 2 Judicial decisions have broadened the fair use
doctrine: "The doctrine of fair use allows a holder of the privilege to use
copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without the consent of the
copyright owner."28 3 The court then analyzed the four factors expressed
in § 107.284 In particular, Nintendo argued that Galoob's device was sup-
planting Nintendo's commercially valuable right to make and sell deriva-
tive works. 285 Noting that the fourth factor is the "most important and
indeed central fair use factor,"28 6 the court upheld the district court's
finding that Nintendo had "failed to show any harm to the present market
for its copyrighted games and [had] failed to establish the reasonable likeli-
Congress also passed the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990. Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat.
5128 (Dec. 1, 1990) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106A, 107, 113, 301, 411, 412, 501, 506,
608-610 (1990)). These amendments essentially prevent the use of an author's name as the
author of any work of visual art which he or she did not create, and prevent the use of an
author's name as the author of the work of visual art in the event of a distortion, mutilation,
or other modification of the work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputa-
tion. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106A(a) (1) (B) & (a) (2) (Supp. IV. 1992). A "work of visual art" is defined
in 17 U.S.C. § 101 as encompassing certain paintings, drawings, prints and photographs. As
expressly provided by the Visual Artists Rights Act, a work of visual art does not include any
motion picture or audiovisual work, data base, electronic information service, electronic pub-
lication, or similar publication. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. IV 1992). For the most part, there-
fore, the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 is inapplicable to most multimedia applications.
For more information regarding the Visual Artists Rights Act, see Brett Sirota, The Visual
Artists Rights Act: Federal Versus State Moral Rights, 21 HoFsrTA L. Ray. 461 (1992); Edward J.
Damich, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: Toward a Federal System of Moral Rights Protection for
Visual Art, 39 CATH. U. L Rav. 945 (1990).
276. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988 & Supp. V 1992); see also supra notes 212-51 and accompany-
ing text.
277. 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1582 (1993).
278. Id. at 967.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 968.
281. Id. at 969.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 970.
285. Id. at 970.
286. Id. at 971.
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Cases such as Lewis Galoob Toys and Sega Enterpyises illustrate how
courts must apply traditional copyright principles in ways not previously
envisioned. While the rush of multimedia products is under way, all of
their various forms and interactions with existing technologies are yet to
be conceived or anticipated. Existing copyright laws, however, are ex-
pected to provide protection.
Computer software is a form of work for which courts have had diffi-
culty categorizing the extent of available copyright protection. In particu-
lar, recent judicial holdings have severely limited the scope of
protection. 2 88 Certain courts have even questioned whether copyright is
the appropriate form of protection.28 9 In addition, the risk of inconsis-
tent results arise as courts attempt to formulate approaches for determin-
ing the level of protection to be afforded computer programs. Software
developers face the prospect of seeing their original expressions commer-
cially exploited by competitors.
Into this uncertain judicial environment comes a tidal wave of mul-
timedia applications. While, for the most part, they consist of "traditional"
works-sound recordings, motion pictures, dramatic works-multimedia
applications are fundamentally computer programs. Exclusive rights avail-
able to authors to copy, distribute, and display multimedia works, as well as
restrictions on those exclusive rights, are subject to doubt based upon the
existing software copyright decisions.
290
The fundamental elements of copyright-exclusive rights, idea versus
expression, and fair use-are sound. It is the application of these ele-
ments to emerging technologies that leave courts struggling to extrapolate
existing approaches to new concepts.A1 History demonstrates that copy-
right laws have had difficulty keeping pace with technological develop-
ments. The experience of software copyright protection has been one of
courts struggling to apply traditional precedents to unfamiliar technolo-
gies. The rapid development of multimedia only promises new
challenges.
287. Lewis Galoob Toys, 964 F.2d at 971.
288. See supra notes 135-65, 171-82 and accompanying text.
289. See Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 544, 560 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) ("In-
deed, it has been suggested that computer software is better protected by patent law than by
copyright law."); Randall M. Whitmeyer, Comment, A Pleafor Due Processes: Defining the Proper
Scope of Patent Protection for Computer Software, 85 Nw. U. L RLV. 1103, 1123-25 (1991).
290. See supra Part IIA.
291. See supra Part II.B.
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Title 17 of the United States Code defines criminal copyright in-
fringement as willful infringement for the purpose of commercial advan-
tage or private financial gain.' Prosecution of criminal copyright
infringement, meaning the piracy2 and counterfeiting5 of all forms of
copyrighted works, is governed by Tide 18 of the United States Code, cov-
ering crimes and criminal procedure.
4
On October 8, 1992, Congress approved the Copyright Felony Act,
5
which harmonizes the sanctions imposed for criminal copyright infringe-
ment. This Article examines the nature of copyright protection, the evolu-
tion of sanctions for criminal infringement, and the elements of the
offense of criminal copyright infringement as defined by the Copyright
Felony Act.
A. Copyright Protection
Copyright, as a form of intellectual property protection, is rooted in
the United States Constitution.6 Copyright subsists in original works of
authorship 7 including the following broad categories: (1) literary works,8
(2) musical works, (3) dramatic works, (4) choreographic works, (5) picto-
* Partner, Arter and Hadden, Washington, D.C.
1. See 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
2. "Piracy" or "bootlegging" are words popularly used to describe the unauthorized
duplication of sound recordings, films, tape cartridges, cassettes, software programs on
floppy diskettes, video cassettes, and video games. A pirated copy or bootleg is an accurate
copy of all or part of the original commercial version, but the package and graphics are
usually unrelated in appearance to the original.
3. "Counterfeiting" is one step beyond piracy. A counterfeit reproduces both the un-
derlying work and the packaging, including color art, company labels, corporate logos and
trademarks. A counterfeit is often difficult to distinguish from the original. Indeed, identifi-
cation of counterfeits is often so difficult that unscrupulous retailers and distributors are able
to meld the counterfeits into their stock of legitimate products. See United States v. Shultz,
482 F.2d 1179 (6th Cir. 1973).
4. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1-6005 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
5. Pub. L No. 102-561, 106 Stat. 4233 (1992).
6. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 8, cl. 8.
7. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
8. Id. § 101. "'Literary works' are works, other than audiovisual works, expressed in
words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the nature of
the material objects, such as books, periodicals, manuscripts, phonorecords, film, tapes,
disks, or cards, in which they are embodied." Id. Thus, computer software programs are pro-
tected as literary works.
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rial, graphic and sculptural works,9 (6) motion pictures' 0 and other audio-
visual works,1 ' and (7) sound recordings.
1 2
The Copyright Act imposes three basic requirements for a work of
authorship to qualify for copyright protection. First, the work must be
original;' 3 it cannot be copied from another source.' 4 Second, the work
must consist of "expression" and not just "ideas."15 Third, the work must
be fixed in a "tangible medium of expression ... from which [it] can be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or
with the aid of a machine or device." 16 Copyright protection begins as
soon as a work of authorship is created;17 for example, as soon as pen is
put to paper and original sentences appear.
Copyright is a valuable form of intellectual property protection be-
cause, subject to certain limitations, a copyright owner 18 has the exclusive
right to control copying and distribution of his or her work.' 9 Anyone
9. "Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works" include two-dimensional and three-dimen-
sional works of fine, graphic, and applied art, photographs, prints and art reproductions,
maps, globes, charts, diagrams, models, and technical drawings, including architectural
plans. Such works shall include works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as their form but not
their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned.
Id.
10. "'Motion pictures' are audiovisual works consisting of a series of related images
which, when shown in succession, impart an impression of motion, together with accompany-
ing sounds, if any." Id.
11. "Audiovisual works" are works that consist of a series of related images which are
intrinsically intended to be shown by the use of machines, or devices such as projectors,
viewers, or electronic equipment, together with accompanying sounds, if any, regardless of
the nature of the material objects, such as films or tapes, in which the works are embodied.
Id.
12. "Sound recordings" are works that result from the fixation of a series of musical,
spoken, or other sounds, but not including the sounds accompanying a motion picture or
other audiovisual work, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as disks, tapes,
or other phonorecords, in which they are embodied.
Id. Sound recordings were added to the Copyright Act under the Sound Recording Act of
1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391.
13. E.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1879).
14. Id.
15. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1978).
16. See i& § 102(a); see also i& § 101 ("A work is 'fixed' in a tangible medium of expres-
sion when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the au-
thor, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.").
17. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
18. Section 202 of the Copyright Act distinguishes between ownership of a copyright
and ownership of "any material object in which the work is embodied." 17 U.S.C. § 202
(1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Ownership of the material object, for example, a video tape, does
not of itself convey any rights in the copyrighted work embodied in the object, such as a
sound recording or motion picture.
19. Section 106 of the Copyright Act provides that the owner of copyright has the
exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by
sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). The exclusive rights to perform and display the
copyrighted work publicly are also provided under this section.
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who violates any of the exclusive rights of a copyright owner is an infringer
of the copyright.
20
Both civil and criminal remedies are available for copyright infringe-
ment. In a civil action an infringer is liable for either the copyright
owner's actual damages and any additional profits of the infringer, 2 1 or
for statutory damages, which range from $500 to $20,000 for each non-
willful infringement and up to $100,000 for each willful infringement.2 2 A
copyright owner who prevails in a civil infringement action is also entitled
to court costs and attorneys' fees. 23 As part of a final judgment or decree,
the court may also order the destruction or forfeiture of all infringing
copies or phonorecords as well as all plates, molds, tapes, film negatives,
and other articles used for reproduction.
24
B. The Evolution of Criminal Copyright Infringement Sanctions
Copyright infringement has been a crime since 1897, when criminal
infringement provisions were first added to U.S. copyright law. 25 The
crime of copyright infringement was initially limited to unlawful perform-
ances and representations of copyrighted dramatic and musical composi-
tions.26 Other acts of copyright infringement, such as unauthorized
reproduction or distribution of a copyrighted work, were pursued through
civil litigation. Such acts, however, were not considered criminal behavior.
The criminal intent or mens rea requirement for criminal copyright
infringement was also established under the 1897 law. A conviction under
the first criminal infringement provision required a showing that the de-
fendant's conduct was both "willful" and "for profit."
27
The first attempt at broadening the crime of copyright infringement
occurred with the general copyright revision of 1909.28 The 1909 Copy-
right Act applied criminal infringement provisions to all types of copy-
righted works except sound recordings. 29 Again, the mens rea requirement
made infringing conduct criminal only if it was done willfully and for
profit.3 0 The 1909 Copyright Act also imposed criminal liability on any-
20. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1988), amended &y 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (Supp. III 1991).
21. "In establishing the infringer's profits, the copyright owner is required to present
proof only of the infringer's gross revenue[.]" The burden then shifts to the infringer "to
prove his or her deductible expenses and the elements of profit attributable to factors other
than the copyrighted work." 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
22. Id. § 504(c)(1) & (2).
23. Id § 505.
24. Id. § 503(b).
25. Act of January 6, 1897, ch. 4, 29 Stat. 481-82.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 33 stat. 1075-82.
29. Id. § 5. Copyright protection for sound recordings was considered but rejected dur-
ing the 1909 revision to the Copyright Act. Instead, the only copyright protection was given
to the composer of the music, not to the performer or the producer of the recording. Under
compulsory licensing provisions, the composer was given only the exclusive right to license
the first recording of a musical composition. After the composition was first recorded, any-
one else could record the composition so long as a royalty of two cents per copy was paid to
the composer. Id. §§ 1(e), 25(e).
30. Id. § 280.
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one who "knowingly and willfully" aided and abetted an infringement.3 1
Criminal offenses under the 1909 Copyright Act were punishable as
misdemeanors.
3 2
By 1971, certain inadequacies in the scope of copyright protection
were becoming apparent. For example, the House of Representatives Ju-
diciary Committee estimated the annual volume of record and tape piracy
to be in excess of $100 million.3 3 The Committee traced the record and
tape piracy problem to the exclusion of sound recordings from criminal
copyright infringement provisions. Record pirates had to pay the com-
poser only a de minimis royalty fee to avoid liability under the federal copy-
right statute.
3 4
In response to demands from the sound recording industry, Congress
extended general federal copyright protection to sound recordings with
the Sound Recording Act of 1971.35 This Act makes criminal sanctions
available against willful, for-profit infringement of sound recordings.
3 6
The 1976 general revision to the Copyright Act3 7 continued the of-
fense of criminal copyright infringement, but eliminated the crime of aid-
ing and abetting infringement. The 1976 Copyright Act also altered the
mens rea requirement for criminal copyright infringement. Instead of
proof that the infringement was done willfully and for profit, the offense
of criminal infringement now required conduct engaged in "willfully and
for purposes of commercial advantage or private commercial gain."
38
Persons convicted of the misdemeanor offense of criminal infringe-
ment under the 1976 Copyright Act faced a maximum fine of $10,000 or
imprisonment for not more than one year or both.3 9 In the case of sound
recordings or motion pictures, the court could increase the fine to
$25,000, although the term of imprisonment remained at one year or
31. Id.
32. Id. Any offense punishable by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding one year
is a felony. Any other offense is a misdemeanor. See 18 U.S.C. § 1 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
33. See H.R. REP. No. 487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.CAN.
1566, 1567.
34. See Annotation, Making, Selling, or Distributing Counterfeit or "Bootleg" Tape Recordings or
Phonograph Records as Vwlation of Federal Law, 25 A.L.R. FED. 207 n.36 (1975).
35. Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391.
36. See Heilman v. Levi, 391 F. Supp. 1106 (E.D. Wis. 1975), afTfd, 583 F.2d 373 (7th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 959 (1979).
37. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17 U.S.C.
§§ 101-801).
38. 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1978). The mens rea requirement does not mandate evidence
that the defendant actually realized commercial advantage or private financial gain, only that
the defendant's activity or activities were for the purpose of financial gain or benefit. See
United States v. Cross, 816 F.2d 297, 301 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that video store clerk's
assertion that she, as a store employee and not the owner, realized no commercial advantage
or private financial gain from alleged conspiracy, nevertheless did not preclude liability for
criminal infringement).
39. 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1978).
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less.40 Repeat offenders faced increased fines of not more than $50,000 or
imprisonment for not more than two years, or both.
4 1
Upon conviction of criminal copyright infringement, the 1976 Act
also provided for the forfeiture, destruction, or other disposition of all
infringing copies or phonorecords and all implements, devices, or equip-
ment used in the manufacture of such infringing copies or pho-
norecords.4 2 The Act made forfeiture and destruction mandatory for
criminal copyright infringement but discretionary with the court in a civil
infringement action.
43
Beginning in the late 1970s, two trade associations representing the
motion picture and sound recording industries, the Motion Picture Associ-
ation of America, Inc., (MPAA) 44 and the Recording Industry Association
of America, Inc., (RIAA), 45 organized an effort to increase the penalties
for film and record piracy and counterfeiting. In 1979 MPAA and RIAA
reported that even though the motion picture and sound recording indus-
tries were spending upwards of $1 million a year to investigate and combat
piracy through civil infringement actions. The problem of record and
film counterfeiting and piracy remained epidemic.
46
From the point of view of the motion picture and sound recording
industries, civil infringement actions had no deterrent effect on sophisti-
cated criminals engaged in pirating and counterfeiting activities. 47 In ad-
dition, the modest penalties prescribed under then existing law tended to
discourage criminal enforcement efforts.48 U.S. Attorneys confronted
with a wide range of possible prosecutions clearly preferred the prospect
of almost any felony conviction to a misdemeanor conviction for copyright
infringement. 49 Most indictments of pirates and counterfeiters focused
40. Under the 1976 Copyright Act, criminal infringement involving sound recordings
would lie for violation of three exclusive rights: reproduction, distribution, and preparation
of derivative works. For motion pictures, criminal infringement would lie for infringement
of reproduction, distribution or public performance rights. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1978). Crimi-
nal infringement lies in addition to the prohibition on and penalties for trafficking in coun-
terfeit labels for phonorecords, copies of motion pictures, and other audiovisual works. See
18 U.S.C. §§ 2318-19 (1988), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (Supp. IV 1992).
41. 18 U.S.C. § 2319(b)(1)(c) (1988), amended &y 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (Supp. IV 1992).
42. See 17 U.S.C. § 506(b).
43. Compare id. ("[tihe court in its judgment of conviction shall, in addition to the pen-
alty") with 17 U.S.C. § 503(b) ("[t]he court may order the destruction").
44. The Motion Picture Association of America, Inc., is a trade association representing
producers and distributors of theatrical and television programs exhibited in the United
States and throughout the world. See Hearings on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws Before the
Senate Comm. on theJudiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 10694-95 (1979) (Joint statement of the
Motion Picture Association of America, Inc., and Recording Industry Association of America,
Inc.).
45. The Recording Industry Association of America, Inc., "is a trade association of re-
cording companies whose members create and market approximately 90 percent of the
records[, compact discs] and tapes sold in the United States." Id. at 10695.
46. Id. at 10699. MPAA and RIAA estimated that by 1979 "all forms of record and film
counterfeiting and piracy" were draining more than -$650 million annually from legitimate
sales and rentals in both industries." Id. at 10697.
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on related felony offenses such as mail fraud, wire fraud, interstate trans-
portation of stolen property, RICO, and even customs violations, rather
than the principal criminal offenses committed: copyright infringement
and counterfeiting.
5 0
Congress responded to the concerns of the motion picture and sound
recording industries by restructuring the sanctions for criminal infringe-
ment.5 1 The offense of criminal infringement was still defined in § 506(a)
of Title 17; the penalties, however, were placed in new § 2319 of Title
18.52 Certain acts of criminal copyright infringement were also defined as
felony offenses.
5 3
The first felony provisions for criminal copyright infringement involv-
ing reproduction or distribution of records, motion pictures, and audiovi-
sual works laid out substantial sanctions.54 Fines of up to $250,000 and
prison terms of up to five years were available based on a complex formula
of time periods and numbers of infringing copies or phonorecords repro-
duced or distributed.
55
For example, if the defendant was convicted of reproducing or dis-
tributing, during any 180-day period, "at least one thousand phonorecords
or copies infringing the copyright in one or more sound recordings," 56 or
50. Id. C.f United States v. Dowling, 739 F.2d 1445 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. granted in pan
469 U.S. 1157, rev'd, 473 U.S. 207 (1985) (mail fraud).
51. Act of May 24, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-180, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 96 Star. 91.
52. See 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (1982).
53. Id.
54. See id. § 2319. As originally enacted, § 2319 of Title 18 read:
(a) Whoever violates section 506(a) (relating to criminal offenses) of title 17 shall
be punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section and such penalties shall be
in addition to any other provisions of title 17 or any other law.
(b) Any person who commits an offense under subsection (a) of this section-
(1) shall be fined not more than $250,000 or imprisoned for not more than 5
years, or both, if the offense-
(A) involves the reproduction or distribution, during any one-hundred-
and-eighty-day period, of at least one thousand phonorecords or copies
infringing the copyright in one or more sound recordings;
(B) involves the reproduction or distribution during any one-hundred-
and-eighty-day period, of at least sixty five copies infringing the copyright
in one or more motion pictures or other audiovisual works; or
(C) is a second or subsequent offense under either of subsection (b) (1)
or (b) (2) of this section, where a prior offense involved a sound recording,
or a motion picture or other audiovisual work;
(2) shall be fined not more than $250,000 or imprisoned for not more than
two years, or both, if the offense-
(A) involves the reproduction or distribution, during any one-hundred-
and-eighty-day period, of more than one hundred but less than one thou-
sand phonorecords or copies infringing the copyright in one or more
sound recordings; or
(B) involves the reproduction or distribution, during any one-hundred-
and-eighty-day period, of more than seven but less than sixty five copies
infringing the copyright in one or more motion pictures or other audiovi-
sual works; and
(3) shall be fined not more than $25,000 or imprisoned for not more than one
year, or both, in any other case.
55. 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (1982). Section 2319 refers to both "copies" and "phonorecords."
Both terms were included, "because a motion picture soundtrack that reproduces a sound
recording is a 'copy,' and not a 'phonorecord.' " See 2 PAUL GOLDsrIN, COPYRiGHT: PRiNci-
PLEs, LAW AND PRAcncE § 11.4.1 & n.32 (1989) [hereinafter GousTrEn].
56. 18 U.S.C. § 2319(b)(1)(A).
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"at least sixty-five copies infringing the copyright in one or more motion
pictures or other audiovisual works,"5 7 or the conviction was a second of-
fense,58 the court could impose a fine of up to $250,000, order the in-
fringer imprisoned for not more than five years, or do both.59 A fine of
no more than $250,000 and imprisonment for no more than two years, or
both, was prescribed for criminal infringement involving "the reproduc-
tion or distribution, during any one-hundred-and-eighty-day period, of
more than one hundred but less than one thousand phonorecords or cop-
ies infringing the copyright in one or more sound recordings," or "more
than seven but less than sixty-five copies infringing the copyright in one or
more motion pictures or other audiovisual works."6
Even after these new felony sanctions were enacted, most criminal
copyright infringement remained a misdemeanor offense. For example, if
the infringement case involved motion pictures or sound recordings, but
fewer than the specified number of copies were illegally reproduced, the
offense was a misdemeanor.61 The same result occurred if the govern-
ment failed to prove that all of the infringing copies were made or distrib-
uted within the specified 180-day period. Criminal infringement involving
derivative, performance, or display rights in sound recordings, motion pic-
tures, or other audiovisual works remained misdemeanor offenses. 6 2 It
was also a misdemeanor to duplicate without authorization live perform-
ances not already embodied in existing marketed products.
63
Increased sanctions for certain acts of copyright infringements involv-
ing motion pictures, sound recordings, and audiovisual works were fol-
lowed by increased sanctions for trademark counterfeiting.64 Increased
criminal penalties for trademark counterfeiting were deemed necessary
because civil penalties proved grossly ineffective in deterring these infring-
ing operations. Legitimate businesses were losing billions of dollars each
year to counterfeiters.
65
In the wake of legislation increasing the criminal penalties for trade-
mark counterfeiting and infringements involving motion pictures, sound
recordings, and audiovisual works, the computer software industry became
57. Id. §2319(b)(1)(B).
58. Id. § 2319(b)(1)(C).
59. Id. §2319(b)(1).
60. Id. § 2319(b) (2).
61. See id. § 2319(b) (3); see also United States v. Cross, 816 F.2d 297, 301 (7th Cir. 1987)
(holding that evidence showing rental of only six infringing videocassettes is insufficient for
conviction on felony charges requiring proof of unauthorized reproduction of more than
seven infringing copies).
62. C.f United States v. Gallant, 570 F. Supp. 303, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), rev'd by Dowling
v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 213 n.6 (1985).
63. 18 U.S.C. § 2319(b) (3) (1982).
64. Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2178.
65. S. REP. No. 526, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.CAN. 3627,
3631 ("Able to reap huge profits at little expense, and facing neither criminal sanctions nor
substantial civil penalties, counterfeiters have built steadily larger illegal enterprises."); Jed S.
Rakoff & Ira B. Wolff, Commercial Counterfeiting and the Praposed Trademark Counterfeiting Act, 20
Am. ClaM. L. REv. 145, 151 (1982) (estimated U.S. sales lost in 1981 to commercial counter-
feiters totaled $16 billion exclusive of subsequent losses in tax revenues); see also Montres
Rolex SA v. Snyder, 718 F.2d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100 (1984).
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aware that it had significant piracy problems. 66 When the penalties were
increased for motion picture and sound recording piracy in 1982, com-
puter software did not enjoy a fully developed mass market.6 7 However, by
the late 1980s, an explosion in personal computer usage made the
software industry a major source of job growth and U.S. exports.6
While the software industry was emerging as the fastest growing sector
of the U.S. economy, software piracy was increasing exponentially. Mass-
marketed software and video games became attractive targets for piracy, in
part, because of their relatively high per-copy retail price and also because
of the ease with which an "exact" copy could be duplicated.
69
As of 1990, the estimated U.S. revenue lost to piracy of mass-marketed
software reached $2.4 billion.70 The displacement of legitimate video
game sales due to piracy was an equally staggering $1.0 billion.7 1 Industry
sources believe that, at a minimum, for each legal or authorized software
program or video game in circulation, an estimated one to three unau-
thorized or illegal copies have been reproduced and distributed.
72
Unfortunately, even when the piracy was large scale, prosecutions
under the Copyright Act were not appealing, because the penalties for
most software piracy remained at the misdemeanor level. Prosecutors
were pressed to pursue software and video game pirates under state73 and
other federal74 laws.
66. See Criminal Sanctions For Violation of Software Copyright, 1992: Hearings on S. 893 Before
the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
102d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (statement of Gail Penner on behalf of the Software Publishers
Association).
67. Id.
68. Id. According to statistics maintained by the Software Publishers Association, "the
U.S. software industry currently commands a 75% share of the world-wide software market."
Id Similarly, video games are currently the single largest category of retail toy sales.
69. Id. at 27. Unlike the products produced by other copyright-based industries, mass
marketed software is exceptionally easy to reproduce. "Whereas reproduction of a good copy
of a book requires a printing plant and bindery, and commercial scale reproduction of cop-
ies of video cassettes or audio cassettes requires [reasonably sophisticated equipment,] all that
is required to make perfect copies of a computer program within a few seconds is a standard
personal computer." I&
70. Id. Worldwide, revenue lost by U.S. software publishers due to piracy is even higher,
measuring between $10 and $12 billion annually. The estimated loss in Western Europe
alone is measured at $4.46 billion each year. Id.
71. See Criminal Sanctions For Violation of Sofiware Copyright, 1992: Hearings on S. 893 Before
the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property andJudicial Administration of the House Comm. on theJudiciay,
102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1991) (statement of James Chame on behalf of the video game
industry).
72. These figures are widely quoted by two software industry trade associations, the
Software Publishers Association and the Business Software Alliance. See also CONG. REc.
S7580 (daily ed. June 4, 1992) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
73. See State v. Smith, 789 P.2d 1146 (Wash. 1990) (Copyright Act does not preempt
prosecution under Washington theft statute); State v. Tanner, 534 So. 2d 535 (La. Ct. App.
1988) (defendant convicted on charges of "offense against intellectual property" under Loui-
siana law).
74. See United States v. Brown, 925 F.2d 1301 (10th Cir. 1991) (indictment charging
defendant with violation of National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314-15, properly dis-
missed because software program is intangible, purely intellectual property, which does not




The software and video game industries became frustrated by this
bootstrap approach to prosecution and, following the example set by the
motion picture and sound recording industries, turned to Congress. Sena-
tors Orrin Hatch (Republican, Utah) and Dennis DeConcini (Democrat,
Arizona) initiated Senate Bill 893, to create felony sanctions for willful
piracy of copyrighted software.
75
As originally drafted, Senate Bill 893 applied only to software. 7 6 Sena-
tor Hatch's bill amended § 2319 of Tide 18, and provided that the repro-
duction or distribution of fifty or more infringing copies of computer
software over a 180-day period would be punishable with up to a five-year
prison term and a $250,000 fine. 77 The reproduction of ten to forty-nine
copies within that same period would be punishable by a fine of up to
$250,000 and/or two years in prison.78 Other violations would be punish-
able by up to a $25,000 fine and/or one year in prison. 79 In floor remarks
Senator Hatch called the bill, "a strong tool for prosecutors who seek to
limit the growing problem of computer software piracy."80 Senate Bill 893
was reported favorably by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on April
7, 1992,81 and passed the Senate on June 4, 1992.82 There was no com-
panion House bill.
The Subcommittee on Intellectual Property and Judicial Administra-
tion, House Judiciary Committee, held a hearing on Senate Bill 893 on
August 12, 1992.83 Testimony at the hearing was received from represent-
atives of the computer software and video game industries.
8 4
After this hearing the Subcommittee chairman, Representative Wil-
liam Hughes (Democrat, NewJersey), proposed an amendment in the na-
75. See CONG. REc. S4862 (daily ed. Apr. 23, 1991) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
76. S. 893, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (enacted after amendment).
77. Id. Specifically, S. 893, as introduced by Senator Hatch provided for.
(1) A fine of not more than $250,000 or imprisonment for not more than 5 years or
both if, during any 180-day period, at least 50 copies infringing the copyright in one
or more computer programs are reproduced or distributed;
(2) A fine of not more than $250,000 or imprisonment for not more than 2 years or
both if, during any 180-day period, more than 10 but less than 50 copies infringing
the copyright in one or more computer programs are reproduced or distributed;





80. S. REP. No. 268, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
81. Id.
82. See CONG. REc. S7581 (daily ed. June 4, 1992) (statement of the presiding officer).
83. See supra note 71.
84. Id Testifying at the Subcommittee hearing on S. 893 were James Charne, general
counsel, Absolute Entertainment, Inc., representing the video game industry, Gail Penner,
counsel, Autodesk, Inc., representing the Software Publishers Association; Edward J. Black,
vice president and general counsel, Computer & Communications Industry Association; and
David Ostfeld, chairman, Institute of Electrical & Electronics Engineers-U.S.A. Mr. Charne
and Ms. Penner endorsed S. 893, while Mr. Black and Mr. Ostfeld expressed concern that
felony provisions might be misapplied to ordinary business disputes and situations involving
reverse engineering.
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ture of a substitute to Senate Bill 893.85 Rather than adopting a piecemeal
approach to copyright legislation and simply adding computer programs
to audiovisual works, and sound recordings to the list of works whose in-
fringement can give rise to felony penalties under § 2319, Representative
Hughes suggested that felony provisions should apply to willful infringe-
ment of all types of copyright works.8 6 Representative Hughes also sug-
gested altering the "threshold that must be satisfied before felony liability
may be imposed." 87 Representative Hughes' amendment, in the nature of
a substitute, received the endorsement of the proponents of Senate Bill
893, and upon approval by the House of Representatives and Senate, the
proposed substitute became the Copyright Felony Act.88
C. Elements and Nature of the Offense of Criminal Copyright Infringement
Under the Copyright Felony Act
The Copyright Felony Act provides that a felony offense has occurred
where an infringer has reproduced or distributed, within a 180-day period,
at least ten unauthorized copies or phonorecords of one or more copy-
righted works with a collective value of more than $2,500.89 A five-year
prison term and a fine of up to $250,000 can be applied.90 Where the
offense is a second or subsequent offense, the term of imprisonment in-
creases to 10 years.91
In order to secure a conviction under the Copyright Felony Act, the
government is required first to establish that an act of copyright infringe-
85. See Hearing on Criminal Penalties for Copyright Inftingement, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (Oct.
1992).
86. See H.R. REP. No. 997, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.CAN.
3569, 3572.
87. Id.
88. Section 2319, as amended, of Tide 18 of the Copyright Felony Act reads as follows:
(a) Whoever violates section 506(a) (relating to criminal offenses) of tide 17 shall
be punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section and such penalties shall be
in addition to any other provisions of title 17 or any other law.
(b) Any person who commits an offense under subsection (a) of this section-
(1) shall be imprisoned not more than 5 years, or fined in the amount set
forth in this title, or both, if the offense consists of the reproduction or distri-
bution, during any 180-day period, of at least 10 copies or phonorecords, of 1
or more copyrighted works, with a retail value of more than $2,500;
(2) shall be imprisoned not more than 10 years, or fined in the amount set
forth in this tide, or both, if the offense is a second or subsequent offense
under paragraph (1); and
(3) shall be imprisoned not more than 1 year, or fined in the amount set forth
in this tide, or both, in any other case.
(c) As used in this section-
(1) the terms "phonorecord" and "copies" have, respectively, the meanings set
forth in section 101 (relating to definitions) of title 17; and
(2) the terms "reproduction" and "distribution" refer to the exclusive rights of
a copyright owner under clauses (1); and
(3) respectively of section 106 (relating to exclusive rights in copyrighted
works), as limited by sections 107 through 120, of title 17.
18 U.S.C. § 2319.
89. See H.L REP. No. 997, at 3572.
90. 18 U.S.C. § 2319(b) (as amended, 1992).
91. Id. § 2319(b) (2).
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ment has occurred.92 The prosecution's obligation to establish the de-
fendant's guilt by "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" is a universally
accepted principle of our criminal justice system.93 In a criminal infringe-
ment proceeding the elements to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt
are the same as those that must be proved by a preponderance of the
evidence in a civil copyright infringement action.9 4 Infringement in a
criminal proceeding is thus determined by reference to basic copyright
law.
1. Establishing a Prima Facie Claim of Criminal Copyright
Infringement
To establish a prima facie claim of either civil or criminal copyright
infringement, two basic elements must be proved: (a) ownership of a valid
copyright in each infringed work; and (b) "copying" by defendants (or
violation of another of the exclusive rights provided to a copyright owner
by the Copyright Act).95 Anyone who "violates any of the exclusive rights
of the copyright owner," is an infringer of the copyright. 96
a. Ownership
The first factor, ownership, requires no more proof for a criminal
prosecution than for a civil case. 97 Ownership is most often shown
through certificates of copyright registration for each of the copyright
works involved.98 The Copyright Act specifies that in anyjudicial proceed-
ing a certificate of copyright registration made before or within five years
constitutes prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright and of the
facts stated in the certificate. 99
Although not a condition of copyright protection, copyright registra-
tion is a prerequisite for any civil action for infringement involving works
92. See H.R. REP. No. 997 at 3572 ("First, the Government is required to establish that an
act or acts of copyright infringement have occurred.").
93. See, e.g.,Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); In reWinship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
94. See United States v. Larracuente, 952 F.2d 672, 673 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v.
Cross, 816 F.2d 297, 303; United States v. O'Reilly, 794 F.2d 613 (11th Cir. 1986).
95. See Larracuente, 952 F.2d at 673; S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1085 (9th
Cir. 1989).
96. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a); see also United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 929 (1977) ("[A]ny act which is inconsistent with the exclusive rights of the
copyright holder ... constitutes infringement.").
97. Larracuente, 952 F.2d at 673.
98. See United States v. Taxe, 540 F.2d 961 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1040 (1978)
(certificate of copyright registration is available and gives adequate information of coverage
of copyright); see also Carol Cable Co. v. Grand Auto, Inc., 4 U.S.P.Q.20 (BNA) 1056, 1061
(N.D. Cal. 1987) ("Plaintiff's copyright registration certificate is prima facie evidence of own-
ership. .. ").
99. Section 410 of Title 17 provides, in pertinent part, that
[i]n any judicial proceedings the certificate of a registration made before or within
five years after first publication of the work shall constitute prima facie evidence of
the validity of the copyright and of the facts stated in the certificate. The eviden-
tiary weight to be accorded the certificate of registration made thereafter shall be
within the discretion of the court.
17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
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of U.S. origin. 10° Copyright registration is also generally accepted as a
prerequisite for criminal copyright proceedings. 10 1 Although the 1976
Copyright Act is silent with respect to a registration requirement in a crim-
inal proceeding, the 1909 Copyright Act made the deposit of copies and
registration a condition precedent to the maintenance of any action for
infringement, including a criminal proceeding.
10 2
However, copyright registration can be challenged even in a criminal
case.' 03 Where a registration certificate is produced, the burden shifts to
the defendant to present evidence of copyright invalidity, 10 4 a license, 1°0
or another defense. Failure to present any evidence to contradict the
prima facie validity of copyright certificates is fatal for the defendant.
10 6
b. Proof of Infringement
It is axiomatic that there can be no civil or criminal infringement
unless there has been a copying of the copyrighted work or violation of
another of the copyright owner's exclusive rights.' 0 7 Copying or violation
of the exclusive rights of a copyright owner is proved by showing, first, that
the defendant had access to the copyrighted work, and second, that the
defendant reproduced or distributed copies' 0 8 substantially similar' 0 9 to
the copyrighted work.
i. Access
Direct evidence of access to the copyrighted work is often not avail-
able. Access is most frequently established through circumstantial evi-
100. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (1988), as amended by 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (Supp. III 1991).
101. See United States v. O'Reilly, 794 F.2d 613, 614 (1lth Cir. 1986) (government suffi-
ciently proved what was copyrighted for purposes of action alleging criminal copyright in-
fringement, by introducing copyright registration certificates for allegedly infringed video
games).
102. See United States v. Backer, 134 F.2d 533, 535 (2d Cir. 1943).
103. Defects in copyright ownership or lack of originality in the underlying work will
defeat a civil infringement case as well as a criminal infringement case. See Gou.sTnN, supra
note 55, § 11.4.1, at 290-91.
104. See Runstadler Studios, Inc. v. MCM Ltd. Partnership, 768 F. Supp. 1292 (N.D. Ill.
1991).
105. See, e.g., United States v. Minor, 756 F.2d 731, 734 (9th Cir.), vacated by, 477 U.S. 991
(1985); United States v. Whetzel, 589 F.2d 707, 711-712 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
106. See United States v, Sherman, 576 F.2d 292, 296 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 913
(1978); United States v. Taxe, 540 F.2d 961,966 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1040 (1978);
United States v. Rose, 149 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 820, 823 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
107. See 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1978).
108. The Copyright Act defines "copies" as:
material objects . . . in which a work is fixed by any method now known or later
developed, and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. The term
.copies" includes the material object, other than a phonorecord, in which the work
is first fixed.
Id § 101.
109. See Novelty Textile Mills, Inc. v. Joan Fabrics Corp., 558 F.2d 1090 (2d Cir. 1977); see
generally 3 MELVILLE B. NiMMER & DAVID NMMER, NIMMER ON CopuRmHT §§ 13.01 [B],13.12
(1993) [hereinafter NIMMER].
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dence. 10 Access can be inferred when there is evidence that the
defendant played a role in the creation'' or manufacture 1 2 of both the
infringed work and the infringing copies. Access can also be presumed
from the fact the copyrighted work at issue is readily available on the mar-
ket, 113 or that the defendant knew the copyrighted work was not readily
available on the market. 114 Moreover, access may be shown indirectly by
evidence the copyrighted work has been widely disseminated. 1 5 Access
may also be inferred when the copies are identical or there are striking
similarities between expressive elements.1 16 In all events, the evidence
must establish that the defendant encountered the work in question.
117
ii. Substantial Similarity
The government must also prove copying by establishing that there is
a substantial similarity between the copyrighted work and the defendant's
version or versions. 1 18 A finding of substantial similarity between a copy-
righted work and an alleged infringing work requires more than evidence
of adherence to the general ideas expressed, because ideas in and of
themselves cannot be copyrighted. 1 9 Similarity in expression also is not
infringing to the extent the nature of the creation makes the similarity
necessary. 120 Accordingly, "indispensable expression of generalized
idea [s] maybe protected only against virtually identical copying. " 12 1 If the
110. See United States v. Cohen, 946 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that circumstantial
evidence including unauthorized copies and recording equipment is adequate to support
conviction for criminal copyright infringement); United States v. Belmont, 715 F.2d 459 (9th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1022 (1984), (holding that conviction for criminal infringe-
ment can be based on circumstantial evidence of illegitimate origin of defendant's motion
picture video tapes, most copied off the air).
111. See, e.g., Gross v. Seligman, 212 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1914) (same photographer photo-
graphed model in essentially the same pose).
112. See, e.g., Kamar Int'l, Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 657 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1981).
113. See Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 125, 146 (D.N.J. 1982),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1047 (1986); see also ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722
F.2d 988, 998 (2d Cir. 1983) (access may be established by wide dissemination). See generally
NIMMER, supra note 109, § 13.02[A], at 13-21 & n.15 (citing cases); GOLnSTEIN, supra note 55,
§ 7.2.1 & n.13 (citing cases).
114. See United States v. Minor, 756 F.2d 731, 734 (9th Cir.), vacated, 477 U.S. 991 (1985).
115. SeeAtari, Inc. v. Amusement World, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 222, 227 (D. Md. 1981). But
see Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. McCall Pattern Co., 649 F. Supp. 832 (N.D. Ga.
1986), affid, 825 F.2d 355 (11th Cir. 1987).
116. See Meta-Film Associates, Inc. v. MCA Inc., 586 F. Supp. 1346, 1355 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
See generaly NIMMER, supra note 109, § 13.02[B]), at 13-22.
117. See United States v. Gallo, 599 F. Supp. 241 (W.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding that an indict-
ment for conspiracy to infringe copyrights survives motion to dismiss where there is probable
cause to believe that defendants acquired, possessed, and sold copies of infringing video
games).
118. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
119. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) states in part: "In no case does copyright protection ... extend to
any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery
120. See Merritt Forbes & Co. v. Newman Inv. Secs., Inc., 604 F. Supp. 943, 951 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) ("[W]here an underlying idea may only be conveyed in a more or less stereotyped
manner, duplication of that form of expression does not constitute infringement, even if
there is word for word copying.").
121. See Gund, Inc. v. Smile Int'l, Inc., 691 F. Supp. 642 (E.D.N.Y. 1988), affid, 872 F.2d
1021 (2d Cir. 1989).
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copies are not substantially similar in terms of protected expression, there
can be no criminal infringement because, "it is not illegal to possess some-
thing which [only] comes close to copyright infringement."
122
Obviously, a comparison should be made between the alleged infring-
ing copies and the version of the work deposited in the Copyright Of-
fice. 123 It may be enough, however, for the government to provide
evidence that the copyright owner's duplicates are accurate and
authentic.'
24
In some cases, particularly those involving counterfeits of sound re-
cordings, motion pictures, or mass-marketed "off-the-shelf" computer
software, the copies involved will be exact copies of the whole of a copy-
righted work.12 5 Unauthorized literal reproduction of the whole, or sub-
stantially the whole, of a copyrighted work constitutes an infringement.
1 26
Even when only a section or part of the original work has been copied,
substantial similarity can be shown, because literal copying of even one
section will, in most cases, defy coincidence.1 2 7 Common errors can also
be used to prove copying by reducing the statistical probability that the
defendant's work is original.
128
Indirect copying can also be a violation of the copyright owner's ex-
clusive rights. For example, paraphrasing, if done to a great extent, is
copying and an infringement.' 29 A copy made from an infringing copy is
also an infringement of the original.' 3 0 It makes no difference that the
pirate did not know that the version from which he or she was copying was
infringing; the pirate at least knew that he or she did not own what was
being copied.13 ' Even the fact an infringer acknowledges the source from
which the appropriated matter was derived does not relieve him or her of
legal liability.'
3 2
122. United States v. Gallo, 599 F. Supp. 241, 247 (W.D.N.Y. 1984).
123. See United States v. O'Reilly, 794 F.2d 613, 614-15 (11th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Shabazz, 724 F.2d 1536, 1539 (11th Cir. 1984).
124. Shabazz, 724 F.2d at 1539.
125. See M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 425 (4th Cir. 1986).
126. See, e.g., United States v. Taxe, 380 F. Supp. 1010, 1013-14 (C.D. Cal. 1974), afl'd, 540
F.2d 961 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1040 (1977) (holding that infringement for criminal
purposes exists when tapes were made by rerecording copyrighted tapes and copying more
than trivial parts even though slight changes were made).
127. See Ace Novelty Co. v. Superior Toy & Novelty Co., 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 236, 240
(N.D. I1. 1983); see also Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 308 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that no
copier may defend an act of plagiarism by pointing out how much of the copyrighted work
he has not pirated).
128. See Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859, 863-64 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that
common errors, omissions and inconsistencies in baseball card guide support finding of
infringement).
129. SeeAnsehl v. Puritan Pharmaceutical Co., 61 F.2d 131, 138 (8th Cir.), cel. denied, 287
U.S. 666 (1932).
130. See Barry v. Hughes, 103 F.2d 427 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 604 (1939).
131. American Press Ass'n y. Daily Story Pub. Co., 120 F.2d 766 (7th Cir.), appeal dismissed,
193 U.S. 675 (1904).
132. See Heilman v. Bell, 583 F.2d 373, 376 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 959
(1979) (holding that compliance with notice and royalty provision of compulsory license




2. Effect of First Sale Doctrine on Criminal Copyright
Infringement Proceeding
Because felony sanctions are available for both unauthorized repro-
duction and unauthorized distribution of copies of a copyrighted work,
13 3
the first sale doctrine must be considered in a criminal copyright infringe-
ment proceeding involving unauthorized distribution of a copyrighted
work.
Unauthorized distribution of a copyrighted work is an infringement.
The Copyright Act provides the copyright owner with the exclusive right
"to distribute copies... of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or
other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending," 13 4 and
"[a] nyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner
... is an infringer of the copyright." 13 5 The legislative history of the Copy-
right Act makes it clear that "any unauthorized public distribution of cop-
ies.., that were unlawfully made would be an infringement."
3 6
The copyright owner's distribution right is akin to an exclusive right
to control the first publication or first public distribution of copies or pho-
norecords of the work.' 3 7 This concept, known as the "first sale" doctrine,
gives the copyright owner the right to sell or publicly distribute particular
copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work. The distribution right
ceases once the owner has parted with those particular copies or pho-
norecords. a3 8 The Copyright Act states that the owner of a particular, law-
fully made copy or phonorecord is entitled, without the authority of the
copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy
or phonorecord. 139
The first sale doctrine applies only where the possibility exists that the
person possessing the copyrighted work obtained it lawfully. 140 In other
words, if you own a lawfully made copy, you have the right to sell or lease
that copy to another party. The only exceptions are sound recordings and
software, which may not be rented without the authorization of the copy-
133. 18 U.S.C. § 2319.
134. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3).
135. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a).
136. H.R REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 62 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5676. Section 109 of the Copyright Act limits the exclusive right of a copyright owner
to distribute copies. Section 109(a) provides: "the owner of a particular copy .. .lawfully
made under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the au-
thority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy...."
17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (emphasis added). This section, which embodies
the first sale doctrine, does not apply to the case of piratical software vendors. The primary
reason is that the piratical copy is not "lawfully made under this title." Indeed, the Notes of
the Committee on the Judiciary explicitly state that "any resale of an illegally 'pirated' pho-
norecord would be an infringement...." H.R. REP. No. 1476, at 79, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5693.
137. See Annotation, G. M. Buechlein, Burden and Sufficiency of Proof Under First Sak Doc-
trine in Prosecution for Copyright Infringement 94 A.LR. FED. 101 (1989).
138. 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1988), amended by 17 U.S.C. § 109(b) (1) (c) (Supp. III 1991).
139. Id.
140. See United States v. Powell, 701 F.2d 70, 73 (8th Cir. 1983).
19941
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
right owner. 141 There can be no lawful distribution of pirated or counter-
feit copies of a work, because the copyright holder cannot, by definition,
part with legal title through a first sale.
142
The first sale doctrine is significant in prosecutions for copyright in-
fringement, because the government must show proof that particular
items are copies of a work that infringe a copyright and not merely legiti-
mate products of resale.1 43 The first sale doctrine is also a defense in
criminal copyright infringement cases. 144 When a defendant presents evi-
dence that the copies in question were legally made and that he or she
owned them, the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate that the
copies were either not legally made or not owned by the defendant. 145
The government may show that the defendant knew that a particular copy
of the copyrighted work had not been sold first by the copyright owner
through direct evidence 146 or as an inference from circumstantial
evidence.'
47
The indictment does not necessarily have to allege specifically that
the defendant knew that a first sale of the copyrighted material had not
been made or disprove every conceivable scenario in which the defendant
would be innocent of infringement. 148 The indictment, however, should
fairly inform the defendant of the offense charged: criminal copyright
infringement.
149
141. 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1)(A) (1988), amended by 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1)(a) (Supp. III
1991) ("[N] either the owner of a particular phonorecord nor any person in possession of a
particular copy of a computer program ... may, for the purposes of direct or indirect com-
mercial advantage, dispose of, or authorize the disposal of, the possession of that pho-
norecord or computer program... by rental, lease or lending. .. ."); see also A&M Records,
Inc. v. A.L.W., Ltd., 855 F.2d 368 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that defendants who were shown
to have rented records were liable for infringement).
142. Powe//, 701 F.2d at 73.
143. See United States v. Sachs, 801 F.2d 839, 842-43 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that govern-
ment has the burden of establishing that defendant's activities are forbidden by the criminal
copyright statute); United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1190 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
929 (1977) (holding that government must prove the absence of a first sale).
144. See United States v. Atherton, 561 F.2d 747, 749 (9th Cir. 1977) (conviction reversed
because government failed to prove that copies sold by defendant had not been subject to
first sale).
145. United States v. Goss, 803 F.2d 638, 644 (11th Cir. 1986).
146. United States v. Drum, 733 F.2d 1503, 1507 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Cooper
v. United States, 469 U.S. 1061 (1984).
147. See United States v. Minor, 756 F.2d 731, 734 (9th Cir. 1985), vacated, 477 U.S. 991
(1985) (holding that on evidence in record, a rational jury could find beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant knew that records charged in the indictment were not the subject
of a valid first sale).
148. United States v. Sachs, 801 F.2d 839, 842-43 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that govern-
ment's burden is to show that defendant did not distribute a lawfully obtained copy, but
government need not disprove every conceivable scenario in which defendant would be in-
nocent of infringement).
149. United States v. Powell, 701 F.2d 70, 72-73 (8th Cir. 1983) (holding that an indict-
ment for criminal infringement is not defective even though government failed to allege that
defendants knew that first sale rights did not apply-, "[a]n indictment is generally sufficient if
it sets forth the words of the statute itself, as long as those words fairly inform the defendant
of the elements necessary to constitute the offense charged"); see United States v. Steerwell
Leisure Corp., 598 F. Supp. 171, 173 (W.D.N.Y. 1984); United States v. Schmidt, 15 F. Supp.
804 (M.D. Pa. 1936) (holding that an indictment charging defendant with inciting, counsel-




Intent to infringe must also be established. In accordance with the
language of the Copyright Act, the government must prove that the de-
fendant infringed "willfully and for purpose of commercial advantage or
private financial gain."
150
With regard to civil copyright infringement, proof of willful intent to
infringe may result in an increased damage award.' 5 1 Such proof is not
required to prevail on the underlying claim of infringement, because
copyright is a strict liability tort.152 For a conviction on charges of crimi-
nal copyright infringement, the government must prove a specific crimi-
nal intent to infringe.1 53 Without the requisite criminal intent or mens rea,
no criminal violation has occurred, even if the number of unauthorized
copies or phonorecords reproduced or distributed is significant.'
54
Although both the Copyright Act and the Copyright Felony Act use
the term "willfully" in describing criminal copyright infringement, the
term has never been defined by statute. The legislative history of the
Copyright Felony Act shows that Congress intended for the courts to as-
sume the task of defining this term.
1 55
Not every criminal statute requires evidence of specific intent to vio-
late the law. Indeed, criminal law presumes generally that every person
knows the law, and that ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is no
defense to criminal prosecution.' 56 A requirement of specific intent to
violate the law is most often reserved for relatively intricate areas of law,
such as criminal tax evasion.
1 57
The government does not have to show that a defendant has detailed
knowledge of the statute prohibiting the conduct in question to prove that
the defendant exhibited specific intent to violate the law.158 If the govern-
ment did have to make such a showing, defense lawyers could argue that
their clients should be acquitted simply because they were unfamiliar with
the intricacies of a substantive area of law such as copyright.
The better view is that specific intent to violate the law is established
by proof that the defendant intended to act as he did and that the defend-
ant's actions were knowing or voluntary, not accidental. This approach is
Blanton, 531 F.2d 442, 444 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 935 (1976) (affirming con-
viction even though statute was erroneously cited in indictment; record shows defendant was
not misled or prejudiced by error).
150. 17 U.S.C. § 506(a).
151. See id. § 504(c)(2) ("In a case where the copyright owner sustains the burden of
proving, and the court finds, that infringement was committed willfully, the court in its dis-
cretion may increase the award of statutory damages to a sum of not more than $100,000.").
152. Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 198 (1931).
153. H.R. REP. No. 997, supra note 86, at 4-5, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.CA.N. at 3573.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Cheek v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 604, 609 (1991).
157. Id. at 609 ("[The] special treatment of criminal tax offenses [as specific intent crimes]
is largely due to the complexity of the tax laws.").
158. Id.
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consistent with well settled case authority regarding the meaning of willful-
ness in a wide variety of contexts. 15 9
In the context of criminal copyright infringement, courts have inter-
preted the term "willfully" in two ways. The majority of courts have said
that the language of the Copyright Act makes criminal copyright infringe-
ment a "specific" intent crime; in other words, a prosecutor must show
that the accused specifically intended to violate the copyright law.
160
The minority view, endorsed by the Second and Ninth Circuits, holds
that in the context of a criminal copyright infringement proceeding, "will-
ful" means only intent to copy, not intent to infringe. 161 For example, the
Second Circuit found liability where the defendant, although without ac-
tual notice from the copyright owner, unlawfully issued instructions to
make copies resembling the copyrighted work "as closely as they might
without 'copyright trouble,'" indicating the defendant was aware of the
legal prohibition against infringement.
162
The minority view, which requires only evidence of an intent to copy,
places a significantly lower burden on prosecutors. It is not surprising that
most criminal copyright infringement cases are initiated in the circuits
that have adopted this minority view.
Irrespective of the definition applied, a finding of willful infringe-
ment in a criminal copyright infringement proceeding can be based on
direct 6 3 or circumstantial' 64 evidence. Willfulness is a factual determina-
159. See, e.g., United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63 (1984) (holding that defendant did
not have to know that statements were being made to the United States government to be
convicted under the False Statements Act); United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 394
(1933) (holding that the word "willfully" is "employed to characterize a thing done without
ground for believing it is lawful... or conduct marked by careless disregard whether or not
one has the right so to act") (citations omitted); United States v. Brown, 954 F.2d 1563, 1564
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 284 (1992) (holding that a defendant was not required to
know that the structuring of a currency transaction was unlawful to be convicted under Bank
Secrecy Act); United States v.Jones, 735 F.2d 785 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 918 (1984)
(holding that willful violation of mining regulations was intentional, knowing or voluntary, as
distinguished from accidental, and did not require knowledge of the terms of the safety stan-
dard); United States v. Berardelli, 565 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding that crime of criminal
contempt does not require that defendant intend to violate statute making such an act a
crime); United States v. Keegan, 331 F.2d 257 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 828 (1964)
(holding that willfulness on bribery charges was sufficiently established by proof of knowing
and intentional commission of the acts charged); United States v. Gris, 247 F.2d 860 (2d Cir.
1957) (holding that a willful wiretap violation was sufficiently established by proof that de-
fendant intended to act as he did, rather than proof of intent to violate Federal Communica-
tions Act); Cheek v. United States, 111 S. CL 604, 610 (1991) (holding in a criminal tax
prosecution that a good faith misunderstanding of the law or the good faith belief that one's
actions were not illegal negates a charge of willfulness).
160. See United States v. Cross, 816 F.2d 297, 303 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that defendant
must have engaged in the infringing conduct with knowledge that his -or her activity was
prohibited by law). But see United States v. Moran, 757 F. Supp. 1046, 1049-51 (D. Neb.
1991) (discussing the willfulness criterion at some length and holding that a person who
made and rented unauthorized copies of videotapes did not "willfully" infringe, even though
he was aware that original videotapes were protected under Copyright Act).
161. See United States v. Taxe, 380 F. Supp. 1010, 1017 (C.D. Cal. 1974), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1040 (1977).
162. United States v. Backer, 134 F.2d at 533, 535 (2d Cir. 1943).
163. See Dean v. Burrows, 732 F. Supp. 816, 825-26 (E.D. Tenn. 1989) (infringer fraudu-
lently obtained authorized copy of work, removed copyright notice, then copied and sold
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tion that will not be disturbed on appeal unless the determination is
clearly erroneous. 165
The mens rea for criminal copyright infringement also requires evi-
dence that the defendant acted "for purposes of commercial advantage or
private financial gain."166 Although actual sale of a counterfeit or pirated
copy is the best evidence that the defendant has a commercial purpose or
financial objective, a "for-profit" objective can be established by an act as
simple as giving an infringing copy to a government witness to test before
buying. 167 The government is not required to show that the defendant
actually realized a profit from the infringement, and lack of profitability is
not grounds for arresting a criminal infringement judgment. 168 The gov-
ernment has to show only that the defendant hoped to make a profit 169 or
realize a commercial gain.
170
Both owners17 1 and employees 172 can be found to have infringed for
the purpose of commercial advantage or private financial gain. Indeed,
the fact the defendant is an employee and not an owner will not preclude
liability.173
Of course, the Copyright Felony Act cannot be applied to every in-
fringement, even if there is evidence the defendant intended to ignore
copyright law or acted for the purpose of commercial advantage or private
financial gain. The legislative history of the Copyright Felony Act clearly
states that "ordinary business disputes such as those involving reverse engi-
neering of computer programs or contract disputes over the scope of
licenses" will not give rise to felony liability.
174
work; liability for willful infringement found); see also RSO Records, Inc. v. Peri, 596 F. Supp.
849, 859 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding that for purposes of showing willfulness in civil action,
defendant's earlier guilty plea to two counts of criminal copyright infringement meant he
knew similar conduct was unlawful).
164. See United States v. Hernandez, 952 F.2d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 334 (1992) (holding that evidence presented was sufficient to support element of
knowledge or intent to join conspiracy to infringe where defendant had control over tapes,
had key to storage unit where tapes were kept, had shown others how to use tape duplicating
machine, and had transported tapes from production site to storage unit); see also United
States v. Gottesmann, 724 F.2d 1517, 1522 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding that evidence presented
was sufficient to show that defendant willfully infringed on copyright where she was present
at meetings in which her husband told undercover FBI agents that videotape source was
secret and where she provided lists of available movies to agents and claimed that she was a
partner in the operation).
165. Chi-Boy Music v. Charlie Club, Inc., 930 F.2d 1224, 1227 (7th Cir. 1991).
166. 17 U.S.C. § 506(a).
167. United States v. Moore, 604 F.2d 1228, 1235 (9th Cir. 1979).
168. United States v. Stolon, 555 F. Supp. 238, 239-40 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
169. See, e.g., United States v. Rose, 149 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 820, 825 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) ("If...
the Government has demonstrated... the profit motive of the defendant, then the Govern-
ment has met its burden .... ').
170. United States v. Steele, 785 F.2d 743, 749 (9th Cir. 1986).
171. See Luft v. Crown Publishers, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 1378, 1379-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
172. U.S. v. Cross, 816 F.2d 297, 301 (7th Cir. 1987).
173. Id.
174. See H.R. REP. No. 997, supra note 86, at 5 ("In cases where civil liability is unclear-
whether because the law is unsettled, or because a legitimate business dispute exists-the
Committee does not intend to establish criminal liability."); see also United States v. Lar-
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4. Threshold of Infringement
To secure a conviction under the Copyright Felony Act, the govern-
ment must first establish the infringement and then show that at least ten-
copies or phonorecords, with a retail value of more than $2500, have been
copied or distributed without the copyright owner's permission within a
180-day period.175 These ten copies or phonorecords can represent an
infringement of one copyrighted work or an aggregation of different
works of authorship.1 76 The Copyright Felony Act does not require that
all the copyrights affected be in the same class or be held by the same
copyright owner. This means that a case for felony conviction can be built
by showing that several copyright holders have been adversely affected by
one infringer. For example, a defendant's reproduction of five copies of a
copyrighted word-processing computer program having a retail value of
$300 and the reproduction of five copies of a copyrighted spreadsheet
computer program also having a retail value of $300 would satisfy the re-
quirement of reproducing 10 copies having a retail value of at least $2,500,
if done within a 180-day period.1 77 If less than ten copies have been cop-
ied or distributed, or if the copies have a combined value of less than
$2,500, the offense is a misdemeanor.
178
Again, the government must also show evidence that the infringing
copies have a retail value of more than $2,500 to secure a felony convic-
tion.' 7 9 "Retail value" was deliberately undefined, but the implication is
that it will, in most cases, represent the price at which the work that is
being infringed is sold through normal retail channels.180 Where a
"usual" retail value cannot be established, the courts may look to the sug-
gested retail price, the wholesale price, the replacement cost of the item,
or financial injury caused to the copyright owner. It may even be appro-
priate in some cases to use saved acquisition costs to place a value on the
infringing copies.
181
racuente, 952 F.2d 672, 673-74 (2d Cir. 1992) ("If the accused infringer has been licensed by
a licensee of the copyright owner, that is a matter of affirmative defense.").
175. See 18 U.S.C. § 2319(b)(1).
176. See H.R. REP. No. 997, supra note 86, at 6 ("The phrase 'of one or more copyrighted
works' is intended to permit aggregation of different works of authorship to meet the re-
quired number of copies and retail value.").
177. Id.
178. See 18 U.S.C. § 2319(b) (3) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); see also United States v. Cross,
816 F.2d 297, 301 (7th Cir. 1987).
179. 18 U.S.C. § 2319(b)(3).
180. See United States v. Larracuente, 952 F.2d 672, 674-75 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that
the trial court was correct in applying the "normal retail price, rather than the lower bootleg
price paid by those who presumably are aware that the prices they are buying are not legiti-
mate," but noting possible exceptions); United States v. Hernandez, 952 F.2d 1110, 1119 (9th
Cir. 1991) (court established probable loss based on market value); see also U.S.S.G. § 2B5.3,
cmt., reprinted in, 18 U.S.C.A. app. (Supp. 1994) (sentencing guidelines for copyright in-
fringement designed to adequately reflect the anticipated gains to the criminals or losses to
the victims of the crime). But see United States v. Kim, 963 F.2d 65, 68-70 (5th Cir. 1992)
(holding that "retail value" is based on the value of the counterfeit merchandise, but that
using retail value of genuine merchandise was also relevant to calculation of "retail value").
181. See, e.g., Deltak, Inc. v. Advanced Systems, Inc., 767 F.2d 357, 361-62 (7th Cir. 1985);
Quinto v. Legal Times of Washington, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 579, 582 (D.D.C. 1981).
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A successful felony prosecution will also require proof that the statu-
tory requirements, both in terms of number of copies and retail value have
been met within a 180-day period. This requirement exists to preclude
from felony prosecution, "children making copies for friends," as well as
"other incidental copying of copyrighted works having a relatively low re-
tail value."182 The 180-day period is also intended to remove the "possibil-
ity that the increased penalties under the bill for computer program
infringement can be used as a tool of harassment in business disputes over
reverse engineering."1"'
CONCLUSION
The Copyright Felony Act represents a significant improvement in the
criminal sanctions that can be imposed against willful copyright infringe-
ment. While tangible evidence of the deterrent effect of these increased
sanctions will not exist for some time, copyright owners can be expected to
press increasingly for criminal prosecution of large-scale pirates.
182. See H.R. REP. No. 997, supra note 86, at 6.
183. Id. This language was included presumably to alleviate concerns expressed by cer-
tain computer industry representatives that increased criminal penalties might be used by
certain software vendors as a weapon against competitors in infringement cases where civil
liability is unclear-whether because the law is unsettled, or because a legitimate business
dispute exists. See Criminal Sanctions For Volation of Software Copyright, 1992: Hearings on S.893
Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 46-70 (1991) (statement of EdwardJ. Black, Vice President and
General Counsel, Computer & Communications Industry Association, and Statement of
David Ostfeld, Chairman, Intellectual Property Committee, Institute of Electrical & Electron-
ics Engineers-United States Activities).
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PROMOTING THE COPYRIGHT ACT'S CREATOR-
FAVORING PRESUMPTION: "WORKS MADE FOR
HIRE" UNDER AYlMEs v. BoNELLi & A vEC
SYS7EMS, INC. V. PEIZFER
PROFESSOR ALAN HYDE & CHRISTOPHER W. HAGER*
INTRODUCTION
In the abstract, it is virtually irrefutable that what one creates should
rightfully belong to the creator; however, this assumption rests on a deli-
cate foundation under U.S. copyright laws.' Of particular precariousness
is the relationship between a party funding such a creation and the creator
herself. Where a copyrightable work has been produced in an employ-
ment-type setting, the issue becomes difficult to resolve. Should the party
who financed the original work, or the individual who created it, be its
copyright owner?
Congress addressed this issue in § 101 of the Copyright Act of 1976
("1976 Act"), 2 in which it defined "works made for hire"3 in part as:
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or
her employment [hereinafter § 101 (1) ]; or
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a con-
tribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or
other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary work,
as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer ma-
terial for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a
written instrument signed by them that the work shall be consid-
ered a work made for hire [hereinafter § 101 (2)].
4
Section 201 (b) of the 1976 Act gives substantive meaning to this defi-
nition by providing that:
* Professor Alan Hyde is a Sidney Reitman Scholar at Rutgers-Newark School of Law
and is a visiting professor at Yale Law School during the 1993-94 academic year. Professor
Hyde is supervising a series of studies on disputes between employers and employees over the
ownership of ideas. Mr. Christopher W. Hager is the Editor-in-Chief of Rutgers Computer &
Technology Law Journal at Rutgers-Newark School of Law and will be graduating from
Rutgers in the Spring of 1994. Mr. Hager is the primary author of the study comprising this
law review article.
1. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810, 1001-10 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Congress is constitutionally
empowered to promulgate intellectual property legislation under Article I of the Constitu-
tion, which provides that "Congress shall have the Power ... To Promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2. Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 101, 90 Stat. 2541, 2544 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C.
§§ 101-810, 1001-10 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)). Congress' enactment of the 1976 Act replaced
the Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075.
3. For stylistic fluidity, a "work made for hire" will generally be referred to as simply a
"work for hire."
4. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
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In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other per-
son for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for
purposes of this title, and, unless the parties have expressly
agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns
all of the rights comprised in the copyright. 5
What becomes apparent when reading these provisions is the control-
ling nature of § 101 over § 201(b). 6 Only where a work was created
"within the scope" of an employee's employment or was commissioned or
ordered as the subject of an express written instrument executed between
the parties involving one of the nine exclusive works listed in § 101(2)
7
can a § 201 (b) "work for hire" analysis ensue.
The modem "work for hire" doctrine's importance lies in its break
from copyright law's traditional presumption favoring the employer or
funding party over the actual creator for the purposes of assigning copy-
right ownership.8 Recent case law illustrates this departure. In two recent
federal court decisions involving authorship of computer programs, Aymes
v. Bonefi9 and Avtec Systems, Inc. v. Peiffer,10 program creators retained own-
ership of their personal "works"'1 notwithstanding the employment or
work for hire setting related to the programs' development.
12
This Article will present the facts of both cases and discuss the devel-
opment of the underlying legal principles. After discussing the historic
tension between copyright ownership of a work created by an individual
who is not clearly recognized as an "employee" I3 and the understandable
5. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1988).
6. See Easter Seal Soc'y for Crippled Children & Adults, Inc. v. Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d
323, 328 (5th Cir. 1987) (noting that § 201 "makes the buyer" of a work its "author and initial
owner" only where the "work was made for hire"), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 981 (1988); Mister B.
Textiles Inc. v. Woodcrest Fabrics, Inc., 523 F. Supp. 21, 24 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (observing, as a
preliminary matter, the controlling nature of § 101 in a work for hire examination). But see
Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093, 1097-98 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding one of § 201 (b)'s
traits to be its vesting of initial copyright ownership in employers).
7. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 121 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.CAN. 5659, 5737 [hereinafter HoUSE REPoRT] (noting the "specific categories of
[§ 101 (2)] commissioned works that can be considered 'works made for hire' under certain
circumstances") (emphasis added). See also Robert A. Kreiss, Ten Theories for Hiring Parties Who
Want to Own Works Created or Invented by Independent Contractors, COMPUTER LAW., May, 1991, at
11 (outlining the "three requirements" involved in § 101 (2) "work for hire" examinations).
8. See I.T. Hardy, Copyright Law's Concept of Employment-What Congress Really Intended, 35
J. COPp. Soc'v 210, 211-12 (1988) [hereinafter Hardy I]; see also infra notes 42-61 and accom-
panying text (discussing the evolution of the work for hire doctrine up until the 1976 Act).
9. 980 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1992).
10. 805 F. Supp. 1312 (E.D. Va. 1992), affd in partk vacated in part and remanded, Nos. 92-
2521, 92-2607, U.S. App. LEXIS 6522 (4th Cir. Apr. 6, 1994).
11. Copyright law recognizes original creations fixed in a "tangible medium of expres-
sion" as "original works." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (emphasis added). Ac-
cordingly, usage of the terms "work" and "works" throughout this article refers to
copyrightable original creations. In a similar fashion, the word "creator" will be used genei-
cally to indicate a person who produces a work of authorship utilizing his or her individual
thoughts and creativity. See Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 506 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating that
a copyright "[a]uthor" is simply a work's "originator").
12. See Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1992); Avtec Sys., Inc. v. Peiffer, 805 F.
Supp. 1312 (E.D. Va. 1992).
13. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810, 1001-10 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Nowhere within the cur-
rent copyright statute is the term "employee" defined. It has been contended, however, "that
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proprietary interests of a party funding the work's creation, this Article
contends that the recent decisions reflect a trend creating a presumption
in favor of an individual creator's artistic interests.1 4 Simply stated, judicial
adherence to this congressional objective will promote the predictable
evolution of a modem copyright "work for hire" doctrine.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Creative Process of Writing a Computer Program
Copyright laws only protect original expression. 15 Due to the way
computer programs are written, Congress has chosen to protect them
under copyright law as "literary works." 16 A computer program 17 is "a set
of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a com-
puter in order to bring about a certain result."1 8 Put simply, a program is
the part of a computer that "makes [it] go, what brings it to life, [and] what
turns it from a heap of fancy parts into a powerful working tool."19 Similar
an 'employee' for copyright purposes is one who is a formal, salaried" member of an em-
ployer's work force, Hardy I, supra note 8, at 212, or an individual "who receives employment
benefits required by law and whose employer withholds taxes from salary." Marci A. Hamil-
ton, Comment, Commissioned Works as Works Made For Hire Under the 1976 Copyright Act: Misin-
terpretation and Injustice 135 U. PA. L. RE'. 1281, 1313 (1987). But see I MELVILLE B. NIMMER
& DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 5.03[B] [1], at 5-25 n.80 (1993) (asserting that
whatever the formal, salaried employee standard gains in predictability is lost because of
"rigidity and unfairness" when used in close cases).
14. Related to this proposition, but beyond the more narrow scope of this article, is the
efficacy of valid contractual arrangements between creating parties. For a current discussion
of this topic, see Mary M. Luria & Laura Butzel, Legal Rules Still Hazy on "Workfor Hire," NAT'L
L.J., Jan. 24, 1994, at S21, 22-24.
15. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988).
16. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL
REPORT 16 (1979) [hereinafter CONTU]. "Literary works" are defined under copyright law
as: "works, other than audiovisual works, expressed in words, numbers, or other verbal or
numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as books,
periodicals, manuscripts, phonorecords, film, tapes, disks, or cards, in which they are embod-
ied." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
17. It is helpful to segregate a "computer," which comprises hardware such as the cen-
tral processing unit [CPU] and some memory, from its activating software, which entails the
written statements and instructions upon which the hardware acts. See Randall Davis, The
Nature of Software and Its Consequences for Establishing and Evaluating Similarity, 5 Sovw A LJ.
299, 302-03 (1992) (analyzing "hardware" and "software" separately).
18. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). Two general types of computer programs are available:
Operating system programs, such as DOS... and OS/2 ... control the basic functions
of the computer hardware, such as the efficient utilization of memory and the start-
ing and stopping of application programs. Application programs [such as Wordperfect
6.0 or Lotus 1-2-3] permit a user to perform some particular task such as word
processing .... or spreadsheet calculations ....
Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 43 (D. Mass. 1990) (emphasis
added). See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1253-54 (3d
Cir. 1983) (holding operating system programs to be copyrightable), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S.
1033 (1984); Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 875 (3d Cir. 1982) (recog-
nizing that application program was copyrightable); PETER NORTON, INSIDE THE IBM PC 19
(1986) (stating that operating systems programs aid in the computer's function while appli-
cations programs help to get the user's work done).
19. NORTON, supra note 18, at 16-17. See Anthony L. Clapes et al., Silicon Epics and Binary
Bards: Determining the Proper Scope of Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, 34 UCLA L. REV.
1493, 1512-13 (1987) (stressing the distinction between a functional computer and the writ-
ten program that enables the computer to perform different functions).
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to "more time-honored literary works" such as novels, the process of writ-
ing a computer program illustrates originality and imagination.
2 0
The first step in developing a program requires the programmer to
ascertain the program's "ultimate function or purpose."21 For example, a
programmer might be asked to write a program that will calculate figures
associated with the fiscal revenues of a business. The written program pro-
vides the means by which the programmer instructs a computer to per-
form this function. Once a programmer begins designing and writing the
program, she embarks upon a process that involves making numerous cre-
ative decisions. These decisions can be divided into two categories or
stages.
First, the programmer must design the program's internal structure
or "logic."22 She will begin this stage by dissecting the program's overall
idea into the more integral "problems or 'subtasks'" associated with
achieving its primary purpose.2 3 Typically, the programmer creates a flow
chart2 4 mapping out in human-readable form the various modules or sub-
routines that will respond to particular assigned electronic tasks.2 5 The
interaction between a program's modules or subroutines, which may be
further branched into submodules or sub-subroutines, constitutes the pro-
gram's structure.
26
As the program's structure develops, the programmer is confronted
by decisions on what data are needed and where the data fit into the pro-
gram's overall operations.2 7 In theory, no programmer is limited by either
the number of ways she can solve data organization problems 28 or the
names she chooses to identify the elements in her program.
2 9
20. Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, Databases, and Computer-
Generated Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU, 106 Hav. L. REv. 977, 983 (1993).
21. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 697 (2d Cir. 1992); see also
Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1229 (3d Cir. 1986) (initial
step in program design is identification of "the problem that the computer programmer is
trying to solve"), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
22. See Clapes et al., supra note 19, at 1531 (noting that a program's logic is a "principal
characteristic").
23. Steven R. Englund, Note, Idea, Process, or Protected Expresion?: Determining the Scope of
Copyright Protection of the Structure of Computer Programs, 88 MicH. L. REv. 866, 870 (1990).
24. A "flow chart" has been characterized as "a graphic representation for the definition,
analysis, or solution of a problem in which symbols are used to represent operations, data
flow, or equipment." CONTU, supra note 16, at 21 n.109. It has been observed that flow
charts of "sufficient intellectual labor" or originality are copyrightable works of authorship.
Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 45 (D. Mass. 1990) (quoting
CONTU, supra note 16, at 21).
25. "Modules" are sections of programs "devoted to one of the major capabilities of the
program" [Clapes et al., supra note 19, at 1524], while "subroutines" are sets of instructions
used together to achieve a particular result. Davis, supra note 17, at 304. See Autoskill Inc. v.
National Educ. Support Sys., Inc., 994 F.2d 1476, 1491 n.18 (10th Cir. 1993) (defining mod-
ules and subroutines), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 307 (1993).
26. Englund, supra note 23, at 871.
27. Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1230 (3d Cir. 1986).
28. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1230. As a practical matter, efficiency concerns may be the only
limit on the ways a programmer might solve data organization problems. See id. (noting that
the efficiency of a program can be improved through "different internal arrangements of
modules and subroutines").
29. Clapes et al., supra note 19, at 1534.
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Once the program's internal logic has been determined, its structure
is written into a language that the computer can understand.3 0 This is the
second stage of program writing, and it is called coding.
3 1
The first step of coding requires the programmer to write the pro-
gram's structure into a "source code" language, which can be one of sev-
eral high-level language styles such as FORTRAN (FORnula TRA.Mlation)
or COBOL (COmmon Business Oriented Language).3 2 These higher-level
statements represent the programmer's human-readable version of the
program, written in easy-to-understand English often accompanied by
common Arabic numerals.3 3 One court has analogized writing the source
code to" 'the novelist fleshing out the broad outline of his plot by crafting
from words and sentences the paragraphs that convey' the ideas."
3 4
Upon finishing the source code version of the program, the program-
mer translates the source code into a binary language consisting of
machine-readable sequences of Os and is.3 5 Although programmers'origi-
nally wrote object codes, "interpreter" and "compiler" programs now
translate a programmer's source code into the necessary object code.
3 6
Following the coding process, the programmer will run the software on a
computer to "debug"3 7 it and "correct any logical and syntactical errors" it
may contain.3 8 Once this process is completed, so is the program.
39
Based upon the above discussion, it becomes clear "that the detailed




30. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 698 (2d Cir. 1992).
31. Id.
32. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1230; Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp.
37, 44 (D. Mass. 1990).
33. See Clapes et al., supra note 19, at 1522-23.
34. Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 698 (quoting Marc T. Kretschmer, Note, Copyright Protec-
tion for Software Architecture: Just Say No!, 1988 COLUM. Bus. L. Rav. 823, 826).
35. Computer Assocs., 982 F.2d at 698.; Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740
F. Supp. 37, 44 (D. Mass. 1990); see Clapes et al., supra note 18, at 1520-21. The object code
is written in bits, or B/nary digiTS, each of which represents a single binary decision "such as
an 'on' - 'off' or 'yes' - 'no' choice." Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 43. Eight bits constitutes a "byte"
and 1024 bytes comprise a "kilobyte." Id.
36. Interpreter and compiler programs achieve their ends by slightly different means.
An "interpreter" program is a simultaneous translator that works in conjunction
with the application program every time the application program is run, carrying
out the instructions of the program one step at a time. In contrast, a "compiler"
program translates the program once and for all into machine language, after
which the translated program can be executed directly by the CPU without the
need for any further resort to the compiler. A distinctive "interpreter" or "com-
piler" program is available for each type of source code programming language and
each type of CPU.
Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 44; see also HARRY KAxr.4, JR., OPERATING SSTIMs: A PRAGMATIC Ap-
PROACH 23-24 (1986) (discussing compiler and interpreter programs).
37. "Debugging" is simply the removal of errors in the program, but it is far from simple
when done for a large, complex program. Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc.,
797 F.2d 1222, 1231 & n.21 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
38. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 698 (2d Cir. 1992).
39. Id.
40. Clapes et al., supra note 19, at 1544.
41. See generally KAxAN, supra note 36, at 12-36 (explaining the structure and technology
of computer programs).
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B. "Works for Hire" Prior to the Copyright Act of 1909
Early common law cases dealing with works allegedly created "for
hire" involved disputes over the ownership of copyrightable subject matter
generated in a traditional employment setting.42 These early opinions
fashioned a presumption resting copyright ownership in employers for any
works prepared by one of their employees. 43 Justice Holmes's opinion in
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.44 was representative of this early
common law presumption. Bleistein focused on the alleged copyright in-
fringement of chromolithograph circus advertisements prepared by the
plaintiffs' employees.
45
Justice Holmes asserted that the plaintiff-employers owned the origi-
nal designs, because they were "produced by persons employed and paid
by the plaintiffs in their establishment to make those very things."4 6 The
employers in Bleistein employed the artists for the express purpose of creat-
ing the advertisements. Bleistein therefore dealt with works unmistakably
created "for hire." Works created by an individual commissioned or spe-
cially ordered by a hiring party, however, involve a completely different set
of issues.
C. The Copyright Act of 1909 and "Work for Hire"
The Copyright Act of 1909 (1909 Act) § 26 provided merely that "the
word 'author' shall include an employer in the case of works made for
hire."47 Nothing more illuminating was contained in the entire 1909 Act.
This phrase was interpreted to be simply a codification of the common law
presumption favoring employers. 48 A study by Borge Varmer, supported
by the 1958 U.S. Copyright Office, that analyzed the "statutory concept of
works made for hire"49 heavily influenced this interpretation. After re-
viewing the case law, Mr. Varmer concluded that because the decisions
"involved salaried employees who received either a fixed salary or a mini-
42. See, e.g., Colliery Eng'r Co. v. United Correspondence Sch. Co., 94 F. 152
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1899).
43. Hamilton, supra note 13, at 1283; see Colliery, 94 F. at 153. In Co/!iety, the Circuit
Court for the Southern District of New York held that an individual's compiling, preparing
and revising of "instruction and question papers" while a salaried employee became the liter-
ary property of his employer. Id. One commentator has noted that this common law pre-
sumption was simply an extension of the master-servant doctrine. Michael C. Smith, Work For
Hire: Revision on the Horion, 30 IDEA: J.L. & TECH. 21, 26 (1989).
44. 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
45. Id. at 248.
46. Id.
47. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 62, 35 Stat. 1087. This section was originally codi-
fied as § 62 and then subsequently renumerated in 1947 as § 26. See Act ofJuly, 30 1947, ch.
391, § 1, 61 Stat. 652 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 26 (1976)). In 1976, Title 17 was
revised in its entirety by the Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified
as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810, 1001-10 (1988 & Supp. 1992)).
48. See infta notes 97-110 and accompanying text.
49. See STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON PArr.is, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 1ST SESS., COPYIGHT LAW REVISION, STUDY 13, at 128
(Comm. Print 1960) (by Borge Varmer), reprnted in I STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 717, 720 (Copy-
right Soc'y of the U.S.A. ed., 1963).
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mum salary plus commission,"5 0 § 26 implicitly considered as made "for
hire" only those works created "by salaried employees in the regular
course of their employment."51 Although embodying the employer-favor-
ing presumption, § 26 offered no guidance for defining the terms "em-
ployer" or "employee."5 2 This task was left to the courts.
53
The 1909 Act also failed to address the important issue of how to treat
works created by independent contractors. Although Congress recog-
nized the practical significance of this issue during legislative hearings on
the 1909 Act,54 the final enactment failed to resolve this issue.55 Absent
any legislative direction, courts applying the 1909 Act also failed to differ-
entiate a full-time, salaried employee from an independent contractor,
"generally presum[ing] that the commissioned party had impliedly agreed
to convey the copyright, along with the work itself, to the hiring party."
5 6
During the 1909 Act's waning years, courts crafted principles granting
copyright ownership to an employer who "possessed the right to direct
and to supervise the manner in which the work was being performed"5 7 or
where the "employee's work [was] produced at the instance and expense of
his employer."58 In particular, the Second Circuit held a commissioned
party to the same standards as that of an ordinary employee where a work
was created "at the instance and expense" of a funding party.59 This stan-
50. Id. at 722. See, e.g., Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
51. 1 STuDIES ON COPYIGHT, supra note 49, at 722. See Hardy I, supra note 8, at 223;
Hamilton, supra note 13, at 1284 & n.16 (citing various authorities supporting the belief that
the 1909 Act bestowed upon an employer ownership in the works created by a full-time sala-
ied employee during the regular course of business).
52. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 744 (1989).
53. Id. Although interpreting the 1976 Act, which also did not define the crucial terms
"employer" or "employee," the Fifth Circuit reacted to the difficulty inherent in this task in
bemoaning that "[t] he more we examine the statute and cases interpreting it, the more puz-
zled we become." Easter Seal Soc'y for Crippled Children & Adults, Inc. v. Playboy Enters.,
815 F.2d 323, 328 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 981 (1988).
54. Hamilton, supra note 13, at 1284-85.
55. Id. at 1284.
56. Reid, 490 U.S. at 744. See Hamilton, supra note 13, at 1285 (noting that judicial
standards created under the 1909 Act for determining whether an employment relationship
existed had been carelessly incorporated into commissioned works examinations).
57. Scherr v. Universal Match Corp., 417 F.2d 497, 500 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 936 (1970). See I NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 13, § 5.03[B], at 5-12 to 5-13.
58. Brattleboro Publishing Co. v. Winmill Publishing Corp., 369 F.2d 565, 567 (2d Cir.
1966). This case was viewed as upending any potential balance between independent con-
tractor-hiring party ownership interests because the existing presumption, which granted
copyright ownership to an employer, rested on the belief that a traditional employee implic-
itly agreed to transfer his or her copyright to said hiring party. Brattleboro's application of this
same standard to a commissioned party pushed the "work for hire" analysis too far. See Hardy
I, supra note 8, at 242. Courts following Brattleboro treated cases involving a commission rela-
tionship in a manner comparable to the way employment disputes were previously resolved.
See Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc., 457 F.2d 1213, 1216 (2d Cir. 1972) (refusing to frus-
trate the work for hire statute's "purpose" with "conceptualistic formulations of the employ-
ment relationship"), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 997 (1972).
59. Brattleboro Publishing, 369 F.2d at 567-68 (finding the work for hire principles that
apply to an employee's work "produced at the instance and expense of his employer" also
applicable "when the parties bear the relationship of employer and independent
contractor").
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dard would not carry into the next generation of "work for hire" analysis,
but the "right to control or supervise"6° standard would.
6 1
D. The 1976 Act: Distinguishing An Employee From a Commissioned Paty
A revision of U.S. copyright laws began in 1955.62 With this revision,
Congress and the Copyright Office intended, among other things, a total
revision of copyright law's view on the employment relationship. 63
After sponsoring a number of studies on copyright's evolution, the
Copyright Office issued an initial legislative proposal in 1961 that distin-
guished traditional employees from independent contractors. 64 The 1909
Act's employer-favoring presumption for commissioned works made Con-
gress' treatment of these works a major issue in how "work for hire" would
be defined under the new copyright laws.65 The Copyright Office's recog-
nition of the importance of creators' proprietary interests played a signifi-
cant role in Congress' treatment of this issue.66
In 1963, the Copyright Office proposed a "Preliminary Draft" for a
copyright act67 that provided for a segregation of commissioned works
from those created "for hire."68 This proposition met with strong resist-
60. 1 NIMMER & NiMMER, supra note 13, § 5.03[B], at 5-13. One commentator has in-
sightfully noted that the "control" element will always be part of the work for hire analysis
because it is inherent to the notion of an employment relationship. See Robert A. Kreiss,
Scope of Employment and Being an Employee Under the Work-Made-For-Hire 1rviso of the Copyright
Law: Applying the Common-Law Agency Tests, 40 KAN. L. Ray. 119, 127 (1991).
61. See, e.g., Aymes v. Bonelli, 21 U.S.P.Q 2d (BNA) 1716, 1717 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (con-
cluding that although "Aymes may not have been an employee in the classic sense," he per-
formed the programming work "under the direction and supervision" of Bonelli), rev'd and
remanded, 980 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1992).
62. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 743 (1989); see also
Hardy I, supra note 5, at 221-22; Hamilton, supra note 13, at 1290. See generally Jessica D.
Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Leg*slative Histoiy, 72 CORNELL L. REa. 857, 870-79 (1987)
(discussing in detail the activities behind the 1909 Act revision process).
63. See Hamilton, supra note 13, at 1290-91. A comprehensive examination of what lead
up to enactment of the 1976 Act's "work for hire" provisions has been meticulously covered
in Professor I.T. Hardy's 1988 article, Copyright Law's Concept of Employment-What Congress
Really Intended, 35J. CoPR. Soc'v 210 (1988).
64. Reid, 490 U.S. at 744; see Hamilton, supra note 13, at 1291.
65. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 121 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5737.
66. See Hamilton, supra note 13, at 1290-91, where a Register of Copyrights report is
quoted as saying that:
[w]hile some limitations and conditions on copyright are essential in the public in-
terest, they should not be so burdensome and strict as to deprive authors of their
just reward.... [The creator's] rights should be broad enough to give them a fair
share of the revenue to be derived from the market for their works.
Id. (quoting REGISTER OF CoYmiGHTs, 87TH CONG., 1ST Sass., CoPYRGHT LAw RmvisIoN 6
(Comm. Print 1961)). See also Hardy I, supra note 8, at 224 (pointing to the separation of
commissioned works from those characterized as being "for hire" in the 1961 Register's Re-
port). For an interesting natural law approach to creator's rights, see Wendy J. Gordon, A
Property Right in SelfE"rssion: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Prop-
erty, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993) (discussing under Lockean theory the intellectual property
interests of creators).
67. Reid, 490 U.S. at 744-45 (quoting STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARv, 88TH
CONG., 2D SEss., COPYRIGHT LAw REVIsION, PART 3: PREusINARY DRAr FOR REVIsED U.S. COPY-
RIGHT LAw AND DISCUSSIONS AND COMMENTS ON -hE DATrr 15 n.l1 (Comm. Print 1964)).
68. Hardy I, supra note 8, at 228; Hamilton, supra note 13, at 1291.
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ance from associations whose members relied on copyright protection.
These groups disliked this classification because it enabled a commis-
sioned creator to reclaim an assigned work69 through reversion. 70 In def-
erence to industry concerns, a revised bill proposed in 1964 maintained
the employee "for hire" proviso, but included new language that would
make "for hire" a commissioned work or one prepared "on special order"
if the parties agreed in an express writing that it would be considered as
such. Understandably, objections remained on both sides of the reversion
issue. Creators argued that this new condition would enable parties with
superior bargaining power, generally employers, to pressure those with-
out, generally creators, into signing a writing, 7 1 while industry representa-
tives continued their opposition to any reversionary rights in creators.
72
These polar stances led to a "historic compromise" in 1965.
7 3
In an attempt to meet the conflicting positions of industry and cre-
ators, a bill was proposed in 1965 denoting four particular works created
by either special order or commission that could be considered made "for
hire."74 After the publishing industry expressed displeasure over the four
works' exclusivity, a further compromise increased the number of commis-
sioned or specially ordered works that could be "for hire."75 In exchange,
69. Ownership of a copyright can be transferred under 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1) (1988),
which provides in part that "[t]he ownership of a copyright may be transferred in whole or in
part by any means of conveyance or by operation of law."
70. The significance of this industry concern, voiced by groups including the Authors
League of America, MGM and American Textbook Publishers Institute, was that as commis-
sioned works under the Preliminary Draft were not "works for hire," they would not be ex-
cepted from the reversion provisions in the same manner as "works for hire." Hardy I, supra
note 8, at 233-37. This meant that the creator of an assigned copyright would be able to
recover ownership after a period of years expired through the property right of reversion,
which would arguably force employers to hire on as full time employees creators whom they
would otherwise treat as independent contractors. Id. The revision bill that would issue in
1964 removed "reversion" language in favor of "termination of transfer" language, which
would be the expression ultimately adopted in the 1976 Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 203 (1988).
71. See Hardy I, supra note 8, at 237; Hamilton, supra note 13, at 1292. See generally
Copyright Law Revision, Part I: Hearings on H.R. 4347, Hi?. 5680, H.R 6831, H.R. 6835 Before
Subcomm. No. 3 of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1966) (statement of Leo-
nard Zissu, Composers & Lyricists Guild of America).
72. See Smith, supra note 43, at 28 (indicating industry's position that authors were not
at a bargaining disadvantage due to their affiliations with guilds and various professional
groups); Hardy I, supra note 8, at 237 (noting industry resistance to any right of reversion in
creators).
73. Reid, 490 U.S. at 746.
74. The 1965 bill provided that specially ordered or commissioned works that contrib-
ute to a collective work, are part of a motion picture, are translations, or are supplementary
works could be "for hire" if accompanied by an express written agreement between the par-
ties. Hardy I, supra note 8, at 238 (quoting STAFF OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
89TH CONG., IsT SEss., COPIRGHT LAw REVISION, PART 6: SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE REG-
ISTER OF COPVRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPvRIGHT LAw: 1965 REVISION
BILL 66 (Comm. Print 1965)).
75. The added works were those prepared as a compilation, text or test material, an
atlas, and a "history or statement of activities of a private business or organization." Hardy I,
supra note 8, at 240 (quoting Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on H.R. 4347, H.R. 5680, H.R.
6831, H.)R. 6835 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 134
(1965) (Memorandum of American Book Publishers Council, Inc., American Guild of Au-
thors & Composers, American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, American
Textbook Publishers Institute, The Authors League of America, Inc., Composers & Lyricists
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the publishing industry withdrew its objections to the termination of trans-
fer provisions. 76 Save one deletion, this final compromise embodied the
language adopted and codified in § 101 of the 1976 Act.7 7 Implicit in this
last compromise was the creators' interest in individually crafted works not
being subject to any premature termination rights in others.78 Hence, the
1976 Act effectively removed the ownership presumption previously en-
joyed by funding parties with its limitation of § 101 (2) to nine exclusive
works supported by an express written agreement between both parties
stating that such work was to be "for hire."79 A construction of the mean-
ing of § 101(1)'s "work prepared by an employee within the scope of his
or her employment" remained for the courts.80
E. "Works For Hire" Under the 1976 Act: Four Interpretations of § 101(1)
Culminating in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid 81
1. Retention or Actual Wielding of the Right to Control
Although Congress expended significant effort to ameliorate the diffi-
culties resulting from the varied § 26 judicial interpretations under the
1909 Act, the 1976 Act perpetuated this interpretive problem by failing to
define "employer" or "employee."8 2 In Reid, the Supreme Court discussed
four different interpretations of what § 101 (1)'s "employee" and "scope of
employment" could mean. The first two virtually indistinguishable inter-
pretations explained that an "employee" created a work if the hiring
party8 3 retained the right8 4 or actually wielded the right8 5 to control the
Guild of America, Inc., Music Publishers' Protective Association, Inc., Music Publishers Asso-
ciation of the United States, Re H.R. 4347)).
76. Reid, 490 U.S. at 746; see also Hardy I, supra note 8, at 240.
77. The proposed work for "a history or statement of activities of a private business or
organization" was not part of the final "made for hire" enactment. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988
& Supp. IV 1992).
78. See Smith, supra note 43, at 28 (contending that the independent contractors "won"
this aspect of the legislative battle over which works could be "for hire"); Litman, supra note
62, at 893 (noting that authors' and composers' creative rights could not be alienated in
advance).
79. See I NIMMER & NiMMER, supra note 13, § 5.03[B], at 5-36 to 5-40 (contending that the
1976 Act's position on commissioned works leans more toward independent contractors than
commissioning parties).
80. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (no effort to expound on the meaning of
scope of employment").
81. 490 U.S. 730 (1989). The Supreme Court noted that in the absence of [statutory]
guidance, four interpretations have emerged. Id. at 738; see also 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra
note 13, § 5.03[B], at 5-13 to 5-18 (discussing all four interpretations).
82. See Reid, 490 U.S. at 739.
83. Professor Nimmer noted that the Supreme Court's choice of a "hiring party" charac-
terization of what would otherwise be considered an "employer" was because "the inquiry at
this stage [of Reid's rationale was] to determine whether the putative 'employer' may rightly
claim that status." I NIMMER & NrmmER, supra note 13, § 5.03[B], at 5-13 n.27.
84. Reid, 490 U.S. at 738-39 (citing Peregrine v. Lauren Corp., 601 F. Supp. 828, 829 (D.
Colo. 1985) and Town of Clarkstown v. Reeder, 566 F. Supp. 137, 142 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)).
85. Reid, 490 U.S. at 739 (citing Brunswick Beacon, Inc. v. Schock-Hopchas Publishing
Co., 810 F.2d 410 (4th Cir. 1987), Evans Newton Inc. v. Chicago Sys. Software, 793 F.2d 889
(7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 949 (1986) and Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc.,
738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984)).
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creation of a work. The Second Circuit's decision in Aldon Accessories Ltd.
v. Spiege4 Inc.8 6 explored these two interpretations.
Aldon involved a dispute over the copyright ownership of statuettes
created by a Japanese firm under the alleged auspices of Aldon Accesso-
ies. Aldon claimed that Spiegel's similar statuettes infringed its copy-
right.8 7 The Second Circuit agreed with Spiegel and held that these works
did not fall within § 101(2)'s listed scope.8 8 Spiegel contended further,
however, that as the statuettes were not within § 101 (2) and not created in
an employer-employee relationship as envisioned by § 101 (1), they did not
qualify as "works for hire."89
First, the court found Spiegel's interpretation of § 101(1) to be
"overly restrictive."90 Then the court stated that Congress did not intend
to dispense with the "work for hire" principles articulated in 1909 Act
cases and, as a result, both § 101 (1) and (2) applied to independent con-
tractors. 9 1 The court held that § 101(2) was relevant only in those cases
where the commissioned party did most of the work.92 Where an em-
ployer sufficiently supervised and directed a creator's work then an em-
ployer-employee relationship could be found even if the employee was
neither formal nor regular.93 By supporting the trial court's finding that
the statuettes created under Aldon's guidelines were made "for hire,"
9 4
the Second Circuit enunciated an "actual control" standard that other cir-
cuits then adopted.95 But this standard also received criticism for its disre-
gard of the congressional intent underlying § 101.
9 6
86. 738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984).
87. Id. at 549-50.
88. Id. at 551.
89. See id. at 551-52.
90. Id. at 551.
91. Id. at 552.
92. Id.
93. See id.
94. Id. at 553.
95. See, e.g., Evans Newton Inc. v. Chicago Sys. Software, 793 F.2d 889, 894 (7th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 949 (1986). But see Brunswick Beacon, Inc. v. Schock-Hopchas
Publishing Co., 810 F.2d 410, 413 (4th Cir. 1987) (showing a reluctance to follow Akdon by
distinguishing it factually).
96. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 13, § 5.03[B], at 5-15 to 5-16 (observing that
Aldon "carried forward standards from the 1909 Act" in determining what an "employee"
could be under the 1976 Act); Hardy I, supra note 8, at 241 (asserting that Aldon was "flatly in
conflict" with Congress' § 101 intent); Hamilton, supra note 13, at 1313 (proposing work for
hire amendment language which would overrule Aldon and its progeny). The court's surpris-
ing inattention to express congressional intent was most patently evidenced when it stated
that:
[n]othing in the 1976 Act or its legislative history indicates the Congress intended to
dispense with this prior law .... [If] Congress intended... to narrow the type of
employment relationships within the work for hire doctrine to include only "regu-
lar" employees, it is unlikely that there would have been no discussion of this
change in the legislative history.
Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 738 F.2d 548, 552 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denie4 469 U.S.
982 (1984).
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2. "Agency" Guiding § 101 Employee Determinations
A third interpretation cited by the Reid Court was that § 101(1) "em-
ployees" followed the common law's agency rules,97 an approach that de-
veloped quickly after Aldon's sweeping decision.98 The Fifth Circuit's
decision in Easter Seal Society for Crippled Children & Adults, Inc. v. Playboy
Enterprises- espoused this "agency" approach.10°
The Easter Seal Society ("Easter Seal") sued Playboy Enterprises and a
New Orleans public television station for Playboy's use of film excerpts
originally shot by the T.V. station for Easter Seal's use.' 0 ' Although no
discussion of copyright had occurred between Easter Seal and the televi-
sion station prior to the first videotaping, Easter Seal argued that it ac-
quired copyright ownership of the film because it was shot "for hire."'
0 2
Affirming the defendant's partial summary judgment, the Fifth Cir-
cuit rejected Easter Seal's "work for hire" contention by interpreting the
1976 Act "literally" to hold that an "employee" should be determined
through use of the common-law's agency doctrine.' 0 3 Under this ap-
proach, a court first determines whether a work was created by an em-
ployee or an independent contractor 1°4 within "the scope of employment"
by reference to the agency factors. 10 5 Once the creator's status is ascer-
tained, one of the two § 101 provisions will apply.10 6 Underlying this con-
struction was the court's belief that Congress had "radically"1 7 rewritten
the "work for hire" provision in the 1976 Act in order to confine the hiring
parties' ownership capabilities.10 8 Agency was therefore both broader than
97. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739 (1989) (citing
Easter Seal Soc'y for Crippled Children & Adults, Inc. v. Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d 323 (5th
Cir. 1987)). See REsrATEmENT (SEcOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1958).
98. 1 NIMMER & NimMER, supra note 13, § 5.03[B], at 5-16 (noting the "quick succession"
in which differing approaches arose after Aldon was decided).
99. 815 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 981 (1988).
100. Id. at 334-35 (cited in Reid, 490 U.S. at 739). See REsrrATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 220(2) (1958) (presenting a nonexclusive list of factors to distinguish a "servant" from an
"independent contractor").
101. Easter Sea, 815 F.2d at 324-25.
102. See id.
103. Id. at 329-30, 334-35. Easter Seal's "literal" interpretation read "§ 101 as reflection of
a simple dichotomy in fact between employees and independent contractors." Id. at 329.
104. See infra note 135 for the Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220(2) (1958) agency
framework.
105. The Restatement (Second) of Agency § 228(1) (1958) employs a three-part test for
determining whether something occurred within "the scope of employment" in an attempt
to distinguish an independent contractor from an employee. Specifically, conduct is within
the scope of employment if:
(a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform;
(b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits;
(c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master ....
RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF AGENCY § 28(1) (1958).
106. Easter Sea, 815 F.2d at 329. In this context, the court stated that § 101(1) applied to
employees and § 101(2) to independent contractors. Id.
107. Id. at 330.
108. See id. at 330-31. A hiring party's ownership potential would be confined "[uinder
the literal interpretation of the 1976 Act, [because] independent contractors are always statu-
tory 'authors' unless they have written certain kinds of works and have signed away their
authorship rights." Id. at 331 (emphasis added).
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common notions of a traditional employee and narrower than employees
under 1909 Act analyses.' t° 9 Reading § 101 in this fashion, the court in
Easter Seal rejected the approach adopted by the A/don court.110
3. Section 101 Applies Only to Formal Employees
The fourth lower court version discussed by the Reid Court was that
§ 101(1) simply referred to "formal, salaried" employees.1 I The Court
cited Dumas v. Gommerman1 2 to support this position.
In this case, Jennifer Dumas, widow of the late graphic artist Patrick
Nagel and representative of his estate, brought a suit against Stefan Gom-
merman, a Los Angeles art gallery owner, for the alleged copyright in-
fringement of lithographs that Nagel had produced for ITT Cannon.
11 3
Nagel apparently created the lithographs under a 1979 ITT Cannon
purchase order that mentioned nothing about being "for hire" or a trans-
fer of its copyrights. 114 In 1985, Gommerman purchased the works from
ITT Cannon and any copyrights ITT may have owned in the works. Gom-
merman then registered them for copyright protection in 1986 under his
name.1 15 Gommerman was then notified by Dumas that she owned the
works' copyrights.1 1 6 Gommerman nevertheless made a poster-sized re-
production of one of the works and marketed it nationally. 117 Dumas
filed a conflicting copyright registration in 1987 and then sought a prelim-
inary injunction of Gommerman's continued commercialization of any of
the disputed works. 118 The district court granted Dumas' injunctive re-
quest and rejected Gommerman's argument that ITT Cannon had owned
Nagel's lithographs since they were "works for hire." 1 9 In affirming this
decision, the Ninth Circuit analyzed the 1976 Act's legislative history120 to
arrive at the conclusion that § 101(1) covered only "formal, salaried em-
.109. See id. The use of agency law in "work for hire" cases has been questioned for a
§ 101 "employee." See Hardy I, supra note 8, at 221 (arguing against such a technique).
Note, however, that the Supreme Court in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid,
490 U.S. 730 (1989) held "that the term 'employee' should be understood in light of the
general common law of agency." Reid, 490 U.S. at 741. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 228(1) (1958).
110. Easter Seai 815 F.2d at 334. Regarding Aldon's "actual control" standard as "more an
interpolation of the statute than an interpretation" of it, the Fifth Circuit outlined four
problems that Akfdn represented which made the Second Circuit's test unhelpful and a po-
tential retrograde into 1909 Act principles. Id. at 331, 334.
111. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739 (1989) (citing Du-
mas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1989)). Professor Hardy, based on his interpre-
tation of legislative history and case law behind the 1976 Act, adhered strongly to the idea
that 'employee' within the work for hire context means only formal employees. Hardy I,
supra note 8, at 232-35.
112. 865 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1989).
113. Id. at 1094.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1094-95.
117. Id. at 1095.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1098-1101.
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ployees" 121 while § 101(2) encompassed "[o] nly certain types of specially
commissioned works."122 Applying this analysis, the Ninth Circuit deter-
mined that Nagel had not prepared the "works for hire" and upheld in-
junctive relief for Dumas.
123
4. The Supreme Court's Approach in Community for Creative Non-
Violence v. Reid
124
James Earl Reid, a sculptor, donated his talents and time to create a
statue depicting three homeless minority individuals for display in a pag-
eant by the Community for Creative Non-Violence (CCNV).125 Outside of
receiving design instructions from a CCNV member and occasional physi-
cal assistance from CCNV funded workers, Reid created the statue in his
studio and he did not use CCNV facilities. 12 6 When Reid finished the
statue, he delivered it for the pageant, but, after it was returned to him
following the pageant, he refused to give it back to CCNV because of his
belief that its physical composition could not endure the nationwide sculp-
ture tour planned by CCNV.1 2 7 A controversy then arose over whether
CCNV owned the statue by virtue of § 101 (1) or whether Reid created it as
an independent contractor.
128
After reviewing the four prevailing constructions of a "work for hire"
under the 1976 Act, 12 9 the Court held that an "employee" under the 1976
Act would be determined by consulting "the conventional master-servant
relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine." 130 Endors-
ing Easter Seats rejection of Aldon's "actual control" test because "no statu-
tory support [existed] for an additional dichotomy between commissioned
works" involving disputed control,13 1 the Court made it clear that Con-
gress intended to provide two mutually exclusive ways for works to acquire
"for hire" status: one for employees and the other for independent con-
tractors. 132 The Court then asserted that it must first look to agency prin-
ciples to determine whether a creator is an employee or independent
contractor.133 This analysis required the Court to consider "the hiring
121. Id. at 1102.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1105.
124. 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
125. Id. at 733-34. Reid agreed to donate his services, but the project's cost of approxi-
mately $15,000 was to be paid for by the Community for Creative Non-Violence. Id. at 734.
126. Id. at 734.
127. Id. at 735.
128. See id. at 735-36. Because the sculpture could not be a § 101(2) work because it
neither fell within the nine types of works nor had an express written agreement been exe-
cuted between the parties, the Court examined only the parameters of § 101(1) as it related
to the CCNV-Reid relationship. Id. at 738.
129. See supra notes 82-123 and accompanying text.
130. Reid, 490 U.S. at 740. The Court rejected proposals favoring the "formal, salaried
employee" interpretation. Id. at 742 n.8.
131. Id. at 742.
132. Id. at 742-43. In confirming this reading of § 101's language, the Court further
emphasized that "only enumerated categories of commissioned works [under § 101 (2)] may
be accorded work for hire status." Id. at 748.
133. Id. at 751.
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party's right to control the manner and means by which the product is
accomplished."13 4 Applying an analysis borrowed from the Restatement
(Second) of Agency,' 35 the Court held that although CCNV provided
Reid with some paid assistance, the extent to which CCNV controlled the
production's details was not "dispositive." 136 After making the analysis ac-
cording to the Restatement factors, the Court held that Reid was an in-
dependent contractor rather than a CCNV employee.
Thus, after Reid, courts have a framework to decipher whether a
§ 101(1) "employee" created the disputed work within the scope of her
employment. 137 If the status of the creator is disputed, the framework
examines the extent to which a hiring party exercised control over "the
manner and means" used in its creation before deciding whether it was
made "for hire."
With the Reid concerns laid out, the discussion now turns to "work for
hire" settings of two recent software ownership cases decided in light of
Reid.
134. Id. Professor Nimmer has cogently remarked that the principle enunciated by the
Supreme Court "is striking in its similarity to the rejected standard, i.e., right to control the
product." 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 13, § 5.03[B], at 5-21,
135. To determine whether an individual qualifies for § 101(1) "employee" status, the
Court listed a nonexclusive string of relevant analytical factors:
the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of the
work; the duration of the relationship between the parties; whether the hiring party
has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired
party's discretion over when and how long to work; the method of payment; the
hired party's role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part of the
regular business of the hiring party, whether the hiring party is in business; the
provision of employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party.
Id. at 751-52 (citing RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1958)). RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1958) provides the following list of non-exclusive factors for help-
ing determine whether a person is a servant or an independent contractor:
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise over
the details of the work;
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or busi-
ness;
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is
usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without
supervision;
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools,
and the place of work for the person doing the work;
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed;
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;
(h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the employer;
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation of master and
servant; and
(j) whether the principal is or is not in business.
Importantly, the Court in Reid said that "no one of these factors is determinative," Reid,
490 U.S. at 752, thereby providing a seed bed for lower courts' discretionary preference over
which factors control.
136. Reid, 490 U.S. at 752.
137. As used in this context, "employee" means an individual that neither party disputes
as having been in the hiring party's employ when the contested program was written. Thus,
in approaching a "scope of employment" framework, post-Reid courts have applied a REsrATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY standard.
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II. RECENT APPLICATIONS OF RED IN THE COMPUTER PROGRAM CONTEXT
A. Aymes v. Bonelli'3
8
Jonathan Bonelli, President and C.E.O. of Island Recreational, hired
Clifford Scott Aymes, an engineer, to work as a computer programmer. 39
Aymes was engaged by Bonelli to modify programs used on one genera-
tion of IBM computers so they could be further employed on an upgraded
IBM system. 140 Between 1980 and 1982, Aymes developed a number of
record-keeping computer programs under Bonelli's general supervision
entitled "CSALIB." 14 1 Although Aymes claimed that these programs were
supposed to be used on a single computer in one Island office, they were
used instead at a number of Island business locations.
1 42
Without any notice, Bonelli cut Aymes' hours following CSALIB's cre-
ation, which ultimately led to Aymes' resignation from Island in Septem-
ber of 1982. At the time of his departure, however, Island owed Aymes
over $14,500 in wages. 143 After Aymes requested these back wages,
144
Bonelli stated that Aymes needed to execute a release of his CSALIB rights
before any back wages would be paid.145 Aymes refused. He registered
CSALIB under his name with the U.S. Copyright Office in 1985146 and
proceeded to file a suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of New York against Bonelli and Island for, inter alia, copyright infringe-
ment of the CSALIB program.
t4 7
138. 980 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1992).
139. Id. at 859.
140. Aymes v. Bonelli, 21 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1716 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), afld an reconsideration,
23 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1317 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), rev'd, 980 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1992).
141. Aymes, 980 F.2d at 859.
142. Aymes, 21 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1716. Aymes claimed that Bonelli had orally prom-
ised that CSALIB would "be used on one computer by one of Mr. Bonelli's corporations and
that [Aymes] was the only person who could modify those programs." Id.
143. Aymes., 980 F.2d at 859.
144. Id.
145. Id. Transfer of copyright ownership is covered by 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (1988).
Although this issue was not before the court, Bonelli's request for Aymes' release is curious if
Bonelli believed Island was the CSALIB copyright owner. Aymes also requested compensa-
tion for the multi-site use of CSALIB because it contravened the intent of Bonelli's alleged
oral promise regarding CSALIB's limited use. Aymes, 980 F.2d at 859.
146. Id. Copyright laws have been applicable to computer programs since the congressio-
nally created National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works recog-
nized the need for copyright protection of a program's expressive elements. See CONTU,
supra note 16, at 20-21. CONTU's findings resulted in two amendments to the 1976 Act: (1)
a definition of "computer program" under § 101; and (2) conditional permission for a pro-
gram owner to copy or modify the protected program under § 117. See Act of Dec. 12, 1980,
Pub. L. 96-517, § 10, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028 (1980) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117 (1988)). It
was only after CONTU that computer programs became recognized by the courts as copy-
rightable "literary works." See, e.g., Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222,
1236-38 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin
Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1249 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984).
147. Aymes, 980 F.2d at 859. Under 17 U.S.C. § 501 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), the owner of
a valid copyright can sustain an action for copyright infringement by showing that the de-
fendant copied "constituent elements of the work that are original." Feist Publications, Inc.
v. Rural Telephone Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991). Along with the allegations of copy-
right infringement were claims involving New York state law. The copyright infringement
aspect of Aymes' suit, however, was severed from the pendent state claims and reassigned in
the district court. Aymes, 980 F.2d at 859.
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After disagreeing with Aymes' allegations regarding Bonelli's oral
promise to restrict CSALIB's use to a single location,1 48 the district court
held that the CSALIB program was a work for hire that rendered Aymes'
copyright invalid. Therefore, the district court dismissed his infringement
claim. 149 Following this decision, Aymes filed a motion for reconsidera-
tion in the district court based upon the "work for hire" factors articulated
in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid 1 °50 The district court con-
cluded, however, that Aymes was Island's "employee" based upon its appli-
cation of the Reid factors, and the court upheld its original ruling.151
Although the district court rejected Aymes' subsequent request for con-
tract rescission based upon Island's failure to pay back wages,' 5 2 it
awarded him $34,549.13 for the wages and interest.'5 Unsatisfied with
only a monetary award, Aymes appealed the district court's infringement
determination to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed and remanded and held that
Aymes was an independent contractor and that the CSALIB program had
not been created "for hire."'
54
After determining that no written agreement existed assigning
CSALIB ownership from Aymes to Bonelli, the Second Circuit proceeded
to analyze the case in light of Reid's § 101(1) common-law agency stan-
dard.1 5 5 Taking a cue from the Supreme Court's suggestion that no one
factor in its twelve-part framework could be dispositive, 156 the Second Cir-
cuit reviewed the district court's application of the Reid test. The court of
appeals noted that the trial court's "factual findings as to the presence or
148. Aymes, 21 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1717 (finding "no basis to conclude ... that Mr.
Bonelli ever agreed to limit his right to use the programs he was paying for in a way that
would prohibit him from using it for any other corporation he might form or from ex-
panding his data processing capability by adding a second computer").
149. Id.
150. 490 U.S. 730 (1989). See Aymes v. Bonelli, 23 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1317 (S.D.N.Y.
1991); see also supra note 135 (discussing the twelve Reid factors).
151. Aymes, 23 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1317-18.
152. Aymes v. Bonelli, No. 85 Civ. 2228 (SM), 1991 WL 274811, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 9,
1991). The effect of a contractual rescission in this context would have probably bestowed
upon Aymes the CSALIB program he created while at Island. Whether this weighed upon
the district court's ruling is unclear. It has been observed that a hiring party's material
breach of an employment contract should entitle the employee-creator to ownership of any
copyrighted works he or she created under the broken contract. See 1 NIMMER & NiMMER,
supra note 13, § 5.03[E], at 5-46 to 5-47.
153. Aymes v. Bonelli, No. 85 Civ. 2228 (JSM), 1991 WL 278913, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18,
1991).
154. Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, 864 (2d Cir. 1992).
155. Id. at 860. Remember that for an assignment to be effective under § 101(2) there
must be a signed writing and the work must fall within one of the nine exclusive categories.
See 17 U.S.C. § 101(2) (1988). It should be noted, however, that the nine works listed in
subsection (2), which includes "instructional texts," does not preclude the future possibility
of a computer program being within its parameters. The reason for this is found in the
subsection's language, which provides that "an 'instructional text' is a literary... work pre-
pared for publication and with the purpose of use in systematic instructional activities."
Computer programs are currently classified under copyright law as "literary works" of author-
ship. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (defining both "computer program" and
"literary works").
156. Aymes, 980 F.2d at 861.
1994]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
absence of the Reid factors [could not] be reversed unless clearly errone-
ous."157 Notably, the court asserted, that de novo review applied to the
ultimate legal determination of whether the CSALIB program was a work
for hire.
15 8
The Second Circuit determined that, while some factors might often
have little probative value, "some factors will be significant in virtually
every situation." 159 These consistently significant factors included: "(1)
the hiring party's right to control the manner and means of creation;
16°
(2) the skill required; (3) the provision of employee benefits; (4) the tax
treatment of the hired party; and (5) whether the hiring party has the
right to assign additional projects to the hired party."161 Using this as its
foundation, the court found that the district court's "mechanistic" applica-
tion of the Reid factors misconstrued their relative value for determining
whether Aymes was an Island employee. 162 The court of appeals instead
balanced the factors according to their practical relevance.
163
1. Applying the Weighted Factors
Noting that the district court did not specifically examine the "right
to control" factor,1M the court reasoned that the directions and program-
ming limitations placed upon Aymes during his programming of CSALIB
caused this factor to weigh in favor of Island's claim that Aymes was its
employee.
165
Examining the next factor, Aymes' "[1] evel of skill," the Second Circuit
rejected the district court's finding that Aymes' CSALIB programming re-
quired " no peculiar expertise or creative genius. "166 Finding conversely
157. Id. at 860-61.
158. Id. at 861.
159. Id. To illustrate this point, the court remarked that "the factors relating to the au-
thority to hire assistants" would be irrelevant if the hired party worked alone. Aymes, 980 F.2d
at 861. The Second Circuit's weighted application of Reid has been questioned. See Respect
Inc. v. Committee on the Status of Women, 815 F. Supp. 1112, 1118 n.11 (N.D. Ill. 1993)
(questioning, but not deciding, whether Aymes' weighted "gloss should be superimposed on
what the ultimate authority - the Supreme Court - has said in [Reid]").
160. This standard was enunciated by the Reid Court outside of the multifactor enumera-
tion that followed, which seemed to make it the primary "inquiry" around which the dozen
listed factors revolved. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751
(1989). The Second Circuit's election to treat this as if it constituted a part of the dozen Reid
factors relevant to a determination of the "hiring party's right to control the manner and
means by which the product" seemed to be redundant.
161. Aymes, 980 F.2d at 861. Other courts take a similar view. See, e.g., Merchant v.
Lymon, 828 F. Supp. 1048, 1058 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (finding "the hiring parties' right to control
the manner and means of creation, the method of payment, the skill required, the provision
of employee benefits, the tax treatment of the hired party, and whether the hiring party has
the right to assign additional projects to the hired party" to be "[t]he most important
factors").
162. Id. at 861-62. The court found that by giving "each factor equal weight and simply
count[ing] the number of factors for each side.... the district court "over-emphasized inde-
terminate and thus irrelevant factors having little or no bearing on Aymes' case." Id. at 861.
163. Id. at 862.
164. Id. at 862.
165. Id.
166. Id. (quoting Aymes v. Bonelli, 23 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1317, 1317 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)).
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that Aymes was "a skilled craftsman," the court concluded that this factor
weighed "heavily" in favor of Aymes' independent contractor status.
16 7
Next, the court examined two factors together: employee benefits
and tax treatment. 168 Island did not provide Aymes with employee bene-
fits nor did it pay any of his social security taxes or withhold state or fed-
eral income taxes. 169 After reviewing these factors, the district court
concluded that Aymes was working "off the books;"' 7 0 however, the Sec-
ond Circuit gave these factors "even greater weight" because Island had
not contested them.' 7 1 The Second Circuit focused on the fact that Island
denied Aymes the advantages conferred upon its employees while receiv-
ing the business benefits of treating him as an independent contractor.
172
The court concluded that an inequity would result if Island could manipu-
late the classification by denying Aymes his employee privileges at one
time, while at another time permissibly classifying him as an employee in
order to avoid any potential liability.173 In concluding its discussion on
the tax and benefit factors, the Second Circuit suggested that these two
factors would usually distinguish an employee from an independent
contractor.
174
Addressing the final weighted factor of whether Bonelli had a right to
assign other projects to Aymes, the court found that this factor weighed in
Island's favor because Bonelli assigned other projects, in addition to
CSALIB, to Aymes. 175 The court, however, accorded little weight to this
factor because "the delegation of additional projects.., is not inconsistent
with [the duties of an] independent trouble shooter."
17 6
Finally, after examining the Reid test's "remaining factors," the court




170. Id. (quoting Aymes, 23 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1318).
171. See id. In fact, the court opined that since these two factors had not been challenged
by Island throughout the case's ten year duration, their absence unequivocally supported the
conclusion that Island was not treating Aymes as an employee. Id. at 862-63.
172. The benefits to Island would include an absence of expenses for Aymes' benefit
package and payment of his payroll taxes. Id. at 862.
173. Id.
174. See id. at 863. See also Hamilton, supra note 13, at 1313 (suggesting the that an "em-
ployee" could be classified on the basis of whether she has received employment benefits
along with taxes being withheld from her salary).
175. Aymes, 980 F.2d at 863.
176. Id.
177. Id. Dealing with these factors "in order of their relative importance" to this case the
court concluded as follows:
(1) "the method of payment" presented a conflict in that Aymes had been paid
both hourly and flat fees. The court agreed with the district court's finding that this
factor was inconclusive;
(2) as Island's business involved the sale of swimming pools, Aymes' programming
of CSALIB was therefore not the "work [of] Island's regular business." The court
noted, however, that businesses often hire people performing duties outside of
their regular course. As a result, the court deemed this factor to "be of little use in
evaluating a claim that a work was made for hire;"
(3) the next factor, "[w ] hether Island is in business" was discredited by the court as
"always hav[ing] very little weight in this analysis;"
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that Aymes was an independent contractor owning the CSALIB
copyright.
1 78
Of apparently great significance to this decision was the absence of a
formalized written agreement between Aymes and Bonelli as to CSALIB's
copyright ownership. Due to Aymes' independent contractor status,
§ 101(2) would have been applicable if a written agreement existed;
whether or not CSALIB would have been considered a statutorily listed
work, however, remains a matter of speculation. 179 In the end, however,
the court needed only to evaluate Aymes' situation with regard to the Reid
factors before concluding that they weighed in his favor, a clear reflection
of the creator-favoring presumption embodied in the 1976 Copyright
Act.18 0 In those cases where the creator's employment status is undis-
(4) an impasse existed as to "[t]he discretion over when and how long to work"
because Aymes could work when he wanted although Island was controlling the
project;
(5) the court gave "[t]he duration of the relationship," inquiry little weight be-
cause of Aymes' inconsistent involvement with Island;
(6) although "[tihe location of the work" was not expressly covered by the district
court, the Second Circuit found it to be of little weight because Aymes was required
to work in Island's offices to have access to the proper computer hardware;
(7) as "[t ] he location of the work" had been given minor attention, so too was "the
source of the equipment;" and
(8) Finally, the court found Aymes' "authority to hire assistants" almost meaning-
less where he did not require any.
Id. at 863-64. For another court that has taken a similar approach, see Merchant v. Lymon,
828 F. Supp. 1048, 1058 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (suggesting by implication that some factors are of
minimal significance in comparison to others).
178. Aymes, 980 F.2d at 864.
179. Statutory guidance for this notion can be found in the language of § 101 (2), which
makes specially ordered or commissioned "instructional texts" works for hire. 17 U.S.C.
§ 101 (1988). Under the statute, an "instructional text" can be a literary work "prepared for
publication and with the purpose of use in systematic instructional activities." Id. Defined in
this way, it might be argued that an "instructional text" could encompass a specially ordered
or commissioned computer program similar to the one at issue in Aymes. Cf. Playboy Enters.,
Inc. v. Dumas, 831 F. Supp. 295, 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (adjudging a case under § 101 (2) and
finding no ownership in a hiring party).
180. See also MacLean Assocs., Inc. v. Win. M. Mercer-Meidinger-Hansen, Inc., 952 F.2d
769 (3d Cir. 1991). In this case, the Third Circuit addressed the "work for hire" issue in
another software infringement case. Here, the court first relied upon Reid's twelve factor
"employee" standard to hold that MacLean was not a Mercer "employee" when the contested
JEMSystem program was written, but rather an independent contractor. Id. at 778. Although
predating Aymes, the Third Circuit employed a similar type of weighted Reid standard to find
MacLean's skill and discretion used in writing JEMSystem to weigh in his favor. Id. at 777.
Resembling a "right to control the manner and means" factor, the court also found that
MacLean's writing of JEMSystem on his personal system also to weigh in his favor. Id. The
court also found that when MacLean created JEMSystem, Mercer was not in the business of
providing software to its clients and that MacLean's discretion over when and where to work
onJEMSystem weighed against his being characterized as a Mercer "employee." Id. Further-
more, because MacLean's payments from Mercer were for consultations rather than being a
salary and that Mercer was not witholding any taxes or providing benefits to him once he left
in 1985, he was not a § 101(1) "employee." Id.
Within their rationale, however, was the Third Circuit's analysis of an "apparent agency"
factor as it related to a client of Mercer that MacLean still serviced. This aspect of the deci-
sion focused on the client's perception of how MacLean was or was not associated with
Mercer.
Although MacLean portrayed himself to the client as still being a Mercer employee, the
court noted that Reid's "central focus" was "the relationship between the person performing
the work and the person paying him to perform the work." Id. at 777-78. Therefore, despite
the client's lack of knowledge that MacLean left Mercer's employ in 1985, the court focused
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puted insofar as it relates to the time period when the program was cre-
ated, or when the creator was an "employee" during the program's
writing, the Reid factors fall into the background as the court must deter-
mine instead whether the program was created within the employee's
"scope of employment." Addressing this precise issue was a recent U.S.
district court decision.
B. Avtec Systems, Inc. v. Peiffer98 '
From May 1984 to April 1992, Jeffrey Peiffer was employed as a com-
puter programmer by Avtec Systems, a government contractor which pro-
vided space-related computer services.1 82 In 1985, Peiffer began writing
the "Orbit Program" ("Orbit") for Avtec.' 8 3 Following a demonstration of
Orbit to Avtec's President, Ronald Hirsch, Mr. Hirsch and another Avtec
employee, Mr. Greg Kope, asked Peiffer to modify Orbit before it would
be marketed.' 8 4 Peiffer, in making the suggested program changes and
charging Avtec accordingly, developed Orbit into the ".309 version."
185
In 1988, Orbit was used as a demonstrative representation of Avtec's
technological capabilities in the space satellite field. The 1988 demonstra-
tion helped Avtec secure a government contract.1 8 6 In February, 1990,
Peiffer gave Orbit to an Avtec employee for use in another demonstration.
However, this employee discovered a number of bugs in the program that
Peiffer corrected before the demonstration.18 7 Two years later Peiffer
demonstrated an updated version of Orbit to NASA that did not include
on "the nature of the relationship between Mr. MacLean and Mercer," not the third-party
client's perception of MacLean's affiliation with Mercer. Id. at 778. At this point in the
decision, the court referred to the Restatement (Second) of Agency. The court concluded
that the client's perception of MacLean as Mercer's 'apparent" agent was not dispositive.
Rather, whether MacLean was an "actual" agent was the crucial question. Id. See also NIMMER
& NIMMER, supra note 13, § 5.03[B] [I] [a] [iii], at 5-21 n.71.1 (discussing MacLean's "actual"
agency holding).
181. 805 F. Supp. 1312 (E.D. Va. 1992), affid in par, rev'd in part and remanded, Nos. 92-
2521, 92-2607, U.S. App. LEXIS 6522 (4th Cir. Apr. 6, 1994).
182. Id. at 1314.
183. Id. at 1315. The court described the "Orbit Program" as follows:
The Orbit Program is a computer program which displays orbital simulations and
related data in graphic form on a Macintosh computer. Specifically, the Orbit Pro-
gram displays the path of orbits relative to certain earth positions, the visibility of
satellites from certain earth stations, the visibility of stars from the satellite, and
calculates and displays various data in a graphic format. The Orbit Program's uni-
queness stems from the fact that the Macintosh permits the Orbit Program's user to
interact directly with it by using a handheld control known as a "mouse" and the
program displays data in graphic form.
Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1315-16.
186. Id. at 1315. The Fourth Circuit has since rejected this utilitarian finding by the dis-
trict court in regard to Avtec's .309 program, concluding that it "inject[ed] into the analysis of
copyright ownership an element contemplated neither by the Restatement's scope of em-
ployment test nor by the law of copyright generally...." 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS, at *11. This
conclusion does not, however, bind the district court to alter its ultimate legal conclusion on
remand-a conclusion based upon the creator-favoring presumption. See infra note 198 and
accompanying text.
187. Id. at 1315-16.
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improvements he knew were important to NASA.18 8 As a result, Avtec did
not receive the NASA contract.18 9 One month later, in February 1992,
Peiffer refused to demonstrate Orbit for a potential Avtec client, claiming
"he did not have a copy of [Orbit] at the office." 190
A potential reason for Peiffer's conduct involved his prior independ-
ent acts outside of Avtec. Unbeknownst to Avtec, Peiffer had begun in-
dependent work on the Orbit program in 1989 in order to alter it from
the demonstration program used by Avtec into a "stand alone" program
for commercial distribution.19 1 The impetus behind this Orbit modifica-
tion arose out of a 1989 meeting Peiffer had with Mr. Paul F. Kisak, the
sole shareholder and president of Kisak-Kisak, Inc. ("KKI").192 The two
men discussed marketing a modified Orbit program through KKI.193 In
March of 1989, Peiffer entered into an agreement with KKI that gave KKI
exclusive license to market the updated Orbit program.' 94 From its 1989
inception until the time the case was heard in 1992, this modified version
of Orbit generated $197,000 in gross revenues for KKI, with $98,500 going
to Peiffer.
19 5
After learning of Orbit's commercial distribution through KKI, Avtec
instituted an action against Peiffer, Kisak and KKI, alleging, inter alia, that
the Orbit program was prepared by Peiffer within the scope of his employ-
ment. According to the action, Orbit was a work for hire thereby making
Avtec the true owner.
196
Initially, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia found that Peiffer was a full-time Avtec employee when he created
Orbit.197 The court went on to hold that Peiffer owned the Orbit pro-
gram's copyright despite his employee status because Avtec "failed to over-
come the presumption that [a work's creator] is its rightful owner for
copyright purposes."' 9 8
Avtec argued that Peiffer created the Orbit Program within the "scope
of his employment." On the other hand Peiffer argued that he created
the Orbit Program as a "hobby. "199 After addressing these arguments,
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia undertook a Reid
"work for hire" analysis.
188. Id. at 1316.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. Under the same reasoning expressed in note 186 supra, the Fourth Circuit found
the "stand alone" characterization to be outside of copyright's "work for hire" policy objec-
tives. 1994 U.S. LEXIS, at *11.
192. Id. at 1314-16.
193. Id. at 1316.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1317. Avtec also sued Peiffer and KKI for misappropriation of its Orbit trade
secrets, misappropriation of business opportunity and Peiffer individually for breach of fidu-
ciary duty. Id. at 1314.
197. Id. at 1318.
198. Id. at 1319.
199. Avtec Sys., Inc. v. Peiffer, 805 F. Supp. 1312, 1317 (E.D. Va. 1992), affid in par, rev'd
in part and remanded, Nos. 92-2521, 92-2607, U.S. App. LEXIS 6522 (4th Cir. Apr. 6, 1994).
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The court stated as a preliminary matter that Reids construction of
the 1976 Act, creates a "presumption ... that the one who creates the work
is its rightful owner for copyright purposes. This presumption may be
overcome, however, if the work is one 'made for hire.'"200 Next, the
court laid out Reid's two step approach: (1) was the " 'creator'" of the
disputed work an " 'employee' " or an " 'independent contractor' "; and if
found to be an employee, (2) was the work generated within the creator's
scope of employment.20 1 The district court first found that Peiffer was
Avtec's full-time employee during the disputed time period of Orbit's crea-
tion.2 0 2 Then the court turned to the second leg of the test.
Citing a "three-part Restatement test" enunciated by the Reid
Court, 20 3 the court found as a matter of law that Avtec did not satisfy its
evidentiary burden for the "scope of employment" requirement.2 0 4 The
court concluded that Avtec failed to prove that the KKI version, Orbit
2.05, was created within the scope of Peiffer's employment. 20 5 In particu-
lar, the court noted that Avtec provided insufficient evidence to show that
the 2.05 version was created "within Avtec authorized time and space lim-
its." 20 6 Furthermore, Peiffer created the 2.05 version outside of his Avtec
hours, on his own personal equipment and not as a service to Avtec.
20 7
Because Avtec failed to satisfy the tripartite Restatement test, the court
held that Avtec also "failed to overcome the presumption that Peiffer, as




201. Id. at 1317-18 (citing Reid, 490 U.S. at 751).
202. Id. at 1318. This does not stray from Red, which states only that § 101(1) cannot be
restricted to formal, salaried employees, not that such an employee classification is outside of
§ 101(1)'s purview. See Reid, 490 U.S. at 742 n.8 (rejecting "the suggestion . . . that the
§ 101 (1) term 'employee' refers only to formal, salaried employees") (emphasis added).
203. Avtec, 805 F. Supp. at 1318; see supra note 105.
204. Id. at 1318.
205. Id. at 1318-19.
206. Id. at 1318.
207. Id. at 1319. The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court on the issue of whether
Peiffer's 2.05 program was created within the scope of his employment at Avtec. This rever-
sal, however, turned upon the narrow issue of whether or not Peiffer's creation of the 2.05
program "was at least 'appreciably' motivated by a desire to further its corporate goals in
order to satisfy the third element of the [Restatement § 228] work-for-hire test." 1994 U.S.
App. LEXIS, at *11. Despite its reversal, the Fourth Circuit expressed an awareness that
Avtec may, on remand, still be unable to satisfy the work-for-hire test. Id. at *17. Hence, the
Fourth Circuit's remand can be easily read as an endorsement of the creator favoring
presumption.
208. Id. Curiously, the court did not distinguish which version of Orbit applied to its
decision, leaving this important detail subject to conjecture. See Improved Software was not
Work for Hire but Violated Trade Secrets, Pat., Trademark & CopyrightJ. (BNA) No. 1106, at 43
(Nov. 19, 1992) (remarking that the court's ambiguous referral to the "Orbit program" will
leave many questions about its decision open to question).
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The court also rejected Avtec's claim for joint authorship,2 0 9 stating
that Avtec failed to demonstrate an "intent to merge separate efforts into a
unitary whole."
21 0
Thus, notwithstanding its noting that a rebuttable "work for hire"
ownership presumption resides in the creator of a work under the 1976
Copyright Act, the Avtec court made it abundantly clear that a hiring party
will not receive the same presumptive favortism that it enjoyed under the
1909 Copyright Act. To have held otherwise would have contradicted the
policy concerns symbolized by the Supreme Court in Reid.
2 11
III. ANALYSIS
The Aymes2 12 and Avtec213 interpretations of Reid recognize a clear
policy underpinning: the presumption under the 1976 Act has swung
away from the employer or commissioning party to the employee or crea-
tive individual producing a copyrightable work. In the past, many cases
seemed to focus on which of the two parties was best able to disseminate
the work publicly. This focal party was typically the one with "deep pock-
ets."2 14 For example, the Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc.21 5 "actual
control" test 216 arguably embraced the view that the party better equipped
to market and distribute a work to the public would prevail in a "work for
hire" dispute.2 17 Since the Supreme Court's rejection of this standard,
218
a judicial trend has developed that favors the creator of a work over the
person best prepared to disseminate it.2 19 This trend is evidenced by the
209. A "joint work" is defined under copyright as "a work prepared by two or more au-
thors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdepen-
dent parts of a unitary whole." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Authors of a joint
work will be co-owners of the copyright in the work. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1988).
210. Avtec, 805 F. Supp. at 1319.
211. But see Miller v. CP Chems., Inc., 808 F. Supp. 1238 (D. S.C. 1992) (reaching an
opposite result in a case similar to Avtec).
212. Aymes represents a weighted application of the Reid factors for differentiating an
"employee" from an "independent contractor" based on the particular facts of a case.
213. Avtec stands for an application of a three-part Restatement test for determining
whether a work has been created within one's "scope of employment."
214. See, I.T. Hardy, An Economic Understanding of Copyright Law's Work-Made-For-Hire Doc-
trine, 12 COLUM.-VLAJ.L. & AsRrs 181 (1988) [hereinafter Hardy II] (arguing that the "better
exploiter," or party best-suited to distribute a work to the public, was generally the victor in a
1909 Act "work for hire" controversy).
215. 738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984).
216. See supra notes 83-95 and accompanying text.
217. See Hardy II, supra note 214, at 220 (asserting that Aldon, a U.S. business, was "in a
better position to exploit the figurines commercially" than the foreignJapanese firm involved
with their creation).
218. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 742 (1989) (con-
cluding that the "actual control" test cannot be supported by "the language and structure of
§ 101"). A major problem with the Aldon approach was that it seemed to "carry[ I forward"
1909 Act principles into a 1976 Act context. 1 NIMMER & NiMMER, supra note 13, § 5.03[B],at
5-15 to 5-16; see also Litman, supra note 61, at 899-90. Other courts have not been immune
from the temptation to read the 1976 Act in terms of the 1909 Act's caselaw. See, e.g., Rock-
ford Map Publishers, Inc. v. Directory Serv. Co., 768 F.2d 145 (7th Cir. 1985) (relying upon
1909 Act case law in adjudging a matter clearly within the scope of § 102(b) in the 1976
Copyright Act), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1061 (1986).
219. See, e.g., Easter Seal Soc'y for Crippled Children & Adults, Inc. v. Playboy Enters., 815
F.2d 323, 331 (5th. Cir. 1987) (finding its "literal" interpretation of the 1976 Act to make
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rationale of decisions such as Aymes and Avtec. Reflecting this trend are
the two decisions' pro-creator common-law approaches:
(1) that which enables a court to weigh, within its discretion,
the Reid factors as it deems appropriate; 220 , or
(2) using the Restatement's § 228(1) tripartite "scope of em-
ployment" test.
2 2 1
The inescapable conclusion is that along with Congress' revision of
the "work for hire" provisions in the 1976 Act came a refocus on the bed-
rock principle of United States' copyright laws: " [t]o Promote... for lim-
ited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings."22 2 The Supreme Court's outline of a general common-law for-
mat in Reid provided the lower courts with a workable means to foster this
constitutional principle. Therefore, absent an express written agreement
between the creating parties or the creation of a § 101 (2) listed work, a
rebuttable presumption now rests in the creative author. 223 This ap-
proach benefits the public by favoring those who expand our wealth of
artistic treasures-creative individuals who put their natural gifts into the
design of valuable works such as socially beneficial computer programs.
CONCLUSION
Since the mid-nineteenth century courts have wrestled with issues of
copyright ownership in works created out of an employment setting. At
first, courts adopted a master-servant presumption which rested ownership
in the employer. Although shaping this presumption around the em-
ployer-employee relationship, courts construing the ambiguous 1909
Copyright Act merged this previously applied presumption into cases in-
volving commission relationships. The conflict arising out of this judicial
approach, which failed to differentiate employees from commissioned par-
ties, was a major catalyst for the copyright laws' "work for hire" revision.
In 1976, Congress enacted a statutory framework (the Copyright Act
of 1976) that placed the parties associated with a work's creation on more
equal footing. Since its enaction, courts have constructed and applied the
independent contractors statutory authors unless a particular statutory work has been cre-
ated subject to an express written agreement between the parties), cet. denied, 485 U.S. 981
(1988).
220. See, e.g., Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, 860-61 (2d Cir. 1992); Marco v. Accent Pub-
lishing Co., Inc., 969 F.2d 1547, 1550-51 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding photographer to have been
an independent contractor where only three Reid factors weighed in the commissioning
party's favor); Kelstall-Whitney v. Mahar, CA89-4684, 1990 WL 69013 at *9-10 (E.D. Pa. May
23, 1990) (holding computer programmer's application software to not be a § 101 (1) "work
for hire" using selected Reid factors). See also Robert A. Kreiss, supra note 60, at 172-73 (dis-
cussing Reid's agency test as susceptible to judicial manipulation).
221. Avtec Sys., Inc. v. Peiffer, 805 F. Supp. 1312, 1318-19 (E.D. Va. 1992), aff'd in part,
vacated in part and remanded, Nos. 92-2521, 92-2607, U.S. App. LEXIS 6522 (4th Cir. Apr. 6,
1994).
222. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 8.
223. See M.G.B. Homes, Inc. v. Ameron Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d 1486, 1492 (1 1th Cir. 1990)
(holding a work to have not been created "for hire" through an application of selected Reid
factors and a finding that the architectural drawings were neither created under contract nor
a § 101 (2) listed work).
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framework in a manner that gives creative individuals significant bargain-
ing leverage against funding parties. With a continued judicial observance
of this trend, imaginative individuals not under contract will have a bar-
gaining chip to offset the funding party's "deep pockets"-it is called the
law.
THE FUTURE OF THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AcT's
DELIBERATIVE PROCESS EXEMPTION AND DISCLOSURE
OF COMPUTERIZED FEDERAL RECORDS AFTER
Petroleum Information Corp. v.
United States Department of the Interior
INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA")l to pro-
vide a true governmental records disclosure statute. 2 FOIA mandated the
availability of federal records to any member of the public, subject to nine
broad exemptions.3 The fifth of these nine exemptions protects "inter-
agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be avail-
able by law.., to a party in litigation with the agency" ("Exemption 5").4
Courts have construed Exemption 5 to mean that an agency is permitted
to withhold information associated with its deliberative, or decision-mak-
ing, process.
5
Since the enactment of FOIA, the deliberative process privilege ex-
emption has been heavily litigated.6 In Petroleum Information Corp. v. United
States Department of the Interior,7 the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
held that computerized records of the Bureau of Land Management
("BLM"), a division of United States Department of Interior, were not pro-
tected by Exemption 5 because of the objective nature of the records and
the unreasonable accessibility to the records in another form.8 This deci-
sion is important in its recognition of the right of public citizens to obtain
computerized agency records already available in a non-computerized for-
mat. This Comment discusses FOIA's deliberative process privilege, re-
views how courts have treated the privilege, and analyzes the impact of
Petroleum on the future of the privilege and the ability to obtain electronic
information under FOIA.
1. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988).
2. H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.CAN.
2418.
3. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)-(9) (1988).
4. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1988).
5. See, e.g., Dudman Communications Corp. v. Department of Air Force, 815 F.2d 1565,
1567 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Department of Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 256
(D.C. Cir. 1977); Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Train, 491 F.2d 63, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
6. Se I JAMES T. O'RLLY, FEDERAL INFORMATION DiscLosuRE, § 15.01 (2d ed. 1990).
7. 976 F.2d 1429 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
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I. THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT'S DELIBERATIVE PROCESS
PRIVILEGE
Congress originally conceived FOIA as a revision of Section 3, the
public disclosure section of the Administrative Procedure Act.9 The legis-
lature recognized that Section 3 fell far short of its disclosure goals and
considered it to be more of a withholding statute than a disclosure stat-
ute.1 0 Under FOIA, an agency can potentially avoid disclosure by assert-
ing that the requested documents fall under one of the nine statutory
exemptions. Exemption 5 permits the withholding of documents gener-
ated within an agency or transferred between agencies that are not avail-
able to a party in litigation with the agency.11 Courts have viewed
Exemption 5's language as "somewhat Delphic"12 and "obscure."13 Many
decisions thus relied on legislative history for interpretation of Exemption
5.14 Although the documents comprising the legislative history of FOIA
were voluminous, a leading commentator stated that a ten-page Senate
committee report and a fourteen-page House committee report consti-
tuted the substantial useful information on the legislative intent behind
FOIA. 5
Both the Senate report 16 and the House report 17 were favorable on
the passage of FOIA. The general theme of both reports was that Con-
gress intended to incorporate the government's common law discovery
and executive privileges into Exemption 5.18 The House report leaned
toward nondisclosure in its remarks that agencies should release only that
information "routinely" available to private parties in litigation with agen-
cies, and Exemption 5 should protect documents which the agency has
received or generated before it completes the process of making a deci-
9. 5 U.S.C. § 1002 (1964); seeS. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1966) 3 [hereinaf-
ter S. Rep. No. 813] (discussing why Section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act needed
revision).
10. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79 (1973) (citing S. Rep. No. 813 at 5).
11. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (5) states that FOLA does not apply to "inter-agency or intra-agency
memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency
in litigation with an agency."
12. Department of Justice v.Julian, 486 U.S. 1, 8 (1988).
13. City of W. Chicago v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 547 F. Supp. 740,
747 (N.D. 11. 1982); see also Petroleum Info. Corp. v. United States Dep't of Interior, 976 F.2d
1429, 1439 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (recognizing the "slippery" application of Exemption 5); Parke,
Davis & Co. v. Califano, 623 F.2d 1, 5 (6th Cir. 1980) ("It is much easier to state the purpose
of Exemption 5 than to apply it").
14. See, e.g., Julian, 486 U.S. at 12; Mink, 410 U.S. at 83; Petrleum, 976 F.2d at 1434;
Pacific Molasses Co. v. NLRB, 577 F.2d 1172, 1183 (5th Cir. 1978); SDC Dev. Corp. v. Ma-
thews, 542 F.2d 1116, 1119 (9th Cir. 1976).
15. Kenneth C. Davis, The Information Act: A Prdiminay Analysis, 34 U. CI. L. REy. 761,
762 (1966-67). At least three Supreme Court FOIA decisions, NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
421 U.S. 132, 153 (1975),Julian 486 U.S. at 17-18 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting), and United
States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 772 n.19
(1989), have cited Professor Davis' article.
16. See generaly S. REP. No. 813, supra note 9.
17. H.R. RaP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.CA.N.
2418.
18. See id.; see generaly S. REP. No. 813, supra note 9.
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sion. 19 The Senate committee's remarks, on the other hand, emphasized
that exemptions to disclosure should be construed as narrowly as possi-
ble.2 0 Virtually all of the courts which have reviewed the difference be-
tween the two reports have stated that the Senate report represents the
truer indication of Congress' purpose in enacting Exemption 5.21 Despite
the conflicting language in the two reports, courts have cited both because
they clearly identify Congress' intent to address the need to maintain an
environment within agencies in which candid discussions can take place.
22
The Supreme Court has construed Exemption 5 to mean that the
public is entitled to all documents which would be discoverable by a pri-
vate party in litigation with an agency.23 However, differentiating between
discoverable and privileged material is not always easy.24 The Court has
not interpreted Exemption 5 to clearly incorporate every civil discovery
privilege.2 5 Because of the uncertainty inherent in the rules governing
discovery, the Court has held that discovery rules should be applied in
FOIA cases only by "rough analogies." 26
The deliberative process privilege contains three policy bases.2 7 First,
the privilege protects candid discussions within an agency.2 8 Second, it
prevents public confusion which would result from premature disclosure
of agency opinions occurring before the agency establishes final policy. 29
Third, it protects the integrity of an agency's decision because the public
should notjudge officials based on the information they considered prior
to issuing their final decisions.
30
In order for a record to qualify for Exemption 5 under the delibera-
tive process privilege, it must meet a two prong test of being both "predeci-
sional," or created prior to the adoption of agency policy, and
"deliberative," or actually related to the process by which the policy was
developed.3 1 These two requirements recognize that the primary purpose
of the privilege is to protect the confidentiality of the process by which an
agency makes governmental decisions.
3 2
19. Davis, supra note 15, at 763; see H.R. RF,. No. 1497, reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.CAN. at
2428. But see Federal Open Mkt. Comm. v. Merrill, 443 U.S. 340, 354-55 (1979) (finding it
unclear whether Exemption 5 intended to incorporate every civil discovery privilege and
courts should be hesitant in construing Exemption 5 to incorporate a civil discovery privilege
which would duplicate another FOIA exemption).
20. S. REP. No. 813, supra note 9, at 9.
21. Vaughn v. Rosen, 523 F.2d 1136, 1141 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (and cases cited
therein); see alsoJordan v. Department ofJustice, 591 F.2d 753, 768 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (stating
that the language of the House Report is "less consonant" with the purpose of FOIA).
22. 1 BURT A. BRAvEaMAN & FwAcasJ. CHETWY, INFORMATION LAw § 9-2 (1985).
23. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 86 (1973).
24. Id. at 87-89.
25. Mer,iU 443 U.S. at 354.
26. Mink, 410 U.S. at 86.
27. Jordan, 591 F.2d at 772.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 772-73.
30. Id. at 773.
31. Id. at 774.
32. National Wildlife Fed'n v. United States Forest Serv., 861 F.2d 1114, 1117 (9th Cir.
1988); see also S. REP. No. 813, supra note 9, which states:
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II. DEVELOPMENT OF DELIBERATWE PRIVILEGE CASE LAw
A. Factual vs. Deliberative
Early FOIA decisions involving agencies that claimed the deliberative
process privilege dwelled on whether the information was factual or delib-
erative, the latter consisting primarily of the opinions and recommenda-
tions of agency officials.33 Under this factual-deliberative distinction,
agencies could withhold deliberative information, but had to disclose fac-
tual information.34 In EPA v. Mink,3 5 the Supreme Court reasoned that
the release of factual information would not harm the consultative pur-
poses that the privilege of nondisclosure protects. 36 However, agencies
could not withhold factual data merely by placing it in an opinion.3 7 To
the extent that the agency could excise factual data from the document
without compromising the confidential remainder of the document, the
agency must disclose the factual information.3 8 Beginning with Mead Data
Central, Inc. v. United States Department of Justice,3 9 decisions soon recog-
nized that the factual-deliberative distinction did not work in all cases.
40
In Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy,4 1 D.C. CircuitJudge Wald
held that the deliberative process privilege did not exempt documents
merely because they were deliberative on their face; the documents had to
also somehow reflect the "give-and-take" by which an agency made its deci-
It was argued, and with merit, that efficiency of Government would be greatly ham-
pered if, with respect to legal and policy matters, all Government agencies were
prematurely forced to "operate in a fishbowl." The committee is convinced of the
merits of this general proposition, but it has attempted to delimit the exception as
narrowly as consistent with efficient Government operation.
I at 9.
33. See, e.g., Mink, 410 U.S. at 87-88; Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 939 (D.C.
Cir.); cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970).
34. See Mink, 410 U.S. at 90.
35. 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
36. See i& at 88. In Mink, Congresswoman Patsy Mink and 32 other members of the
House commenced an action under FOIA to seek release of recommendations to President
Nixon regarding the advisability of scheduled underground nuclear tests. Id at 75-76. The
EPA argued that the recommendations were protected under Exemption 5 because they
were prepared for the sole purpose of advising the President. Id. at 77.
37. Id. at 92.
38. 1I The court of appeals directed the trial court to order an in camera inspection of
the materials to determine if any factual material could be severed and disclosed. I& at 93.
The Supreme Court reversed and held that if the EPA could demonstrate by affidavit or
testimony that the materials sought were purely advisory and contained no factual informa-
tion which could be severed, an in camera inspection of the documents was not "automatic."
I& at 93.
39. 566 F.2d 242, 256 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
40. 1I The court warned that, although the factual-deliberative test could offer a quick
and predictable rule for decision, "courts must be careful not to be victims of their own
semantics." I at 256. The court stated that in some situations the disclosure of purely fac-
tual matter could expose the agency's decision-making process. Thus, the court rejected
Mead Data Central's argument that the documents sought were "reportorial and factual"
because the documents only provided summaries of discussions among Air Force personnel
regarding negotiations between the Air Force and West Publishing and did not set out rec-
ommendations or opinions. The court stated that such summaries of discussions were as
much a part of the deliberative process as the actual recommendations based on the negotia-
tions. I at 257; see also Lead Indus. Ass'n v. OSHA, 610 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1979).
41. 617 F.2d 854, 866 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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sion.4 2 Conversely, documents apparently factual sometimes revealed a
lot about the agency's decision-making process. 43 Thus, less emphasis was
placed on the kind of documents sought and more on the effect of the
documents' disclosure. 44 The determinative question in Exemption 5
cases then became whether the release of material would expose the
agency's deliberative process in such a way as to harm candid discussions
and thereby harm the ability of agencies to function effectively.
45
B. Predecisional vs. Postdecisional
Courts also began to differentiate between predecisional and
postdecisional documents when interpreting FOIA.46 Deliberation is a
process which works toward a future decision, and the additional require-
ment that material must be predecisional seemed superfluous. 47 How-
ever, as set forth in Access Reports v. Department ofJustice,48 an "after-the-fact
explanation" of an agency's decision may be deliberative, but because
Congress did not intend to exempt such "explanatory" information from
FOIA, the privilege will be denied if the court finds that the documents
were not predecisional. 4 9 Concerns arose that if agencies did not have to
disclose explanations of their final decisions, they could develop a body of
"secret law."5 0 The Coastal States court reasoned that postdecisional inter-
pretations are a part of the agency's law itself, and agencies should make
42. Id. at 866 (holding that Exemption 5 covers "recommendations, draft documents,
proposals, suggestions and other subjective documents" that suggest an agency position
which may be only a personal opinion of the agency's position); see a/so Parke, Davis & Co. v.
Califano, 623 F.2d 1, 6 (6th Cir. 1980) (stating that just because a document contains recom-
mendations from a subordinate to a superior does not make the document deliberative; the
court must know whether the document is a requisite part of the deliberative process or
simply a "peripheral item which just 'beefs up' a position with cumulative materials");
Vaughn v. Rosen, 523 F.2d 1136, 1144-45 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (finding that the evaluative sec-
tions of the reports which the government maintained were shielded from disclosure and
only provided the "raw data upon which decisions [could] be made; they were not themselves
a part of the decisional process").
43. See, e.g., Lead Indus. Ass'n, 610 F.2d at 83; Washington Research Project, Inc. v. De-
partment of HEW, 504 F.2d 238, 249 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Train, 491
F.2d 63, 68-69 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
44. Dudman Communications Corp. v. Department of Air Force, 815 F.2d 1565, 1568
(D.C. Cir. 1987).
45. Id.
46. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 151-52 (1975) (and cases cited
therein).
47. Access Reports v. Department of Justice, 926 F.2d 1192, 1194 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
48. Id.
49. Id. However, Judge Williams dismissed Access Reports' argument that the requested
document was not predecisional because the Department ofJustice could not "pinpoint" its
contents to a later decision. Judge Williams found that the Department of Justice memo
superficially resembled a postdecisional explanation of an agency decision because it ana-
lyzed amendments to FOIA proposed by the Department ofJustice and already introduced in
the Senate. However, the memo was found exempt because the Department ofJustice met
its burden of identifying the decisionmaking process contained in the memo, which was the
Department ofJustice's study of how to push the FOIA amendments through Congress. Id.
at 1196.
50. Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 867 (D.C. Cir.
1980).
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them available to the public. 51 For example, if a company has a case
heard before the FTC, the company has a right to know the orders and
interpretations which the FTC has actually applied to prior cases before
it.5
2
Since the passage of FOIA, courts have had difficulty applying the
two-part test because neither the factual-deliberative test nor the predeci-
sional-postdecisional test offers a clear-cut analysis. Recent cases involving
factual material requested under FOIA illustrated this point as courts held
that census statistics,53 cost estimates5 4 and summaries of facts gleaned
from a voluminous hearing record5 5 were all protected by Exemption 5.
Regarding the predecisional component, the Coastal court noted that case
law was not too helpful in deciding whether documents were predecisional
because the deliberative process privilege was so dependent upon the par-
ticular document and its role in the decision-making process.5 6 The court
found the Department of Energy had adopted a particular policy even
though it argued that the source of the policy was contained in a draft
document. 57 The court held that such a document lost its privileged sta-
tus because the Department of Energy adopted the policy.
58
C. D.C. Circuit Treatment of the Deliberative Process Privilege
Since the passage of FOIA, the D.C. Circuit has delivered more FOIA
decisions than any other circuit.5 9 During the late seventies and early
eighties, the D.C. Circuit was known for its pro-disclosure stance in decid-
ing FOIA cases, 60 but beginning in the mid-eighties, the court began in-
creasing the range of the deliberative process privilege in requests
involving factual information. 6 1 Wolfe v. Department of Health and Human
Services,62 Quarles v. Department of Nasyf3 and Dudman Communications Corp.
51. Id. at 867-68 (citing Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698, 708 (D.C. Cir. 1971)).
52. See Sterling Drug, 450 F.2d at 714.
53. Florida House of Representatives v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 961 F.2d 941,
950 (11th Cir. 1992).
54. Quarles v. Department of Navy, 893 F.2d 390, 392-93 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
55. Lead Indus. Ass'n v. OSHA, 610 F.2d 70, 86 (2d Cir. 1979).
56. Coastal States, 617 F,2d at 867.
57. See id. at 866; cf. City of W. Chicago v. NRC, 547 F. Supp. 740, 747 (N.D. Ill. 1982)
(holding that an affidavit which described the process of "give and take" needed to polish
unpublished drafts of an environmental impact statement which would later be published
established the statement's predecisional status).
58. Coastal States, 617 F.2d at 869. The Department of Energy memoranda here were
routinely used by agency staff in conducting audits and were kept and "referred to as prece-
dent." Id. If this occurs, Judge Wald reasoned, the agency has "promulgated a body of secret
law which it is actually applying in its dealings with the public." Id. The Department of
Energy then could not attempt to protect such memoranda behind a "tentative opinion"
label. Id.
59. See Patricia M. Wald,... Doctor, Lawyer, Merchant, Chief" 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv.




62. 839 F.2d 768 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
63. 893 F.2d 390 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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v. Department of the Air Force6 4 are illustrative of this approach by the D.C.
Circuit to increase the range of the deliberative process privilege.
In Wolfe, where five of the eleven judges dissented, Judge Bork, writ-
ing for the majority, held that a log containing the dates that the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services received and forwarded regulatory
proposals was exempt because the dates would reveal the proposals prema-
turely.65 As Judge Wald pointed out in her dissent, however, the log only
disclosed dates and the destination of the proposals. 66 The information
neither disclosed the desired effect of the proposal nor the origin of any
decision not to regulate. 67 Judge Wald found that the log was not deliber-
ative because it did not even show a clear "yes" or "no" recommendation,
let alone any substantive language regarding the regulation. 68 Judge Wald
characterized the majority opinion as exaggerating the effect of the log on
agency deliberations and confusing the purpose of Exemption 5.69 Addi-
tionally, Judge Ginsburg noted in her dissent that the majority opinion
strayed from the legislative intent behind the deliberative process privi-
lege, which was to construe the privilege "as narrowly as possible."
70
In Quarles, the plaintiff characterized Navy cost estimates of building
ports as fact, and argued that disclosure would not harm the Navy.7 1 The
plaintiff relied on two cases from the Sixth and Ninth Circuits which ruled
that real property appraisals were disclosable. 72 Although the two cases
had special features which made them distinguishable, 73 the Quarles court
stated that appraisals seemed to involve "fewer judgment calls than esti-
mates of what construction will cost."7 4 The court also contended that if
the cost estimates were made public, naval officials might tend not to call
for cost estimates or to fudge such estimates. 75 The opinion also discussed
how disclosure of cost estimates could threaten public acceptance of the
Navy's final decision because the Navy might end up building a port
which, although more expensive, was strategically superior. 76 However,
this kind of information was precisely what the public had a right to seek.
If ports were being built for purely political reasons, as Quarles con-
tended, agencies should not be able to hide behind excuses that to dis-
64. 815 F.2d 1565 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
65. Wolfe, 839 F.2d at 775.
66. Id. at 777.
67. Id.
68. Id at 779.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 780 (quoting S. REP. No. 813, supra note 9, at 9).
71. Quares, 893 F.2d at 392-93.
72. Id. at 393 (citing General Services Administration v. Benson, 415 F.2d 878 (9th Cir.
1969) and Tennessean Newspapers, Inc. v. FHA, 464 F.2d 657 (6th Cir. 1972)).
73. In Benson, a statute which required disclosure in the absence of a compelling reason
was a deciding factor for the court. 415 F.2d at 880. In Tennessean Newspapers, FHA had
already disclosed the content of the appraisal, withholding only the appraiser's name. 464
F.2d at 662.
74. Quares, 893 F.2d at 393.
75. Id. at 393.
76. Seeid.
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close such information would produce "stillborn or wishy-washy"
analyses.
77
The Dudman court relied heavily on a prior decision, Russell v. Depart-
ment of the Air Force,78 to hold that a draft manuscript of an Air Force his-
torical work containing factual matter was exempt under the deliberative
process privilege. 79 In Russell, the draft sought differed from the docu-
ment released to the public only because it contained 20 pages of factual
material which the Air Force decided to delete in the final version. 80
Therefore, the court found that a simple comparison of the draft and final
documents would reveal the editorial decision the Air Force made and
thus held that such a decision was exempted by the deliberative process
privilege. 8 1 In Dudman, on the other hand, the historical manuscript at
issue was revised numerous times before it was made public. 82 Dudman
only sought the initial draft prepared by Riley Sunderland.83 After the Air
Force became dissatisfied with Sunderland's work, Martin Blumenson was
hired to "substantially" rework the manuscript. 8 4 Dudman contended
that, unlike the document at issue in Russell the Sunderland draft was
materially different from the final manuscript. The draft document then
could not arguably provide any clue as to agency deliberations in editing
the work. 85 And even though the court acknowledged that any person
comparing the Sunderland draft to the final manuscript would find it im-
possible to attribute any given change to a particular person or particular
stage in the editorial process, the Sunderland draft was held exempt.
86
Against this increasingly broadened scope of Exemption 5 case law, in
1992 the D.C. Circuit decided Petroleum Information Corp. v. United States
Department of the Interioi8 7 and found that an agency could not shield a
"draft" database from disclosure. 88
III. PETROLE'M INFORMATION CORP. V. UArIED STA =S DE&PARTAU'r OF
T-E INTF- OR
A. Facts
The BLM maintains more than one billion paper documents con-
cerning the 340 million acres of federally owned lands and 750 million
acres of federal mining holdings which it manages.89 In 1982, the BLM
began a lengthy process of developing the Automated Land and Mineral
77. Id.
78. 682 F.2d 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
79. Dudman, 815 F.2d at 1569.
80. Russell 682 F.2d at 1049.
81. Id.
82. Dudman, 815 F.2d at 1569.
83. Id. at 1567.
84. 1d. at 1569.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Petroleum Info. Corp. v. United States Dep't of Interior, 976 F.2d 1429, 1439 (D.C.
Cir. 1992).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1431.
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Record Systems Project ("ALMRS"), a computerized database containing
files and records currently available to the public in paper form.90 The
ALMRS contains three main files: (1) the Legal Land Description File
("LLD"), which provides information about BLM property such as its de-
scription, location, relevant political unit and administering agency; (2)
the Mining Claims Recordation System ("MCRS"), which records and
tracks mining claims; and (3) the Case Recordation System ("CRS"),
which records and tracks oil and gas leases.9 1 At the time of the court's
decision, the LLD was more complete than the MCRS or the CRS, but the
BLM had not planned to release any information in the ALMRS to the
public until all three data files were complete.
9 2
The LLD file was created to convert graphic representations con-
tained in Master Title Plats, 93 planimetric maps and surveys, as well as nar-
rative information contained in original patents and survey documents,
into 17 categories of information about a particular parcel of land which
are represented on a computer screen as alphanumeric codes.94 The
BLM contended that its selection of these data elements could change
prior to completion of the LLD file and the LLD's file integration into the
ALMRS system. 95 The BLM also emphasized that creation of the LLD file
involved considerably more work than simply converting the paper files
into computerized records.96 When source documents contained conflict-
ing or incomplete information on a parcel of land, BLM staff who com-
piled the information had to revise the record and exercise discretion in
doing so, because the BLM expects that the ALMRS will adjust previously
incorrect property rights.
97
Between 1987 and 1989, Plaintiff, Petroleum Information Corpora-
tion ("Petroleum"), a supplier of oil and gas exploration and production
information, contracted with the BLM to collect and input the informa-
tion regarding property in several Western states for the LLD file. 98 As
provided by its contracts with the BLM, Petroleum had access to magnetic
computer tapes containing the LLD files for those states. However, the




93. Master Title Plats are sets of manually prepared maps that depict land ownership
and uses within a township. Id.
94. Id. The seventeen categories were: "meridian, township, range, section, survey type,
survey number, survey suffix, aliquot part, acreage, survey note, state, county, congressional
district, BLM district, resource area, planning unit and administrative agency." I. at 1431-32
n. 1.
95. Id. at 1432.
96. Id.
97. Id. Along with the existing CRS and MCRS files, the Status file and the Geographic
Coordination Data Base ("GCDB"), two other new data bases, will be merged with the LLD
file. The Status file will contain information regarding the availability of different uses for a
given parcel of land, and "[t]he GCDB will graphically relate ownership and survey informa-
tion to physical points on the Earth's surface." Id. Both the Status and GCDB files will also
readjust previous incorrect property rights because the information from these two files will
be much more accurate. Id.
98. Id.
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mation for the Status file in the LLD.99 The contracts also required Petro-
leum to return the LLD files to the BLM upon completion of data
collection and to not provide the files to anyone outside of the con-
tracts. 10 0 However, as the court noted, the contracts apparently did not
bar Petroleum from obtaining through FOIA what was prohibited in the
contracts.1 0
In March, 1989, Petroleum requested under FOIA a copy of the
BLM's computer tape which included part of the LLD file for Montana,
Nevada, North Dakota and Wyoming. 0 2 The request sought LLD data
relating to the "description, location, surface administrative agency, polit-
ical unit and acreage" of BLM property in those states.103 Apparently, Pe-
troleum intended to sell the information to its oil and gas customers.'
0 4
The BLM refused Petroleum's FOIA request. The BLM claimed that the
data was protected by the deliberative process privilege contained in Ex-
emption 5.105 After waiting more than five months for a decision on its
administrative appeal, Petroleum filed suit.10 6 On cross-motions for sum-
mary judgment, the BLM argued for the information's protection under
FOIA's deliberative process privilege because of the LLD file's unfinished
"draft" status. 10 7 The district court found that the data sought by Petro-
leum was completely factual and "neither predecisional nor delibera-
tive." 10 8 The district court emphasized the data's lack of any decisional
component.'09 Also, the district court judge did not find that BLM staff-
ers' work of verifying the records' accuracy resembled the "give-and-take"
of ideas among employees which is characteristic of the deliberative pro-
cess Exemption 5 seeks to protect." 0 The district court entered summary
judgment in favor of Petroleum."' The Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit affirmed, concluding that the LLD information requested was not
shielded by the deliberative process privilege.
112
B. Holding
The district court's decision rested on three main points." 3 First, the





103. Petroleum Info. Corp. v. United States Dep't of Interior, No. 89-3173, 1990 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17137 at *1-2 (D.D.C. Dec. 20, 1990).
104. Petroleum, 976 F.2d at 1432.
105. Id See EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79 (1973), for an explanation of Exemption 5.
106. Petroleum, 976 F.2d at 1432.
107. Id
108. Petroleum 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17137 at *8.
109. Id
110. Id (citing Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 866 (D.C.
Cir. 1980)).
111. Id. at *10.
112. Petroleum Info. Corp. v. United States Dep't of Interior, 976 F.2d 1429, 1431 (D.C.
Cir. 1992).
113. Petroleum Info. Corp. v. United States Dep't of Interior, No. 89-3173, 1990 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17137 at *6 (D.D.C. Dec. 20, 1990).
[Vol. 71:3
PETROLEUM INFORMATION CORPORATION
ing any decisional character, and fell easily into the factual exclusion to
Exemption 5, articulated by the Supreme Court in EPA v. Mink 114 Sec-
ond, the district court found that none of the BLM's reasons for claiming
the exemption, i.e., the compilation of the LLD, its draft status, its merg-
ing into the ALMRS data base, or its verification by the BLM employees, in
any way resembled the "give-and-take" of ideas which characterizes the Ex-
emption 5 deliberative process privilege. 1 15 And third, the district court
noted that the BLM's nondisclosure of the LLD file would increase the
scope of Exemption 5 beyond congressional intent.
1 16
The court of appeals first addressed whether the material was factual
versus subjective. It found that the LLD file contained technical and objec-
tive material and was thus factual in content.' 1 7 The court of appeals also
affirmed the district court's second finding that the process by which the
BLM created the LLD was not deliberative.18 Because the appellate court
found that the LLD file was not deliberative, it did not find it necessary to
also decide whether the data was predecisional. 119 Judge Ginsburg stated
that the task of creating the LLD file here differed greatly from other situ-
ations in which agency functions were held deliberative.' 20 She character-
ized the BLM's task as merely rearranging a large collection of data.'
21
This was different from where an agency selectively compiled material
from a sizable hearing transcript, which, if disclosed, would show the
agency's deliberative process in deciding which information was rele-
vant.' 22 The court of appeals also found that BLM employees' duties to
make acreage estimates where the source documents were incomplete or
inaccurate may have been time-consuming, but did not involve the kind of
discretion which the deliberative process demands. 123 Judge Ginsburg
also dismissed the BLM's argument that revealing the current data ele-
ments could harm its ultimate choice of such data elements.' 24 The data
code and format choices were not the kinds of decisions which, if re-
vealed, would hamper candid communication within an agency or cause
public confusion. 12 5 The court of appeals also affirmed the district court's
114. Id. at *6-7 (citing EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 87-91 (1973)).
115. Id. at *9 (quoting Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854,
866 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
116. Id. at *9.
117. Petroleum, 976 F.2d at 1438.
118. Id.
119. 1& at 1436 n.9.
120. I&
121. Id. at 1438.
122. Id. at 1434-35.
123. Id. (citing Quarles v. Department of Navy, 893 F.2d 390, 393 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
124. Id. at 1438-39.
125. Id. (citing Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 866
(D.C.Cir. 1980)). An interesting aside about the court's determination that revealing the
choice of data elements was not deliberative was that the court stated twice in its opinion that
nothing prevented the BLM from attaching a warning to the LLD file that the file was unfin-
ished and subject to change. PetroLeum, 976 F.2d at 1439. However, in the district court
opinion, the BLM claimed that attaching a warning would not effectively prevent public con-
fusion. Petroleum Info. Corp. v. United States Dep't of Interior, No. 89-3173, 1990 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17137 at *4 (D.D.C. Dec. 20, 1990).
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third factor in awarding summary judgment to Petroleum, in reiterating
the goal of FOIA which calls for broad disclosure and narrow construction
of its exemptions.
126
The BLM also raised the argument that the LLD file should be ex-
empt as "confidential commercial information" protected by rule 26(c) (7)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, under Federal Open Market Commit-
tee of the Federal Reserve System v. MerrilL12 7 In MeriI the Supreme Court
held that Exemption 5 included a privilege for confidential commercial
information, at least to the extent that the information is produced by the
government in the process by which the government decides to award a
contract. 128 The appellate court found that the BLM did not show that
the LLD file was either commercial or confidential. 12 9 Also, the LLD file
was not created in any way for a decision by the BLM to award a con-
tract.'3 0 Thus, the court of appeals found the BLM's argument under
Merrill without merit.
1 31
Bound by the same D.C. Circuit standard of review for FOIA cases
which is applicable generally to summary judgments under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure,1 32 the court of appeals decided, in viewing the
record in the light most favorable to the BLM, that there remained no
genuine issue of material fact.133 In performing that review, Judge Gins-
burg stated that it is the agency's burden in FOIA cases to show that the
requested material falls within a FOIA exemption. 13 4 Since the BLM
failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that creation of the LLD file
impacted on the kind of policy judgments Exemption 5 was enacted to
protect, summary judgment in favor of Petroleum was appropriate.
13 5
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE APPELLATE OPINION
A. Creation of the LLD File Lacked Deliberative Qualities
Notwithstanding the non-disclosure trend in the D.C. Circuit's recent
decisions, the Petroleum court looked at two prominent features of the LLD
file to decide that it was not deliberative.13 6 First, the court emphasized
the current public availability of the records in a paper formatL13 7 The
court distinguished Dismukes v. Department of Interior,138 which involved a
comparable request for BLM records, because in Dismukes identical data
was available in alternate formats. 139 The court found that the instant
126. Petroleum, 976 F.2d at 1439.
127. 443 U.S. 340 (1979).
128. Merri/! 443 U.S. at 360.
129. Petroleum, 976 F.2d at 1439.
130. Id.
131. Id
132. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
133. Petroleum, 976 F.2d at 1439.
134. Id at 1433.
135. See id at 1439.
136. Petroleum, 976 F.2d at 1436-38.
137. Id at 1436.
138. 603 F. Supp. 760 (D.D.C. 1984).
139. Petroleum, 976 F.2d at 1437 n.ll.
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case did not involve "twice-recorded information" as in Dismukes because
BLM personnel testified that the difficulty in amassing the information
prevented Petroleum from obtaining the requested information in a "rea-
sonably accessible form."14° The court relied on Tax Analysts v. United
States Department ofJustice14 1 in holding that Petroleum could not be penal-
ized for trying to avoid the difficulty which the BLM went through in put-
ting together the LLD file.
14 2
The court's decision to allow Petroleum to obtain the records on
computer tapes, notwithstanding their availability on paper, addressed but
did not entirely resolve a serious concern of FOIA requesters who seek
access to the increasing amount of government records which have be-
come computerized.1 43 This concern centers on the FOIA requester's
ability to obtain the computerized version of data that is also available in
another format. Petroleum addressed the concern that if information is not
reasonably available in a format other than computerized records, an
agency must provide the computerized records. Yet Petroleum did not re-
solve situations where an agency can successfully argue that the data is
reasonably accessible and identically reproduced on paper. Since Petro-
leum did not overrule Dismukes, an agency can still withhold computerized
data if the data is identically reproduced and easily accessible on paper or
another non-computerized format. However, as governmental databases
become larger and more complex with programs which provide quick ac-
cess to thousands of records, Dismukes situations may become less fre-
quent. Agencies may have a difficult time proving that access to the paper
records is reasonable when sifting through paper documents for informa-
tion involves considerably more time and manual effort than searching for
the same information via a computerized index.
The second principal characteristic which guided the court in finding
that the BLM must disclose the computer tapes to Petroleum was that the
information was not associated with an important policy decision.1 4 4 The
court found the task of creating the ALMRS was "essentially technical and
facilitative." 14 5 The court then carefully distinguished the other D.C. Cir-
cuit cases which have held that agencies' deliberative processes involving
factual information were privileged. The court noted the information's
dissimilarity with both the political concerns in deciding the location of
navy ports in Quarles and the interpretation of historical events in Rus-
140. Id.
141. 845 F.2d 1060, 1068-69 (D.C. Cir. 1988), aftd, 492 U.S. 136 (1989) (holding that Tax
Analysts' request to obtain from the Department of Justice information for its electronic
database regarding recent tax court cases must be honored by the Department because the
information sought constituted agency records in the Department's possession).
142. Petroleum, 976 F.2d at 1437.
143. Id. From the time FOIA was drafted until 1986, the amount of mainframe com-
puters employed by agencies has increased almost ten-fold. Microcomputers were not used
at the time of FOIA's creation; in 1986, over 125,000 were in use. Agency budgets for infor-
mation technology increased from $9.2 billion to $15 million in just four years. SeeJamie A.
Grodsky, The Freedom of Information Act in the Electronic Age: The Statute is not User Friendly, 31
JURIrmETRcsJ. 17, 18 (1990).
144. Petroleum, 976 F.2d at 1437.
145. Id.
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sell'14 6 The court found the task of transferring in full the public source
documents into the LLD file was unlike Montrose Chemical where a great
quantity of information was selectively summarized.
147
Judge Ginsburg also found the BLM's argument that employees
would have to estimate acreage because of inaccurate source documents
did not personify the judgmental cost estimates made in Quarks.148 How-
ever, the Quarks court's statement that appraisals involve fewer judgment
calls than estimates of what construction will cost seemed overly broad.
An appraisal of unique property, for example, would involve a considera-
ble amount ofjudgment and opinion. Similarly, the Quarles court's asser-
tions that cost estimates derived from a "complex set of judgments" and
consisted of "just that elasticity that has persuaded courts to provide shel-
ter for opinions generally" 149 seemed overreaching. An official's prepara-
tion of cost estimates meant reviewing the cost of building similar
facilities. This comparison process did not involve the "give-and-take" of
agency decision-making which has characterized deliberative process privi-
lege cases.
Finally, Judge Ginsburg did not find that releasing the unfinished
LLD file to Petroleum would compromise the BLM's final choice of file
data elements. 150 The court did not see in the data element choices the
kind of decision which, if exposed, would inhibit candid discussions within
an agency, as stated in Coastal States.'
5 '
Although Petroleum will assist future FOIA requesters to obtain elec-
tronic data which is technical in nature, these requests may still be prob-
lematic if a database contains selected information from public records
because the Petroleum decision did not overrule Montrose Chemical Reques-
ters also may have difficulty obtaining computerized records where such
records contain any political cast because the Petroleum court distinguished
Quarles as noted above and because the court declined to side with the
Ninth Circuit's decision in Assembly of California v. Department of Com-
merrce 52 finding that computer tapes containing solicited, but unused cen-
sus statistics were not exempt by the deliberative process privilege.' 53 The
Eleventh Circuit, in deciding the same set of facts, held that the census
tapes were exempt as "opinion" and emphasized the broad discretion the
Department of Commerce enjoyed in reporting census figures. 154 The Pe-
troleum court stated that the BLM data element choices were not as "broad
and politically charged" as those in the census tape decisions and thus
146. I&
147. Id. at 1438.
148. Petroleum, 976 F.2d 1429.
149. IM.; see Quarkes, 893 F.2d at 393-94.
150. Id
151. Id. at 1439.
152. 968 F.2d 916 (9th Cir. 1992).
153. Petroleum. 976 F.2d at 1438 n.12 (citing Assembly of Cal. v. Department of Com-
merce, 968 F.2d 916 (9th Cir. 1992)).
154. Id at 1438 n.12 (citing Florida House of Representatives v. Department of Com-
merce, 961 F.2d 941, 950 (lth Cir. 1992)).
[Vol. 71:3
PETROLEUM INFORMATION CORPORATION
found that those inconsistent decisions did not affect the outcome in the
instant case.
15 5
B. The Future of FOIA Requests for Computerized information After Petroleum
Although the D.C. Circuit decision allowed Petroleum to obtain the
computerized records, Judge Ginsburg was careful in crafting the decision
so as not to overstep the bounds placed on the court by precedent. How-
ever, whereas FOIA decisions in the D.C. Circuit were becoming more ex-
pansive in their application of Exemption 5 to all kinds of agency records
and decision-making processes, this decision represents a step in the right
direction. After Petroleum, a FOLA requester should be able to obtain elec-
tronic agency information in certain, well-defined situations, such as
where the information is technical and not reasonably accessible in an-
other format. However, the decision did not go far enough. As one com-
mentator noted, FOTA requesters like Petroleum which have the financial
resources and the time to pursue litigation under FOLA may succeed in
obtaining electronic information.' 5 6 However, for the general public
seeking computerized data on a daily basis, at least three problems
remain.
First, since FOLA does not directly define agency records to include
electronic information, courts are still deciding whether agencies must dis-
close computerized data.'5 7 Records exist not only on paper, but also on
computer tapes, diskettes, and other computer formats.158 Also, the
proliferation of personal computers with modems allows users a new way
to access computerized FOIA records.' 59 FOLA was conceived at a time
when virtually all records existed on paper,' 6° and the application of FOLA
to electronic information can be troublesome.' 61 Although agencies
clearly do not have to create records to meet FOLA requests, the legal
picture becomes cloudy when a court must decide what constitutes crea-
tion of a new record. 162 For example, in Yeager v. DEA,16 3 Yeager argued
155. Id.
156. Grodsky, supra note 143, at 47.
157. See Leo T. Sorokin, The Computerization of Government Information: Does it Circumvent
Public Access under the Freedom of Information Act and the Depository Library Program?, 24 COLUM.
J.L. & Soc. PROBLEMS 267 (1991) (discussing how in Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169 (1980),
the Court implied that electronic data constitute agency records because the Records Dispo-
sal Act specifically stated that the "physical storage format" of information does not deter-
mine whether the information is a record); see also Long v. IRS, 596 F.2d 362, 365 (9th Cir.
1979) (holding that because the legislative history of the 1974 amendments to FOIA specifi-
cally discussed problems inherent in computerized information such as search and copying
fees, data tapes are agency records). But see SDC Dev. Corp. v. Mathews, 542 F.2d 1116, 1120
(9th Cir. 1976) (holding that MEDLARS' computerized information is not an agency record
within the meaning of FOIA).
158. Matthew D. Bunker et al., Access to Government-Held Information in the Computer Age:
Applying Legal Doctrine to Emerging Technology, 20 FIA. ST. U. L. REv. 543, 579 (1993).
159. Grodsky, supra note 143, at 44.
160. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Federal Electronic Information Policy, 63 TEMPLE L. REv. 201, 224
(1990).
161. Id.
162. Bunker, supra note 158, at 574.
163. 678 F.2d 315, 322 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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that to require the DEA to use "compacting" software to release reasonably
segregable, nonexempt portions of criminal records did not result in the
creation of a new record. 64 Judge Tamm, writing for the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, rejected this argument. 165 The court held
that FOIA did not contemplate creating a greater segregation duty for
agencies with computerized records than upon agencies where informa-
tion is retrieved manually.' 66 The Yeager court remained unpersuaded
that FOIA intended "any manipulation or restructuring of the substantive
content of a record when it commanded agencies to 'delete' exempt
information."
16 7
Second, as seen above, where the requested information exists in
both paper and electronic formats, and the paper format is reasonably
accessible, under Dismukes, the agency may avoid releasing the informa-
tion in an electronic format. Dismukes, however, misses the point because
FOIA has imposed duties on agencies to not only disclose records but also
to make them accessible to the public.16 By releasing the computerized
data in a non-computerized format, the agency has arguably given the re-
quester less than the agency possesses. For example, the requester would
not obtain the arrangement of the data which the computer has created,
or is capable of creating. Conversely, agencies should not be allowed to
force requesters to take electronic data. Someone who is not proficient in
using a computer should be able to get the information on paper.169
Agencies could accommodate this need by providing the electronic infor-
mation on a video display device with an attached printer so the requester
could make a copy.17 0 Such a system should not impose a hardship on an
agency because the agency can recoup its cost of the equipment by charg-
ing fees for copies and use of the equipment.'
7 1
Third, the Petroleum decision has not completely resolved the "draft"
document conflict. If an agency contends that its database is still in an
unfinished status, it may avoid release of electronic information if it can
show that compiling the information involves greater judgment calls than
those required in Petroleum to estimate acreage and choose the database
data elements. Also, Petroleum did not overrule Russell. The Russell court's
holding that release of the Sunderland draft would expose the Air Force's
decisionmaking process extended the meaning of the predecisional com-
ponent of the deliberative process privilege too far. Russell leaned danger-
ously toward the proposition that an agency could place any material in a




167. Id. at 323.
168. See generaly Sorokin, supra note 157 (discussing the problems involved in making
computerized records accessible to the public).
169. Perritt, supra note 160, at 229.
170. Id.
171. I. at 232. But see Martin & Merrill v. United States Custom Serv., 657 F. Supp. 733,
734 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (holding that FOIA does not require the United States Custom Service
to invest in costly equipment for public access).
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access it. Yet, Petroleum also introduced a point available to requesters in a
case involving an unfinished computer database. 172 Although the BLM
contended that the unfinished status of the file could lead to public confu-
sion and compromise the final decisions involved in formatting or acces-
sing the file, the agency could alleviate this risk by placing a warning on
the tape or disk released to the requester. 173
Also, even if Congress amended the definition of agency records in
FOIA to include computerized information, as the American Bar Associa-
tion and the Administrative Conference of the United States have recom-
mended,174 issues regarding the scope of the agency's duties to provide
electronic information and to preserve data remain. 17 5 Whether an
agency must provide software or programming to retrieve information
pursuant to a request, and if so who must pay for it, are difficult questions
to answer.1 76 As the Department of Defense argued in American Friends
Service Committee v. United States Department of Defense,t 77 FOIA should not
be interpreted to impose on an agency the burden of developing new
software if that is the only way to comply with a FOIA request.1 78 How-
ever, Judge VanArtsdalen side-stepped that issue. He held only that, be-
cause the Department of Defense would have to take extensive steps
beyond mere deletions to arrive at reasonable segregable unclassified
data, the Department of Defense was not required to utilize or readjust
software to reformulate and produce documents that have never been
agency documents. 179
A request which involves simply copying an existing computer file in-
dex onto a disk is a largely different matter from allowing access to the
computer files' programming codes. A strong argument against allowing
access to the latter is that if a third party developed the software upon
which the records run, and the software is subject to copyright or trade
secret protection, the programming codes may not be disclosed.' 8 0 Also,
FOIA's Exemption 4, which protects proprietary commercial information,
172. See supra note 125 regarding the court's suggestion that Petroleum could have at-
tached a warning to the computer tape.
173. Petroleur, 976 F.2d at 1439.
174. Perritt, supra note 160, at 224 n.123.
175. Id. at 230.
176. Id.; see Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Electronic Records Management and Archives, 53 U. Prrr. L.
REv. 994, 994-96 (1992).
177. No. 83-4916, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8741, at *18 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 1988).
178. Id at *18-19. See also TPS, Inc. v. Department of Defense, Defense Info. Agency, No.
C-92-4106, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2988 (N.D. Cal. March 1, 1993), where the Department of
Defense, Defense Information Agency, Defense Commercial Communications Office
("DECCO") created an electronic bulletin board system used to advertise to suppliers and
manufacturers. TPS, Inc., an information marketing company, sought under FOIA to obtain
the layout program used to create DECCO's electronic bulletin board. The requested layout
had unique features which could manipulate data files to retrieve certain data. However, the
district court denied TPS's motion for summary judgment and granted DECCO's motion for
summary judgment because TPS failed to provide any specific evidence that DECCO pos-
sessed the layout program. Id. at *10.
179. American Friends Sew. Comm., 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8741, at *18.
180. Id.
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may apply to computer programs.1 8 1 Allnet Communications Services,
Inc. recently sued the FCC under FOIA to order the FCC to disclose cost
analysis data prepared for the FCC by various telecommunication compa-
nies.18 2 The cost analysis data was created by the telecommunication com-
panies in connection with the FCC's Open Network Architecture ("ONA")
service rates.18 3 The requested information included output data and ex-
tensive descriptive and instructional materials accompanying the Switch-
ing Cost Information System ("SCIS") computer model submitted to the
FCC by Bell Communications Research, Inc., and participating Bell oper-
ating companies (collectively the "Bell Companies"), intervenors in the
action.18 4 Although Allnet amended its FOIA request to drop its request
for the SCIS software, the court found persuasive the argument that even
without the actual software, the data sought would compromise the confi-
dentiality of the Bell Companies' proprietary information.1 8 5 The FCC
also argued that disclosure of the material sought would impair the effec-
tiveness of its review of unreasonable and discriminatory service rates be-
cause the SCIS models were critical in reviewing these rates.18 6 SCIS
switch vendors indicated that, if the information they provided could be
released under FOIA, they would be hesitant to supply the proprietary
input data which was necessary for the SCIS to function.18 7 If the switch
vendors did not voluntarily supply the Bell Companies with the switch
data, the FCC argued, the ONA program would be impaired.' 8 8 The
court found this possible harm to the ONA as another reason for holding
that the information was exempt under FOIA's Exemption 4.189
Regarding an agency's duty to preserve data, in Armstrong v. Bush,190
litigation which is still ongoing, the D.C. District Court granted a tempo-
rary restraining order to prevent the President, the Executive Office of the
President, and the agency subject to FOTA, the National Security Council,
181. Grodsky, supra note 143, at 50 n.146.
182. Allnet Communication Serv., Inc. v. FCC, 800 F. Supp. 984 (D.D.C. 1992).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 986. An SCIS is a computer model created and used by Bell Communications
Research, Inc. An SCIS allows a user to "estimate future costs of providing specific types of
telecommunications services within a call routing network based on proprietary cost and
engineering data provided by the switch vendors." I. The SCIS is used in connection with
the FCC's ONA policies which mandate that Bell operating companies "unbundle" their ba-
sic regulated telecommunication services. This unbundling procedure was created to maxi-
mize use of the telephone network by providers of unregulated "enhanced services" and to
allow such other providers to compete with the Bell companies. Under the ONA, the Bell
companies must provide customers with optional unbundled features called Basic Service
Elements ("BSEs"). When the Bell companies file requests to raise their rates, and the re-
quests describe new services, the Bell companies must identify the new service's direct costs,
overhead costs and the ratio of-unit cost to unit investment. BSEs reside within electronic
switches that also function in other ways. Thus, the SCIS is needed because of its capacity to
allocate joint and common switching costs and to specify the switching costs of the BSEs in
order to review the rates of the BSEs. I&
185. Id. at 989-90.




190. 807 F. Supp. 816 (D.D.C. 1992).
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from erasing any material stored on the "PROFS" electronic mail sys-
tem. 19 1 The plaintiffs, including Armstrong, ajournaist, and citizen pub-
lic interest groups, had sought immediate access under FOIA to PROFS
agency records saved from the last two weeks of the Reagan administra-
tion. 192 The court found that "because history is full of instances where
the outgoing President has decided to... destroy all ... Presidential...
records," the plaintiffs made a showing of "immediate and irreparable
harm." 193 With the rising use of electronic mail, important agency deci-
sions may be found in what appear to be "innocuous" e-mail messages.
194
Although courts may find it difficult to assess the importance of electronic
mail messages and to determine whether the messages are deliberative
and thus exempt under FOIA, the electronic mail messages arguably con-
stitute agency records under FOLA, and the public is entitled to access.
195
CONCLUSION
Petroleum is a bright light at the end of a line of D.C. Circuit cases
which had broadened the application of FOIA's Exemption 5 to the detri-
ment of requesters. The Petroleum court decided that the task of putting
together technical data was not deliberative and also decided that comput-
erized information which was not reasonably accessible in another format
must be disclosed. Even after Petroleum, however, problems remain with
attempting to obtain electronic information under FOIA. Identical infor-
mation in another format which is reasonably accessible may still prevent a
requester from obtaining computerized information under FOIA. Also,
depending on (1) the nature of the documents, (2) whether they contain
recommendations or opinions and (3) whether the process by which the
electronic data is compiled reveals the deliberations of agency employees,
electronic information may still remain nondisclosable. Finally, because
intellectual property rights and FOIA's Exemption 4 may limit the scope
of retrieval of electronic information, agencies may be able to withhold




193. Id. at 820 (citing Nixon v. United States, 978 F.2d 1269, 1277-80 (D.C. Cir. 1992)).




COMPUTER COPYRIGHT PROTECTION NARRows AS VIDEO GAME
GIANTS BATTLE IN Atari v. Nintendo
INTRODUCTION
One out of every three households in the United States has one, and
the next version will cost only $49.95. What is it? The Nintendo home
video game system.' Since its introduction in 1985, the Nintendo En-
tertainment System (NES) has become the number one video game sys-
tem in the world.2 Video games represent only one facet of the computer
industry, which has fostered tremendous advances in technological and
economic growth in the past twenty-five years.3 As a result of this expan-
sion, the United States has witnessed a growing number of intellectual
property disputes. 4 Today, industry leaders operate in fear of litigation
over infringement of patents and copyrights, and of unfair business prac-
tices which may deny risk-taking companies the benefits of their creativ-
ity.5 Although copyright laws do protect computer programs,6 a recent
lawsuit involving two video game giants suggests that this protection has
been narrowed.
7
In Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America Inc.,8 the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit sustained a preliminary injunction, enjoining
Atari Games Corporation (Atari) from infringing Nintendo's copyright of
its 10NES computer program. 9 The court addressed the extent of protec-
tion given to a computer program and attempted to clarify to what extent
a programmer may and may not use another's work to write a program.
1. More Can Buy the Most Popular Video Game System in History; 8-bit NES Gets New Chassis
and Price Tag Below $50, BusiNrss WRE, June 3, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
BWIRE File.
2. Nintendo has sold a total of 60 million hardware units worldwide, and occupies a 99
percent share of the 8-bit market in the U.S. In 1992, the NES accounted for $2.7 million in
hardware sales and almost $1 billion in software sales. Id.
3. In the mid 1960s, sales of computer programs generated approximately $250 million
in annual sales. COMPUTER SCIENCE AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS BOARD, NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUNCIL, INTELLECrUAL PROPERTY ISSUES IN SOFTWARE vii (1991) [hereinafter "CSTB"]. Since
then, the number of U.S. software firms has quadrupled, generating tens of billions of dollars
in revenues annually. In 1990, sales of packaged software alone by U.S. firms totaled nearly
$20 billion and occupied more than 40% of the world market. Id. at 3.
4. Computers have even made theft of intelligence easier, since employees can copy
computer files which may contain trade secrets. SeeJolie Solomon et al, The Grand Pilferer?,
NEWSWEEK, June 7, 1993, at 38, 39.
5. CSTB, supra note 3, at ix.
6. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 to 1010 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). See also 1
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NntmRe ON COPMIGHT § 2.04[C] (1993).
7. See David R. Ellis, Chips, Locks, and Video Games, FLA. BAR J., July-Aug. 1993, at 75, 79;
Lee T. Gesmer, Decisions May Signify AJudicial Turnabout NAT'L L. J., Jan. 18, 1993, at S2, S4;
PhilipJ. McCabe & William A. Tanenbaum, Copyright Decisions Increase the Value of Patent Protec-
tion for Computer Software, 2 J. PROPRIETARY RTs. 2, available in WESTLAW, JLR database,
(1993).
8. 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
9. Id. at 847.
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This Comment examines the court's decision in Atari First, the Com-
ment briefly introduces computer technology to facilitate the discussion.
Second, the Comment explores the doctrines and cases relating to copy-
right law, particularly its development since the 1970s. Third, the Com-
ment explains the facts and the reasoning adopted by the Atari court.
Finally, the Comment analyzes Atar, noting its likely impact on the com-
puter industry in the future.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Introduction to Computer Technology
Computer technology has progressed significantly since the first com-
puter was built in 1944.10 Today, the software" and computer programs
which make the industry so lucrative' 2 are, perhaps, more important than
the computer itself. A computer program is defined by statute as "a set of
statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer
in order to bring about a certain result."1 3 Programmers normally write
software programs in source code, a high-level computer language reada-
ble by humans. 14 Since computers are incapable of understanding com-
mands expressed in source code, the computer contains an assembler or
compiler program which translates the source code into object code15 , a
binary code' 6 which is readable by computers. The computer stores the
object code on disks or silicon chips.
17
The two principle types of computer programs are operating systems
and application systems. 18 An operating system is a series of programs
which manages the internal functions of the computer, while an applica-
tion system is a program which performs tasks for the user. 19 Video game
10. Peter D. Aufrichtig, Note, Copyright Protection for Gomputer Programs in Read Only Mem-
oyy Chips, 11 HoFsTR L. REv. 329, 333 (1982).
11. Software includes "project description and research, source code, object code, pro-
gram documentation, user instructions, and operating manuals." GORDON V. SMITH & Rus.
SELL L. PARR, VALUATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTANGIBLE AssrTs 115 (1989).
12. The computer software industry is a multi-billion dollar business with millions of
users. ANTHONY L. CLAPES, SOFTWARE, COPYRIGHT, AND COMPETITION 19 (1989).
13. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
14. Standard programming languages which are examples of source code are FOR-
TRAN and COBOL. Howard Root, Note, Cppight Infringement of Computer Programs: A Modifi-
cation of the Substantial Similarity Test, 68 MnN. L. REv. 1264, 1266 (1984). These highevel
languages are powerful because each statement usually performs the same task as several
machine language (object code) instructions. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, CoN-
GRESS, FINDING A BALANCE: COMPUTER SOFTWARE, INrELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE CHALLENGE
OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 130 (1992) [hereinafter "CONGRESS"].
15. Aufrichtig, supra note 10, at 340 n.110.
16. Binary form is a system of numeration consisting of ones and zeroes, each represent-
ing an open or closed circuit in the computer. Root, supra note 14, at 1267 n.16. Inside a
computer, both data and instructions are represented by patterns of electronic signals which
take one of two values, a "1" or a "0." For example, in most computers, the letter "A" is
represented by a pattern of signals which corresponds to "01000001." CONGRESS, supra note
14, at 125.
17. Root, supra note 14, at 1267.
18. Peter S. Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Application Programs,
41 STAN. L. Rpv. 1045, 1051 (1989).
19. Id.
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programs are typically application programs.20 In addition, the complex-
ity of many home and arcade video games requires the use of microproces-
sors. A microprocessor is a miniature computer on a single chip 21 within
the computer, which processes information by executing a series of
instructions.
22
Most programmers create software with a "top down design" process.
This process involves defining the problem or function for the program,
decomposing this function by defining the tasks and subtasks for the com-
puter to perform, and writing instructions or commands for the computer
in the form of source code.23 The computer's assembler program then
compiles the instructions, enabling the computer to perform the tasks.
24
Programmers can also reverse this process to obtain source code from a
program on a disk or chip. This process, called "reverse engineering" or
"intermediate copying"25 involves using a "disassembly" program2 6 to
translate object code into source code.27 The programmer then reviews
the code to understand the program's input, output, and functions, and
generates a set of specifications describing the program. 28 A second
programmer then generates a new program using the first programmer's
specifications.2 9 This second programmer works in a "clean room,"30 and
never sees the original code used to create the specifications. 3' Since this
process can eliminate substantial amounts of the time and money compa-
nies normally spend on developing technology, reverse engineering is a




21. E.F.Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp. of Am., 623 F._Supp. 1485, 1488 (D. Minn. 1985).
22. Robert Steinberg, Microcode--Idea or Expression? 9 COMPUTER/L.J. 61, 62 (1989).
Each instruction, provided to the microprocessor by external software or a human program-
mer, is converted into about four microinstructions. Id.
23. See Menell, supra note 18, at 1055. See also Steven R. Englund, Note, Idea, Process, or
Protected Expression?: Determining the Scope of Copyright Protection of the Struture of Computer Pro-
grams, 88 MIcH. L. Ray. 866, 870 (1990). Programmers frequently use flowcharts to define
the tasks, and then convert the elements of the flowchart into code. Final steps in the pro-
cess of developing programs include debugging, or testing the program for accuracy and
proper function, and documentation of materials that explain the program's functions to the
user. Menell, supra note 18, at 1051.
24. See Aufrichtig, supra note 10, at 341.
25. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 844 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
26. Disassemblers are widely available. CONGRESS, supra note 14, at 147.
27. See id. at 146-50. Decompilation is similar to reverse engineering and is "often char-
acterized as any technique that is used to transform 'machine readable' code into 'human
readable' code." Id. at 148.
28. McCabe & Tanenbaum, supra note 7, at 2.
29. Id.
30. "[C]lean room is a metaphor for a software development workplace uncontaminated
by familiarity with the expression of a competitor's product." CSTB, supra note 3, at 79.
Firms use "clean rooms" as a means to avoid charges of infringement, or at least improve the
chance of prevailing against such charges. Id. at 77.
31. See Walter A. Effross, Lega Risks in Software Protection, NJ. LAwJ., July 12, 1993 at 26,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NJLAWJ File.
32. CSTB, supra note 3, at 78. Reverse engineering is controversial in the industry be-
cause it can result in the original program creator having "his lead time erased, his price
undercut, and his market reduced for the very thing he created." Id. (quoting Howard G.
Figueroa, Vice President, Commercial and Industry Relations, IBM Corp.).
19941
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
B. Computer Programs and Copyright Law
1. The Copyright Act of 1976
The U.S. Constitution gives Congress the authority "[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Au-
thors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries."33 Congress enacted the first copyright law in the United
States in 1790, with revisions enacted in 1831, 1870, 1909,34 and most re-
cently, 1976.35 As of 1974, copyright laws did not specifically cover com-
puter uses. This prompted Congress to form the National Commission on
New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU).3 6 CONTU's
purpose was to study and make recommendations for computer uses. The
CONTU Final Report recommended amendments to the Copyright Act of
1976 (Act), which would make computer programs explicitly copyright-
able to the extent they embody the author's original creation.3 7 In addi-
tion, CONTU recommended that a definition of a computer program be
added to section 101.38 In 1980, Congress adopted most of CONTU's rec-
ommendations, specifically applying the Copyright Act to computer pro-
grams. 39 Computer programs are copyrightable as literary works under
section 101 of the Act;40 however, the Act protects only the expression of
an idea or process, rather than the idea or process itself.41 For protection
of ideas and processes, software developers must look to patent law.
42
33. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
34. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.CAN.
5659, 5660.
35. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101-1010 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
36. Act of Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-573, Tit. II, 88 Stat. 1873.
37. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEw TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL
REPORT 1 (1978) [hereinafter "CONTU REPORT"].
38. Id. at 12. CONTU defined a computer program as "a set of statements or instruc-
tions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result."
Id.
39. Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028 (1980) (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-117 (1988)).
40. The Act defines literary works as works, "other than audiovisual works, expressed in
words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the nature of
the material objects, such as books, periodicals, manuscripts, phonorecords, film, tapes,
disks, or cards, in which they are embodied." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
41. "In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to
any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery,
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such
work." 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988); see also H.R. REP. No. 1476,94th Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1976),
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5670 ("Section 102(b) is intended ... to make clear that
... the actual processes or methods embodied in the [computer] program are not within the
scope of the copyright law.").
42. Although computer programs initially were not considered patentable, Gottschalk v.
Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972) (interpreted as rendering software unpatentable because algo-
rithms not patentable), patent protection was established by the Supreme Court in 1981.
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981) (use of computer program in rubber-curing process
did not render the invention unpatentable). Patent law protects "any new and useful pro-
cess, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof." 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). In addition, the subject matter of the work must be non-
obvious. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988). Patents provide protection to owners and give the inventor
the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the patented art. Menell, supra
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2. Interpretation of the Act
Shortly after the passage of the Copyright Act of 1976, litigation in-
volving copyright infringement of computer programs began. 43 One of
the first significant cases was Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer
Corp.,4 in which Apple, one of the computer industry's leaders, sued
Franklin, a manufacturer who had designed an "Apple compatible" com-
puter.45 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the
lower court's denial of a preliminary injunction, and enjoined Franklin
from marketing fourteen infringing computer programs. 4 6 Citing the
CONTU Report, the court held that a computer program is copyrightable
as a literary work, whether expressed in object code or source code.4 7 In
addition, the court reaffirmed that a computer program embedded in a
memory device, such as a chip, meets the Act's requirement of fixation,
and is therefore copyrightable. 48 Finally, the court refused to per se ex-
clude from copyright an operating system program, or a program put to a
utilitarian, or functional, use.
49
3. The Idea/Expression Dichotomy
Although the Act clearly establishes copyright protection for com-
puter programs, the extent of protection is less clear. A major area of
discussion in most copyright infringement cases centers on where to draw
the line on the "gradual sloping beach called the merger of idea and ex-
pression."50 Section 102(b) of the Act clearly precludes protection of
ideas, but many courts have found the line between idea and expression to
be ambiguous. 5 1 Judge Learned Hand, one of the most cited authorities
note 18, at 1074. The number of software related patents awarded has risen from none in
1980 to about 200 annually. CSTB, supra note 3, at 31.
43. Eg., Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003
(N.D. Tex. 1978) (claim of copyright infringement of instruction manuals and input formats
used with computer program); Data Cash Systems, Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp.
1063 (N.D. I1. 1979), aftd 628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980) (claim of copyright infringement of
object code).
44. 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismisse4 464 U.S. 1033 (1984).
45. Id. at 1242-43.
46. Id. at 1242.
47. Id. at 1249; see alsoJohnson Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix Control Sys., Inc., 886 F.2d
1173, 1175 (9th Cir. 1989) (source and object code consistently held protected by copyright);
MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAw § 3.6(B) (1989).
48. Apple Computer, 714 F.2d at 1249; see also Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685
F.2d 870, 876 (3d Cir. 1982) (program embedded in ROM device copyrightable). The Copy-
right Act requires that a work be "fixed in any tangible medium of expression." 17 U.S.C.
§ 102(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
49. Apple Computer, 714 F.2d at 1252 (citing Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc.,
562 F. Supp. 775, 780 (C.D. Cal. 1983), afld, 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984)); see also Mazer v.
Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954) ("We find nothing in the copyright statute to support the
argument that the intended use or use in industry of an article eligible for copyright bars or
invalidates its registration."); CONTU REPORT, supra note 37, at 21 ("That the words of a
program are used ultimately in the implementation of a process should in no way affect their
copyrightability.").
50. CSTB, supra note 3, at 23; see also, e.g., Frybarger v. International Business Mach.
Corp., 812 F.2d 525, 529-30 (9th Cir. 1987) (discussing which features of two similar video
game programs are protected ideas).
51. See, e.g., Apple Computer, 714 F.2d at 1253.
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on the subject, noted that "[t]he test for infringement of copyright is of
necessity vague."52 In his opinion in Nichols v. Universal Pictures,5" Judge
Hand described an "abstractions" test which separates the idea from the
expression by analyzing the patterns of increasing generality in a written
or dramatic work.5 4 In this "series of abstractions," the work reaches a
point where it is no longer protected because it consists of the idea only.55
Further difficulty in drawing the line between the idea and its expres-
sion arises because many, if not all, computer programs are essentially util-
itarian rather than artistic works. In considering this issue, many courts
have relied upon the rationale of the Baker v. Selden decision. 56 In Baker,
the Court held that a ledger form in an accounting book was not copy-
rightable because the form was necessary and incidental to the method of
accounting. 57 Therefore, the utilitarian nature of the work rendered it
unprotected. Courts have also expressed this idea as the scenes a faire doc-
trine, where expressions that are indispensable in the standard treatment
of an idea are not protected.5 8 Similarly, the court in Apple Computer fo-
cused on whether the idea can be expressed in various modes. If the idea
can only be expressed in one way, the idea and expression "merge" and
copyright protection is unavailable.
59
Another issue in protectable expression is whether protection extends
beyond the literal code in a program. In Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow
Dental Laboratory, Inc.,6° the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
held that the structure, sequence, and order of a program is protectable as
expression. 6 1 According to the court, a dental laboratory record keeping
program infringed a similar program, which accomplished the same pur-
pose, but was written in a different language. 6 2 Even though the literal
code of the two programs differed, the court found infringement because
52. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960).
53. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931).
54. Id. at 121.
55. Id.; see also William E. Hilton, Quantifying Originality: A Logical Analysis for Determining
Substantial Similarity in Computer Software Copyright Infringement Actions, 31 IDEA 269, 285-86
(1991) (describing the abstractions analysis).
56. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
57. Id. at 104.
58. Copyright protection cannot "be afforded to elements of expression that necessarily
follow from an idea." Data E. USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc., 862 F.2d 204, 208 (9th Cir. 1988) (no
infringement where idea inseparable from expression of home computer karate game). See
also See v. Durang, 711 F.2d 141, 143 (9th Cir. 1983) (scenes from a play which were "stock
scenes" or those which "flowed necessarily from common unprotectable ideas" not
protected).
59. Apple Computer, Inc., 714 F.2d at 1252. Another court has stated, "at some point in
the process the idea or 'broad and general statement of the purpose' of the program merges
into the expression, the 'smaller and more detailed tasks' necessary to carry out that idea".
E.F. Johnson Co v. Uniden Corp. of Am., 623 F. Supp. 1485, 1501-02, n.17 (D. Minn. 1985).
See also CONTU REPORT, supra note 37, at 20 ("[W]hen specific instructions, even though
previously copyrighted, are the only and essential means of accomplishing a given task, their
later use by another will not amount to an infringement."); Englund, supra note 23, at 877
n.56 (explaining the merger doctrine).
60. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
61. Id. at 1240.
62. Id.
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the structure and organization of the two programs were substantially simi-
lar.65 Commentators and courts, however, have since criticized the Whelan
decision as being overbroad in the protection it granted computer
programs. 64
The Supreme Court in 1991 significantly narrowed this broad protec-
tion in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co..65 Although Feist
concerned the copyrightability of telephone directory white pages, the
Supreme Court's holding that copyright law did not protect Rural's list-
ings had an impact on software copyrightability as well.66 The Feist Court
rejected the "sweat of the brow" doctrine, 67 refusing to allow copyright
protection for factual compilations absent the creation of an original work
in the selection and arrangement of pre-existing materials. 68 Although
the Court conceded that factual compilations may possess the originality
required for copyright protection, 69 the Court limited protection "only to
those components of a work that are original to the author."70 The deci-
sion therefore lowered the threshold of protection from Whelan, which
allowed protection for almost every aspect of a program except the broad
idea of running a dental laboratory efficiently. 71 Because computer pro-
grams consist of a number of subroutines and ideas, they normally contain
more than one broad idea. When an idea is broken into component sub-
routines, many aspects of the program are more utilitarian in nature, and
therefore may not be copyrightable. 72 For these reasons, the Feist decision
has allowed software developers more freedom in building on the work
and ideas of others.
73
4. Substantial Similarity
Having determined the parts of a program that are protected by copy-
right, a court must then determine whether the programs are substantially
similar. Different circuits have varied somewhat in their formulation of
tests for substantial similarity. One test is an "iterative" approach, which
63. Id. at 1248.
64. See, e.g., Computer Assoc. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706 (2d Cir. 1992)
(noting Whelan's "outdated appreciation of computer science"); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Acco-
lade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1525 (9th Cir. 1992) (criticizing Whelan as simplistic and over-
broad); CLAwFs, supra note 12, at 100 (discussing the immediate criticism of the decision);
Steven W. Lundberg et al., Identifying Uncopyrightable Computer lmplemented Processes and Systems,
9 COMPUTER IAw. April 1992, at 7, 8 (discussing the Whelan court's "misconception" of
processes embodied in computer programs); Menell, supra note 18, at 1082-83 (discussing
increased costs of innovative activity as a result of broad copyright protection).
65. 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991).
66. See generally Philip D. Bartz &Jonathan Band, Feist v. Rural Telephone: The Beginning of
the End of Sojtware Ovesprotection?, 8 COMPUTER LAw. 10 (1991).
67. Some courts had developed the notion "that copyright was a reward for the hard
work that went into compiling facts." Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1291.
68. Id. at 1293 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988)).
69. Id. at 1287.
70. Id. at 1289.
71. See Bartz & Band, supra note 66, at 11.
72. See Sega Enters. v. Accolade Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1525 (9th Cir. 1992) (emphasizing the
essentially utilitarian nature of computer programs).
73. Bartz & Band, supra note 66, at 11.
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was applied in E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp. of America.74 In that case, the
court characterized the test for substantial similarity as having two
prongs.7 5 The court first required proof that the defendant used the
copyrighted work in preparing a copy. 76 This was established by proof of
access to the work and similarity sufficient to infer use of the copyrighted
work.7 7 Next, the court required that the alleged copy be an iterative pro-
duction, or one produced by an exact duplication of substantial parts of
the copyrighted work.78 The court noted that expert testimony is neces-
sary to analyze the similarities in both prongs of the test, in addition to the
lay observer's impressions of the "total concept and feel" of the two
works.
79
A more sophisticated test which has been used by several circuits, is an
extrinsic/intrinsic test.80 In Whelan, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit discussed this type of two part test for substantial similarity.81
First, by deciding whether the works are sufficiently similar, the trier of
fact must establish that the alleged infringer used the copyrighted work.
In applying the "extrinsic" or objective test, expert testimony may be used
to assist the fact-finder.8 2 Next, the trier of fact applied the "intrinsic" or
subjective part of the test to determine whether the copying was illicit, as
viewed from the lay observer's perspective, without expert testimony.
83
The intrinsic part of the test has also been characterized as capturing the
"concept and feel" of the works, similar to the iterative approach.8 4 This
test has also been used in the Fourth and Ninth Circuits.
8 5
A variation, used in the First and Seventh Circuits, applies only the
second prong of the extrinsic/intrinsic test. This is known as the "ordi-
nary observer" test. Here, the inquiry the court makes is whether an ordi-
nary, reasonable person would conclude that the protected part of a work
had been copied.
8 6
74. 623 F. Supp. 1485, 1492-93 (D. Minn 1985) (citing Williams Elecs. v. Artic Int'l, Inc.,
685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982) as following the iterative approach).
75. Id. at 1492.




80. E.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prods., Inc., 930 F.2d 277, 291 (3d Cir. 1991);
Moore v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 972 F.2d 939, 945 (8th Cir. 1992).
81. The court discusses this bifurcated approach and hints that it is the law in the Third
Circuit but does not adopt or utilize the test in Whelan itself. Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental
Lab., 797 F.2d 1222, 1232 (3rd Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987) (describing the
test as set forth in Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468-69 (2d Cir. 1946)).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1232. See aLso Sid & Marty Kroft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp.,
562 F.2d 1157, 1164-65 (9th Cir. 1977) (discussing the extrinsic and intrinsic tests of substan-
tial similarity).
84. See Dawson v. Hinshaw Music Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 733 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
981 (1990).
85. See, e.g., id. at 732-33 (two part intrinsic/extrinsic test); Data E. USA, Inc. v. Epyx,
Inc., 862 F.2d 204, 208 (9th Cir. 1988) (two step test for substantial similarity in the Ninth
Circuit).
86. See Concrete Machinery Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d 600, 607 (1st
Cir. 1988) (applying second part of test from Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946));
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More recently, in Computer Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc.,
87
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit utilized a three part test
for substantial similarity, consisting of an abstraction, filtration, and com-
parison analysis.88 The first part usesJudge Hand's abstractions analysis. 89
After determining the various levels of abstractions, the trier of fact must
filter unprotectable material from the work. Standard techniques in the
public domain are excluded", as well as portions of the program neces-
sary because of structural9 ' or external factors.9 2 The court characterized
this filtration process as a method of defining the scope of copyright pro-
tection.93 This process ideally leaves a "core of protectable material."
94
The final step involves comparing this core of protectable expression in
the copyrighted work to the alleged copy for substantial similarities.
95
This test somewhat limits copyright protection because by protecting only
a core of expression, very little of the work may be left protected. The
court's rationale for such limitation, however, emphasized a desire to cre-
ate incentive for future program development and noted the ultimate aim
of copyright law in stimulating artistic creativity for the public good.96
This three part test has also been adopted by the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit since the decision in Computer Associates International.
97
In general, most of the circuit courts of appeal seem to be shifting away
from the test set forth in Whelan.98
5. Fair Use Exception
Even if a court finds substantial similarity under one of the above
tests, copyright law permits some degree of copying under statutory excep-
tions.99 One such exception is the traditional privilege of other authors
for "fair use" of the copyrighted work. 10 0 In Harper & Row Publishers v.
Evans Newton Inc. v. Chicago Systems Software, 793 F.2d 889, 895 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 949 (1986); Atari, Inc. v. North Amer. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 614
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982).
87. 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
88. Id. at 706-11.
89. Id. at 706-07. See also supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
90. Computer Assocs. Int'4 892 F.2d at 710.
91. Id. at 707-09.
92. Id. at 707-710.
93. Id. at 707.
94. Id. (citing 3 NIMMER, supra note 6, § 13.03(F)(5), at 13-72).
95. Id. at 710-11.
96. Id. at 711 (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp. v Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156
(1975) (Stewart, J.)).
97. See Autoskill Inc. v. National Educ. Support Sys., Inc., 994 F.2d 1476, 1490 (10th
Cir.), cert denied, 114 S.CL 307 (1993).
98. See Lee T. Gesmer, Decisions May Signify a Judicial Turnabout, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 19,
1993, at S2, S3 (indicating that Whelan is no longer followed in the Second, Fifth, Ninth and
Federal Circuits and predicting other circuits will follow Computer Associates InternationaL)
99. 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-120 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (limitations on exclusive rights).
100. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988). "[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by
reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for
purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for
classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright." 17 U.S.C.
§ 107 (1988). Factors which are considered in determining whether a use is fair include:
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Nation Enterprises,1 0' the Supreme Court held that a magazine's unauthor-
ized publishing of verbatim quotes from President Ford's memoirs was not
a fair use because it deprived the copyright owners of their valuable right
to first publication.' 0 2 The Court stated that when a publication is used
commercially for profit rather than for a nonprofit educational use, a
court will less likely find a fair use. 10 3 The issue of whether a use is fair,
however, requires a case-by-case analysis.' 0 4 In Sega Entrprises v. Accolade,
Inc.,10 5 the court did not allow reverse engineering of a computer pro-
gram, stating that such a use "for financial gain and ... aimed at the
creation of a competitive product" was not fair use of copyrighted
software. 10 6 This was an important issue which the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit would consider in Atari later the same year.
II. INSTANT CASE
A. Factual History
Nintendo sells the Nintendo Entertainment System (NES), a home
video game system. The system includes a monitor, a console, and con-
trols. To play a game, the user inserts a game cartridge into the console,
thereby creating images on the display.10 7 In order to prevent cartridges
other than Nintendo cartridges from working in the NES, Nintendo
designed a security system called the 1ONES. The console and authorized
game cartridges both contain microprograms, 10 8 which are chips
programmed with the 1ONES. The console contains a master chip which
acts as a lock to the NES. Authorized game cartridges contain a "slave
chip", which acts as a key to the system. When one inserts an authorized
cartridge into the NES, the slave chip "unlocks" the console, allowing the
1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a com-
mercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 2) the nature of the copy-
righted work; 3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a Whole; and 4) the effect of the use upon the potential market
for or value of the copyrighted work.
Id.
101. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
102. Id. at 569.
103. Id. at 562; see also 3 NiMMER, supra note 6, § 13.05(A)(1)(c), at 13-161 to 13-165.
104. H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5680.
105. 785 F. Supp. 1392 (N.D. Cal.), affid in part, rev'd in part by Sega Enters. v. Accolade,
Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
106. Id. at 1398. The district court cited legislative history indicating intermediate copy-
ing was not intended by Congress to be a fair use. Id. A month after the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit decided Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., 975 F.2d 832
(Fed. Cir. 1992), however, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the
district court's decision on appeal. In that case, Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510
(9th Cir. 1992), the court allowed reverse engineering as a fair use when "disassembly is the
only way to gain access to the ideas and functional elements embodied in a copyrighted
computer program and where there is a legitimate reason for seeking such access." Id. at
1527.
107. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., 975 F.2d 832, 835 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
108. Microprograms are copyrightable as long as the instructions are not completely
functional. Steinberg, supra note 22, at 62.
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user to play the game. An unauthorized game cartridge which sends no
unlocking message to the console will therefore not work in the NES. 1° 9
Beginning in 1986, Atari, one of Nintendo's competitors in the home
video game market, attempted to replicate the 10NES system."10 Atari en-
gineers unsuccessfully attempted to understand the 10NES program by
monitoring communication between the chips.1 11 They also analyzed the
chips by chemically peeling layers from NES chips and microscopically ex-
amining the object code.1 12 Having failed in these efforts, Atari became a
Nintendo licensee in 1987.113 Atari paid Nintendo to insert Atari's games
into 1ONES cartridges, allowing Atari to market its games to Nintendo con-
sole owners.'
1 4
Apparently dissatisfied with this arrangement, Atari attempted to deci-
pher the 1ONES code again. In early 1988, Atari's attorney lied to the
Copyright Office and wrongfully obtained a copy of the 1ONES pro-
gram.1 15 The attorney stated in his application to the Copyright Office
that Atari was a defendant in an infringement action and needed a copy
for that litigation.' 16 Upon obtaining the source code from the Copyright
Office, Atari engineers were able to correct errors in the transcription of
the object code from their microscopic analysis of peeled chips.' 7 In this
way, the wrongfully obtained copy from the Copyright Office permitted
Atari to replicate the 1ONES object code.
11 8
Atari then developed its own program called the Rabbit program,
which performed the same function as the 1ONES. Although the Rabbit
used a different microprocessor and was programmed in a different lan-
guage, the two programs generated functionally indistinguishable signals.
The Rabbit program therefore gave Atari access to Nintendo console own-
ers, in breach of its licensing agreement.' 1 9
In December 1988, Atari sued Nintendo for unfair competition, Sher-
man Act violations, and patent infringement.' 20 Then, in November
1989, Nintendo sued Atari for unfair competition, patent infringement,
copyright infringement, and trade secret violations. The United States
District Court for the Northern District of California consolidated the two
cases, preliminarily enjoining Atari from exploiting Nintendo's
program.'
2 1
109. Atar/, 975 F.2d at 836.




114. Atar/ 975 F.2d at 836.
115. Id.
116. The regulations of the Copyright Office permit reproduction of a copy if the Office
receives a written request from an attorney, on behalf of either the plaintiff or the defendant,
in connection with actual or prospective litigation involving the copyrighted work. 37 C.F.R.
§ 201.2(d)(2) (1992).
117. Atari, 975 F.2d at 836.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 836-37.
120. Id. at 837.
121. Id. at 835.
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B. Opinion of the Court
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit sustained
the preliminary injunction, enjoining Atari from marketing cartridges
containing the Rabbit program. The court concluded that Nintendo
demonstrated the 1ONES program contained at least some protected ex-
pression, 12 2 and that Atari made unauthorized verbatim copies from the
Copyright Office.12 3 In addition, the court ruled that Nintendo showed a
likelihood of success in proving that Atari infringed the 1ONES copyright
by copying the source code from the Copyright Office, and that the Rabbit
program was substantially similar to the 1ONES. 124 Finally, the court
found that Nintendo was likely to overcome Atari's assertion of the de-
fense of copyright misuse.
125
The court based its analysis on traditional requirements for infringe-
ment cases, applying law from the Ninth Circuit. Under this law,
Nintendo had to show 1) ownership of the 1ONES program, and 2) copy-
ing of protected expression, either by verbatim copying, or by Atari having
access to the copyrighted work, plus substantial similarity between the
works.
1 26
The first step required the court to identify the protected expression
in the lONES program. The court did this by usingJudge Hand's abstrac-
tions test 12 7 and the filtration component of Computer Associates Interna-
tionaL128 The court held that the IONES program contained protectable
expression, even though it involved the process of unlocking the sys-
tem. 12 9 Nintendo's use of arbitrary instructions arranged in a unique se-
quence to create an arbitrary data stream was found to be protected after
the filtration process. External factors did not dictate the design, and the
expression was not taken from the public domain.13 0 In addition, the ex-
pression of the data stream did not merge with the idea because alternate
expressions were available, as shown by expert testimony of different ways
to generate it.
131
Next, the court examined whether Atari had infringed by making ver-
batim copies from the source code from the Copyright Office.' 3 2 The
court concluded that the copies from the Copyright Office, which Atari
122. Id. at 840.
123. Id. at 841-42.
124. Id. at 847.
125. Id. Copyright misuse is a defense which "bars a culpable plaintiff from prevailing on
an action for infringement of the misused copyright." Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911
F.2d 970, 972 (4th Cir. 1990) (explaining copyright misuse defense as inherent in copyright
law).
126. Atari, 975 F.2d at 837-38.
127. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 84-94 and accompanying text.
129. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., 975 F.2d 832, 840 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
130. Id. at 840.
131. Id. In a later opinion, Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 1993 WL 214886
(N.D. Cal. 1993), the court emphasized that the data stream itself was not protected, only the
unique expression. Id. at *9.
132. Id. at 840.
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obtained in violation of its regulations,
133 were unauthorized copies.13 4
Since reproducing an unauthorized copy from the Copyright Office vio-
lates the Copyright Act, the court found that Nintendo was likely to show
infringement.
1 3 5
In dicta, the court said that reverse engineering by Atari to under-
stand the unprotected ideas in the 1ONES program was a fair use.13 6 The
court proceeded to say, however, that fair use does not extend to interme-
diate copying for commercial exploitation of protected expression.
13 7
Furthermore, the court stated that in order to invoke the fair use excep-
tion, the user of the copyrighted work must have an authorized copy.
1 38
Since Atari had an unauthorized copy of the program and used reverse
engineering beyond that necessary to understand the program, the court
refused to find Atari within the fair use exception.13 9 In doing so, the
court emphasized the importance of copyright in balancing authors' inter-
ests in controlling and exploiting their works, and society's interest in the
free flow of information and ideas. 14° According to the court, patent law
is the appropriate medium to protect one's ideas, and such protection
cannot be acquired by writing a program "in an unintelligible format and
asserting copyright infringement against those who try to understand" the
idea or process.
14 1
The court used the two step, extrinsic and intrinsic analysis for sub-
stantial similarity. 142 Stating that expert testimony is appropriate to dis-
cern similarities in the two programs, the court noted several unnecessary
instructions in the Rabbit program. This indicated strong evidence of
copying, rather than independent creation. 143 The court therefore found
the two programs substantially similar.
144
Finally, the court rejected Atari's copyright misuse defense. The
court drew a parallel to the patent misuse defense and acknowledged that
the copyright misuse defense would be appropriate under certain circum-
stances. 14 5 Atari, however, was not allowed to raise the equitable defense
of copyright misuse because it had "unclean hands" as a result of its attor-
ney lying to the Copyright Office.
146
133. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
134. Atari, 975 F.2d at 841.
135. Id. at 842.
136. Id. at 843-44.
137. Id. at 843-44.
138. Id. at 843.
139. Id. at 844.
140. Id. at 842 (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429-
30 (1984)).
141. Atar, 975 F.2d at 842.
142. Id. at 844.
143. Id. at 845.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 846.
146. Id.
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III. ANALYSIS
A. Reverse Engineering
One of the most significant aspects in the Atari opinion is the dicta
regarding reverse engineering. The statement that reverse engineering is
a fair use to the extent it is necessary to understand a program 14 7 could
have a significant effect on the computer industry. Although courts have
previously refused to allow reverse engineering as a fair use, 148 the court
in Atari expressly allowed reverse engineering to discern the unprotected
ideas of a work.1 49 The court restricted this use somewhat, requiring the
use be of an authorized copy and that it not be used to profit through
commercial exploitation. 150 Although allowing reverse engineering nar-
rows the scope of copyright protection for computer software, the court's
rationale is logical, and the decision corresponds with the purposes of
copyrights as articulated in the U.S. Constitution.
The purpose of copyright law, as stated in the U.S. Constitution, is to
promote science and encourage innovation and creativity. 151 Ideally, the
extent of protection for computer software involves a balance of public
and private interests. 152 Since computer programs are often highly utilita-
rian works, they may require less protection to promote the progress of
technological advances in the public interest. Because technological de-
velopment involves sequential improvements on existing knowledge,
scientists and entrepreneurs often fear that business and legal constraints
will slow the progress that comes from shared learning. l5 3 The computer
industry, however, is a highly profitable business,' 5 4 and economic inter-
ests of software developers are important as well.
For software developers, the cost of creating programs is high com-
pared to the cost of producing copies of existing programs. 155 Develop-
147. Id. at 843.
148. Id. at 844; see also Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 1392, 1398 (N.D.
Cal. 1992). In Sega, the court argued against allowing reverse engineering as a fair use, since
"[a] competitor who reverse engineers a copyrighted computer program... [does so with the
sole purpose of inducing] the public to purchase his work rather than the original thereby
eliminating the market for the original." Id. Chemical peeling of microchips or program-
ming in a clean room, however, was said to be acceptable as a fair use. Id. at 1399.
149. "Atari did not violate Nintendo's copyright by deprocessing computer chips in
Atari's rightful possession. Atari could lawfully deprocess Nintendo's 10NES chips to learn
their unprotected ideas and processes." Aar, 975 F.2d at 844.
150. Id. at 843.
151. U.S. CoNsr., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See also CSTB, supra note 3, at 17. Copyright law has
two goals: 1) to encourage disclosure of intellectual ideas to the public, and 2) to protect
intellectual property capable of reproduction. Note, Copyright Protection of Computer Program
Object Code 96 HAtv. L. REv. 1723, 1739 (1983).
152. Balancing of public and private interests involves a need to protect innovation and a
need to share ideas in order to encourage compatibility of computer systems. CSTB, supra
note 3, at 17. Protection which is too liberal results in monopolies and inhibits creativity.
Protection which is too conservative also discourages innovation because creative efforts are
easily copied. Menell, supra note 18, at 1047-48.
153. CSTB, supra note 3, at ix.
154. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
155. Both magnetic and hardcopy (on paper) forms of programs can be easily dupli-
cated. CIAPEs, supra note 12, at 23. Like most forms of intellectual property, developing
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ers, therefore, need some degree of protection to avoid a "free rider"
problem,' 5 6 where competitors use reverse engineering or copying to
avoid development costs. Nevertheless, the benefits of protection must
outweigh the costs. Over-broad protection may cause a risk of monopo-
lies, transaction costs from licensing, copyright and patent agreements,
and costs of litigating infringement claims. 157 In addition, society pays a
price when protection is too broad, since progress may be inhibited as a
result of developers having to waste time and resources on research and
development which has already been done by other companies.
1 58
Software developers, however, derive benefits from copyright protection,
since it allows them to freely market their innovative ideas without fear of
others profiting from their efforts. In this way, copyright protection en-
courages innovation. Determining what is too much or too little protec-
tion is therefore difficult, but the bottom line is that the costs to society
clearly outweigh the economic benefits companies receive when protec-
tion becomes too broad.
Allowing software programmers to reverse engineer another's work in
order to understand the technology of the ideas and processes does not
allow them a "free ride." Rather, a company must spend a significant
amount of time and resources to decompile a program, as Atari's exten-
sive reverse engineering efforts and difficulty in deciphering Nintendo's
code illustrates. 159 Although allowing reverse engineering as a fair use
may encourage development of more "security systems" like the lONES as
developers attempt to protect their programs, this is not necessarily a neg-
ative effect. On the contrary, it may foster new and creative methods of
programming and decompiling code. In addition, reverse engineering
encourages innovation by allowing programmers to understand previous
work and build upon it. As the court in Atari states, "[w]here the infringe-
ment is small in relation to the new work created, the fair user is profiting
largely from his own creative efforts rather than free-riding on another's
work."'1
60
An important limitation on reverse engineering is that it not be used
"to exploit commercially or otherwise misappropriate protected expres-
computer programs involves most expenditure of resources in the development stage (de-
sign and implementation). "Reproducing it is trivial. Building it... is the hard part." CSTB,
supra note 3, at 44 (quoting Randall Davis). See aLso Aufrichtig, supra note 10, at 342 (cost of
developing programs is great); Note, Copyright Protection of Computer Program Object Code, 96
HitAv. L. Rav. 1723 (1983) (copying is easy and inexpensive).
156. Closely related to the free rider problem is the "public goods" problem, which is
inherent in markets for intellectual property. The problem stems from the difficulty in ex-
cluding anyone from using the work who did not pay for it, and from nonrivalrous competi-
tion-additional consumers do not deplete the quantity available to others. A means to
correct this problem is to provide limited protection to works containing original expression.
This increases the reward to those engaged in intellectual work, and therefore encourages
inventive activity. Menell, supra note 18, at 1059.
157. Id. at 1065.
158. See id. at 1083.
159. Atari Games Corp. v Nintendo of Am. Inc., 1991 WL 57304, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
160. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., 975 F.2d 832, 843 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (quoting
New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Pub. Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 307 n. 6 (9th Cir. 1992)).
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sion." 16 1 A problem with the rationale of this argument is that any com-
pany using reverse engineering to understand a work is probably involved
in ultimately creating their own product for financial gain. The court in
Sega has addressed this issue since Atari however, it stated that an analysis
considering only production of a competing product is too simple.'
62
Rather, the court "must consider other aspects of 'the purpose and charac-
ter of the use' as well."163 Sega indicates that other factors which increase
the likelihood of a court finding a fair use include: a direct purpose of
simply studying the functional requirements of a program; a public bene-
fit derived from the use, such as increased compatibility' 64 or increased
amount of creative programs available to the public; and a purpose of
competing in the market by developing programs compatible with other
systems. 165 These are significant qualifications which help justify allowing
reverse engineering.
B. Protectable Expression and Substantial Similarity
In ascertaining protected expression and substantial similarity, the
court in Atari logically applied traditional standards. Although these stan-
dards continue to be ambiguous, the court provided some helpful guide-
lines. The court adopted the tests used in the Ninth Circuit for both
issues, along with some aspects of the test used in the Second Circuit for
substantial similanty. 66 Among the factors the court used to separate the
idea from the expression are similarities beyond that necessary for the
function of the program, 16 7 or common errors in the program that indi-
cate copying.168 Furthermore, in discerning protected expression, the
court also combined aspects ofJudge Hand's abstractions analysis and the
filtration analysis used in the Second Circuit to provide a method for dis-
tinguishing protected aspects of a program. 169 For instance, the court
granted protection to a unique and creative sequence of code instructions
which Nintendo created independently. 170 In addition, because no exter-
nal factors dictated code instructions to make the sequence necessary to
the function of the program, the court granted copyright protection.
17 1
The court also considered programs not in the public domain as copy-
rightable, 172 as well as a particular expression of an idea, where alternate
161. Id. at 844.
162. Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1522 (9th Cir. 1992).
163. Id.
164. Compatibility in computer systems is considered by many to be an important goal in
the software industry. Others assert, however, that the argument for compatibility is a "guise
for abetting widespread copying of successful products." CSTB, supra note 3, at 73.
165. Sga, 977 F.2d at 1522-23. In addition, Sega emphasizes that where several ways of
expressing an idea exist, the creative expression will be protected, as in Atari Where the
expression is purely functional of the idea, however, it will not be protected. Id. at 1524 n.7.
166. Atar, 975 F.2d at 845.
167. Id.
168. Id. (citing M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 446 (4th Cir. 1986)).
169. Atari, 975 F.2d at 839.
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expressions of the idea or process are available. 7  These ideas are tradi-
tional in the development of copyright law. 174 In general, the Atari opin-
ion indicates a shift in the analysis of copyright protection from that of
Whelan' 7 5 to that of Computer Associates International17 6 This analysis pro-
vides less protection, but it may be the most appropriate for computer
programs.
C. Implications for the Software Business
Due to this narrowing of protection for computer programs, one con-
sequence of Atari may be that software developers will continue to attempt
to protect their products with methods other than copyright. Other possi-
ble methods are patent, trade secret, misappropriation, and trademark
law. 177 Although CONTU thought copyright the best medium, 178 consid-
ering the utilitarian characteristics of most computer programs, patent law
may be more appropriate today. 179 Due to rapid technological advances
in the industry, however, patent protection is not viable for most pro-
grams.'8 0 Patent law requires a novel, non-obvious innovation, compared
to the less stringent originality requirement of copyright law, and the pro-
cess for obtaining a patent is much more costly and time consuming than
for a copyright. 8 1 Obtaining a patent also requires disclosure of the in-
vention to the patent office, which may destroy availability of trade secret
protection.
82
Although patent law is therefore not the solution for most businesses,
several other options exist to protect software, including trade secret, mis-
appropriation, and trademark law. Trade secret law requires that the in-
formation be novel and valuable in the trade or business, and that it be
secret.' 8 3 Most firms utilize this type of protection with license agree-
ments.1 84 One drawback with this option is that a licensee can reverse en-
gineer and reassemble software to a form bearing little resemblance to the
original, which defeats trade secret protection.' 8 5 Another option is mis-
appropriation, a branch of unfair competition.' 8 6 Finally, trademark pro-
173. Id.
174. See supra notes 50-73 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 84-95 and accompanying text.
177. Menell, supra note 18, at 1077.
178. See CONTU Report, supra note 37, at 17.
179. Copyright law is necessarily limited for computer programs because they are utilita-
rian works. See Englund, supra note 23, at 893.
180. Over 90% of computer programs probably fail to meet the non-obvious require-
ment, and are therefore not patentable. 1 DAVID BENDER, COMP=UrR LAw § 3A.02[1] (1993).
181. McCabe & Tanenbaum, supra note 7, at 4. Patents take several years to obtain, and
most computer programs become obsolete before protection is available. Note, supra note
152, at 1743 and notes 149-153. Owners of copyrights are protected for the life of the author
plus 50 years, or 75 years from publication for works created for hire. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a), (c)
(1978). In contrast, patents only protect a work for 17 years. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988).
182. Menell, supra note 18, at 1076.
183. Id. at 1077.
184. CSTB, supra note 3, at 29.
185. Id. at 30.
186. Misappropriation protects collected information. Menell, supra note 18, at 1078.
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tection may help the developer by protecting the reputation one gains
from introducing a product first.187 Such reputation is potentially valua-
ble, depending on how quickly competitors can reverse engineer and cre-
ate a similar program.
Although all the options for protection have both advantages and dis-
advantages, Atari will probably force software companies to move away
from copyright as a sole means of protection. Due to the lack of availabil-
ity of patents for most software programs and the minimal protection pro-
vided by other options, however, allowing reverse engineering as a fair use
creates a problem for software developers who wish to protect their work.
The court reasonably applied copyright law in Atar/, but the decision fails
to solve the problem of protecting computer software in a way which bal-
ances all interests. Neither copyright law nor patent law ideally suits the
unique characteristics of computer programs as artistic works and utilita-
rian processes.' 8 8 Ultimately, software developers simply need a clearer
picture of the law to provide a better solution to protect their valuable
creative efforts.
CONCLUSION
After Atari, software companies do not necessarily have a clear picture
of copyright law as it applies to their programs. The U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit continued the tradition of applying vague stan-
dards in determining protected expression for computer programs. This
area of the law, however, may necessarily remain ambiguous due to the
unique nature of computer software and intellectual property in gen-
eral.' 8 9 More significantly, the Atari decision narrowed copyright protec-
tion available for computer programs1 90 by stating in dicta that reverse
engineering is a fair use to understand the ideas and processes of a pro-
gram. 19 1 In this way, the court has allowed software developers to cut costs
significantly in developing programs to compete with existing pro-
grams. 192 In attempting to balance the interests of society and those of
entrepreneurs and software developers, the court has given developers lit-
tle option but to seek other areas of the law to protect their work. Patent
law is available to protect useful, novel, and non-obvious ideas, but the
time and cost of obtaining patent protection make it an inviable option for
most software developers.193 Thus, while the Atari decision may have pro-
moted the purpose of copyright in allowing the free flow of ideas, allowing
187. Trademark law protects marks used by manufacturers to aid consumers in avoiding
confusion. Id. at 1078, 1081.
188. "Old doctrines and principles are being stretched to unprecedented dimensions to
accommodate developing software copyright issues." David Goldberg & RobertJ. Bernstein,
Confrontation With the Computer Age, N.Y. LAwJ., Sept. 17, 1993 at 3, 29.
189. See supra notes 50-59 and accompanying text.
190. See Ellis, supra note 7, at 79.
191. The idea that reverse engineering, or disassembly, is a fair use as a matter of law was
expressly upheld in Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1514 (9th Cir. 1992).
192. See CSTB, supra note 3, at 78.
193. See supra notes 180-83 and accompanying text.
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reverse engineering may have created a problem for computer program
developers in protecting their valuable innovations.
Susan E. Dallas

